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Abstract 
In East Asia, services trade integration, both in market and policy, lags far behind goods trade 
integration. In spite of a proliferation of ASEAN plus one type FTAs in the Region since the early 
2000s, policy-led services integration has not happened in East Asia. The aim of this research 
project is to investigate the reasons why the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs, which were concluded 
in the 2000s, resulted in the shallow GATS-plus FTAs. Since barriers in services trade lie in 
domestic regulations, we examine how domestic determinants, namely interests and institutions in 
domestic decision-making, shaped the negotiating positions of Japan and ASEAN. 
From our empirical work, we found the following: (i) The services trade policy-making structure, 
which involves a wide participation of domestic regulatory authorities in the decision-making 
process, constituted horizontal fragmentation of power. Because of horizontal fragmentation of 
power, the domestic regulatory authorities with strong regulatory autonomy and regulatory 
concerns were able to exercise a veto power against changes in the status-quo and pushed 
backward the lead ministry’s negotiating positions. (ii) In terms of interests, no strong pro-
liberalisation interests existed either on the policy demand or supply sides. On the policy demand 
side, while there existed very limited exporting interests, the import-competing services suppliers 
were afraid of the erosion of rents and adjustment costs caused by preferential market liberalisation. 
On the policy supply side, there was few incentives to lock in domestic services reforms by using 
the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. In addition, (a) pressure for speedy conclusion of an FTA to win 
the political competition of creating FTAs in the Region and (b) the strong economic and political 
motivation of FTAs to enhance regional supply chains in the manufacturing sector undermined the 
countries’ negotiating positions on services trade. 
From the findings above, we conclude that services trade integration in East Asia lags far behind 
goods trade because of the double layered political economy impediments. The first layer of 
impediment, which is the horizontally fragmented domestic decision-making structure, reflects the 
heterogeneity of services. The second layer of impediment, which is interests, mostly reflects the 
distinctive characteristics of East Asia. 
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                     Chapter 1: Research Design 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This research project is about the political economy of services trade integration in East Asia. It 
examines how the domestic political economy factors in decision-making shaped the outcomes of 
the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. This introductory chapter explains the research 
design of the project. We first explain background of research. Then we present the research 
questions, which drive this project, followed by hypotheses. After that, we review the existing 
scholarly literature and present the analytical framework. We also explain the methodology applied 
to this research project. Lastly, we summarise findings of this project. 
  
1.2 Background of research -Introduction to the topic 
For the purpose of this research project, the geographic coverage of East Asia is Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus three, which includes the ASEAN Member countries 
(Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam), plus China, Japan and South 
Korea. Services trade integration in East Asia under this project is defined as a part of ‘economic 
regionalism’1 which takes place as a result of (i) state-led economic cooperation projects through 
FTAs and (ii) market-led regionalisation such as intensifying international trade and investment in 
the Region.2  
A new wave of East Asian economic regionalism, which took the form of FTAs, emerged after the 
1997-98 Asian financial crisis. To date, the number of existing FTAs in the Region, either bilateral 
agreements or ‘ASEAN plus one’ agreements, has reached 15. And five FTAs are currently under 
negotiation.3 Among the currently negotiated FTAs, there is a strong political motive to integrate 
                                                          
1 See definition of ‘economic regionalism’ by Dent (2006), p83. 
2 See Chapter 3: 3.2 
3 See Table 3-3. 
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economies by creating a consolidated ASEAN plus six type of FTA (RCEP: Regional Cooperative 
Economic Partnership). 4  
A proliferation of FTAs in East Asia and the way they evolved caught the attention of social 
scientists. There exists a wealth of literature on East-Asian FTAs by economists and International 
Political Economy (IPE) scholars from the early 2000s. In the realm of economics, the ‘de-facto’ 
economic integration aspects of East Asia (e.g. Kawai and Wignaraja 2010; Kimura and Ando 
(2005); Kimura 2008; Ozeki 2008; and Urata 2002) were highlighted. The literature characterised 
the Asian regional integration as ‘de-facto’ economic integration promoted by market-led 
integration, of which is intraregional production networks and supply chains through foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by global multinational corporations (MNCs) in the manufacturing sectors. Then 
the literature argued that institution-led regional economic integration in East Asia would become 
a driving force to achieve deep economic integration. And FTAs can be considered as the means to 
enhance further market integration and institutional integration towards deep integration. 
What is missing from the contributions by economists is any analysis of services trade in spite of 
its growing economic importance in the region. For instance, services as a share of GDP of most of 
the East Asian countries account for more than half of GDP (e.g. Singapore: 75.0 %, Japan: 72.6 %, 
South Korea 59.4 %, The Philippines: 57.3 %, Thailand: 52.7 %, and Malaysia 51.2 %). Even the 
countries where outputs of the services sector have not yet reached a half of GDP (e.g. Cambodia, 
China, Indonesia and Viet Nam), the share of services has been rapidly increasing especially from 
the 2000s. The share of services in these countries accounts for more than 40 % of economy 
outputs. Albeit, services trade integration in East Asia lags far behind from goods trade integration 
both in terms of market and policy.5 Sally (2009) demonstrated the major shortfalls of ‘de-facto’ 
market-led integration in East Asia explained by economic literature. He explained the skewed 
nature of East Asian market integration that has been developed only in the processing trade of the 
manufacturing sector. He pointed out that agriculture, services and swathes of the manufacturing 
sector were highly fragmented mainly due to policy barriers. Yet there exists no economic 
scholarly work, which explains why services trade integration lags far behind goods trade 
integration in East Asia to the best of author’s knowledge. 
In the realm of IPE, the literature perceived that FTA activity is forming a new wave of East Asian 
regionalism (Dent 2005, 2006 and 2008).6 Since the East Asian countries shifted their pivots of 
international economic policy to plurilateralism/bilateralism in the late 1990s and joined a 
                                                          
4 ‘ASEAN plus six’ geographically covers a wider region beyond East Asia. In addition to ASEAN plus three, Australia 
and New Zealand from Asia-pacific and India from South Asia are included. RCEP is currently under negotiations and is 
aimed at concluding its negotiations in 2017. 
5 See Chapter 3. 
6 Dent (2008a) defines regionalism as the structures, processes and arrangements that are working towards greater 
coherence within a specific international region in terms of economic, political, security, socio-cultural and other kinds 
of linkages (Dent 2008, p7). 
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bandwagon of FTA activities, IPE scholar’s academic enthusiasm went mostly to attest (i) what 
the motivations behind FTA activity in East Asia are;7  (ii) how East Asian FTA activity is 
developing (e.g. a trade partner selection, bilateral or plurilateral) and likely to evolve in the future 
(e.g. convergence or divergence);8 and (iii) implications for the global trading system9. 
On the other hand, there exists only a handful of contributions on the political economic factors 
which shape the contents of the East Asian FTAs.10 What is more, most of the literature explained 
the political economy of conventional trade barriers (i.e. tariff concessions combined with the 
Rules of Origins issues). Despite the fact that negotiations of ‘beyond tariff’ issues (e.g. 
investment, competition, services trade, and intellectual property rights) are becoming more and 
more important as applied tariffs continue to fall in the region, analysis of ‘beyond tariff’ chapters 
and provisions are totally underdeveloped. It is only Dent (2007a, 2010a and 2010b) who provided 
a broad picture of the scope and nature of existing East Asian FTAs and analysed the political 
economy of ‘commercial regulation chapters and measures’.11 Nevertheless, the literature still has 
to be further developed in two respects. First, the analysis of Dent (2007a, 2010a and 2010b) did 
not touch upon political economy of services trade. Second, arguments on domestic factors are 
largely missing even though the literature explained that outcomes of an agreement are a result of 
two-level games of domestic-international negotiations (Dent 2007a). As long as the domestic 
political economy is concerned, it is Solis (2010) who associated the quality of FTAs with 
domestic factors (interests and institution), and examined the empirical evidence of Japan to 
demonstrate how these factors affected the outcome of the FTAs. However, Solis (2010) argued 
only the conventional political economy of trade in goods vis-a-vis trade in agriculture and 
dismissed the ‘commercial regulatory’ aspects of the FTAs. To date, no IPE scholarly work, which 
comprehensively analyses the domestic political economy factors and services trade integration, 
exists. 
Services trade integration lags far behind goods trade integration in East Asia. Namely from the 
policy-led perspective, East Asian FTAs concluded during the 2000s ended up all shallow-GATS-
plus.12 Therefore, this project tries to investigate the political economy reasons behind this. For this 
purpose, we illuminate interests and institutions in the domestic decision-making process, which 
formed the negotiating positions of a signatory country by providing an empirical study of Japan-
ASEAN bilateral FTAs.  
                                                          
7 For example, Dent (2003); Dent (2006); Ravenhill (2003); Ravenhill (2010); Sally (2007); Solis, Stallings and Katada 
(2009); Urata (2009); Manger (2005); and Manger (2014). 
8 For example, Dent (2006); Dent (2007a); Dent (2010); and Rajan (2005).  
9 For example, Ravenhill (2003); Dent (2010a) and Sally (2005). 
10 Sally (2006); Dent (2007a); Dent (2010a); Dent (2010b); Ravenhill (2008a); Solis (2010) and Solis (2013). 
11 ‘Commercial regulation’ is defined as the rules and standards that determine the regulatory framework in which the 
trade and investment related activities of firms take place (Dent 2010b, p51). 
12 See an overview of existing East Asian FTAs in Chapter 3. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
Services trade integration in East Asia is underdeveloped both in terms of market and policy 
(Chapter 3). In particular, we draw attention to the fact that, in spite of a proliferation of the 
ASEAN plus one type of FTAs (including the bilateral FTAs) in the Region from the beginning of 
the 2000s, policy-led services integration does not take place in East Asia.13  This leads to the 
central question of this thesis: why did the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs concluded in the 2000s 
result in the shallow GATS-plus FTAs in spite of increasing economic presence of services in each 
country? 
This main question leads to two auxiliary research questions: 
 (1) How did the domestic political economy determinants in the form of interests and domestic 
decision-making structures, affect the negotiating positions of Japan and ASEAN for the Japan-
ASEAN bilateral FTAs? 
(2) Do the domestic political economy determinants reflect the heterogeneity of services or the 
distinctive characteristics of East Asia? 
As for the first research question, this project highlights the political economy factors of the 
domestic decision-making. Why do the domestic factors matter for discussing the international 
political economy of services trade integration? There are two answers for this. The first is that the 
results of economic diplomacy are the aggregation of two negotiating stages: the domestic and 
international as demonstrated in two-level game approaches developed by Putnam (1988). The 
second reason is that it is not tariffs, but domestic regulations that function as protection measures, 
with or without a country’s intentions in the case of services trade and investment. In this regard, 
the dynamics of political economy can be seen at the domestic decision-making level given that 
services trade negotiations rely heavily on the extension to which countries are able to tackle 
domestic regulations (Hoekman, Mattoo, Sapir 2007 and Francois and Hoekman 2010). How the 
complex domestic structure and policy bargaining among stakeholders shape countries’ 
negotiating positions are the issue to be investigated. However, as yet there has not been any 
significant research of this in the context of services trade integration in East Asia.  
                                                          
13 Although this project is not the one to demonstrate a lack of market-led integration in terms of economy, in Chapter 2 
and 3, we describe some economic features. We see some the distinctive characteristics of East Asia which include (i) 
East Asia exhibits diverse levels of economic development and (ii) most East Asian countries are not internationally 
competitive in services (Chapter 3: 3.3). Also we see economic the heterogeneity of services trade such as a strong 
public character (Chapter 2: 2.3). These economic features are reflected in our arguments about interests provided in 
Chapter 5 and 6. 
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Relating to the second research question, which is to identify whether the reasons (domestic 
political economy determinants) reflect the heterogeneity of services or the distinctive 
characteristics of East Asia, we underline the fact that ‘services’ are very different from ‘goods’ in 
terms of the market, policy and political economy (Chapter 2). At the same time, the distinctive 
characteristics of East Asia can be observed from the services market and policy of the countries 
concerned (Chapter 3).  While the heterogeneous nature of services can apply to all regions and 
countries, the distinctive characteristics of East Asia are specific to the Region. Answers to this 
question would help a better understanding of the reasons for underdeveloped services trade 
integration in East Asia. 
  
1.4 Hypothesis  
We posit the political economy reasons for the shallow GATS-plus of the Japan-ASEAN bilateral 
FTAs as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 
The Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs concluded in the 2000s resulted in shallow GATS-plus FTAs 
because of political economy impediments in domestic decision-making: (i) limited pro-
liberal interests, versus strong anti-liberal interests, both on the policy demand and supply 
sides and (ii) policy supply side constraints characterised as a horizontal fragmentation of 
power in combination with domestic regulatory authorities’ veto power against policy 
changes to the status-quo. 
 
Interests 
On the policy demand side (the private sector), generally there are few or weaker export interests 
in comparison with manufacturing since services are more difficult to trade (François and 
Hoekman 2010, p678). In addition, the services sector in East Asia was not globally competitive in 
the 2000s and the export oriented services sector was limited in most East Asian countries with the 
exception of Singapore. Hence, lobbying by the private sector to promote market liberalisation of 
the FTA partner was generally weak except for some specific modes (e.g. Mode 3: investment for 
Japan and Mode 4: movement of natural persons for ASEAN). On the other hand, the standard 
political economy factors (Hoekman, Mattoo, and Sapir 2007) prevails on the anti-liberal side. 
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Incumbents tried to protect their domestic market as they were afraid of the erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs caused by the preferential market liberalisation. On the policy supply side 
(Government), there existed little or no motivations to lock in the country to domestic services 
reforms using the FTAs because of the difficulty of using services trade agreements, either 
multilateral or plurilateral, as domestic policy reform anchors (Francois and Hoekman (2010)). In 
the case of East Asia, countries unilaterally liberalise services in accordance with their economic 
agenda. In addition, enhancing regional supply chains in the manufacturing sector (ADB 2008; 
Kimura 2006a; Kimura 2008; and Urata 2002) was set as the top negotiating-agenda. This 
undermined the lead negotiators’ expectation to achieve a high-quality services trade agreement. 
Also, the speedy conclusion of an agreement was more important than achieving a high-quality 
services agreement since each government was afraid of being left out of political competition of 
creating FTAs in the Region. Thus, services trade negotiators could not spend sufficient time for 
sectoral negotiations. 
 
Institutions (supply side condition) 
According to Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir (2007, p368), services are different from goods because 
of the acuteness of regulatory concerns that cloud the standard domestic economic calculus of the 
gains from liberalization. These regulatory concerns in combination with the usual political-
economy forces (e.g. adjustment costs and resistance by incumbents to erosion of rents) have 
frustrated multilateral services negotiations because it is providing hard to design international 
rules and commitments that sift protectionist from legitimate policies. In this regard, we assume 
that the fundamental problem of regulatory concerns would be reflected in the domestic decision-
making structure for FTA services trade negotiations. 
Since services trade negotiation covers a wide range of sectors, most of the domestic regulatory 
authorities get involved in the policy making process (horizontal fragmentation of government), 
which will be explained as the heterogeneity of services in Chapter 2. The lead ministry,14 which 
generally tries to achieve a GATS-plus FTA, would face institutional difficulties in coordinating 
the different positions among domestic regulatory authorities. It would also suffer a lack of 
political power to compel these ministries to make concessions for negotiations with its FTA 
counterpart. Since the domestic regulatory authorities exercise regulatory power and do not want 
to lose their vested interests, they strongly prefer the status-quo. The domestic regulatory 
authorities act as veto players against a change in the status-quo through the decision-making 
                                                          
14 A ministry which represents a country (see Chapter 4: 4.2.1). 
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process. This horizontal fragmentation of the decision-making process yields limited concessions 
in terms of liberalisation offers. 
 
1.5 Literature Review 
To date, very limited IPE studies have attempted to explore the political economy of services trade. 
Since this research project is about the domestic political economy of FTA services trade 
negotiations in East Asia, we try to fill the gap between the current state of the art in the field of 
IPE scholarly work of East Asian FTAs in the following manner. We first review the FTA 
motivation arguments, since motivations for creating FTAs directly or indirectly influence a 
signatory country’s negotiating positions for FTA services trade negotiations. Next, we review the 
literature, which analyses the domestic political economy of FTA policy strategy-making. Last is 
an overview of the past IPE literature that includes FTA content evaluation and analysis of 
political economy factors, which affect outcomes. 
 
Explanations of motivations to negotiate FTAs 
There exists a wealth of IPE literature, which explains the East Asian new economic regionalism. 
Rationales behind proliferation of FTAs in the Region have been much debated in order to 
establish why there has been a rise of plurilateralism/bilateralism in East Asia from the late 1990s 
(Manger 2005; Manger 2014; Ravenhill 2010; Solis, Stallings and Katada 2009; Solis and Urata 
2007; and Terada 2009). Many IPE scholars underlined the political motivations and some 
emphasise the economic motivations. Relating to this, there is a debate over whether the main 
driving force behind the East Asian FTAs has been government (Aggarwal and Koo 2005; Bowles 
2002; and Ravenhill 2010) or the private sector (Katzenstein 2006; Manger 2014; Munakata 2006; 
Postigo 2016; Solis 2010; and Solis 2013). In reality, it cannot be shown that either of them plays a 
role alone. However, my interest does not lie there. Rather, my interest is to know how general 
incentives of starting the FTA activity affect an FTA signatory country’s negotiating positions for 
the services trade agreement once an FTA negotiation takes place. Keeping this in mind, we 
review how the existing IPE literature explained the general motivations behind East Asian FTAs. 
 
A. Political motivations 
The past literature which explained the political motivations of the East Asian FTAs includes: 
strengthening diplomatic relations (Dent 2006; Dent 2010a; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003; 
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Ravenhill 2003; Sally 2006; Webber 2001; and Yoshimatsu 2008); FTA catch-up incentives (Dent 
2010; Ravenhill 2003; and Ravenhill 2010); competitive regionalism (Dent 2010; Katada, Solis 
and Stallings 2009; Ravenhill 2003; Ravenhill 2010; and Terada 2009;); and locking-in domestic 
reforms (Dent 2003; and Solis and Urata 2007). 
 
Diplomatic incentives 
A generic explanation in the IPE literature is that strong diplomatic incentives to strengthen 
political alliances as well as economic relations with key economic partners became a driving 
force behind East Asian plurilateralism (Dent 2006; Dent 2010a; and Sally 2006). There were 
some international systemic factors which became the impetus of changing the government’s 
economic diplomacy towards plurilateralism. Firstly, the Asian financial crisis 1997-98 triggered 
regionalism since the crisis made East Asian countries realise the intensified economic 
interdependence in the Region and a lack of institutional interstate cooperative mechanisms (Dent 
2010a; Sally 2006; and Yoshimatsu 2008). In addition to the Asian financial crisis 1997-98, a 
series of institutional failures further pushed East Asian countries towards plurilateralism (Dent 
2003). Amongst these, the catastrophe of the WTO Seattle Ministerial 1999 and the deadlock of 
the WTO Doha Development Agenda shifted governments’ strategic diplomacy from 
multilateralism to plurilateralism (Dent 2003; Dent 2010a and Sally 2006). Furthermore, some 
literature underlined the weakness of APEC and AFTA that was exposed after the Asian financial 
crisis (Ravenhill 2002; Sally 2006; and Webber 2001). Originally, frustration with APEC was 
mounting among the member countries. For developed countries, they became unsatisfied with 
APEC as a forum to promote market liberalisation and rule-making. For developing countries, the 
political pressure of market liberalisation and rule-making from developed countries was too 
demanding. On top of that, the Asian financial crisis disappointed APEC supporting countries 
since the forum failed to take collective regional actions to overcome the crisis. For the ASEAN 
countries, extending membership to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar ironically limited the level of 
economic integration such as tariff-cutting obligation under AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area). 
Accordingly, pro-liberal countries such as Singapore and Thailand were motivated to promote 
FTAs with non-ASEAN members. 
 
From FTA catch-up incentives to competitive bilateralism 
There was also a fear of being left–behind in FTA activities at the global level in Japan, Singapore, 
South Korea and Thailand (Dent 2010 and Sally 2006). FTA catch-up incentives were triggered by 
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a series of institutional failures including the declining WTO system. Once some East Asian 
countries such as Singapore, Thailand and Japan launched their bilateralism, political competition 
in creating FTAs, or competitive bilateralism in other words, took place in East Asia (Dent 2010; 
Terada 2009; Solis, Stallings and Katada 2009; Ravenhill 2003; and Ravenhill 2010). Competitive 
bilateralism encompasses not only economic rivalry but also international political rivalry arising 
from security and the race to shape international trade rules (Solis, Stallings and Katada 2009). For 
instance, after Singapore strategically shifted to bilateralism and started negotiating FTAs with the 
US and Japan in the early 2000s, competitive pressures amounted in other ASEAN countries. For 
China and Japan, there has been political rivalry in developing their FTA network in East Asia. 
Competitive bilateralism could well explain the diffusion dynamics of proliferation of bilateral 
FTAs and FTA policy strategy including partner selection and the timing of negotiations in East 
Asia during the 2000s.  
 
Few incentives to lock in domestic reforms 
Locking in domestic reforms is cited as an important element of FTA motives in general (Ethier 
1998). However, there is a doubt about its application to FTAs in East Asia.  In East Asian FTAs, 
governments were motivated to lock in domestic reforms by FTAs and rhetorically attempted to do 
it, yet no substantial evidence of reforms in the actual reality were observed (Dent 2003). In the 
case of Japan, pro-reform minded policy makers were motivated to use FTAs to tackle structural 
reforms in the areas of agriculture, fishery, and some services (e.g. the medical and educational 
sectors) to stimulate the Japanese economy (Solis and Urata 2007). Solis and Urata concluded that 
the motives were undermined by domestic politics in the policy-making process including (i) 
opposition from vested interests and politicisation of policy-making; (ii) bureaucratic sectionalism; 
and (iii) weak executive leadership (Solis and Urata 2007, p227).  
 
B. Economic motivations 
The current explanation of economic motivations of East Asian FTAs can be broadly categorised 
into defensive economic interests (Manger 2005; and Manger 2014); strengthening regional 
production and distribution networks (Solis and Urata 2007; Urata 2009; Dent 2008; and Manger 
2014); boosting trade and FDI (Hicks and Kim 2012 and Manger 2014); and concerns about the 
rise of China and India (Yoshimatsu 1999; Yoshimatsu 2008; and Ravenhill 2008b).  
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Defensive economic interests  
The domino theory of Baldwin (1993) explains that exporters of non-FTA signatory countries are 
motivated to ensure an equal footing for business opportunities with the existing FTA signatory 
countries in order to recoup trade diversion caused by the existing FTA. The economic interests of 
exporters lead governments to join the existing FTA. This enlargement further causes the second 
round effects of enlargement of the block. In this way, the FTA spreads like a domino. In the case 
of East Asia, application of domino theory has not yet been confirmed due to a lack of empirical 
evidence of trade distortion (Manger 2014, p155).  At the time of Japan-Mexico FTA, Japan had a 
strong motivation to countervail the discriminatory effects of NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement). However, when it comes to the Japan’s bilateral FTAs with ASEAN, defensive 
economic interests are not observed (Manger 2005, p822).  
 
Strengthening regional production and distribution networks 
Rather, Japan’s FTAs policy strategy for East Asia was driven by a pro-active economic motive 
(Solis and Urata 2007, p231). Japan’s core economic motivation for East Asian FTAs lay in 
strengthening regional production and distribution networks in East Asia (Solis and Urata 2007; 
and Urata 2009). Since the 1990s, vertical economic integration, particularly in machinery 
industries, was accelerated through FDI in East Asia (Fukao, Ishido, and Ito 2003) and developed 
regional production and distribution networks that entailed cross-border production sharing and 
fragmentation, disintegration of production activities, and the formation of industrial 
agglomeration in the Region (Kimura 2006a, p326). The Japanese business sector lobbied 
government to strengthen its intra-industry trade and FDI in Asia (Manger 2014).  
 
Attracting more FDI and boosting trade 
From the developing countries’ perspective, there was an economic motive to attract more FDI and 
boost trade. FTAs were considered as a policy device to establish export platforms through FDI 
and gain access to big markets (Ethier 1998). FTAs also worked as a signal of strong commitments 
towards trade liberalisation (Hicks and Kim 2012). Especially for ASEAN, attracting FDI was a 
core economic motive of FTA policy strategy when they negotiate an FTA with developed 
countries (Manger 2005, p809). By showing assurance of commitments to investors, ASEAN 
expected to receive more FDI from Japan and South Korea. As for the FTA with China, economies 
of scale were a great economic advantage for ASEAN countries to boost trade. For China, 
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ensuring secure access to raw materials was a strong economic incentive for the China-ASEAN 
FTA (Ravenhill 2008a, p136). 
 
Concerns about the rise of China and India 
Lastly, the rapid economic growth of China and India, and a decline of relative economic 
advantage in world economy as a consequence, also motivated ASEAN to promote plurilateralism, 
in particular, ASEAN market integration (Yoshimatsu 2008; Ravenhill 2006; and Ravenhill 
2008b). For example, China was a threat for the ASEAN countries since FDI into China has been 
rising and became a major FDI destination at the global level.15 ASEAN anticipated that more FDI 
would be diverted towards China bypassing ASEAN. India was increasing its economic 
competitiveness in the business services sector and became an important destination of business 
process outsourcing from the late 1990s. 16  To respond to the challenge of two emerging 
neighbouring countries, ASEAN member countries agreed to establish a single market: the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which aims at a free flow of goods, services, investment, 
capital and skilled labour in 2003 (Ravenhill 2008b, p471). 
 
Summing up, there is an intense focus of IPE scholarly work on FTA motives of East Asia. Albeit, 
there is a scarcity of literature which debates how original motivations actually affected designing 
an agreement including the contents of rules and the level of liberalisation. More than a decade has 
passed since the East Asian countries started to accelerate their FTA activity. It is time to make 
one step further from the FTA motive debate. That is to analyse how motivations for creating an 
FTA influence the domestic decision-making process for thematic contents of the FTA. In this 
regard, this research project attempts to analyse how general motivations of creating an FTA 
affected a country’s negotiating positions for the services trade part of the FTA. 
The current explanation on FTA motives above leads to some questions relating to this research 
project. Firstly, did strong diplomatic motivations which arose from the international systemic 
factors influence thematic services negotiating positions of a signatory country once the actual 
FTA negotiations started? This is a notably important question for the ASEAN countries with the 
exception of Singapore. Because many South-East Asian countries had been promoting unilateral 
                                                          
15   China was globally ranked at the 12th of FDI recipients while Singapore was ranked at 18th and Thailand at 32nd in 
2007. See ‘FDI stock, by host region and economy 1980-2007’, UNCTAD, available at 
http://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiXtoHK5ePMAhUEAsAKHd
JlDLsQFggmMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Functad.org%2Fsections%2Fdite_dir%2Fdocs%2Fwir2008_instock_en.xls&u
sg=AFQjCNG7FfIfnpQ-DbnBiBJH72d52lyWjA&bvm=bv.122448493,d.ZGg 
16 Average growth of business services exports of India between 1995 and 2005 accounts for 25.4% (Hoekman and 
Mattoo 2008). 
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trade liberalisation until the Asian financial crisis 1997-98 took place, however, they shifted to 
trade-light FTA policy after the Asian financial crisis (Sally 2006). Secondly, did political 
competition of creating FTAs affect the FTA services trade negotiations? In fact, each government 
was under pressure of having too many bilateral FTA negotiations at the same time and a speedy 
conclusion to compete with neighbouring countries in the Region. Third, did political actors, either 
policy makers or the business sector have any motives for locking in domestic services reforms at 
the time of FTA negotiations? If so, how were the motives channelled through domestic politics? 
Fourth, did the economic motives for (i) strengthening regional production and distribution 
networks in East Asia and (ii) attracting more FDI and boosting trade, affect a country’s 
negotiating positions for services trade? These are the issues to be investigated in our empirical 
case study (Chapter 5 and 6).  
 
Explanations of domestic political economy factors and East Asian FTA policy strategy 
There exists some IPE literature on the domestic politics of East Asian FTAs which explain how 
domestic political economy factors influence a country’s FTA policy strategy. Yet no previous IPE 
scholarly work has accounted for domestic political economy in the decision-making process and 
its effects on thematic content of an FTA, including services in detail, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge. 
From a theoretical point of view, Aggawal and Lee (2011), who illuminated domestic political 
economy factors in shaping FTA policy strategy (e.g. number of agreements; sequencing; actors; 
geography; size of partners; and nature and scope) of the Asia-Pacific, can be considered as the 
basis of arguments. They posited that external shocks drive a change from the existing trade 
strategy in the first place, and ‘new trade strategy’ (FTA policy strategy) is shaped through the 
domestic policy-making process. Then they introduced a framework to analyse interactions 
between three key determinant factors in the domestic policy-making process: ideas, interests and 
domestic institutions as explanatory variables affecting outcomes of an FTA policy strategy. 
According to them, interactions between the three domestic factors through the policy-making 
process determine a country’s FTA policy strategy in Asia-Pacific. 
The work of some IPE scholars provide empirical studies of the impacts of domestic interests and 
institutions on FTA policy strategy in East Asia (Jiang 2010; Mulgan 2008; Sally 2007; Solis 
2010; Solis 2013; and Yoshimatsu 2010). In terms of interests, the main argument in the existing 
literature is protectionist forces versus liberal forces. In the case of China, Japan, and South Korea, 
liberal forces of manufacturing versus protectionist forces of agriculture has been stylised as major 
domestic interests which affected FTA policy strategy (Mulgan 2008; Solis 2010; and Yoshimatsu 
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2010). As for institutions, a top-down style of domestic political institutions in the case of 
Thailand (Sally 2007) and China (Yoshimatsu 2010); a lack of hierarchy and a weak political 
power of the legislative branch vs. the executive branch in Japan (Manger 2008; and Solis 2010); 
fragmentation of bureaucracy in China (Jiang 2010); and the existence of many veto players in 
Japan (Yoshimatsu 2010) were investigated. Among these studies, the following three works are in 
particular noteworthy in relation with this research project. 
First, Jiang (2010)17 captured more than a conventional domestic conflict between anti-liberal 
agriculture and pro-liberal manufacturers. China’s policy-making process for an FTA with 
developed countries such as Australia are getting complicated since more concessions which 
would threat import-competing industries are required. On the policy demand side, there is a 
conflict between anti-liberal forces of agricultural producers as well as strong resistance of State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the services sector to protect monopoly rents, versus the pro-liberal 
forces of labour-intensive manufacturing industries. This indicates that once a developing country 
starts negotiation with a developed country with a comparative advantage in services, potential 
anti-liberal forces in the services sector wake up. Also, the finding about institutions needs 
attention. In contrast with the existing literature, which considered China as a strategic unitary 
actor, 18   China’s FTA policy-making faces a coordination problem in the bureaucracy. The 
Ministry of Commerce, which is a lead ministry of FTA policy-making, is pro-liberal without 
authorisation power. Thus, it can hardly overcome protectionist forces arising from every part of 
bureaucracy both at the national and provincial levels.  
Second, a study by Mulgan (2008) showed the importance of policy-making institutions in 
pursuing FTA market liberalisation by applying the supply and demand side analysis. The study 
asserted that Japan’s FTA activity caused demand and supply side dynamics of domestic interests 
towards agricultural liberalisation as predicted by public choice theory. On the demand side, FTA 
lobbying by the business sector became intensified against agriculture protection. On the supply 
side, the FTA activity has involved political-leaders who are more in favour of the wider economic 
and diplomatic state strategies. The changes of interests on the demand and supply sides would 
enable liberalisation of agriculture according to public choice theory. However, this did not happen 
in the case of Japan because of institutional obstacles in the policy-making process such as anti-
liberal sectoral sub-governments and a lack of top-down authority of the prime ministerial 
executive to pursue a pro-liberal agricultural policy. Mulgan’s empirical evidence of Japan’s FTA 
agricultural policy indicates that even the interests of both the demand and supply sides change 
                                                          
17 It examined how domestic preferences and decision-making institution influenced the China’s FTA policy-making and 
concluded that China is not a unitary actor in FTA policy-making. 
18 See Jiang (2010), pp 240-241. 
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towards pro-market liberals, no domestic reforms can be expected if a country cannot overcome 
obstacles in the domestic policy-making institutions. 
A study by Solis (2010)19 cultivated a new field of the literature on East Asian FTAs since it 
attempted to evaluate Japan’s FTA policy strategy in terms of partner selection, scope of an 
agreement and sectoral coverage, to demonstrate how domestic political determinants influenced 
the policy strategy. According to the literature, Japan has not achieved high-quality FTAs, which 
satisfy three conditions: selection of large trading partners, encompassing substantial market 
access concessions and WTO-plus sectoral coverage. The core argument of Solis (2010) explains 
how domestic political factors led Japan’s agriculture defensive FTA policy strategy. To 
demonstrate the defensiveness in agriculture, the study selected two independent domestic factors: 
preferences of domestic actors and political institutions. The finding is that (i) in terms of 
preferences of domestic actors, pro-liberalisation forces of business interests were too weak to 
mitigate rent-seeking interests of the agricultural sector and (ii) in terms of institutions, a lack of 
centralisation and hierarchy in the party bureaucracy decision-making process could not bring 
about pro-reform initiatives in agriculture. With regard to institutions, it investigated delegation 
and control problems between the executive and legislative branches by applying a principal-agent 
model. By doing so, the work could demonstrate the importance of institutional design as an 
instrument to channel domestic preferences. While the literature successfully showed how 
domestic preferences and political institutions shaped Japan’s agricultural defensive FTA policy 
strategy (i.e. partner selection and market access concession of agriculture products), it completely 
failed to capture pro-active domestic factors, and thus a wider scope of FTAs to encompass 
commercial regulatory chapters and provisions. Since Solis (2010)’s evaluation of commercial 
regulatory issues is technically too weak, it could not capture an evolution feature of commercial 
regulatory chapters and provisions as assessed by Dent (2010a and 2010b) for example. 
From the IPE empirical studies about the impacts of domestic political economy factors on East 
Asian FTA policy strategy explained above, we learned that attention was mainly given to the 
political economy of conventional merchandise trade but not to the political economy of 
commercial regulatory chapters including services trade. Nevertheless, the previous work implies 
some key issues which should be considered when we discuss the influence of domestic political 
economy factors on FTA services trade negotiations. First, empirical studies of the domestic 
political economy of East Asian FTAs demonstrate that not only domestic interests but also policy-
making institutions, which channel interests, are important determinants which affect a country’s 
FTA policy strategy. This suggests that not only interests but also institutions should be carefully 
examined to attest a country’s negotiating position-making in services. Second, to capture the 
                                                          
19 It should be noted that country coverage of Solis (2010) is not FTAs in East Asia but FTAs which Japan has concluded 
so far. Technical weakness in the evaluation of the existing FTAs is also observed. 
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dynamics of domestic interests, both policy supply side and policy demand side should be 
examined. Third is about institutions. The literature suggests that there must be certain institutional 
problems in the domestic decision-making for services such as a coordination problem in the 
bureaucracy (Jiang 2010), anti-liberal sectoral sub-governments (Mulgan 2008) and delegation and 
control problems between the executive and legislative branches (Solis 2010). We can develop the 
debates on institutional problems on our thematic FTA contents by focusing on services trade 
negotiations. 
 
Explanations of FTA contents and political economic factors 
With regard to FTA contents, some scholars have explained political economic factors which 
shape outcomes, however, the observations form only a part of study which evaluates existing 
FTAs and its political economic impacts. To date, no comprehensive study with empirical 
evidence in any depth exists to the best of author’s knowledge. The past literature found that 
contents of existing FTAs in East Asia are substantially different from each other (Asian 
Development Bank 2008; Dent 2010a; Rajan 2005; and Ravenhill 2008a). Its diversity is 
expressed, for example, as ‘substance variance’ which reflects political and economic objectives of 
FTAs (Ravenhill 2008a) and the bespoke outcomes of politico-economic interactions between 
negotiating parties (Dent 2010a p221). Also, the existing literature found that scope and coverage 
of FTAs are widening and beyond-tariff regulatory chapters are becoming prominent in East Asian 
FTAs.  
Although FTAs in the Asia Pacific Rim is comprehensive in coverage, the substance rarely goes 
beyond the WTO with the exception of the widely covered and high-quality FTAs which the US 
concluded (Ravenhill 2008). As a part of his argument, some political economic factors, which 
reflect the scope of FTAs, such as a signatory country’s respective bargaining leverage; the level 
of development and negotiating capacity; a strong preference for other policy mechanisms (e.g. 
duty-drawback arrangements and free trade zones); a variety of objectives that FTAs serve; and 
extensive unilateral trade liberalisation, are listed up. Since the purpose of the literature was to 
assess the political economic impact of the FTAs in Asia-Pacific, no empirical evidence was 
provided to support the political economic reasons mentioned above.  
In Dent (2010a), a more detailed analysis on political economic factors which influence the 
outcomes of an FTA was provided, although the analysis formed a part of the study which 
predicted a future development of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific by assessing the past. To analyse the 
bespoke nature of existing FTAs, he categorized the FTA formation into at three levels: (i) 
ideational conception of FTAs, (ii) broad chapter-level structure and (iii) article-level structure and 
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content. As for the first level of ideational conception of FTAs, the literature found that FTAs 
usually reflect a dominant partner’s FTA model such as the US market liberalism model and 
Japanese developmentalism. Secondly, as for a broad chapter level structure, the literature 
confirmed a growing importance of ‘commercial regulation chapters and measures’ (Dent 2010a, 
p220) such as competition policy, intellectual property rights, investments, government 
procurement, rules of origin and services trade. He found that these ‘commercial regulation 
chapters and measures’ reflected the private sector’s interests in more developed economies in the 
Region. Thirdly, ‘article-level structure and content’ reflects domestic constraints from the 
domestic constituents (e.g. the private sector, farmers, labour and civil society organisations) 
during the domestic decision-making process and politico-economic interactions between 
negotiating parties (Dent 2010a p221).  
Dent (2010a) provides a foundation to study ‘commercial regulatory issues’ of East Asian FTAs. 
What should be underlined from the argument in Dent (2010a), in relation to this research project, 
is the influence of the private sector’s interests and domestic constraints on the decision-making 
process of the ‘commercial regulation chapters and measures’, as well as ‘article-level structure 
and content’. Given the fact that the existing IPE literature on East Asian FTAs, except Dent 
(2010a and 2010b), stayed at the level of political economy arguments of conventional trade 
barriers (i.e. concessions of tariff reductions with a combination of Rules of Origins at most), 
empirical study about the decision-making process on ‘commercial regulatory issues’ (Dent 2010a) 
has to be further developed.  
 
1.6 Significance of research 
What is missing in the contribution of IPE scholarly work in general? What can be a valuable 
contribution to develop the IPE arguments about the East Asian FTA activity? The significance of 
this research project is twofold. 
In the first instance, we answer the former question, which is to apply the IPE analytical 
framework to the academic work on services trade liberalisation which has been largely ignored by 
IPE scholars. As reviewed in the economic literature, a lack of international services data to 
provide quantitative analysis is hindering academic contribution by economists. Although 
intensive efforts have been made in attesting non-tariff issues, such as quantifying regulatory 
barriers, the basic problem of economic arguments of regulatory issues is the limitation of 
quantification itself. In contrast to the economic analysis, IPE analysis better reflects the complex 
political, societal and international phenomena by embodying an inter-disciplinary approach of 
economics, politics and international relations. In this regard, IPE would be the best academic 
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discipline to explain the mechanism of services trade integration which involves commercial 
regulatory issues. 
The second is an answer to the latter question, which is to develop arguments on the domestic 
political economy determinants which led to outcomes of an agreement. One of the standard 
features of international economic relations is intensifying interaction of international and 
domestic pressures since the 1990s because international trade issues expanded to the area of 
services trade, intellectual property, investment, environment and energy policy (Bayne and 
Woolcock 2011). This is also happening in the realm of East Asian FTA activity as expressed as 
‘commercial regulatory provisions’ by Dent (2010b). Amongst the ‘commercial regulatory 
provisions’, services trade is the crucial subject which involves intricate political economy since 
many state-actors at the state and sub-state level as well as non-state actors are involved in the 
decision-making. As we previously reviewed, the existing literature examined the domestic policy-
making factors which shape the country’s FTA policy strategy. Notably the absence in the existing 
literature is investigation on the domestic decision-making factors which shape a signatory 
country’s thematic negotiating positions once the substantive negotiations of drafting trade 
agreements, as well as liberalisation commitments, start. The distinction between FTA policy-
making processes prior to substantive negotiations and decision-making processes during 
substantive negotiations is crucial to discuss outcomes of services trade chapters and their 
commitments. This is because original motivations would be surpressed through the domestic 
decision-making processes or a specific original motivation might negatively affect the negotiating 
positions for services trade. How did the original motivations of creating FTAs affect the interests 
of governments and the private sector during the decision-making process of FTA negotiations? 
How did specific interests in services trade shape a country’s negotiating position? And how did 
institutions foamulate domestic interests in the case of services trade negotiations? These are the 
issues to be investigated to further develop the existing literature on East Asian FTAs. This 
research project develops an area of novelty in the IPE scholarly work on economic regionalism in 
East Asia. 
 
1.7 Analytical framework 
1.7.1 Explanatory variables 
This research project highlights domestic political economy factors to elucidate the shallow-
GATS-plus FTAs in East Asia. Interests and domestic decision-making structures (institutions) are 
selected as two explanatory variables. Why do we select interests and institutions as explanatory 
factors? The first reason is that politics is partly about the pursuit of interests (Kopstein and 
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Lichbach 2005, p22). The second reason is that institutions are where politics take place to form a 
country’s negotiating positions. Since interests are channelled through decision-making institutions, 
including institutional factors into an argument makes the analysis more persuasive.  
We define interests and institutions as follows. The first is about interests. We define interests as 
being composed of the government’s interests and the private sector’s interests. We also 
understand ideas as a constituent of interests. This is because the interests of the stakeholders, such 
as the policy-makers and business society, are shaped by their ideas and social values.20 The 
second is about institutions. Institutions are defined as a Government’s decision-making structure 
for services trade negotiations. Our focus is on the policy-coordination process of the executive 
branch since domestic decision-making for FTA services trade negotiations is conducted by 
bureaucrats (Chapter 4), and a dynamic political economy is expressed. 
Here we specifically emphasise the role of the private sector as the actor of the domestic decision-
making of services trade negotiations. Neo-liberalist IPE scholars have been aware of an 
increasing role of non-state actors such as the private sector (firms) and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) in shaping domestic trade policy formulation in addition to governments. 
Among non-state actors, the private sector is identified as an essential player because the market is 
an endogenous factor of the world economy (Odell 2000). Namely in the domain of international 
trade policy formulation, the importance of inputs from the private sector is increasing because 
most governments lack the internal research capacity and commercial intelligence that is crucial 
for the identification of negotiating positions for trade agreements and they are dependent on the 
private sector for information on barriers to trade and investment posed by trade measures, 
systems of regulation, standards, public procurement policies and so on. Hence, governments are 
compelled to engage directly with business actors through a broad range of formal and informal 
consultative mechanisms aimed at eliciting this information. (Capling and Low 2010, p5). Services 
trade negotiations are about regulatory barriers, however, as technological innovations are rapidly 
taking place in business practices, governments cannot form its negotiating positions without 
inputs from the private sector. 
 
1.7.2 Application of the policy demand and supply model 
Next, we describe an analytical framework to elucidate the political economy of domestic 
decision-making for FTA services trade negotiations. We apply the rationalist and institutionalist 
approach in explaining interests and services trade decision-making structure. This project 
                                                          
20 Interests, when defined as ideas about how to meet needs are actually constituted by ideas (Nabers 2003, p132) 
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modifies the policy demand and supply model of regional integration developed by Mattli (1999a) 
to analyse the domestic interests and institutions of FTA services trade negotiations. 
Let us briefly review the policy demand and supply model by Mattli (1999a) first. According to 
Mattli (1999a), there are two levels of demand force for regional integration: demand for 
institutional change; and demand for integration. Demand for institutional change was described 
thus: as new technologies increase the scope of markets beyond the boundaries of a single state, 
actors who stand to gain from wider markets will seek to change an existing governance structure 
in order to realize these gains to the fullest extent (Mattli 1999a: p 10). Demand for integration 
forms impetus (i) to ensure gains for wider market (i.e. achieving economies of scale, exploiting 
comparative advantage, and expanding production abroad through FDI) and (ii) to minimize 
international trade and investment transaction costs that arise from trade and investment related 
policy barriers. Mattli (1999a) explained that institutional change and deeper integration do not 
take place if supply conditions are not met. Supply conditions are defined as the conditions under 
which political leaders are willing and able to accommodate demands for functional integration 
(Mattli 1999a: p12). Then the literature applied the prisoners’ dilemma and coordination games 
theory to explain supply conditions. 
Next, we explain how we modify the demand and supply model of Mattli (1999a) for our research 
project. While the demand and supply model provides fundamental insights to analyse how 
interests and institutions play a role in regional integration outcomes, it still needs some 
modifications to apply FTA services trade negotiations in East Asia. First, the model explains 
motives for regional integration on the demand side but did not take into account motives for 
regional integration on the supply side, since Mattli emphasised ‘bottom-up pressure’ (Mattli 
1999a: p9), which is a pressure from the market players (the demand side). As for the East Asian 
FTA activity, we cannot ignore the interests of government as a driving force of 
plurilateralism/bilateralism as the existing literature demonstrated. Thus, we add the policy supply 
side interests into our analytical framework. We understand that a signatory country’s negotiating 
positions are constituted from both demand interests and supply interests. Second, Mattli (1999a) 
did not take into account a role that ideas can play. As Ravenhill (2007) verified, the ascendancy of 
neo-liberal ideas is one of two crucial factors of the new regionalism which began in the 1990s 
(Ravenhill 2007: 186).21 Thus the role of ideas on FTA services trade negotiations would not be 
negligible. Third, Mattli (1999a) defined supply side conditions as acts of political leaders who are 
concerned about re-election. When it comes to chapter level negotiations such as services trade 
agreement, the domestic decision-making process is totally dominated by bureaucrats in spite of 
the different political systems (e.g. the parliamentary system, presidential system and 
                                                          
21 In Ravenhill (2007), the end of the Cold War was identified as another factor of the new regionalism. 
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constitutional monarchy) in the Region. Therefore, this research project focuses on inter-
governmental coordination at the executive branch level. 
Figure 1-1 shows the reframed supply and demand model to contemplate domestic political 
economy of FTA services trade negotiations in East Asia. The policy demand side is specified as 
the private sector (services suppliers) which are directly affected by the FTA ruling and therefore 
expected to show pro-liberal interests from the outward perspective or anti-liberal interests from 
the inward perspective. The private sector includes horizontal business confederations, sector 
associations (sectoral associations and professional associations), services coalitions, and 
individual firms. As for the supply side, we focus on the executive branch. Interests of the lead 
ministry which represents a country and domestic regulatory authorities which participate inter-
governmental coordination process are examined. Ideas embedded in societies in the form of the 
policy demand and supply sides are acknowledged as a source of interest formation. The supply 
side condition means the political economy of the domestic decision-making structure through 
which interests are coordinated. We highlight horizontal fragmentation of power of the inter-
governmental coordination process at the executive branch level as described later (see B. 
Modelling institutions). 
 
Figure 1-1: A supply and demand model of domestic decision-making of FTA services trade 
negotiations 
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A. Modelling interests 
a. Policy demand side interests 
Policy demand side interests are categorized into (i) general motivations for asking government to 
negotiate an FTA; and (ii) specific interests in services trade negotiations. First, general 
motivations of the policy demand side include economic motives for FTAs such as strengthening 
regional production and distribution networks in East Asia in the case of Japan and attracting FDI 
from a signatory country in the case of developing countries. Second, we model specific interests 
in services trade negotiations. The fundamental understanding of the political economy of policy 
demand side is that the private sector can be divided into a pro-liberalisation group and an anti-
liberalisation group. Since Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations” (1776), political scientists have 
been developing the pressure group model that delineates how preferences of domestic groups 
favouring or resisting trade liberalisation influence the state’s trade policy position. In the context 
of regional integration, Mattli (1999a) provided a useful framework using institutional theories (e.g. 
property rights theory, economic history and new institutional economics) to account for the 
demand side motives.22 
Table 1-1 further elaborates Mattli (1999a) to illustrate specific lobbying interests in services trade 
and expected actions during trade policy-making process in the context of FTAs services 
negotiations. On the demand side, there are two types of actors: export oriented services suppliers 
which favour preferential services liberalisation and import competing services suppliers 
(including monopolists and oligopolists) which favour protection. As for export-oriented services 
suppliers, they try to attain preferential market access to achieve economies of scale through trade 
(Mode 1, 2, 3 and 4) and to exploit their comparative advantage. Services sectors may also have 
interests in preferential access of specific services which support FDI in manufacturing companies. 
This type of services are called ‘manufacturing-related investment’, such as providing legal 
services, financial services and logistic services to support goods-related trade and investment. 
Furthermore, firms have strong incentives to reduce transaction costs caused by host country’s 
regulatory barriers and different standards. In terms of policy, export-oriented services suppliers 
try to recoup the loss caused by preferential discriminatory arrangements in the existing FTAs. 
Accordingly, they require the level playing field of the existing FTAs. Also, export-oriented 
services suppliers require commitments at the autonomous liberalisation level to ensure legal 
certainty. If not, they try to attain preferential treatments at the GATS-plus level. 
 
  
                                                          
22 See Mattli (1999a), p7-8. 
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Table 1-1: Policy demand side: Specific interests in services trade negotiations  
 
Box 1-1 lists types of preferential treatment in services trade. Unlike the preferential tariffs in the 
manufacturing sector, preferential treatment in the services sector is all about regulations, such as 
reducing/diminishing quantitative restrictions on services output, reducing/diminishing the 
quantitative restrictions on numbers of services providers or providing a large proportion of the 
quota to FTA partners, reducing/ diminishing limitations on foreign ownership. Furthermore, to 
provide regulatory preferences to FTA partners, standards and MRAs (Mutual Recognition 
Agreements) play an important role in integrating markets. Export oriented services suppliers 
would lobby government to get these preferential arrangements in their sector in a specific or on a 
horizontal basis to attain their economic supremacy. On the other hand, import competing services 
suppliers or incumbents in imperfect competition would try to protect the domestic market from 
erosion of rents and adjustment costs. To that end, they are likely to resist making any further 
commitments beyond what they made under the GATS. 
Box 1-1: Types of preferential treatment in services trade 
 Reduce/diminish quantitative restrictions on services output in horizontal/sectoral 
commitments(e.g. freight and passenger quotas in air, land and maritime transport 
services, airtime allocated to foreign broad casts in audiovisual services) 
 Reduce/diminish quantitative restrictions on the number of services providers or provide a 
larger proportion of the quota to FTA partners (e.g. the number of telecommunications 
operators, banks, and insurance services providers) 
 Reduce/diminish limitations on foreign ownership (e.g. legal entity, branch rights) 
 Provide preferential treatment in taxes and subsidies 
 Provide regulatory preferences to FTA partners in technical regulations, licensing and 
qualification requirements on foreign providers (e.g. professional services and financial 
services) 
Source (A Handbook of International Trade in Services, p226) 
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How do these market actors lobby governments? Export-oriented services suppliers would input 
their basic positions and their specific liberalisation requests to the lead ministry either directly or 
through a business organisation/sectoral organisation. In parallel, they directly consult with the 
domestic regulatory authorities which administer them to ensure solid support. Import-competing 
services suppliers may take a slightly different lobbying approach from that of export-oriented 
services suppliers. They may clearly reveal their negative positions at formal occasions such as the 
meetings organised by business confederations. If they assume that they cannot be influential in 
making general business positions, they may not reveal positions at formal occasions. In both cases, 
import-competing services suppliers may prefer to lobby directly to their domestic regulatory 
authorities to properly secure their positions. 
 
b. Policy supply side interests 
Policy supply side interests are categorized as (i) general motivations to start negotiating an FTA; 
and (ii) specific interests in services trade negotiations. First, general motivations are further 
classified into political motivations and economic motivations. Political motivations comprise 
diplomatic incentives, FTA catch-up incentives/competitive bilateralism, and incentives to lock-in 
domestic reforms. Economic motivations comprise incentives to mitigate negative impacts caused 
by the existing FTAs, pro-active economic motives (i.e. strengthening regional production and 
distribution networks) and boosting trade and investment. General motivations constitute a 
foundation of the negotiating country’s basic positions during FTA negotiations as a whole. 
Accordingly, it is expected that general motivations would affect a position for services trade 
negotiations. 
Second, we further analyse specific interests in services trade negotiations on the policy supply 
side (Table 1-2). All policy makers take actions based on specific economic and policy interests in 
services. In the case of the lead ministry, policy incentives tend to be more important than 
economic incentives, as it endeavours to maintain the multilateral trading system as a WTO 
Member. This means that it aims at satisfying the requirements provided in the GATS Article V 
(services integration). Therefore, the lead ministry tries to achieve a GATS-plus FTA both in terms 
of agreements and the level of commitments. Also, if an FTA partner country already belongs to 
any FTAs, the lead ministry tries to mitigate negative effects caused by the existing FTAs and 
strengthen preferential treatments. In terms of economic interests, the lead ministry would try to 
reflect the export interests of the domestic services suppliers.  
As for the domestic regulatory authorities administering the services sector, we can classify 
interests into two types: (i) domestic regulatory authorities which represent export-oriented 
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services suppliers and (ii) domestic regulatory authorities which represent import-competing 
services suppliers. In reality, it is often the case that one ministry may hold both offensive and 
defensive interests since an authority administers many services sectors as well as sub-sectors. 
(i) For the domestic regulatory authorities which represent the negotiating positions of export 
oriented services suppliers, eliminating discriminatory treatments caused by a partner 
country’s FTAs would be the highest priority. Thus they try to attain a level playing field 
of the highest commitments made by a partner country’s existing FTAs as well as MFN 
treatments for future FTAs. They would further try to strengthen the preferential 
treatments vis-à-vis external regions. However, they are reluctant to commit any 
regulatory reforms or changes of the domestic markets which might threaten their 
regulatory concerns. Given the specific liberalisation requests from export oriented 
services suppliers, they can support the lead ministry to make a GATS-plus FTA in terms 
of making requests, while showing risk-averse positions in terms of making offers. 
 
(ii) The second category is the domestic regulatory authorities which represent the import 
competing services sector. In terms of policy interests, their incentives to protect their 
regulatory autonomy and pursue its regulatory objectives might be stronger than those of 
the domestic authorities which represent export oriented services suppliers. In terms of 
economic interests, the agents would strongly prefer to maintain the commitments already 
made under the GATS or the level of commitments made for the existing FTA of which 
the country had already joined. If import competing sectors are not competitive enough to 
export their services, the regulatory authorities would be reticent to make any requests of 
market liberalisation to an FTA partner. Also, they would resist making higher quality 
provisions than those in the GATS.  
 
What should be noted here is that, in the both cases, the domestic regulatory authorities are 
interested in protecting their regulatory autonomy and pursuing their regulatory objectives. 
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Table 1-2: Policy supply side: Specific interests in services trade negotiations 
 
 
c. Ideas 
When it comes to ideas, we have to note that constructivist analysis involves complexity in 
differentiating interests and ideas as Hiscox (2007) explained that [The] relationship between ideas 
and interests is still very murky, and will remain so until we have a better understanding of where 
new ideas about policy come from, and what explains which ideas catch on and spread. (Hiscox 
2007; 121).23 Acknowledging the complexity of constructivist approach, this research project takes 
into account the role of ideas by defining it as a constituent of interests. We focus on ideas that 
directly affect services trade negotiations. In other words, ideas that are embedded both in the 
policy demand and supply sides, when they make negotiating positions for services trade 
negotiations, are underlined.  
According to the existing literature on East Asian FTAs, underlying ideologies and norms of East 
Asian regionalism are: developmentalism (Dent 2007a; Dent 2008a; and Dent 2008b);24 strong 
sovereignty/non-interference in ASEAN (Aggarwal and Chow 2010; Besso 1999, Narine 2006), 
incrementalism/gradualism in ASEAN (Aggarwal and Chow 2010) and nationalism in ASEAN 
(Narine 2006). Through qualitative interviews with policy-making actors, we will investigate 
whether these ideologies and norms constituted a foundation of interests for FTA services trade 
                                                          
23 For example, Aggarwal and Lee (2011: 19) categorised what were generally considered as diplomatic 
incentives/interests to create FTAs in the existing literature (see 1.5 Literature Review, A. Political motivations) as ideas.  
24 Dent (2007a) highlighted East Asia’s developmentalism versus ‘market liberal’ capitalism (Dent 2007a: 465). 
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negotiations. At the same time, we would not preclude any other ideas that might be discovered 
through qualitative interviews with policy actors. 
 
B. Modelling institutions (supply side condition) 
How are interests of policy supply side and policy demand side channelled through the decision-
making process? We highlight the logic of inter-governmental coordination of the executive 
branch of Government because horizontal fragmentation of power in the decision-making of the 
executive branch reflects the heterogeneous characteristic of services trade (see Chapter 2). 
Although the lead ministry possesses higher ambitions from the foreign diplomacy perspective, the 
political power relating to domestic economic reforms is very limited in comparison with the 
domestic regulatory authorities which administer the services sector. In other words, what the lead 
ministry can do is no more than policy coordination. On the policy supply side, it is the domestic 
regulatory authorities which exercise political power during the services decision-making process. 
And domestic regulatory authorities can be characterised as actors of strong preference of status-
quo (Hoekman, Mattoo, Sapir (2007)). From the inward perspective, these ministries have no 
incentives to lock in services trade agreements as domestic policy reform anchors (Hoekman, 
Mattoo, and Sapir 2007; and Francois and Hoekman 2010). From the outward perspective, the 
domestic regulatory authorities tend to have weak bargaining incentives for services trade 
negotiations (Hoekman, Mattoo, and Sapir 2007; and Francois and Hoekman 2010).  
What does strong preference for the status-quo of domestic regulatory authorities indicate in terms 
of political institutions? Through the veto power model (Tsebelis 2002), we will assert how a 
strong preference for the status-quo of domestic regulatory authorities blocks making concessions 
and becomes an impediment to policy change. Implications of the veto power model for preference 
of status-quo by domestic regulatory authorities are described as follows: 
 Definition: The agenda setter is the lead ministry. Veto players 25  are domestic 
regulatory authorities. 
 We assume that the preference of a domestic regulatory authority is status-quo. Thus, 
a regulatory authority is considered as an individual veto player. 
 Participation of the services-related domestic regulatory authorities into inter-
governmental coordination (horizontal fragmentation of power) creates veto power.  
                                                          
25 Veto players are actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo (Tsebelis 2002, p37). 
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 All domestic regulatory authorities act as veto players because of a strong preference 
for status-quo. 
 Mechanism of status-quo preference of domestic regulatory authorities: Regulatory 
autonomy; pursuit of regulatory objectives (or regulatory concerns) under sectoral 
segmentation; and ‘clientelistic’ relations with professional and sectoral organisations 
constitute status-quo preference. 
 The agenda setter has a significant advantage. However, this advantage diminishes 
as the number of veto players and the distances among them increase (Tsebelis 2002, 
p19). 
 
1.7.3 Approach for the research 
In order to accurately the explain influence of political economic determinants in the decision-
making process on outcomes of bilateral FTA services trade negotiations, this project refines the 
approach taken in Solis (2010). According to Solis (2010), Japan’s domestic political factors are 
direct determinants of the quality of Japan’s FTAs. This approach significantly lacks accuracy 
when one argues outcomes of an FTA. We have to make clear that domestic factors form the 
negotiating positions of a country, but they cannot directly determine the negotiating outcomes of 
an FTA. As the two-level game metaphor of Putnam (1988) stylised, outcomes of negotiations are 
the result of economic diplomacy through the domestic and international level and interactions 
between them. This indicates that there are indirect correlations but no direct correlations between 
domestic factors and outcomes (quality) of the negotiations. To elaborate these arguments, for 
instance, one would need to take into account the domestic factors of all the signatory countries as 
these mutually affect outcomes of the FTA negotiations. Since a dependent variable of this 
research project is the shallow GATS-plus agreements of bilateral FTAs in East Asia, we examine 
domestic political factors of two signatory countries (see Figure 1-2). Provided that there is a 
bilateral FTA between Country A and Country B, we understand that interests of Country A and 
institutions of Country A shape the negotiating positions of Country A. Likewise, interests of 
Country B and institutions of Country B shape negotiating positions of Country B. The outcomes 
of the bilateral FTA between Country A and Country B are the result of the two-level game. By 
analysing domestic political factors of two signatory countries, we can more accurately explain 
correlation between domestic factors and outcomes of an FTA. Also, this approach helps identify 
the distinctive characteristics of East Asia and the heterogeneity of services as we examine 
domestic political economy of two signatory countries. 
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Figure 1-2: Approach for the research 
 
1.7.4 Selection of case studies 
This project applies interpretative case studies in order to generate hypotheses about the influence 
of the domestic factors (interests and institutions) on outcomes of services trade agreements under 
the East Asian FTAs. To date, there are 15 FTAs concluded inside East Asia up to 2016 and 14 
FTAs entered into force during the 2000s (see Table 3-3). Amongst the existing FTAs concluded 
inside the region, we highlight the ASEAN-Japan relationship. This means that we select the 
bilateral FTAs concluded between Japan and ASEAN in the 2000s. These are: the Japan-Singapore 
FTA entered into force in 2002, the Japan-Malaysian FTA entered into force in 2006, the Japan-
Thailand FTA entered into force in 2007, the Japan-Indonesian FTA entered into force in 2008, the 
Japan- Philippines FTA entered into force in 2008, and the Japan-Viet Nam FTA entered into force 
in 2009.26 Then we examine the domestic political economy factors from the Japan’s perspective 
(Chapter 5: Case study 1) and the other from the ASEAN’s perspective (Chapter 6: Case study 2) 
by applying the approach explained in the previous section (1.7.3). 
We selected the Japan–ASEAN relation in the Region for three reasons. The first is the geo-
political reason. ASEAN became the hub of East Asian FTA activity by concluding FTAs with 
China, Japan and South Korea from the early 2000s. All the existing FTAs took the form of either 
plurilateral ASEAN plus one (China/Japan/South Korea) FTA or bilateral FTAs between an 
                                                          
26 We do not examine the ASEAN plus Japan FTA which entered into force in 2008, since it does not cover 
services. 
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individual ASEAN member and China/Japan/South Korea. In this regard, one cannot ignore the 
presence of ASEAN. 
The second reason is that among the three Far-East Asian countries (China, Japan and South 
Korea), Japan became a locomotive of creating FTAs with ASEAN. From the early 2000s, Japan 
concluded seven bilateral FTAs in addition to the ASEAN plus Japan FTA. In comparison, China 
concluded only two bilateral FTAs in addition to ASEAN plus China. And South Korea concluded 
only one bilateral FTA in addition to ASEAN plus in the 2000s.    
The third reason is that the case study of the Japan-ASEAN FTAs can cover a wide range of 
services markets in East Asia. In other words, the selection of countries is well explained from the 
economic perspective. We categorise services markets in East Asia into five types (see Chapter 3: 
3.3.4). These are: (a) a liberalised and competitive market (Singapore), (b) high income OECD 
countries with relatively liberalised services markets where competitiveness lags behind the 
manufacturing sector (Japan and South Korea), (c) a developing economy with a growing services 
sector and some uncompetitive sectors remaining in place (Malaysia and The Philippines), (d) 
developing economies with strong government intervention and imperfect competition (China, 
Indonesia, and Thailand), and (e) LDCs with a small-sized and under-developed services sector 
(e.g. Cambodia). Since no LDCs of ASEAN concluded bilateral FTAs, the last category is out of 
scope for our examination. In short, the case study of the Japan-ASEAN relation can cover a whole 
range of services markets in East Asia in terms of existing FTAs. 
Lastly, we confirm that although China and South Korea are not included in the empirical studies, 
since we apply the interpretative case study, the analysis provided in Chapter 3 and 4 cover China 
and South Korea to understand the strong characteristics of East Asia and decision-making for 
services trade negotiations in practice. 
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis and methodology 
1.8.1 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters (see Figure 1-3). Chapter 2 conceptualises services trade to 
differentiate it from goods trade in terms of market, policy and political economy so that we can 
demonstrate the heterogeneity of services. Chapter 3 provides a background analysis which gives 
an overview of the level of services trade integration in East Asia from the market and policy 
aspects. It demonstrates the mal-integration of services trade in the Region. Chapter 4 serves to 
understand services trade policy-making in practice. The focus is on the actors and the domestic 
policy-making institutions so that one can link in the case studies. Chapters 5 and 6 are about a 
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case study of the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs, one from Japan’s perspective (Chapter 5) and the 
other from the ASEAN’s perspective (Chapter 6). These chapters provide the empirical evidence 
on how interests and institutions in the domestic policy-making influenced the outcomes of the 
negotiations. Chapter 7 concludes this research project by testing hypotheses, referring to 
analytical challenges and areas of future research. 
 
Figure 1-3: Structure of the thesis 
 
 
1.8.2 Methodology 
This research project applies qualitative methods. These include the background analysis, such as 
assessing the policy integration of services trade in East Asia, examining the legal nature of Japan-
ASEAN FTAs, explaining the actors and institutions of decision-making process of services trade 
negotiations, and examining the domestic factors of Japan and the ASEAN countries to test 
hypotheses. To support the qualitative methods, data analysis is used, whenever applicable, in 
terms of the availability of data. 
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A. Data collection and analysis 
Primary sources of data and information are:  documentary research, including academic journals, 
reports and research papers of the international organisations (e.g. Asian Development Bank, 
ERIA:    Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, OECD, UNCTAD, World Bank, 
and WTO), government publications including the government related research institutes (e.g. 
RIETI: Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan), industry position papers, and 
the market surveys done by the private sector (e.g. JETRO: Japan External Trade Organization). 
Other supporting information are economic data and regulatory databases of the international 
organisations (e.g. Asian Development Bank, OECD, UNCTAD, World Bank, and WTO) and 
media reports. Given that the mother tongue of the author is Japanese, the project makes full use of 
Japanese written materials.27  The following explains the data collection and analysis of each 
chapter. 
Chapter 2: As this chapter contributes to conceptualising services trade, to differentiate it from 
goods trade, from the market, policy, and political economic dimensions, scholarly work in 
economics, political economy and law as well as the studies and technical papers of the 
international organisations are the main source of analysis. 
Chapter 3: To provide evidence of underdeveloped services trade integration in East Asia, the 
chapter relies heavily on economic data, as well as the regulatory databases of the international 
organisations (World Bank, OECD and WTO). These include analysis of (i) markets (e.g. the level 
of services trade integration in East Asia, trends of industrialisation of each country) and (ii) 
regulatory environments (e.g. the level of commitments made under the East Asian FTAs and de-
facto restrictiveness). 
With regard to the services trade data, it should be noted that this project faces a technical obstacle 
since there are no comprehensive internationally comparable statistics which reflect the structure 
of the GATS such as modes of supply (cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial 
presence and presence of natural persons) and classification of sectors.28 Also, data of the bilateral 
services trade relations is very limited. Given the situation, this project examines currently 
available international data (e.g. Balance of Payment (BOP) statistics and Foreign Affiliates Trade 
in Services (FATS) statistics), and uses them to review the current level of services market 
                                                          
27 The information in English is very limited on the Japanese government websites as well as on the Japanese private 
sector’s websites. For examples, more detailed policy proposals are available only in Japanese at the Keidanren’s 
website.  
28The international organisations have further developed the international statistics for services trade. See Manual on the 
Statistics of International Trade in Services 2010 which supersedes the 2002 version. 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradeserv/TFSITS/MSITS/MSITS2010%20%20for%20the%20SC%202010%20at%202.22.20
10.pdf.) 
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integration in East Asia. Furthermore, we have to note that the international data of services trade 
is currently available only to 2011.29 
Chapter 4: Since this chapter serves to understand actors and the domestic decision-making 
structure for services, the main source of information are qualitative interviews with the 
government officials and individuals of the private sector supplemented by information of 
government websites as well as private sector websites. Academic work and the secretariat’s 
reports under the WTO Trade Policy Review (TPR) are also used as secondary sources. 
Case studies (Chapter 5 and 6): For the empirical study, which traces back the domestic policy-
making process of each agreement, we heavily rely on qualitative interviews with government 
officials as well as individuals of the private sector. To supplement the qualitative interviews, the 
minutes of the negotiations released by the Japanese government (which exist only in Japanese), 
the policy proposals made by the business organisations and the IPE scholarly literature are used. 
As for analysing market and policy developments in the 2000s, we mainly use the WTO secretariat 
reports, as well as governments’ reports under the WTO Trade Policy Review (TPR) of each 
country which substantially cover the period. The other resources are: periodical policy and 
economic reviews done by the international organisations (e.g. OECD, UNCTAD and World 
Bank), annual trade and investment reports of JETRO30; annual white papers of the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Investment of Japan31; and the annual “National Trade Estimate Report on 
Foreign Trade Barriers” of the USTR.  
 
B. Qualitative interviews 
There are three objectives of conducting qualitative interviews under this project. The first is to 
trace the domestic decision-making negotiations which actually took place for the Japan-ASEAN 
bilateral FTAs as a source of analysis for the Case study 1 (Chapter 5) and the Case study 2 
(Chapter 6). This includes (i) gathering facts (interests and institutions), and (ii) learning about 
interpretations of the cases by the policy makers and the business lobbyists to understand the ideas 
behind them. The second is to collect information and facts about actors and the domestic 
decision-making structure of services trade in East Asia for Chapter 4. The third is to extract 
market and policy trends in the 2000s and to elicit stories (Chapter 5 and 6), in addition to 
literature and data analysis. 
                                                          
29 The reasons are explained in Chapter 3: 3.1. 
30 “Boueki Toushi Houkokusho” in Japanese. 
31 “Hukousei Boueki Houkokusho” in Japanese, [Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade 
Agreements - WTO, EPA/FTA and IIA]. 
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For the first objective, the research embodied process tracing analysis together with the ‘attributed 
influence’ method. 32  Evidence was collected through a combination of the semi-structured 
interviews and in-depth interviews. A series of interviews were organised through two field studies 
(Tokyo and Geneva) as well as video interviews in 2015. The interviewees were:  (a) government 
officials who negotiated the FTAs under the subject and (b) lobbyists of the private sector who 
were involved in the domestic decision-making process for the FTAs under the subject (See 
Appendix 1: the list of interviewees for the case studies). For the field study in Tokyo, which took 
place in April 2015, the researcher’s network established during the previous position as a trade 
policy analyst at the Keidanren was used to access policy makers at the Japanese government and 
lobbyists from the Japanese private sector. Prior to the in-depth interviews, two questionnaires, one 
for the Japanese government and the other for the private sector, were sent to interviewees (see 
Appendix 3 and 4). The field study in Geneva, which took place in July 2015, as well as the video 
interviews during 2015, were organised for the case study 2: Japan-ASEAN FTAs –The ASEAN 
countries’ perspective (Appendix 1 to see the list of interviewees). The questionnaires (Appendix 
5) were sent to all interviewees prior to the interviews as in the case of interviews with the 
Japanese government and individuals of the private sector. 
As for the second objective, the first field study took place in April 2013 in Geneva. Semi-
structured interviews with the services trade negotiators to the WTO who represented ASEAN, 
China, Japan and South Korea were conducted (See Appendix 1: the list of interviewees). Access 
was facilitated by the Japanese delegation to the WTO in Geneva as the researcher previously 
worked as services trade negotiator to the WTO representing Japan. The length of the interviews 
was 1.5 to 2.5 hours each. The interviews were held in accordance with the questionnaire 
(Appendix 2: the questionnaire for the field trip in Geneva in 2013) sent to the interviewees in 
advance. To identify the level of participation of the private sector in these countries, questions 
included the private sector’s role in trade policy-making in these countries. 
With regard to the third objective, semi-structured interviews were conducted with international 
trade policy experts and scholars/researchers during the fieldwork in Geneva (April 2013 and July 
2015) and Tokyo (April 2015). The list of interviewees is attached in Appendix 1. Similar to the 
interviews with government and the private sector, questionnaires were sent to the interviewees 
prior to the meetings (Appendices 6.1 and 6.2).  
 
 
                                                          
32 See Dur (2008a). The ‘attributed influence’ is based on a survey asking for a self-assessment of the lobbyists influence 
or a peer assessment of the influence of other groups. This research does not apply the ‘assessing the degree of 
preference attainment’ (Dur 2008a, p566). 
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1.9 A summary of findings 
This is a summary of findings from this research project. It attests why the Japan-ASEAN bilateral 
FTAs concluded in the 2000s resulted in the shallow GATS-plus FTAs. For this purpose, we 
examine how domestic political determinants, which are interests and institutions, shaped the 
negotiating positions of Japan and ASEAN for the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. Our argument in 
the following chapters confirms that our hypothesis played a significant role in explaining political 
economy of services trade integration in East Asia. 
First, in terms of institutions, a wide participation of domestic regulatory authorities into the 
decision-making process of FTA services trade negotiations constituted a fundamental blockage to 
liberalisation. The domestic regulatory authorities, which preferred the status-quo in order to 
maintain their regulatory autonomy and to pursue regulatory objectives, exercised a veto power 
against any policy changes. As a consequence, the lead ministry’s negotiating positions were 
pushed backward and any concessions of commitment offers which sufficiently go beyond GATS-
plus were hardly made. 
Second, in terms of interests, there were no strong pro-liberalisation forces both on the policy 
demand side and the policy supply side. On the policy demand side, exporting interests were very 
limited. In the case of Japan, interests in FTA services trade liberalisation was nebulous. In the 
case of ASEAN, export interests were limited to some professional services (Mode 4). On the 
other hand, import-competing services suppliers and incumbents were afraid of the erosion of rents 
and adjustment costs. In the case of Japan, professional services suppliers were strongly against 
allowing in medical-related professionals. In the case of ASEAN, SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) 
and SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) and sectoral organisations were afraid of making 
GATS-plus commitments. On the policy supply side, there were three negative factors. First, there 
was no incentive to lock in domestic services reforms by using the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. 
For Japan, Mode 4 liberalisation did not fit bilateral FTA negotiations. For ASEAN, since the 
countries were unilaterally liberalising services in accordance with their economic development 
agenda from the 1990s, FTA negotiations were not considered as a policy device to promote 
services liberalisation. What is more, many ASEAN countries even hesitated to commit the level 
of autonomous liberalisation so as to maintain its policy space. Second, strengthening regional 
supply chains in the manufacturing sector was highlighted during the negotiations, which 
consequently levelled down the ambitions of achieving a high-quality services agreement. Third, a 
speedy conclusion of FTA was prioritised under a huge pressure of policy competition of creating 
FTAs inside East Asia. Thus, services trade negotiators were prompted by the top-negotiators to 
make a deal instead of making time to achieve high-quality services agreements and commitments. 
We also found the ideas, which shaped interests of both policy demand and supply sides (i.e. 
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‘manufacturalism’ in the case of Japan; and gradualism, and developmentalism with notions of 
strong sovereignty in the case of ASEAN), undermined motivations for the services trade 
negotiations. 
From the above, our conclusions from the empirical study of Japan and ASEAN can be 
summarised as follows. Services trade integration in East Asia lags far behind goods trade because 
the horizontally fragmented domestic-decision-making structure, which reflects the heterogeneity 
of services, constituted the first layer of political-economy impediment. And interests, which 
mostly reflect the distinctive characteristics of East Asia,33 constituted the second layer of political 
economy impediment. Because of the double layered political economy impediments, the East 
Asian FTAs concluded in the 2000s resulted in the shallow GATS-plus FTAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
33 A lack of international competitiveness in the services sector as well as restrictive services policies are identified as the 
distinctive characteristics of East Asia (see chapter 3) 
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Chapter 2: The Heterogeneous Nature of Services 
in Comparison with Goods 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Classic international trade discussions have invariably lumped together trade in goods and services. 
In other words, the literature associates trade only with goods and minor attention was given to 
services sector. The classical approach is commonly observed when it comes to the literature on 
regional trade integration. Although economic integration cannot be attained without services trade 
integration, the primary focus is given to tariff reductions to examine the level of market 
integration and the level of trade agreements. The purpose of this chapter is to conceptualise 
services trade by focusing on the heterogeneity of trade in services in comparison with trade in 
goods in order to see its implication for the international political economy of services trade 
integration in East Asia, which will be examined in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. 
The arguments of this chapter take the following procedure. First, the conceptual exercise of 
services trade in the existing literature is seen. Then the heterogeneity on the market dimension in 
terms of the services market structure and global services trade is examined. Next, an observation 
on policy dimension, which highlights (i) the heterogeneity of protective instruments as well as 
services trade barriers and (ii) preferential trade agreements as a tool to promote institutional 
integration, is followed. After looking at the heterogeneity of services trade at market and policy 
dimensions, we observe the heterogeneity of services trade from the political economy perspective. 
We underline incentives to promote plurilateral liberalisation in services and trade policy-making 
institutions.  
 
2.2 Conceptualising services trade 
The nature of services 
First of all, we clarify the nature of services in comparison with goods. According to Hill (1977, 
p,317), goods are defined as a physical object which is appropriable and, therefore, transferable 
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between economic unit whereas services are defined as a change in the condition of a person, or a 
good belonging to some economic unit, which is brought about as a result of the activity of some 
other economic unit, which is the prior agreement of the former person or economic unit. It is 
recognised that there are two distinct differences between goods and services (see for example, 
Copeland and Mattoo 2008). Whereas goods are: (i) tangible, visible, and (ii) storable; services are: 
(i) intangible, invisible and (ii) non-storable although some exceptions exist (see Figure 2-1). The 
intangible nature of services requires strong government involvement due to asymmetry of 
information. 34  The non-storable nature requires simultaneous production and consumption 
(Copeland and Mattoo 2008, p85), that implies that not all services can be tradable. These distinct 
differences by nature are considered as the basis of a conceptual exercise of services trade as they 
may cause important implications for the state of art in the domestic and international political 
economy. 
 
Figure 2-1: Basic difference between goods and services 
 
Goods
Tangible, 
visible
Storable
Services
Intangible, 
invisible
Non-
storable
 
 
Definition and scope of services trade 
 
How does the nature of services matter when it comes to trade? Conceptual analysis of services 
trade was first developed in the realm of economics, in works such as Hill (1977); and Sapir and 
Lutz (1981). Outside the realm of economics, the concept of services trade was intensively argued 
to design the international legal framework before and during the Uruguay Round, which was the 
first multilateral negotiations on services. For example, the study by Feketekuty (1988) shows the 
early stage of conceptual observations on services trade in the policy community and how the 
debate was developed as a preparatory exercise for the Uruguay Round. According to him, trade in 
services is that which is linked to an international movement of people, information, money, or 
                                                          
34 This directly relates to our arguments in the case study (Chapter 5 and 6) about the strong regulatory concerns of the 
domestic regulatory authorities and its relation with market failures. 
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goods. He also conceptualised it by framing it in terms of an application of “value-enhancing 
services” to goods, people, money or information in the exporting country and a transfer of the 
enhanced goods, people, money, or information to the importing country with the help of 
internationally traded support services. (Feketekuty 1988, p28). 
 
As a result of the Uruguay Round, the definition and scope of trade in services was further 
developed and incorporated into the General Agreements of Trade in Services (GATS) which 
entered into force in 1995. Since then, the definition provided under the GATS has been widely 
used for policy discussions as well as academic research. According to Article I of the GATS, the 
transactions are categorised into four types and defined as services trade as follows: 
 
o Cross-border supply (mode 1): services are supplied from country A into country B. 
o Consumption abroad (mode 2): consumer of country B moves for consumption to the country 
A of supplier. 
o Commercial presence (mode 3): Services of country A are supplied through a commercial 
entity in country B (Foreign Direct Investment: FDI). 
o Movement of natural persons (mode 4): natural persons of country A move to country B to 
supply services. 
 
 
The GATS also classifies services trade into 12 sectors:  
1. Business services 
2. Communication services 
3. Construction services 
4. Distribution services 
5. Educational services 
6. Environmental services 
7. Financial services 
8. Health-related and social services 
9. Tourism and travel-related services 
10. Recreational, cultural and sporting services 
11. Transport services 
12. Other services not elsewhere included 
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Heterogeneity of services trade     
When we compare trade in services with trade in goods, three stylised characteristics of services 
trade can be identified in the existing literature (François and Wooton 2001; Copeland and Mattoo 
2008; and François and Hoekman 2010).35 
 
A. Tradability36 -more complex than goods trade 
Figure 2-2 illustrates tradability of goods and services for a comparison. In the case of trade in 
goods, a product is simply shipped from one country to another. In other words, international 
exchange takes place only through cross border trade. In comparison, services are basically non-
storable. Thus proximity between the supplier and the consumer is required for its international 
exchange as mentioned earlier. This implies that international exchange takes place in the way a 
factor moves: either consumers cross a border (mode 2) or suppliers (either commercial entities or 
natural persons) have to cross a border (mode 337 and mode 4). In services trade, cross-border trade 
(mode 1), where service information crosses borders, is not a major way of international 
transactions (Copeland and Mattoo 2008) because of their heterogeneity. Jensen (2011) developed 
the concept of ‘tradability’ by classifying services into ‘tradable services’ and ‘non-tradable 
services’. He accounts for ‘tradable services’ as services which it is technologically possible to 
deliver at a distance inside a domestic market, which are, at least in principle, internationally 
tradable. 
Due to complex tradability, the GATS became complicated to understand. For instance, one is   
required technical knowledge to negotiate services trade. This relates to negotiating capacity of 
developing countries, especially participation of the private sector in the domestic decision-making 
process (see Chapter 4). 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35Our arguments in the case study (Chapter 5 and 6) will show how three distinct characteristics of services trade: 
tradability, strong influence of domestic regulation, and direct effects of technological change affect the negotiating 
positions of Japan and ASEAN for the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. 
36 The scope of transactions in services trade is defined wider than for goods trade in the policy community. While the 
scope of trade in goods includes only cross-border supply (mode 1), GATS covers FDI (mode 3) which is not the case 
for the GATT where trade and trade related investment are separately considered. 
37 In most case, FDI in the case of manufacturing sector (goods) takes place as production nodes or plants while Mode 3 
(FDI) of services takes place as transit points for sale of home production to foreign markets (François and Hoekman 
2010). 
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Figure 2-2: A comparison of tradability of goods and services 
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B. Type of restrictions to trade – stronger influence of domestic regulation than for goods trade 
The restrictions of goods trade normally take the form of border controls such as high tariffs. In 
contrast to goods trade, the scope of border restrictions of services trade is very limited. Instead, 
behind-border restrictions, specifically domestic regulations in this case, have a stronger influence. 
According to Copeland and Mattoo (2008, p84), domestic regulations which often serve the dual 
purpose of responding to market failures and protecting local suppliers from foreign competition 
give rise to trade barriers.38 
From the political economy perspective, as we explained in Chapter 1, the strong influence of 
domestic regulation is the reason why this research focuses on domestic political economy factors 
to attest our hypotheses.  
 
C. More direct effects of technological change than in goods trade 
Unlike goods trade, the modes of supply tend to be more directly affected by technological change 
because of the unique tradability of services trade (Melvin 1989). In fact, due to technological 
progress (e.g. electronic means of delivery) and diffusion of ICT (information and communications 
technology)39, proximity between production and consumption is becoming unnecessary for some 
services (Mattoo et al. 2012a). The evolution of ICT-enabled services to be transformed into digital 
format and/or simply transferred through satellite and telecom networks. Services providers and 
                                                          
38 Chapter 6 will demonstrate this is the case of ASEAN. 
39 Technological advancement includes falling travel costs and costs of ICT (e.g. IT hardware, interconnectedness of the 
hardware via the internet, and telecommunications costs). 
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consumers do not necessarily have to be at the same location at the time of production and 
consumption. This means that services which used to be non-tradable are becoming tradable. One 
example is that falling travel costs facilitate trade through mode 2 (the consumer moves for 
services supply) and mode 4 (the supplier moves for services supply). An empirical study on 
services trade of the US by Jensen (2011), which uses the developed concept of ‘tradable services’ 
and ‘non-tradable services’, shows that technological progress and diffusion of ICT change 
tradability of services.40 
Copeland and Mattoo (2008) also point out that technological progress and diffusion of ICT can 
also affect the relations of modes of supply in services. In many cases, modes of supply are 
complementary, but in some cases can be a substitute.41 For example, that legal services used to be 
provided only by mode 4 (lawyers move cross-border to provide legal services) have now become 
also available via internet (mode 1 or mode 2).42 
From the political economy perspective, the relation between technological change and modes of 
supply would influence the policy demand and supply sides’ interests. For example, the Japanese 
ICT sector is not interested in the GATS type services trade negotiations since they thought that the 
GATS does not reflect technological progress of the ICT sector and is technically outdated (See 
Chapter 5: 5.5).     
 
Economic rationale for services trade – applicability of comparative advantage theory 
 
Why would a country like to export services? What are the economic rationales behind exporting? 
A theoretical perspective of services trade has been analysed by economists from the 1960s. They 
examined whether trade theory, which typically explains goods trade can be also applicable for 
services trade (see Melvin 1989). Among these, the validity of comparative advantage theory and 
the Heckscher and Ohlin approach to services trade have been conceptually and empirically 
examined to see whether these theories are robust to demonstrate economic rationale for services 
trade. 
 
To begin with, we briefly review what comparative theory is and how it was developed. The aim of 
the theory of comparative advantage is to understand what kind of forces drive trade between 
countries and how trade contributes to economic gains. Comparative advantage underlines the 
                                                          
40 Technological development and exporting ability of developing countries will be discussed later. 
41 They point out that substitutability of modes is affected not only by technological progress, but by consumer 
preferences, and the regulatory environment. 
42 The relation between supplementary modes of supply and firms’ decision are discussed in Francois and Hoekman 
2010. If firms are free to choose their modes of supply, they would choose the most cost-effective mix.  
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trade relations of countries by explaining that countries which have a relative advantage in 
producing goods will export goods to other countries.43 Later, the H-O approach44 extended the 
theory by focusing on the aspects of factor intensities and factor abundances. It explains that 
countries trade products which have different input intensities and relative abundance of factors 
(e.g. labor, capital, and land)45. It is widely acknowledged that comparative advantage theory is a 
useful tool to analyse the economic rationale for services trade despite the differences from goods. 
 
Among the literature on conceptual analysis, Hindley and Smith (1984) provided the application of 
comparative advantage theory to services trade by distinguishing the positive component and the 
normative component of the comparative advantage theory.46 As for the observation on the positive 
component of the theory, Hindley and Smith hypothesised that countries with a relatively highly- 
skilled labour as well as substantial capital had a comparative advantage in the production of 
services, which they suggested to be normally the case of developed countries.47 Hindley and 
Smith also predicted that technological advances would increase comparative advantage of 
developing countries in the future. The argument of the normative component of the theory is that 
it can be logically applicable to services trade as the comparative theory does not ipso facto 
exclude international transaction involving services from its scope (Hindley and Smith 1984, 
p374). As a result of the examination, they could conclude that the normative component of the 
comparative theory is applicable to services trade by remarking that services are different from 
goods in ways that are significant and that deserve careful attention48, but the powerful logic of the 
theory of comparative advantage transcends these differences. (Hindley and Smith 1984, p389). 
The recent study of Copeland and Mattoo (2008) was a fine-tuned summary which took into 
account the relation between the economic theory of comparative advantage and four modes of 
services supplies. They stressed that comparative advantage theory is applicable to services trade 
and that the theory applies not only to cross-border trade (mode 1 and 2) but also commercial 
presence (mode 3) and movement of natural persons (mode 4). 
 
Some economists have tried to demonstrate empirically the applicability of comparative advantage 
and the H-O approach to services trade in spite of the lack of data in services trade. The early stage 
                                                          
43 See Ricardo (1821), Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 
44 See Heckscher (1919) The Effects of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income. And Ohlin, B. (1933). Interregional 
and International Trade.  
45 It should be noted that H-O theory simply provides a two-factor (capital and labor) model. Later, economists have 
been extending theory using more factors, such as national resources, human capital, technology, the scale of economy, 
and market-imperfection. 
46 Positive theory (descriptive theory) explains the pattern of production and specialisation. Normative theory (or 
prescriptive theory) explains whether trade derived by comparative advantage can generate economic gains and 
investigates the optimal government policies (Hindley and Smith p370). 
47 Hindley and Smith acknowledged their hypotheses need further empirical analysis. In their study, an empirical study 
done by Sapir and Luts (1981) was used to support their hypotheses.   
48 The study raised three cases that reflect the characteristics of services sector: (i) regulation and licensing, (ii) 
investment and (iii) infant-industry protection for further careful analysis. 
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of empirical analysis was done by Sapir and Luts (1981). They empirically tested the determinants 
of comparative advantage in the freight services, passenger services, and insurance services. They 
found that the comparative advantage theory is empirically applicable and that the countries which 
are abundant in physical and human capital have a comparative advantage in services. In addition, 
location and economies of scale are critical factors in some cases. Li, Moshirian and Sim (2005) 
analysed the intra-industry trade in financial services. Their results suggest that relative abundance 
of human capital and physical capital are major factors of comparative advantage. They also found 
that mean per capita income, economies of scale, trade intensity, and the degree of market 
openness are important factors. 
 
Further, recent empirical studies show strong evidence of the validity of comparative advantage 
theories to services. Nyahoho (2010) expanded the categories of services49 using updated data, and 
tested the variables: physical capital, human capital, per capita GDP, economies of scale, and 
research and development. The result suggests that H-O theory is a useful tool to account for 
services trade, although he assessed that further improvement of the model is necessary. His 
findings also indicate that the significance of explanatory variables differs among ten categories of 
services. For example, human capital is the most significant determinant of the computer and 
information services, while R&D shows positive link in several categories of services. A recent 
study done by Jensen (2011) proved by strong empirical evidence that comparative advantage and 
H-O approach can be applied to the US services trade which has comparative advantage in skill-
intensive and high-wage business service industries. He found that the workers engaged in the 
‘tradable services’50 have higher education and earnings in the US. And he concluded that the 
results demonstrate that ‘tradable services’ are exported to the rest of the world in consistency with 
comparative advantage. In other words, the US has comparative advantage in ‘tradable services’ 
industries and occupations. The findings of an empirical study done by Mattoo et al. (2012a) are 
also noteworthy. They found that in addition to two major important determinants of service 
exports: human capital and electronic infrastructure, they identified that the quality of institutions51 
also shows a strong positive relation with services exports.   
 
From the above, we can summarise as follows. In spite of the heterogeneity of services trade, the 
economic rationale for trade can be explained by using comparative advantage and the H-O 
approach just as for goods trade. The major determinants of exporting services trade include: 
                                                          
49 These are passenger transport, freight, travel, communications services, construction services, insurance, financial 
services, computer and information services, royalties and licence fees, and personal, cultural and recreational services. 
50 As noted earlier, he classified services industries and occupations by tradability and categorised into two groups: 
tradable services and the non-tradable services. 
51 In Mattoo et al. (p7, 2012a), the quality of institutions includes the degree of corruption, complexity of export 
procedures, and rigidity in employment law. We have to recognise the definition of ‘institution’ in terms of international 
political economy is much wider than their narrow definition. 
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human capital, physical capital and the electronic infrastructure. 52  Other factors, such as 
institutions, per capita GDP, research and development, location, economies of scale, trade 
intensity and degree of market openness also show positive relations, though the degree of 
intensity differs by services sectors.  
 
 
2.3 The Market dimension – market structure and global services trade 
 
The assessment of market structure should not be ignored when one analyses the market 
integration of the services sectors as the market structure strongly affects market access and the 
degree of integration inside a region (see for example François and Wooton 2001). This section 
aims to provide a theoretical analysis of the services sector in two dimensions: (i) market structure 
and (ii) global trade in services, in order to facilitate the empirical analysis of the services sector in 
East Asia (Chapter 3: 3.2). By examining the domestic market structure, one can identify the 
characteristics of the services firms as actors of domestic political economy in trade. By looking at 
the structure of global trade, one can understand the economic power balance of the services sector, 
namely in the relation between developed and developing countries. 
 
Characteristics of services market structure 
According to the literature (François and Wooton 2001; Copeland and Mattoo 2008; Hoekman and 
Mattoo 2008; and François and Hoekman 2010), the services market structure has three strong 
characteristics. These comprise: (a) public character, (b) natural monopoly and imperfect 
competition, and (c) division of labour in production. 
 
(a) Public character 
We can see a strong public character in the services sector. Many services sectors are traditionally 
publicly owned or services are provided under regulated monopolistic conditions. Some services 
such as educational, health, water supply, postal services are illustrated as examples of public 
oriented services sectors. Other sectors such as communications, transportation, and financial 
sectors used to be publicly owned. Then privatisation took place during the late 1980s and 1990s in 
many countries followed by introduction of competition.53  However, strong restrictions to protect 
incumbents still tend to remain especially in developing countries.  
 
(b) Natural monopoly and imperfect competition 
Because the service sectors cover from the upstream market to the downstream market, economic 
                                                          
52 According to economic analysis of three major determinants, the ASEAN government’s positions to focus on human 
capital, physical capital and the electronic infrastructure to develop its domestic services sector rather than services trade 
liberalisation (Chapter 6) is rational.  
53 See Hoekman and Mattoo (2008). 
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agents tend to gain and exercise market power. In the network industries (e.g. telecommunications, 
electricity, gas, postal, water and transport), which are vertically integrated and require economies 
of scale for their operation, natural monopolies tend to arise. Even if not at the point of natural 
monopoly, traditionally services sectors are intensively regulated due to asymmetry of information 
and suchlike. The result is a low degree of competition, as with professional services.54  
 
(c) Division of labour in production  
The services sector can be sub-divided into smaller segments of services in relation to the 
production process. Hindley and Smith (1984) express a prominent role of services as ‘an 
intermediate good’. François and Hoekman (2010) observe that “services serve a coordination role 
and make possible a further subdivision of tasks and wholesale reorganisation of production” 
(François and Hoekman, 2010, p651).  
  
 
Characteristics of global trade in services 
 
(a) Developed countries as major exporters in global trade in services 
Mode 1 and Mode 2: Developed countries retain their place as major suppliers of global trade in 
services in terms of Mode 1 and Mode 2.55 As can be seen from Figure 2-3, the United States 
accounts for almost 15 per cent of world trade in services. Other OECD countries, such as the EU 
member countries, other European countries and Japan are listed in the top 20. One reason is that 
services industries engaging in international transactions tend to be organised around information 
and its exploitation (Hindley and Smith 1984, p386). As comparative advantage suggests, it is 
developed countries which have a relatively large skilled labour force and substantial capital 
export services. The other reason is that the services intensity of economies increases as per capita 
income increases (see Hoekman and Mattoo 2008).56 This implies that developed countries are 
potential providers in global services markets. 
 
  
                                                          
54 See Rincon-Aznar et al. (2010). 
55 Services trade data provided by the international organisations (e.g. the World Bank and the WTO) covers trade flows 
in Mode 1 and Mode 2 but not Mode 3. See the World Bank Trade in Services Database (http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/trade-in-services).  
56 Hoekman and Mattoo (2008) provides several demand-and supply-side reasons for this, such as high income 
elasticities of demand for services (which is higher than 1), labour productivity improvements in providing consumer 
services, demand for intermediate services and demand for outsourcing by firms and government in accordance with 
economic and social structural change through development. 
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Figure 2-3: Leading exporters in world trade in services, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2011 
 
 
Mode 3 (FDI): Mode 3 (FDI) plays a significant role in services trade among the four modes of 
supply, accounting for 55-60 per cent of world services trade.57 However, due to a deficiency of 
publicly available data on services investment (Mode 3),58 economic researchers in the area have 
been unable to provide a comprehensive analysis of world trends. Currently researchers are 
developing new micro-level data on services investment (Mode 3) to improve the situation. 
According to Kilrkegaard (2012), who introduced a new micro-level of data sources59 to provide a 
detailed sector-specific analysis of services investment in ADB regional members in Asia, 60  
OECD countries dominated almost three-quarters of inward transactional FDI (mode 3) in services 
to ADB regional member countries between 1988-2011.61 As can be seen from the Figure 2-4, 
among East Asian countries, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong China, China, and Malaysia were in 
the top-ten source economies of FDI (mode 3) in services to ADB regional member countries.62 
However, the size of FDI (Mode 3) from the U.S. is remarkably large in comparison with that of 
others. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 From the World Bank website (https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/data_day15_e/jose_guilherme_reis.pdf). 
58 The traditional data used for analysis of FDI trends is the data collected in accordance with IMF Balance of Payments 
Manual Fifth Revision. Since many developing countries face a lack of capacity to collect data, the traditional data is not 
comprehensive in terms of coverage, periodicity, timeliness, quality and integrity (Kirkegaard 2012, p3). 
59 See Kirkegaard 2012, p6. 
60 There are 48 ADB regional members within Asia and the Pacific (https://www.adb.org). 
61 Kirkegaard 2012, p14 
62 One should note that the data is inward FDI to ADB regional member countries, instead of global level. 
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Figure 2-4: Inward Transactional FDI in services (Mode 3), Source Country, 1988-2011 
 
 
Source: kirkegaard (2012), p14 
 
 
(b)  Global value chains (GVCs) and potential for developing countries 
The classic trade relationship, which is developed countries as exporters of services trade and 
developing countries as importers, is changing (Ghani, Grover, Kharas 2011; and Mattoo et al. 
2012). Thanks to advances in ICT, non-tradable services are becoming tradable (e.g. mode 1 trade 
in IT sector increased). Further, as international air flights become cheap, mode 4 is becoming a 
major source of supply for developing countries (e.g. nurses, IT service providers and 
infrastructure services providers). This provides great opportunities for developing countries to 
export services. 
 
In addition, it should be noted that developing countries are participating in global value chains 
(GVCs). GVCs is a term explaining the possibility of slicing up and optimising value chain 
activities among multiple companies and various geographical locations (WTO and IDE/JETRO 
2011h, p10). Thanks to technological advances and the reduction of transport costs, a vertical 
production process is becoming more fragmented into tasks which can be internationally traded. In 
fact, recent trends show that division of labour expands to the global level. It is well understood 
that GVCs have been expanding in the manufacturing sector and that the services sector plays an 
important role in supporting division of labour in the manufacturing sector. In other words, “a 
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chain or network of services” (Maurer and Tschang 2011) enables effective GVCs in the 
manufacturing sector. An empirical study done by WTO and IDE/JETRO (2011h) shows that 
services trade is now becoming an important segment of growing GVCs. 
 
According to the WTO and IDE/JETRO empirical analysis, a value chain takes place not only in 
the manufacturing sector but also the services sector, such as ‘business process outsourcing (BPO)’ 
or ‘information technology-enabled services’ (ITES)63, and distribution and retail sales in East Asia. 
Developing countries in East Asia are increasingly benefitting from emerging GVCs relating to the 
services sector. Maurer and Tschang (2011) explain the new trend that GVCs exist in the services 
sector itself, not only in the manufacturing sector or to facilitate the GVCs in the manufacturing 
sector. Global services supply chains can be seen in sectors such as telecommunications; computer 
and IT services; banking services; education services; research and development services; legal, 
accountancy and management services; and architecture and engineering services (Maurer and 
Tschang 2011; and PECC and ADB Institute 2011). 
 
What should be noted here is that analysis of GVCs and global services supply chains became 
available from late 2000s to early 2010s (Box 2-1). Both the private sector and government were 
now aware of an increasing role of GVCs and global services supply chains at the time of services 
trade negotiations for the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs (see Chapter 5 and 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 BPR and ITES includes the services such as R&D, data processing, call centres, virtual assistance, legal support, 
medical support, finance and accounting, software and applications development (see WTO and JETRO 2011, p24) 
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Box 2-1: Trade Development in East Asia –From the flying geese model to IPNs, then 
to GVCs? 
The ‘flying geese’ model developed by Akamatsu (1935) has been often cited to explain the 
pattern of trade and development in East Asia. Akamatsu (1935) discovered a pattern of trade 
related to the pattern of development of Japanese industry. Starting from the textiles in the 
1930, Japan went through the sequential stages of trade development: importing a new product, 
localisation of producing the new product, exporting the new product, catching-up by Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIES), shifting to other production.  And NIES experienced the 
same sequential stages followed by ASEAN. In this way, industrialisation in East Asia took 
place led by technology transfer and comparative advantage. Since the pattern of development 
appeared on a time-series-graph forms ‘V’ shape and looks like ‘flying geese’, it was named 
‘flying geese’ model. 
From the 1990s to the 2000s, literature on East Asian economic integration (Kimura and Ando 
2005; Kawai 2007; Ando 2006; and Kimura 2006a)) underlined that economic integration in 
East Asia was led-by international production networks (IPNs) namely driven by the Japanese 
manufacturing sector. IPNs were defined as vertical production networks of intra-firm and 
inter-firm linkages which were extended across the countries in the region. What should be 
noted here is that role of services trade was neglected in the literature since economic literature 
on IPNs used the traditional statistical measurement of trade which include the full export value 
of ‘embodied services’ (services input during the manufacturing production process) into 
manufacturing exports. 
The statistical measurement for GVCs derived from Input-Output Tables paved a way to 
identify the emerging ‘embodied services’ in international trade. The issue of GVCs and the 
roles of services trade is attracting the attention of economists (Gareffi and Sturgeon 2009; 
Maurer and Tschang 2011; Drake-Brockman and Stephenson 2012; and Stephenson 2013). 
However, there exist several statistical limitations and the economic study on services trade 
dimension of GVCs in East Asia is still at the initial stage. 
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2.4. The Policy dimension 
 
2.4.1 Instruments of protection and impediments to services trade integration 
 
The market is integrated when the free movement of goods or services is attained. However, the 
market would hardly be integrated when impediments restrict free movement. In terms of political 
economy, it is crucial to identify how governments intervene in the market to protect their 
domestic market and what kind of government interventions are likely to become impediments to 
foreign services suppliers. Based on that, one should clarify how government intervention for trade 
in services differs from trade in goods. We differentiate here between two types of trade barriers. 
One consists of measures which governments intentionally introduce to protect the domestic 
services sector.  The other is government interventions in the market which are introduced without 
intention of restricting trade which, however, become de-facto impediments64 to foreign services 
suppliers. In practice, differentiation between the two is not easy, because at the domestic level, in 
almost all economies, the services sector is the target of government intervention and regulation of 
a nature and degree which is different from the intervention to which non-service activities are 
subject. (Hindley and Smith 1984, p377) 
 
Instruments of protection 
 
The significant difference in comparison with trade in goods is that barriers to trade in services are 
more complicated. Copeland and Mattoo (2008) provided three reasons for this. First, whereas 
trade in goods physically crosses the border and is subject to tariffs as well as customs procedures, 
trade in services is intangibly delivered from supplier to consumer. Therefore, applying tax is 
technically infeasible. Second, the modes of supply for services are more complicated than for 
goods. Lastly, many services are highly regulated or are provided by the public sector.  
 
Table 2-1 shows a comparison of protection measures between goods trade and services trade. 
While tariffs are a common way to protect the domestic market in the case of goods trade, services 
trade policies tend to take the form of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as prohibitions, quotas, 
qualification and licensing (see Box 2-2). As is the case with goods, NTBs are not transparent and 
are difficult to measure. The significant difference is that the institutions and domestic regulations 
are more complicated than for goods as many regulatory agencies are involved in protection 
                                                          
64 De-facto impediments can be explained in economics as the measures which unintentionally make foreign suppliers’ 
operation relatively more costly (Copeland and Mattoo 2008). 
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measures. 
 
Table 2-1: Characteristics of protection measures – a comparison between goods trade and 
services trade 
 
 
 Goods trade Services trade 
Tariffs  Common device of protection 
 Easy to measure 
 Negotiation focal point is clear 
 Technically infeasible  
 
Non-tariff barriers  As tariff goes down or are 
eliminated, NTBs are 
highlighted for further 
liberalisation. 
 Difficult to measure, not 
transparent. 
 Negotiation focal point is not 
clear 
 Barriers take the form of 
NTBs 
 Difficult to measure, not 
transparent. 
 Complicated institutions (e.g. 
many regulatory agents are 
involved) 
 Negotiation focal points are 
not clear 
 Pervasiveness of NTBs 
makes services liberalisation 
difficult 
 
 
 
 
Impediments of services trade integration - Domestic Regulations 
Whether governments have an intention to protect the market or not, domestic regulations can be 
impediments to services trade. Economists observe that the services sector is more highly 
Box 2-2: Examples of government protection measures 
o Control of the rates charged by utilities 
o Control of entry into and of rates charged in various modes of transport 
o Control by licensing and/or numerical restriction of entry into many services such as the 
law, accountancy, medicine, hairdressing and taxi driving,  
o Government ownership or control of telecommunication, broadcasting, cable television 
and other media, 
o Detailed supervision of the structure and practices of banks, insurance companies, security 
traders and other financial companies. 
(in Hindley and Smith 1984, p378) 
Restrictions relating to Mode 3 
o Application of some form of screening or registration process which causes unnecessary 
burden for the foreign investors 
o Restrictions on the level or share of foreign ownership (often relating to privatisations) 
o Case-by-case assessments based on vague national interest criteria 
o Restrictions on ownership and control (e.g. the share of board membership) 
o Performance requirements or input controls  
(in Findlay and Warren 2000, p53) 
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regulated than other sectors due to market failures.65 Types of market failures include:  
 
(i) Market power: To prevent firms from exercising market power (natural monopoly or 
oligopoly), government introduce pro-competitive regulations. 
(ii) Imperfect and asymmetric information: To keep quality of services and protect consumers 
from imperfect information, regulations such as licensing, technical standards, qualification 
requirements, prudential regulations are introduced. 
(iii) Externalities:  (e.g. universal service obligations (= equity) in a network sector)  
(iv) Public goods: Governments have to consider non-economic objectives as public policy 
objectives such as protecting health, safety and the environment. 
 
When governments react to resolve market failures, it is considered as legitimate.66 Box 2-2 shows 
some examples of domestic regulations in the banking and financial sector and 
telecommunications sector. In the case of the financial sector, major objectives of regulations are: 
(i) to constrain the use of market power, (ii) to protect smaller and less informed clients against 
failure or adverse behaviour of financial institutions, and (iii) to ensure systemic stability. Although 
governments pursue legitimate objectives, the regulations can still be considered as de-facto trade 
barriers for foreign services suppliers. In practice, the regulations can be also become a tool to 
protect local service suppliers from foreign services suppliers.67 Hindley and Smith (1984) point 
out that once the service supplier fulfils the regulatory requirement, the regulatory agency “is in 
imminent danger of ‘capture’ by the industry, of being more concerned with protecting the interests 
of suppliers than those of consumers” (Hindley and Smith 1984, p380).68  
  
                                                          
65 See Hindlay and Smith (1984), Copeland and Mattoo (2008) and others. 
66 We will argue the issue of market failures in the context of the status quo of domestic regulatory authorities by using 
veto power model in Chapter 5 and 6. 
67 In economic terms, regulation is justified: if market failures are overcome; the least-cost form of regulation is opted 
for; and the net benefit is positive. 
68 This relates to our arguments of interests of domestic regulatory agencies in Chapter 5 and 6. 
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2.4.2 Preferential services liberalisation 
 
From the theoretical point of view, promoting services trade liberalisation by international 
agreements, either multilateral or plurilateral, is very difficult in comparison with goods due to the 
heterogeneity of services (Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir (2007); and François and Hoekman (2010)). 
The policy options to promote services trade are: reciprocal liberalisation through the multilateral 
system under the GATS, preferential liberalisation or unilateral liberalisation. Preferential services 
liberalisation is a political economic strategy to promote regional economic integration by 
improving market access among the member countries of the agreements. However, the level of 
liberalisation is not as clear as is the case for goods trade and attaining substantive liberalisation is 
more difficult than for goods. We highlight three major differences in comparison with goods. 
  
First is that the GATS has a more flexible structure than in the case for goods trade under GATT. 
For example, the GATS takes a liberalisation approach which is called the ‘positive list approach’. 
This means that only the sectors for which commitments are made become subject to liberalisation 
undertakings. Another example is that whereas GATT in principle prohibits quantitative 
restrictions or denial of national treatment, GATS prohibits them only where commitments are 
made. François and Hoekman (2010) raised a concern on effectiveness of the GATS in terms of 
liberalisation by explaining that how much discipline the agreements impose, whether in terms of 
required policy changes on paper or in terms of actual implementation, is not known. (François 
Box 2-3: Types of domestic regulations of services 
Example 1. Banking and financial sector: 
(a) restrictions which limit competition: licensing restrictions on the entry of new 
domestic or foreign banks, equity limits that prescribe minimum domestic or 
government involvement and operating restrictions limiting the nature and scope of 
bank operations 
(b) Restrictions which meet legitimate objectives: For prudential purposes, minimum 
capital requirements, capital adequacy ratios, liquidity reserve ratios, possible 
coverage by an insolvency guarantee or deposit insurance scheme, and transparency 
measures. 
 
Example 2. Telecommunications: 
(a) Restrictions which limit competition: limited or heavily prescriptive licences, 
equity limits, and failure to adopt a pro-competitive regulatory regime. 
(b) Restrictions which meet legitimate objectives: regulations to meet universal 
services obligations 
(in Dee 2010a) 
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and Hoekman 2010, p678). Since most of FTAs take the GATS style69, the rules governing services 
trade liberalisation within the region and the type of commitments they make is mostly the same as 
in the GATS. This implies that services liberalisation in an FTA itself cannot become a strong 
promoter of services trade integration in comparison with preferential liberalisation in goods.  
 
Second, services liberalisation is more complicated than in the case of goods. In other words, the 
policy targets of services trade liberalisation or liberalisation criteria, are not clear as is the case of 
goods. As pointed out earlier, tariffs are major barriers in the case of goods trade. Thus, 
governments can reduce or eliminate tariffs as the first policy priority for liberalisation. The 
private sector can also easily request tariff reduction or elimination of the sectors of their concerns. 
Given that regulations themselves are barriers in the case of services, simple tariff reduction as 
such cannot be the option. Thus, regulatory reforms become necessary. Furthermore, as pointed out 
by Copeland and Mattoo (2008), services trade liberalisation cannot be achieved without 
subsequent domestic regulatory reform. Dee (2010a) suggested that for substantive market 
integration in services, governments should focus on (i) first restrictions that explicitly limit 
competition, (ii) then, the domestic regulations that are intended to meet legitimate objectives but 
are more burdensome than necessary. On the other hand, Dee admits the fact that judging whether 
regulations are more burdensome than necessary is not easy because of the different level of 
development among members of a preferential trade area. The complexity of services liberalisation 
and of the way to achieve substantive market integration may also diminish the private sector’s 
incentive to promote services liberalisation through FTAs as they do not know how to set up their 
policy targets. 
 
Third, domestic politics matters more than in goods trade liberalisation as many regulatory 
agencies are involved through the process of domestic reform. Mattoo and Amin (2006) pointed 
out that impediments to services trade integration are not necessarily limited to regulations alone. 
They emphasise a role of governance institutions 70  especially in developing countries. They 
explain that services sectors are more institutionally dependent than other sectors because services 
need a more complicated web of transactions and rely more on regulations to redress asymmetry of 
information. 
 
  
                                                          
69 Some PTAs introduce the ‘negative list approach’, the so-called NAFTA approach, where liberalisation applies to all 
sectors unless a country specifies exemptions. 
70 In Mattoo and Amin (2006), governance institutions mean institutions relating to regulatory and contract enforcement. 
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2.5 The Political economy dimension 
 
From the political economy dimension, how are services trade negotiations different from goods 
trade negotiations? Here we highlight (i) incentives to promote services trade negotiations, (ii) 
trade policy-making institutions by reviewing the existing literature and (iii) impediments to the 
WTO services trade negotiation.71 The case study (Chapter 5 and 6), which apply our policy 
demand and supply side model modified from Mattli (1999a), will reflect the theoretical arguments 
below. 
 
2.5.1 Incentives to promote services trade negotiations 
François and Hoekman (2010) diagnose incentives to promote services trade negotiations by 
focusing on two explanations: (a) Incentives to use trade agreements as domestic policy reform 
anchors, and (b) bargaining incentives. According to the literature, incentives for services trade 
negotiations are weaker than that of goods trade. 
 
(a) Weak incentives to use trade agreements as domestic policy reform anchors: To promote trade 
agreements for the purpose of using them as an anchor of domestic reforms of trade partners, 
the pressure of the domestic private sector for market access has to be strong enough. In the 
case of services, export interests are weaker than in manufacturing sector because services are 
more difficult to trade (François and Hoekman, 2010, p678). As a result, the vested interests of 
import-competing sectors to resist opening the domestic market overcome the interests of 
export-oriented services pushing for liberalisation of foreign markets. Even if the interests of 
export-oriented services sectors overcome the pressure from import-competing services sectors, 
reducing trade barriers through trade negotiations is difficult in practice. This observation by 
François and Hoekman implies that the ineffectiveness of services trade agreements diminishes 
the willingness of export-oriented services sectors to push governments promoting 
liberalisation through FTAs. François and Hoekman also observe that achieving domestic 
reform of the services sector through trade agreements is difficult by illustrating the experiences 
of the EU internal market for services.72 They also point out that if the size of the markets of 
negotiating partners is small, the incentive to promote domestic reform is diminished. 
 
                                                          
71 IPE literature on services trade policy and FTAs in general is scarce. Research on services trade has been mostly 
initiated by international organisations (e.g. World Bank, WTO, and OECD). 
72 Chapter IV of this project will observe in detail. 
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(b) Weak bargaining incentives: François and Hoekman (2010) point out a lack of bargaining 
incentives in services trade. In their analysis, incentives of the potential direct investors to use 
the GATS negotiation process as well as reciprocity mechanisms including regional agreements 
are very weak. They also observe that bargaining incentives of governments are weak because 
the adjustment costs associated with service-sector liberalisation may be lower than in the case 
of goods (François and Hoekman 2010, p679). 
 
2.5.2 Trade policy-making institutions 
VanGrasstek (2011) underlined the political economy of services in regional trade agreements. 
Although a policy working paper by the OECD secretariat is not a contribution by an IPE scholar, 
it gives an important insight to differentiate services trade negotiations from goods trade 
negotiations. For example, he identifies two differences in domestic politics between trade in 
services and trade in goods in terms of institutions. 
(a) Complicated “division of labour among domestic governmental institutions” of services: 
There are many regulatory agencies policing services-related domestic regulations, and in 
some countries several layers of governance (e.g. states, provinces, and cantons) exist inside a 
country. The regulatory agencies concerned exercise “exclusive” or “shared” regulatory power 
which make it difficult to promote negotiations. 
(b) Lack of awareness of services sectors as an actor of trade policy formulation: Producers in 
some services sectors are less aware of themselves as producers and more likely not aware 
that they are potential exporters. Thus, services sectors are less likely to participate actively in 
trade policy formulation. 
As for the first point, there are two distinct institutional characteristics of government as an actor 
of services trade diplomacy. One is horizontal fragmentation. Many ministries are involved in 
services trade policy especially during the domestic policy-making process and sometimes even 
the international negotiation process. The services cover a wide range of industries which are 
divided into eleven categories such as transport, communication, construction, distribution, 
educational, environmental, financial, health-related and social services, tourism, business, and 
cultural and sporting.73 These services sectors are all supervised by a certain ministry or regulatory 
agency. Hence, when it comes to services trade negotiations, whether multilateral or plurilateral, 
all of these regulatory ministries or agencies become potential actors to reflect their offensive or 
defensive interests. The second institutional characteristic is vertical fragmentation. The situation 
                                                          
73 See the GATS classification described in Chapter 2: 2.2. 
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becomes more complicated in federal states as provincial governments administer the services- 
related regulations (e.g. licensing and qualification of professional services, health related services, 
educational services and water or energy related services) at the sub-national level. In this case, a 
provincial government may possibly exercise regulatory power through the domestic decision 
process. 
 
2.5.3 Impediments to the WTO services trade integration 
Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir (2007) analysed why the WTO services trade negotiation lacks 
dynamism by examining six hypotheses: (i) due to technological advances, more and more 
services are becoming available through cross-border trade without being affected by policy, (ii) 
many countries unilaterally liberalised markets expecting that liberalisation increases competition 
in the services industry and brings about economic efficiency, (iii) there are perceptions to advance 
preferential trade agreements as a substitute for the WTO, (iv)  resistance to further liberalisation 
due to adjustment costs and vested interests of incumbents exist in the domestic politics, (v) 
governments concern that the ability of regulators might be limited by multilateral rules and 
disciplines, (vi) the domestic regulatory structures of sharing/overlapping regulatory competencies 
between national and provincial governments makes international negotiations more 
complicated.74 They argued that all factors play an important role in explaining the little progress 
made in the WTO services trade negotiations. And among these factors, regulatory constraints, 
which are characterized as one of the most unique features of services trade in comparison with 
goods trade, are highlighted as a critical factor to explain the political economy of services trade. 
The literature provides basic political economic insights of services trade liberalisation under the 
multilateral system which can be also applied to plurilateral negotiations.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter captured the heterogeneity of services trade by distinguishing it from trade in goods to 
see the implications for our political economy arguments on services trade integration in East Asia. 
The following is a summary of the key findings: 
 
                                                          
74 The literature solely relied on a quantitative analysis (e.g. a regression model) to prove the causality between a 
dependent variable and six independent variables. The analysis lacks empirical evidence which is supported by the 
sectoral, mode-based or country case studies. 
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From the conceptualisation of services trade (2.2), we can see that the intangible and non-storable 
characteristics of services by nature generate the heterogeneity of services trade such as more 
complicated modes of supply, stronger effects of domestic regulations, and more direct effects of 
technology advancement on tradability in comparison with goods trade. In spite of the differences, 
comparative advantage can be applied as a framework to examine the economic rationale for 
services trade. 
Observing services trade from the market dimension (2.3), we also found strong characteristics. 
First, the services market structure exhibits heterogeneity such as (i) strong public character, (ii) 
natural monopoly and imperfect competition, and (iii) division of labour in production. In terms of 
global trade in services, it is observed that developed countries are major exporters. At the same 
time, developing countries have a huge potential for exporting services. Thanks to technology 
advancement and reduced costs of international transportation, formerly untradeable services are 
becoming more tradable. As a consequence, the scope for developing countries to participate as 
part of emerging global services supply chains is increasing. 
Next, this paper looked at the policy dimension (2.4) by highlighting (i) instruments of protection 
and impediments to services trade integration, and (ii) preferential trade agreements as a tool to 
promote institutional integration. The instruments of protection are more complicated than those 
for goods trade because protection measures take the form of NTBs. Because the services sector is 
more highly regulated than the manufacturing sector due to market failures, domestic regulations 
tend to become de-facto impediments to services trade integration whether governments have an 
intention to protect the market or not.  As for the second point, it is clear that achieving 
liberalisation through FTAs is more difficult than in the case of goods trade, because GATS-type 
agreements cannot be the powerful tool to implement liberalisation. Moreover, liberalisation 
criteria are not clear due to the fact that domestic regulations become the barriers for services trade.  
Lastly, we analysed the political economy dimension by spotlighting (i) incentives to promote 
services trade agreements through FTAs and (ii) trade-policy institutions. From the existing 
literature, we found that incentives to promote services trade agreements are weaker than those of 
goods trade. We also found that the trade policy-making institutions of services trade are more 
complicated than that for goods trade.  
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Chapter 3: Underdeveloped Services Trade  
Integration in East Asia –The Distinctive 
Characteristics 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the existing economic literature, East Asia is featured as ‘market-driven (de facto)’ integration.75 
This seems an extreme characterisation highlighting only the manufacturing sector while ignoring 
the services sector which is as important a segment of economies. In fact, services trade integration 
is underdeveloped in East Asia in spite of its growing importance. The objective of this chapter is 
to demonstrate underdeveloped services trade integration in East Asia in terms of market 
dimension as well as policy dimension, since this can be featured as the distinctive characteristics 
of East Asia. We discuss this in the following order. We first conceptualise services trade 
integration. As for the market dimension, we observe the level of development of the countries 
concerned and the size of the services sector. Then we examine the competitiveness of East Asian 
countries in global services trade. Based on these, the level of services trade integration in the 
region is assessed. As for the policy dimension, the level of restrictiveness of the actual policies 
and regulations of each country is analysed. Then we focus on the level of existing FTAs in the 
region to assess the level of policy-led integration. Lastly, a conclusion is given. 
We have to note that the economic data used in this chapter is drawn from around 2010.76 The first 
reason is to show the economic status of each country as well as trade relations of the East Asian 
countries after the first wave of bilateral FTA policy initiative took place in East Asia in the 2000s. 
 
3.2 Defining services trade integration 
This project modifies the concept used in Urata (2002) and Gasiorek and Holmes (2008) to define 
services trade integration. Urata (2002) uses the terminology of ‘market-led’ integration and 
‘institution-led’ integration in explaining the regional economic integration in East Asia. He 
                                                          
75 See Chapter 1: 1.2.1. 
76 We should also note that the international data of services trade is currently available up to 2011. The World Bank 
explained that collecting services data is difficult due to intangible nature of services as well as the high capacity needed 
to record such data (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/trade-in-services). Checking existing services data of East 
Asian countries, the author of this research selected the data with a wider coverage of the countries in the Region. 
Consequently, data used in this chapter is mostly from the year 2010 and 2011. 
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examines the foreign trade and FDI patterns of East Asia and characterises the pattern of 
integration as a ‘market-led’ integration. Then he judges that East Asia is currently shifting from 
‘market-led’ to’ institutional-led’ economic integration. 77  Gasiorek and Holmes (2008) 
conceptualise market integration and institutional integration in the context of the globalised world 
economy. Market integration refers to the economic dimension of integration such as the private 
sector’s trade and investment. Institutional integration refers to policy actions. They argue that the 
deep integration 78  taking place in the world economy can be defined as a market-led and 
institutional-led process towards integration. Their hypothesis is that ‘deep institutional integration 
is likely to lead to deep market integration, but that deep market integration is also creating a 
demand for further institutional integration’ (Gasiorek and Holmes 2008, p3).  
Given the conceptualising exercises above, the term ‘services trade integration’ is conceptualised 
along two dimensions: (a) ‘market-led services trade integration’ which means the economic 
dimension of integration and (b) ‘policy-led services trade integration’ which means the political 
and institutional dimension of integration (see Figure 3-1). To analyse the political economy of 
services trade in East Asia, this project defines ‘policy-led services trade integration’ as the 
services trade segment of the FTA activity in East Asia. 
 
Figure 3-1: Definition of Services Trade Integration 
 
                                                          
77 In comparison with East Asia, Urata (2002) analyses that economic integration took place in Western Europe early 
post WWII was institution-led type, and economic integration in North America was developed by market-led 
integration supplemented by institution-led integration.  
78 Gasiorek and Holmes (2008) developed further the term ‘deep integration’ firstly developed by Lawrence (1996). 
According to Lawrence (1996), whereas ‘shallow integration’ means the elimination of border measure such as tariffs 
and quotas, ‘deep integration’ is defined as a process whereby behind the border measures such as domestic regulatory 
measures, are eliminated. 
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3.3 An Overview of the Services market 
 
3.3.1 East Asian countries and services sector 
 
East Asia - the region of diversified economies 
Before taking a closer look at the services market, one has to understand the background of the 
region. East Asia covers countries with diversified levels of development in terms of economy and 
socio-economy. As can be seen from the GDP per capita (Figure 3-2), Japan and Singapore are 
high income economies with more than 40,000 US dollars, followed by middle income countries: 
Brunei and South Korea, of between 26,000 and 20,000 US dollars. Other countries: Malaysia, 
Thailand, China, Indonesia and The Philippines, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, still belong to 
lower middle income or low income economies with GDP per capita under 10,000 US dollars.  
Figure 3-3 presents the level of development and its relation with market demand. Singapore and 
Brunei show high PPP GNI79, followed by Japan, South Korea and Malaysia. PPP GNI of the rest 
of the East Asian countries accounts for still less than 10,000 US dollars, which means that market 
demand is not so powerful. The exception is China which can exploit the economies of scale. 
Taking into account the socio-economic factors (see Table 3-1: international human development 
indicators, world ranking), the top-ranked countries are Japan (rank: 12), South Korea (rank: 15), 
Singapore (rank: 26) and Brunei (rank: 33). At the middle level, Malaysia is ranked 61. The other 
countries are ranked lower than 100. In short, from GDP per capita, PPP GNI and human 
development indicators, the East Asian countries can be classified into three groups. One 
comprises the wealthy economies such as Japan, Singapore, Brunei and South Korea. Second is the 
middle class industrialised economy such as Malaysia. And the rest are developing economies. 
 
  
                                                          
79 PPP GNI: GNI per capita: GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) is gross national income (GNI) 
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. 
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Figure 3-2: GDP per capita, East Asian countries 
 
 
 
Note: The data for Brunei is 2002-2006. No data for Myanmar are available. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
 
Figure 3-3: GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity of East Asian Countries: 2010 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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Table 3-1: International Human Development Indicators, World Ranking, 2011 
Country Rank 
Brunei 33 
Cambodia 139 
China 101 
Indonesia 124 
Japan 12 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 138 
Malaysia 61 
Myanmar 149 
Singapore 26 
South Korea 15 
The Philippines 112 
Thailand 103 
Viet Nam 128 
 
Source: UNDP International Human Development Index, World Ranking, 2011 
 
 
Growing services sector in economies 
The shares of economic outputs in the services sector increase in accordance with economic 
development, while the outputs of the agriculture and manufacturing sectors fall (see Findlay and 
Warren 2000 and François and Hoekman 2010). In other words, as explained in Chapter 2, the size 
of the services sector in developing countries is smaller than in developed countries. This 
characterisation applies to East Asia (see Figure 3-4). The services sectors of Japan and Singapore 
accounted for more than 70 % of GDP in the 2010, which is significantly higher than those of the 
East Asian developing countries. Looking at the dynamic trend, services as a share GDP in The 
Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan and China increased from 2000 to 2010. On 
the other hand, some of the ASEAN countries, such as Viet Nam and Thailand, experienced slight 
declines over the period. The latter two have growing export-oriented manufacturing industries 
which play a role as a part of regional supply chains in East Asia. Thus, the growth of the 
manufacturing sector overcame that of the services sector during the period. 
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Figure 3-4: Services as a share of GDP - comparison between 2000 and 2010 
 
Note: No data for Brunei are available  
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2012 
 
 
The share of services employment in total employment also reflects the level of economic 
development (see Figure 3-5). While the services sector in some countries such as Singapore, 
Japan, and Korea is a major source of employment accounting for almost 70 % (2010), the services 
employment in developing countries such as China, Indonesia and Thailand shows between 40 and 
50 % (2010). The figure also illustrates that the share of services employment in most East Asian 
countries (except China and Singapore) grew between 2000 and 2010. This indicates that the 
services sector in the East Asian countries is growing.80 
 
  
                                                          
80 China’s growth in services fluctuated in the late 2000s. In the case of Singapore, the capital intensive services sector (e.g. 
financial sector and R&D) is growing. 
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Figure 3-5: Share of services employment in total employment (2000, 2005, and 2010)  
 
Note: No data for Brunei, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam are available. Since a date for Singapore in 2010 are not 
available, the data in 2011 are used.  
Source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.SRV.EMPL.ZS 
 
 
Services Trade balance 
Table 3- 2 presents the services trade balance in value. In East Asia, most countries show a 
negative balance in services trade. Only Singapore and The Philippines can be characterised as a 
services exporting countries, as the balance is significantly positive. Malaysia, Laos, and 
Cambodia also show positive balance, although the level is not remarkable. In fact, far-East Asian 
countries (China, Japan and South Korea) are actively engaged in exports, but the volume of 
imports offsets the volume of their exports. China and Japan especially have large import markets 
followed by South Korea and Singapore. By comparison, the size of import markets of some 
ASEAN countries, including Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, are rather small. 
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Table 3-2: Services trade balance in value, East Asia 
Country 
Balance in value,  US 
Dollars thousand 
Exported value, US 
Dollars thousand 
Imported value, US 
Dollars thousand 
Brunei -519279 914911 1434190 
Cambodia 775534 2255612 1480078 
China -54983040 182712096 237695136 
Indonesia -9323500 16765800 26089300 
Japan -16113024 141282912 157395936 
South Korea -4579704 94769696 99349400 
Laos 247870 510990 263120 
Malaysia 543800 32760100 32216300 
Myanmar -430440 366620 797060 
The Philippines 3260716 15515736 12255020 
Singapore 15845104 112308000 96462896 
Thailand -10549000 34298400 44847400 
Viet Nam -823000 3972400 4795400 
 
Source: ITC (International Trade Centre) trade database available at 
http://www.trademap.org/index.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fService_SelService_TS.aspx 
Note: Cambodia, China, South Korea, The Philippines: 2011, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, 
Thailand: 2010, Brunei: 2009, Viet Nam: 2004 
 
In summary, the importance of the services sector in the economy differs across the countries in 
the region, reflecting the level of development. Whereas the services sector in high income 
countries such as Japan, Singapore and South Korea shows a high share in their economic outputs, 
the size of the services sector in developing countries in East Asia is much smaller. The dynamic 
trend tells us that while the services sector in some countries in East Asia (e.g. China, Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and The Philippines) is growing fast, the services sector in 
some ASEAN countries (e.g. Viet Nam, Thailand and Indonesia) is experiencing a little growth. In 
the context of trade, most East Asian countries are services importing countries, except Singapore 
and The Philippines. The volume of exports of China and Japan are more than that of Singapore, 
however, the size of their imports render the balances negative.  
 
3.3.2 Export competitiveness 
Status of East Asian countries in global services trade 
What is the status of the East Asian countries in global services trade? As Figure 3-6 shows, the 
EU and the US are dominant services exporters of world trade (Extra-EU 24.4%, US 18.5%). 
Among the East Asian countries, China (6.1%), Japan (4.9%) and Singapore (4.0%) are ranked top 
ten although the amount of exports is less than one third of that of US. South Korea (2.9%), 
Thailand (1.2%), Malaysia (1.2%), Indonesia (0.6%), and The Philippines (0.5%) are ranked 
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among the top 30 world trade exporters, although the share is quite small. The situation is almost 
the same in terms of imports (see Table 2 of Appendix 7). The major importers are Extra-EU 
(21.9%) and US (13.3%). Although China (7.1%), Japan (5.8%), Singapore (3.6%) and South 
Korea (3.4%) are ranked in the top ten, the market size is significantly smaller than those of the 
EU and the US. As can be seen, most East Asian countries are not major services exporters in 
world trade likewise for services imports. In global services trade, the US and the EU are dominant 
players both in terms of exports and imports. 
  
Figure 3-6: Top 30 World services trade exporters, 2010 
 
Source: Data in the WTO World Trade Developments 2011, p27 
 
Observing major determinants of services exports 
Next, we investigate whether the East Asian countries have a comparative advantage in services. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, economists use the theory of comparative advantage to examine a 
country’s competitiveness in services trade and examine the determinants of services exports. 
According to the empirical study done by Mattoo et al. (2012a), (a) human capital, (b) electronic 
infrastructure and (c) the quality of institutions show strong correlation with services exports. 
Given that no existing empirical studies highlighting the East Asian countries exist, this project 
applies the results of Mattoo et al. (2012a) and assesses three major indicators of the East Asian 
countries to determine the level of competitiveness in services exports.  
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(a) Human capital81 
The level of human capital of developed countries is generally much higher than developing 
countries. The top 10 of the education index are EU member countries, New Zealand, Australia, 
US and Canada. (e.g. Australia: 0.981, US: 0.939, and Germany: 0.928).  As can be seen in Figure 
3-7, South Korea (0.934), Japan (0.883) and Singapore (0.751) have relatively high human capital 
in East Asia. Some developing countries in East Asia, such as Malaysia (0.73), The Philippines 
(0.684), and China (0.623), perform relatively well, however there is a significant gap from the 
scores of high income countries (Japan, South Korea and Singapore) in the region. 
 
Figure 3-7: Education Index, 2011 
 
Source: UNDP International Human Development Index 
Note: the Index of Brunei does not exist. 
 
 
(b) Electronic infrastructure 
Electronic infrastructure is the backbone of economic activities. As Jensen (2011) observed, better 
technological environments enable several ways of delivering of services and bring dynamic to the 
services sector. Here, we use internet penetration as the indicator, as was done in Mattoo et al. 
(2012a). As Figure 3-8 shows, high penetration can be seen in South Korea (85.52%), Japan 
(77.64%) and Singapore (71.13%), which is comparable to the OECD average (74.77%). Malaysia 
(56.3%) and Brunei (49.99%) are in the second group and show around 50 % penetration. Other 
countries still remain at a low penetration rate. 
 
                                                          
81 In the study of Mattoo et al. (2012a), the indicator of the tertiary schooling enrolment from the World Development 
Indicators database of the World Bank was used for human capital. We selected an “education index” which is the sub-
index of the “UNDP international human development index” as it is a more comprehensive index based on mean years 
of schooling (of adults) and expected years of schooling (of children). 
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Figure 3-8: Internet penetration82 , 2010   
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database 
 
(c) The quality of institutions 
The policy aspects of services trade are explained in detail in the section 3.4. Here we look at an 
international comparison of costliness of policies affecting services trade (Figure 3-9) to assess the 
competitiveness in East Asia. According to PECC and ADB (2011), East Asia and the Pacific are 
more restrictively regulated and more costly to do business than the world average. Restrictive 
policies negatively affect competitiveness in these countries.  
Figure 3-9: Costliness of Policies Affecting Services Trade 
 
                         Source: PECC and ADBI (2011), p21 
                                                          
82 Internet penetration stands for internet users (people with access to the internet) per 100 people. 
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Summing up, the major determinants of service exports in East Asia vary reflecting the level of 
development. It can be seen that Japan, Singapore and South Korea, which are in fact ranked in the 
top 10 of world exports, satisfy the basic condition to be relatively competitive in global services 
trade whereas the developing countries in the region reveal relatively weak competitiveness. 
 
Sectoral competitiveness in services 
What are the major services exports of each East Asian country? In other words, which sectors are 
competitive enough to export? Using the currently available data obtained from the ITC trade 
database,83 some strong characteristics on sectoral competitiveness in services were found such as: 
 Countries showing strength in the capital and/or skill-intensive sectors: Japan, Singapore and 
South Korea. They mainly export infrastructure-related services which support merchandise 
trade such as transport services, construction services and financial services. 
 The Philippines and Indonesia show strength in exporting workers. 
 Travel services dominate services exports for many ASEAN countries such as Thailand, 
Cambodia, Viet Nam and Laos. 
 Telecommunication and financial sectors are not the major exporting sectors in East Asia, 
except for Singapore. 
 
The country-level analysis84 is as follow. 
Japan (Figure 3-10) has its comparative advantage in capital and skill-intensive sectors. The major 
exports of Japan are transport services (26 % in total for sea transport and related services and air 
transport and related services), royalties and licence fees (19%), merchanting and other trade-
related services (17%), and miscellaneous business, professional and technical services (11%). 
  
                                                          
83 It should be noted that the countries use their own classification of services which does not correspond to the WTO 
services classification list (WTO, MTN.GNS/W/120). Hence, sometimes the classification itself is not clear from the 
research perspective. However, the data are sufficiently enough to provide information on the sectoral competitiveness of 
each country. The data of Myanmar are not available. 
84 The country-level analysis here helps assess the offensive sectors of lobbying the Government for the services trade 
negotiations in each country, the arguments of which are given in Chapter 5 and 6. 
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Figure 3-10: Japan services exports to the world 2010 
 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) statistics 
 
South Korea (Figure 3-11) shows strength in capital-intensive sectors like for Japan. Nearly half 
of its exports are transport services (42% in total for sea transport freight, sea transport supporting 
services, air transport passenger, and air transport freight). The construction services are also 
strong (13%). 
 
Figure 3-11: South Korea services exports to the world 2010 
 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organisation and 
International Monetary Fund statistics 
Sea transport -
Freight
19%
Royalties and 
license fees
19%
Merchanting and other 
trade-related services
17%
Miscellaneous business, 
professionnal and 
technical services
11%
Personal travel
8%
Construction services
7%
Supporting, auxiliary and 
other air transport 
services
3%
Financial services
3%
Operational leasing 
services
2%
Air transport - Freight
2%
Government services, 
n.i.e.
2%
Sea transport -
Supporting, auxiliary and 
other 2%
Business travel
2%
Construction 
services
13%
Financial services
3%
Sea transport - Freight
31%
Sea transport -
Supporting, auxiliary 
and other sea transport 
services
3%
Air transport -
Passenger
4%
Air transport -
Freight
4%
Business travel
5%
Other personal travel
6%
Other royalties and 
license fees
3%
Merchanting
3%
Other trade related 
services
2%
Other miscellaneous 
business, professionnal 
and technical services
4%
Services between 
affiliated 
enterprises, n.i.e.
3%
Worker's Remittances
7%
87 
 
Singapore (Figure 3-12) depends on exporting transportation (48%) more heavily than South 
Korea does. Travel (23%) and financial services (18%) follow transportation. 
Figure 3-12: Singapore services exports to the world 2010 
 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division and International Monetary 
Fund statistics. 
 
China (Figure 3-13) is more diversified in exporting services. Travel services (27%) are at the top, 
then merchanting and other trade-related services (17%), transport services (15% in total forsea 
transport –freight, sea transport supporting, air transport passenger and air transport freight). 
Figure 3-13: China services exports to the world 2010 
 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organisation and 
International Monetary Fund statistics. 
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The Philippines (Figure 3-14) overwhelmingly relies on workers’ remittances which account for 
almost half (47%) of its total exports. In other words, comparative advantage lies on movement of 
workers (mode 4).  Business and management consultancy and public relations services (18%) 
form the second largest sector. 
Figure 3-14: The Philippines services exports to the world 2010 
 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organisation and 
International Monetary Fund statistics. 
 
Thailand (Figure 3-15) has its competitiveness in travel services which account for 47% of its 
total services exports.85 Other business services (17%) and transportation (16%) follow. 
Figure 3-15: Thailand services exports to the world 2010 
 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund statistics 
                                                          
85 The category of “Other personal travel” does not exist in the WTO classification. 
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Malaysia (Figure 3-16) also shows its strengths in the travel sector. Other business travel86 (73%) 
overwhelmingly dominates its services exports. Transport services (19% in total for sea transport 
freight, air transport passenger, sea transport supporting and air transport freight) follows other 
business travel. 
Figure 3-16: Malaysia services exports to the world 2010 
 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organisation and 
International Monetary Fund statistics. 
 
Indonesia (Figure 3-17), similarly to The Philippines, relies heavily on workers’ remittances 
(30%). Personal travel (23%) and other business services (19%) are also major exports, like for 
Thailand. 
Figure 3-17: Indonesia services exports to the world 2010 
 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund statistics 
                                                          
86 The category of ‘Other business travel’ does not exist in the WTO classification. 
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Other ASEAN countries: Brunei’s major exports are transportation (49%) and travel (28%). For 
Cambodia, Viet Nam and Laos, travel (the tourism sector) is the largest export, accounting for 
about 60 % of its total services exports.87  
 
Competitiveness in financial sector and telecommunication services 
It became clear from the country-level analysis that the financial services and telecommunication 
services are generally not major export sectors of the East Asian countries. Then, what is the status 
of the East Asian countries in the global financial and telecommunication trade? Looking at global 
financial services trade, it is clear that the EU and the US are major players both in terms of 
exports and imports. Looking at the share of top 15 financial exporters of world, exports of the 
extra-EU accounts for 25.6 % and that of the US accounts for 21.1 % in 2008 (see Annex III Table 
16). 88 Whereas Singapore, Japan and South Korea are ranked in the world top 10, their share is 
very limited (2.3%, 1.9% and 1.3% respectively). Global telecommunication services trade also 
reveals the strong competitiveness of the EU and the US (see Annex Table 17). Both in terms of 
exports and imports, the EU and US are dominant players. For example, the share of the extra-EU 
is 20.3 % and that of the US is 14.7 % in terms of exports.89 An interesting point is that Malaysia 
(ranked 9, 1.0%), South Korea (ranked 11, 0.9%) and The Philippines (ranked 15, 0.7%) are 
ranked above the 15 exporters of telecommunications. Malaysia (ranked 5, 1.6%) and South Korea 
(ranked 6, 1.6%) also show their presence in terms of imports. 
 
3.3.3 Level of services market integration in East Asia  
To what extent does intra-services trade exist in East Asia? To evaluate the level of market 
integration, one can theoretically examine the bilateral trade relations in the region. However, 
given the fact that the data for bilateral services trade relations are scarce, 90 the existing data 
cannot fully cover the countries in the region. The project uses the WTO data on services exports 
by destination and services imports by origin from which the data of China, Japan, Singapore and 
                                                          
87 See Appendix 6, Figure 1 to 5, from ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund 
statistics. 
88 Note: the figures do not represent the share of total world export value but the share of the top 15 economies in exports 
of financial services. 
89 Note: The figures of telecommunication services also represent the share in top 15 economies in exporting 
telecommunication services. 
90 According to the WTO secretariat, only limited OECD countries release the data on origins and destinations of 
services trade. 
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South Korea are available. Although the existing services trade data are underdeveloped and 
cannot sufficiently cover the market analysis of the region,91 the following can be observed.  
(i)   The US and the EU are major partners of services trade 
For Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, most services trade flows take place with the US and 
EU.  A certain degree of intra-services trade can be seen among Far-East Asian countries 
(China, Japan and South Korea) plus Singapore. However, the shares are limited in comparison 
with trade with the US and the EU. 
 
(ii)   Japan (Figures 3-18, 19): The US and the EU are major services trade partners. More than 
one half of exports are directed to the US (27.2%) and the EU (26.6%). The total share of 
exports to the East Asian partners accounts for 21.7 % (Singapore: 8.3%, China: 6.2%, South 
Korea: 3.0%, Thailand 2.0%, Indonesia: 1.4% and The Philippines: 0.8%). Imports are also 
dominated by the US (28.3%) and the EU (23.5%). The total share of imports by East Asian 
partners is 18.8 % (China: 5.9%, Singapore: 4.9%, South Korea: 4.0%, Thailand 2.0%, 
Indonesia: 1.2%, The Philippines: 1.0%). 
 
 
Figure 3-18: Services Exports by destination –Japan 2009 
 
 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2010 
 
  
                                                          
91  For example, Malaysia and Philippines have export competitiveness in a certain sector. However, their export 
destinations are not clear, due to a lack of bilateral data. The analysis here could be improved if more data became 
available. 
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Figure 3-19: Services Imports by origin –Japan 2009 
 
 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2011 
 
 
(iii) Singapore (Figures 3-20, 21): Like in the case of Japan, the US and the EU are major trade 
partners. The EU (13.55%) and the US (10.5%) are major export destinations of Singapore. 
Major export destinations inside East Asia are Japan (5.5%) and China (5.0%) although these 
accounts for only half size of the exports to the EU and the US. The exports to intra-East Asia 
accounts for 22.7 % (Japan: 5.5%, China 5.0%, Indonesia: 3.7%, Malaysia: 3.4%, South Korea: 
3.0%, Thailand: 2.1%). Imports are also dominated by the US (18.4%) and the EU (16.3%). 
Services imports from other East Asian countries accounts for only 12.9 % (Japan: 4.4%, 
China: 3.5%, South Korea: 1.6%, Malaysia: 1.4 %, Indonesia: 1.1%, and Thailand: 0.9%).  
 
Figure 3-20: Services Exports by destination –Singapore 2009 
 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2011 
 
United States, 28.3
European Union 
(27), 21.5
China, 5.9
Singapore, 4.7
South 
Korea, 4.0Hong Kong, China, 
3.3
Taipei, Chinese, 2.6
United Arab 
Emirates, 2.5
Australia, 2.3
Thailand, 2.0
Switzerland, 1.8
Indonesia, 1.2
Philippines, 1.0
Canada, 1.0
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of, 0.7
Others, 17.2
European 
Union (27), 
13.5
United 
States, 10.5
Japan, 5.5
Australia, 5.4
China, 5.0
Hong Kong, 
China, 4.4Indonesia, 3.7
Malaysia, 3.4India, 3.2
Sourth 
Korea, 3.0Switzerland, 2.4
Taipei, Chinese, 2.2
Thailand, 2.1
United Arab 
Emirates, 1.5
Norway, 1.1
Others, 33.1
93 
 
Figure 3-21: Services Imports by origin –Singapore 2009 
 
 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2011 
 
(iv) South Korea (Figures 3-22, 23): For South Korea, the US, EU, Japan and China are major 
services trade partners. For exports, the US (15.6%) is the largest destination followed by China 
(13.5%), Japan (11.7%) and the EU (10.5%). The intra-East Asia exports in total are 34 % 
(China: 13.5%, Japan: 11.7%, Singapore: 4.1%, Viet Nam: 1.9%, Thailand: 1.6%, The 
Philippines: 1.2%), which is a much higher figure than for China, Japan and Singapore. On the 
other hand, almost half of imports are from the US (27.1%) and the EU (20.1%). The total 
amount of imports from the East Asia trade partners accounts for 28.4 % (China: 10.8%, Japan: 
9.4%, Singapore: 3.6%, Viet Nam: 2.0%, Indonesia: 1.5%, and Thailand: 1.1%).   
 
Figure 3-22: Services Exports by destination –South Korea 2009 
 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2011 
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Figure 3-23: Services Imports by origin –South Korea 2009 
 
 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2011 
 
 
(v)    China (Figures 3-24, 25): Unlike others, China greatly depends on Hong Kong, China both in 
terms of both exports and imports. The major export destinations are Hong Kong, China 
(28.9%), the EU (13.4%) followed by Japan (7.4%) and the US (6.4%). The intra-East Asia 
exports amount to only 15.8 % (Japan: 7.4%, South Korea: 4.4%, and Singapore: 4.0%). For 
imports, Hong Kong, China (16.6%) and the EU (12.8%) are major origins followed by the US 
(9.9%) and Japan (9.6%). The intra-East Asia imports account for 18.5 % (Japan: 9.6%, South 
Korea: 6.4%, and Singapore: 2.5%).    
 
Figure 3-24: Services Exports by destination –China 2009 
 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2011 
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Figure 3-25: Services Imports by origin –China 2009 
 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2011 
 
In short, the data illustrate that there is a certain level of intra-services trade among Far-East Asian 
countries (China, Japan and South Korea) plus Singapore although the trade relations with the US 
and the EU are much stronger for these countries. The presence of the ASEAN countries, except 
Singapore, is very limited both in terms of exports and imports in East Asia as far as can be seen 
from the total share of the volume of trade. 
 
3.3.4 Economic features of the services market 
Understanding the economic features of the services market (e.g. public character and condition of 
competition) helps clarify the economic reasons behind a lack of competitiveness in global 
services trade, as well as the scant level of intra-services trade in East Asia. The services markets 
in East Asia can be categorised into five types. The extreme is the most competitive and liberalised 
services market of Singapore. The second group comprises relatively open markets such as Japan 
and South Korea, where competitiveness lags behind their manufacturing sector. The third is 
formed by the markets of developing countries where some growing service sectors can be seen, 
while an uncompetitive market character remains (e.g. Malaysia and The Philippines). The fourth 
involves countries which can be characterised as featuring a strong public character (e.g. state-
owned enterprises) and imperfect competition such as China, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
The last group is where the services sector markets are of limited size and still underdeveloped, 
which can be seen in the ASEAN LDCs (Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar). 
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(a) Liberalised and competitive market 
Singapore: Unlike other ASEAN countries, the economy of Singapore largely depends on the 
services sector, which accounts for more than 70 % of GDP in 2010. It retains internationally 
competitive services such as its financial sector. The competition authority and competition law 
came into force between 2004 and 2007. Since then, competition was introduced to the sectors 
where public monopolies used to exist (e.g. telecommunication, electricity, gas and media 
services).92 Among these, the telecommunications sector enjoys full competition in combination 
with the market liberalisation.  
 
(b) High income OECD countries with relatively liberalised services markets where 
competitiveness lags behind the manufacturing sector 
Japan: The Japanese services sector has not been as competitive as its manufacturing sector.  For 
example, labour productivity growth in the services sector in 2007 was 1.61 % in comparison with 
that of manufacturing (5.55%). The reason for its weakness is that the Japanese services sector is 
shielded from competition both internally and internationally, inter alia, compared with the 
Japanese manufacturing sector. According to the WTO report, the import penetration rate for 
services and the share of foreign affiliates in total services turnover was among the lowest in the 
OECD93 due to its domestic restrictive regulations and lacklustre business environment which 
require domestic reform. The Japanese financial sector has been opened up under the GATS 
commitments; however, the share of foreign business is limited. 94  Likewise, the Japanese 
telecommunications sector is open to foreign companies with some exceptions. However, the 
market is largely occupied by NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone), 33.7 % of the shares of 
which is owned by the Government. 
South Korea:  In comparison with Japan, the Korean services sector is less open and still has 
strong government intervention in the financial, telecommunications, energy and transportation 
services. Labour productivity of the Korean services sector ranks 18th among 19 OECD countries. 
And the labour productivity of the services sector is just over half that of the manufacturing 
sector.95  Within the services sector, it can be observed that the financial sector is gaining in 
competitiveness after a series of reforms and restructuring since the financial crisis in 1997 and on-
                                                          
92 However, it should be noted that these sectors are subject to the sector-specific legislation on competition. Some 
network industries such as electricity, gas and water supply are still under privatisation and regulatory reform. See WTO 
(2008a), pp.64 -92. 
93 See WTO (2011b), p3. 
94 One example is the banking sector, where the total assets of 62 foreign banks accounts for 36.2 trillion Yen which is 
only 11% of the total assets (426.5 trillion Yen) owned by the Japanese five city banks. 
95 See WTO (2008c), p110. 
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going privatisation.96 In the telecommunications sector, Korean Telecom is the dominant player 
(94% of the local market and 80% of long-distance in 2008).97 
 
(c) Developing economies with a growing services sector and some uncompetitive sectors 
remaining in place 
Malaysia98: Given that the Malaysian services sector has been growing rapidly and become a 
driving force of its economic growth since the 2000s, the government started to focus on 
developing the services sector, inter alia, ICT services, logistics, distribution, construction, 
education and training, healthcare, and tourism services. The government launched reforms and 
liberalisation of the market in several sectors from the mid-2000s. However, GLCs (government-
linked companies) are still in transition to privatisation and retain their market power in major 
sectors such as the financial, telecommunications, and transport sectors.    
The Philippines: Whereas The Philippines’ major export has been movement of workers, the 
business process outsourcing service has been gaining competitiveness from the mid-2000s.99 On 
the other hand, the tourism sector, which is one of the priorities of The Philippines’ development 
policy, is underperforming due to the infrastructure weakness.100 Although the services sector is 
privatised, imperfect competition can be seen in some sectors, such as telecommunications where 
the fixed-line market is dominated by one company. Given that no general competition law exists 
in The Philippines, competition policy is still under-developed. 
 
(d) Developing economies of strong government intervention and imperfect competition 
China: For historic reasons, the services market in the Chinese economy is still characterised by 
state-owned enterprises with monopoly status and imperfect competition. The share of assets 
owned by SOEs in China amounts to 43.8 % of the total industrial and services sector’s assets in 
2008. In the Chinese services sector such as telecommunication services, financial services, 
transport services and energy services, the existing state-owned enterprises are excising their 
market power. For example, about a half of the total assets of financial institutions are dominated 
                                                          
96 See WTO (2008c), p11. 
97 See WTO (2008c), p119. 
98 See WTO (2009a). 
99 See Yi (2012). 
100 See WTO (2012a). 
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by the five largest state-owned commercial banks.101 In the telecommunication sector, the three 
majority state-owned companies102 dominate the market. 
Indonesia: Government intervention in the services sector still remains strong in Indonesia. The 
financial sector is underdeveloped in comparison with other ASEAN countries of the same 
economic development level, such as Thailand and Malaysia. For example, the banking sector is 
featured with a strong government control of 38 % of national banking assets and a highly 
concentrated market dominated by the state-owned commercial banks. 103  In contrast, the 
telecommunication sector has successfully gone through a series of privatisation processes and 
introduction of competition from the early 2000s.104   
Thailand: The growth of the services sector in Thailand in general is slower than other sectors. The 
exception is the financial sector which showed the highest growth rate (6.4% in annual) among 
other economic sectors in late 2000s. The services sector in Thailand remains restrictive and sealed 
off from international competition. For example, the financial sector is still public oriented with 
strong government intervention through equity holdings and through specialised financial 
institutions. In the telecommunications sector, two state-owned companies dominate the market 
and exercise their market power in fixed-line services whereas competition in some sub-markets 
(e.g. the mobile-phone market) is becoming intense following a series of regulatory reforms.105 
 
(e) LDCs with a small sized and under-developed services sector 
Cambodia: Cambodia is seriously developing its services sector which accounts for 40% of its 
economy.106 However, the services markets are still underdeveloped in general and need a series of 
reforms. For instance, the banking sector was dominated by six banks and highly concentrated (75 
% of all assets in 2010). 
 
3.4 An Overview of Policy of the Services Sector 
What is the situation of the services trade policies and regulations in East Asia? Are existing FTAs 
in East Asia playing a role of liberalising services markets towards regional integration?  There are 
two ways to answer these questions. One is to analyse the level of restrictiveness of the actual 
                                                          
101 See WTO (2012d), p122. 
102 These are: China Telecom, China Unicom and China Mobile. The regulations rule that at least 50% has to be state-
owned for the basic telecommunication (WTO 2012d, p141). 
103 WTO (2007d), p88. 
104 WTO (2007d), p91. 
105 WTO (2011e). 
106 WTO (2011d). 
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policies and regulations in the services sector. The other is to analyse the preferential commitments 
made under the existing FTAs in the region. 
 
3.4.1 Restrictiveness 
To examine the restrictiveness of the services polices and regulations in East Asia, this project uses 
the “services trade restrictions database” of the World Bank,107 the objective of which is to identify 
the service sector policies affecting services trade. By using this database, one can examine the 
trade restrictiveness of the actual policies which are applied under the Most-Favoured Nation 
(MFN) principle instead of the commitments made under the GATS. The database covers five 
major services sectors: financial services (banking and insurance), telecommunications, retail 
distribution, transportation and professional services and disaggregated into subsectors and modes 
of supply relevant to them. Then it scores the listed policies into five categories: open without 
restrictions (scale 0), virtually open (scale 25), existence of major/non-trivial restrictions (scale 
50), virtually closed (scale 75), and completely closed (scale 100). 
Mattoo et al. (2012c) made interesting findings on the regional and country level comparison from 
the World Bank database.108 First they showed that the level of openness increases as per capita 
income increases (see Figure 3-26), where most OECD countries retain generally open markets.  It 
also pointed out that high restrictiveness is identified in some growing economies in East Asia 
such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines and Thailand whereas Latin America, and 
Eastern Europe are relatively liberal. The high income Gulf Cooperation Council countries are the 
most restrictive region in the world. In their cross-country sectoral analysis, it is identified that the 
pattern of relative restrictiveness across five sectors is similar in all countries. Professional services 
are the most restrictive followed by transportation services. On average, telecommunications and 
financial sectors are still not completely open. Retail distribution is the most open among five 
sectors. 
 
  
                                                          
107 The trade restrictions database of the World Bank (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicestrade/home.htm) is the only 
database specifying the services trade related policies and regulations encompassing 103 countries. The data is based on 
the questionnaires over the period 2008-2010 with some updated information on the recent policy changes. See Mattoo 
et al. (2012b).  
108 See Mattoo et al. (2012c), p21-24. 
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Figure 3-26: Country-level services trade restrictions index (STRI) plotted against the per 
capita income of the country 
 
 
           Source: Mattoo et al. (2012c), p21 
 
As for the services trade restrictive index (STRI) in East Asia,109 the following are found to be 
strong characteristics of East Asia. Looking at the average of all sectors (Figure 3-27), the 
restrictiveness is much higher in most East Asian countries than the world average, except 
Cambodia, Japan and South Korea. As pointed out by Mattoo et al. (2012c), The Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Viet Nam and China are the countries which retain high 
restrictiveness in international comparison. Even for Japan and South Korea, the STRI is higher 
than the OECD average. One exception is Cambodia, the restrictiveness of which is much lower 
than the world average and almost the same as that of Japan and South Korea. Overall, it can be 
summarised that the East Asian services markets are restrictive. 
 
  
                                                          
109 It should be noted that the trade restrictions database of the World Bank 
(http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicestrade/home.htm) does not cover the data of Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar 
and Singapore in East Asia.  
101 
 
Figure 3-27: Services Trade Restrictions Index (STRI), East Asia 
 
Source: World Bank trade restrictions database 
Note: The data of Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar and Singapore do not exist 
 
 
Next, we look at the sectoral policy patterns of the region. The restrictiveness of the financial 
sector110 is extremely high in Thailand, The Philippines, Malaysia, Viet Nam and China (see 
Figure 3-28). In contrast, the markets of Japan and South Korea are quite open, showing much 
lower restrictiveness than the OECD average. Indonesia is more or less at the world average. An 
interesting case is Cambodia, which also shows lower restrictiveness than the OECD average. 
 
Figure 3-28: Services Trade Restrictions Index (STRI) of the financial sector, East Asia 
 
Source: World Bank trade restrictions database 
Note: The data of Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar and Singapore do not exist 
 
                                                          
110 The data covers the banking sector (bank lending deposit acceptance) and insurance sectors (automobile insurance, 
life insurance and reinsurance). The modes of supply cover Mode 1 and Mode 3 (see Mattoo et al. 2012c). 
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The restrictiveness of the telecommunications sector111 in East Asia is relatively higher than that of 
the financial sector (see Figure 3-29). Most of the countries in the region (e.g. China, South Korea, 
The Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam) score 50, which means that the relatively high restrictive 
policies and regulations are retained in the sector. The restrictiveness of Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Japan and Malaysia (25) is slightly less than the world average (27.5). One thing that should be 
noted here is that even the restrictiveness of Japan and South Korea is much higher than the OECD 
average (10.5). 
Figure 3-29: Services Trade Restrictions Index (STRI) of the telecommunications sector, 
East Asia 
 
Source: World Bank trade restrictions database 
Note: The data of Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar and Singapore do not exist 
 
Figure 3-30 presents the STRI of the retail distribution. The retail distribution sector in East Asia is 
also restrictive except in Cambodia and South Korea, the indicators of which show complete 
openness. The countries which maintain the most restrictive policies are: Indonesia, The 
Philippines, and Viet Nam with an STRI score of 50. The restrictiveness of China, Japan, Malaysia 
and Thailand (scored 25) are also higher than the world average (16.3). 
 
  
                                                          
111 The data encompasses the policies and regulations in the fixed-line and mobile sub-sectors. The modes of supply 
covers mode 3 (see Mattoo et al. 2012c). 
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Figure 3-30: Services Trade Restrictions Index (STRI) of the retail distribution sector, East 
Asia 
 
Source: World Bank trade restrictions database 
Note: There are no data for Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar and Singapore. 
 
The restrictiveness of the transportation sector in East Asia varies across the countries (Figure 3-
31). The ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, Viet Nam, and 
Cambodia) show a more restrictive pattern than the world average. Among these, the Indonesian 
market is the most restrictive one with a score of 66.4, which means almost closed in practice. The 
transportation markets of three Far East Asian countries (China, Japan and South Korea) are 
relatively open showing the lower restrictiveness than OECD average (22.4). 
 
Figure 3-31: Services Trade Restrictions Index (STRI) of the transportation sector, East Asia 
 
Source: World Bank trade restrictions database 
Note: There are no data for Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar and Singapore. 
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Lastly, Figure 3-32 presents STRI of professional services. Even OECD countries maintain 
restrictive policies for this sector (46.8) which shows little difference from the world average 
(48.3). What should be noted here is that almost all East Asian countries except Viet Nam are 
much more restrictive than the world average. Among these, the professional services in The 
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia are notably highly protected, all of which scored 
above 70.  
 
Figure 3-32: Services Trade Restrictions Index (STRI) of the professional services sector, 
East Asia 
 
Source: World Bank trade restrictions database 
Note: There are no data for Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar and Singapore. 
 
 
In summing up, we confirmed from the figures above that the ASEAN countries and China 
maintain more restrictive policies than the world average except in a few cases. Hoekman and 
Mattoo (2008, p28) explain the situation by noting that many developing countries have moved 
away from public monopolies in sectors such as communications, financial, and transport 
services, but still restrict new foreign entry. Asian countries are unwilling to allow foreigners to 
acquire a majority share of ownership and full control of firms in these sectors. Japan and South 
Korea retain restrictive policies and regulations in specific sectors (e.g. the telecommunication 
sector) while they are almost completely open in other sectors (e.g. the financial sector). As a 
consequence, their scales of cross-sector average are higher than the OECD average. The results 
indicate that penetrating the services markets and doing business in East Asia is not easy in general 
regardless of the origins of services suppliers.  
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3.4.2 Free Trade Agreements in services 
As previously described, the manufacturing trade integration is market-driven in East Asia and 
institutional integration has taken place to support or reinforce further market integration. As a 
comparison, services trade integration in terms of market does not take place in East Asia. Then, 
the question is, to what extent did governments in East Asia institutionally integrate the services 
markets? In other words, to what extent did the East Asian countries preferentially open the market 
inside East Asia? Is the policy initiative of institutional integration strong enough to encourage 
services trade inside East Asia and promote services trade integration? In order to evaluate the 
level of preferential liberalisation in the services sector, this project assesses the key architectural 
elements of the agreements, then compares the commitments made under the existing FTAs in the 
region with their commitments made under the GATS.  
 
Proliferation of FTAs in East Asia and underlying motivations 
To begin with, we first review a proliferation of FTAs in the region since 2000s. Inside East Asia, 
there are three types of FTAs (See Table 3-3). The first is ASEAN which was originally formed in 
1967. Another is the bilateral FTAs between an ASEAN member country and either of China, 
Japan or South Korea. The third is the ‘ASEAN plus one (China, Japan or South Korea)’ type. The 
bilateral type and ASEAN plus one type started to be created in the early 2000s. To date, the total 
number of the FTAs in the region is 15 among which 14 FTAs include services provisions.  
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Table 3-3: FTAs in East Asia 
Existing FTAs Prospective FTAs 
 
Korea-Viet Nam FTA, 2015 
 
Singapore-China FTA, 2009 
 
Viet Nam-Japan FTA, 2009  
 
ASEAN-Japan, FTA, 2008 (Japan, Singapore, Laos, 
Viet Nam, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei 
implemented) 
 
Indonesia-Japan FTA, 2008 
 
The Philippines-Japan FTA, 2008 
 
Brunei-Japan FTA, 2008 
 
Thailand-Japan, FTA, 2007 
 
ASEAN-Korean FTA 2007 
 
Malaysia-Japan FTA, 2006 
 
Singapore-Korean FTA, 2006 
 
Thailand-China, FTA, 2006 
 
ASEAN-Chinan FTA, 2005 
 
Singapore- Japan, FTA, 2002 
 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services , 1995 
 
 
[Under negotiation] 
 
China-Korea (signed 2015, not yet in effect) 
 
RCEP: Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(2013-) 
 
China-Japan-South Korean FTA (2012-) 
 
Korea-Indonesian FTA (2012-) 
 
Korea-Japan FTA (negotiation suspended since 2003, 
under consultation for restarting negotiation) 
 
[Under consultation/study] 
 
Malaysia-Korean FTA (2005-) 
 
Thailand-Korean FTA (2003-) 
 
Total 15 Total 7 
Note: Services trade agreements of ASEAN-Japan FTA are under negotiation 
 
This dynamic trend of creating FTAs in East Asia during the period of the 2000s is leading the 
governments in the Region towards a consolidated ASEAN++ type of FTA in the future.112 The 
currently negotiated ASEAN plus, which is called RCEP, is one of the political initiatives. The 
RCEP negotiations are due to be concluded in 2017. The other possibility is forming an ASEAN 
plus three. However, the prospect of creating an ASEAN plus three FTA is unforeseeable at this 
stage owing to some political complications in the region, such as the political rivalry between 
China and Japan.113 
 
                                                          
112 See Kawai and Wignaraja (2007) and Kawai and Wingnaraja (2010) for example. 
113 See Dent (2010a). 
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Quality of East Asian FTAs in services 
Next, we assess the level of coverage and commitments in East Asian FTAs. Among the existing 
14 FTAs in the region, only the plurilateral ASEAN-Japan FTA does not include services 
components. As of September 2016, the services provisions of the ASEAN-Japan FTA are not yet 
concluded. On the other hand, there are bilateral FTAs between Japan and seven ASEAN countries 
(Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, The Philippines, Indonesia and Viet Nam) which include 
services components. Because Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar do not have a bilateral FTA with 
Japan, they are not covered under the preferential liberalisation framework in services trade with 
Japan.114 The evaluation in this section covers, therefore, 13 East Asian FTAs in services. There 
are several studies which have analysed the quality of some FTAs in services. 
 
(a) Key architectural elements  
Mattoo and Sauve (2010) used qualitative analysis to evaluate the structure and disciplines of the 
76 FTAs around the world, among which nine FTAs in East Asia115 are relevant to this research 
(see Table 3-4).116 As for the scope and coverage, the East Asian FTAs are universal within the 
concept of the GATS.117 Except for Korea-Singapore, FTAs in East Asia apply a “positive list 
approach” where commitments are made for a sector (or a sub-sector) which is committed to 
liberalise. Where the commitments are made, a negative list of limitations is provided under 
market access and national treatment disciplines. Japan- The Philippines includes a ratchet 
mechanism although it takes the positive list approach. Korea-Singapore stepped further 
liberalisation. It applies a ‘negative list approach (NAFTA type approach)’ where all sectors and 
non-conforming measures are to be liberalised unless otherwise listed as reservations in the 
reservation list of a specific sector. While no guarantees of locking-in are given under the “positive 
list approach”, the regulatory status can be locked in under the ‘negative list approach’.118 The 
provisions of investment in services (mode 3) are more than the GATS provisions except for 
China-ASEAN and China-Singapore. For example, Japanese bilateral FTAs with each ASEAN 
country provide a detailed investment chapter in addition to mode 3 covered in the services 
chapter. Korea-Singapore treats investment in a completely separate chapter in which more 
                                                          
114 It should be noted that Laos and Myanmar are member of Japan-ASEAN FTA while Cambodia has not yet joined the 
agreement. 
115 These are: ASEAN framework Agreement on services, China-ASEAN, China-Singapore, Japan-Indonesia, Japan-
Malaysia, Japan-The Philippines, Japan-Singapore, Japan-Thailand and Korea-Singapore. Thailand-China, Viet Nam-
Japan, Brunei-Japan and ASEAN-Korea are not included in Matoo and Sauve (2010). 
116 There are also other studies which applied the qualitative analysis such as Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2007), Fink. and 
Molinuevo (2008a), and Fink and Molinuevo (2008b). We use Mattoo and Sauve (2010) as a basis for observations here 
because it widely covers the PTAs in East Asia. 
117 Exclusions are air transport and certain cases of cabotage in maritime services. 
118 Mattoo and Sauve (2010, p46) compares two approaches in detail.  
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detailed rules than the GATS are provided. The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services also 
includes a separate investment chapter in addition to mode 3 coverage in the services provisions. 
 
Table 3-4: Key architectural elements of the FTAs in East Asia 
 
Source: Mattoo and Sauve (2010) 
Note: ‘Universal’ means that the agreement universally covers services, except air transport and cabotage in maritime 
services in certain cases. 
 
(b) Key disciplines 
The key disciplines are also important elements to examine the quality of agreements. Table 3-5 
summarises the key disciplines in some East Asian FTAs. With regard to Most-Favoured-Nation 
(MFN) treatment and National Treatment, all FTAs basically apply the GATS definitions. Among 
the key disciplines, MFN treatmentm stand still and transparency are crucial elements since they 
directly affect the quality of commitments. First, MFN treatment under FTAs means that each 
signatory shall immediately accord no less favourable treatment than it accords to like services and 
service suppliers of the third countries to services and service suppliers of any other FTA 
signatories. Under the Japan-The Philippines FTA and the Japan-Brunei FTA, MFN shall be 
provided to each other (exceptions are provided in the exception lists). This means, for example, if 
Japan offers higher commitments in the FTA with Switzerland than Japan offered in Japan-The 
Philippines, Japan shall immediately accord no less favourable treatment to The Philippines. Under 
the Japan-Singapore FTA and the Japan-Thailand FTA, MFN treatment is weaker than that of the 
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Japan-The Philippines FTA. If one signatory concludes an FTA with any other country with a 
higher level of commitments, the other signatory can request MFN extension. Then the signatory 
which concludes the new FTA shall consider the requests. The MFN treatment provisions in the 
Japan-Malaysian FTA and the Japan-Indonesian FTA are more complicated. MFN is committed in 
the agreement, however, the list of exceptions covers almost all sectors except for the financial 
services and construction services. In the Japan-Viet Nam FTA, MFN is an exception in 
accordance with the GATS,119 however, a signatory of the FTA can ask consultations for MFN 
extension to the other signatory. 
Secondly, the standstill provision works as a ratchet mechanism. FTA signatories cannot impose 
any new or more restrictive measures after the conclusion of the FTA. The Japan-The Philippines 
FTA is the most liberal in terms of standstill. The reason is that The Philippines offered the 
standstill of the laws and regulations over the 65 sub-sectors. Under the FTAs of Japan-Malaysia, 
Japan-Thailand, Japan-Indonesia, the discipline of standstill applies only to the NT (National 
Treatment) commitments where the ‘SS’ is marked (measures listed incompatible with NT). In 
fact, the commitments with ‘SS’ mark is very limited in these FTAs.  Singapore, Brunei and Viet 
Nam do not include standstill provisions. 
Third, some FTAs provide GATS-plus transparency provisions. In the case of the Japan-The 
Philippines FTA and the Japan-Thailand FTA, whether specific commitments are undertaken or 
not, services trade related measures which are incompatible with NT and MA (Market Access) 
disciplines have to be listed.  
  
  
                                                          
119 The GATS stipulates that Regional Trade Agreements can be listed in a MFN exemption list. 
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Table 3-5: Key disciplines in FTAs, East Asia 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Investment of Japan (2014). Hukousei boueki houkokusho (Report on Unfair 
Trade Practice), Tokyo: METI. 
*SS means standstill. 
 
From the key architectural elements (Table 3-4) and the key disciplines (Table 3-5), the 
motivations of the countries can be observed. Singapore and South Korea aim at practically higher 
liberalisation scheme than the GATS. Japan focuses on promoting investment in services through 
preferential bilateral agreements. Also, Japan underlines improving legal transparency and 
predictability for the Japanese services suppliers. In contrast, China is reluctant to make high 
standard agreements in services. Singapore makes high standard FTAs in general, however, it 
flexibly changes its approach in accordance with an FTA partner, whereas other ASEAN countries 
generally prefer not to go beyond the architecture and disciplines of the GATS. Despite that, 
ASEAN officially schedules to achieve “one single market” where free movement of services is 
accordingly applied by 2017 (extended from the original goal of 2015). The GATS level structure 
and discipline of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) seems legally unlikely 
to achieve the political goal. 
 
 (c) The level of liberalisation commitments in comparison with the GATS commitments 
To assess the level of commitments under FTAs, the recent studies done by Miroudot et al. (2010), 
Roy et al. (2007) and Roy (2011) applied the quantitative approach. They quantified the bounded 
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FTA commitments made under the ‘market access (MA)’ and ‘national treatment (NT)’ discipline 
columns in the schedule of the commitments.120 Among these, this project uses the dataset used in 
Roy (2011) which is called “the dataset of the commitments in regional trade agreements” of the 
WTO121 because it is the most comprehensive data. According to Roy (2011), the objective of this 
dataset is to evaluate the level of improvement of the existing FTAs commitments as well as the 
GATS offers submitted for the WTO Doha Round from the GATS commitments.122 The data set 
covers 12 FTAs in East Asia except China-Thailand which has not been notified to the WTO. 
Figure 3-33 and 3-34 present the level of commitments in the East Asian FTAs in comparison with 
the GATS commitments.123 What has to be noted here is that the current GATS commitments had 
little additional market opening, but do function as a lock-in for unilateral liberalisation (Hoekman, 
1996). In other words, the level of the GATS commitments, which are the results of the Uruguay 
Round concluded in 1993, is far behind the actual liberalisation under unilateral policy. Therefore, 
even if the level of commitments in FTAs are slightly GATS-plus, they are still much below the 
actual liberalisation level. Bearing this point in mind, the major features are summarised as 
follows. 
 
 All of the East Asian countries made higher levels of commitments in the East Asian FTAs in 
comparison with the GATS commitments. However, the margins of preferential treatment are 
limited in most FTAs. Some cases, such as Singapore’s offers against South Korea and against 
JAPAN and the ASEAN 7th package124 under the ASEAN framework on services, show wide 
margins of preference. 
 All East Asian countries change the level of preferential liberalisation in accordance with the 
FTA partners. 
 As far as both the multilateral and preferential liberalisations are concerned, Japan holds the 
highest level of commitments among East Asian countries, followed by South Korea, 
Singapore and China. Interestingly, Viet Nam is more liberal than other ASEAN countries 
such as The Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei and Indonesia.  
 While Singapore gives priority to bilateral FTA with China, Japan and South Korea, other 
ASEAN countries prioritise the ASEAN partners with providing higher level of commitments 
in the ASEAN 7th package. 
                                                          
120 The methodology applied differs depending on the objective of the research. 
121 Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/dataset_e/dataset_e.htm 
122 The dataset assessed only mode 1 and mode 3 which in fact can capture the overwhelming share of services trade. 
The index scoring reflects the level of improvement in a Member’s partial commitments. 
123 The level of the DDA offers of each member country is not available from the dataset although some results are 
illustrated in Roy (2011). Also see Table 18 in Appendix 7. 
124 AFAS 7th (2009) was the first liberalisation package which achieved substantial GATS-plus commitments as 
described in “Limited services integration under AFAS” in Chapter 6: 6.2. 
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 The level of commitments in the ASEAN 7th package seems far behind its political 
commitment of achieving free movement of services by 2017 inside ASEAN.  
 South Korea: Whereas South Korea made higher a level of commitments (58.42) in 
comparison with the GATS commitments (48.81) in the Korea-Singapore FTA, it provided 
little preferential treatment to other ASEAN members in the Korea-ASEAN FTA (49.7). 
 Japan: Japan’s level of GATS commitments (52.89) is the highest among the East Asian 
countries. It gave more or less the same level of preferential treatment to each ASEAN 
countries under the bilateral FTAs, ranging between 54.51 (to Viet Nam) and 62.84 (to 
Malaysia). The margins of preferential treatment are moderate (1.5-10). 
  China: China provided little preferential treatment in its East Asian FTAs, despite the fact that 
its level of GATS commitments accounts for only 32.29. Even though China has a separate 
bilateral FTA with Singapore, the level of commitments of the China-Singapore FTA (40.14) 
is almost same as the China-ASEAN FTA (39.97). 
 
Figure 3-33: The level of commitments in FTAs offered by South Korea, Japan and China 
 
Source: The index is from the “dataset of the commitments in regional trade agreements” of the WTO (available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/dataset_e/dataset_e.htm). 
Note: The index is brought onto a 0-100 scale: 100 (full-commitments in all sub-sectors and relevant modes). GATS 
stands for the GATS commitments. K stands for Korea, J: Japan, C: China. For example, K-Singapore is the 
commitment offered by Korea under Korea-Singapore FTA. Japan-Indonesia EPA is not included here because index is 
not available from the dataset. 
  
48.81
58.42
49.70
52.89
62.59 62.84 62.33 62.84
54.51
58.50
39.29 40.14 39.97
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
113 
 
 Singapore: Singapore’s level of GATS commitments is only 37.59. On the other hand, 
Singapore seems more seriously committed to bilateral FTAs as the preferential margins of 
Singaporean bilateral FTAs on average are higher than those of the other East Asian countries. 
For example, it provided the highest level of commitments (70.98) in the Singapore-Korean 
FTA. Even under the ASEAN services framework, Singapore’s level of commitments (42.03) 
is lower than its bilateral commitments with South Korea, Japan (59.62) and China (44.07). 
 The Philippines: The level of GATS commitments of The Philippines are relatively low 
(16.41). For The Philippines, it seems that ASEAN services integration is a priority (34.95). 
The commitments made in the bilateral FTA with Japan (27.68) are higher than those in 
ASEAN-China (18.75) and ASEAN-Korea (21.47). 
 Malaysia: ASEAN services integration seems a top priority for Malaysia as the margin is 
relatively large between its ASEAN 7th commitments (43.39) and GATS commitments 
(27.47). On the other hand, it provided little preferential treatment to China (28.66), Japan 
(29.08) and South-Korea (33.89). 
 Thailand: Thailand significantly prioritises ASEAN. The level of its ASEAN 7th commitments 
accounts for 37.86 while the commitments with Japan (20.37), South Korea (19.69) and China 
(20.32) show little difference from its GATS commitments (19.39).  
 Brunei: More than Malaysia and Thailand, Brunei gives a high priority to ASEAN. It provided 
the much higher level of commitments under the ASEAN 7th package (30.78) than its GATS 
commitments (7.99) which are lowest among the East Asian countries. 
 Viet Nam: Although Viet Nam is still an LDC, its GATS commitment is relatively high 
(34.18). Interestingly, it gave no preferential treatment to PTAs with China, Japan and South-
Korea. Even under the ASEAN 7th package, the level of commitments (38.27) is not much 
higher than the GATS commitments. 
 Indonesia: Indonesia also prioritises ASEAN. The level of the ASEAN 7th package shows 
41.58 while the level of its GATS commitments is only 17.26. It also differentiates the level of 
preferential treatment according to the partner in an FTA (e.g. South-Korea: 23.43 and China: 
17.52).125 
                                                          
125 We cannot include the Japan-Indonesian FTA as the level of commitment is not contained in the dataset. 
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Figure 3-34: The level of commitments in FTAs offered by ASEAN member countries 
 
 
Source: The index is from the “dataset of the commitments in regional trade agreements” of the WTO (available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/dataset_e/dataset_e.htm). 
Note: The index is brought onto a 0-100 scale: 100 (full-commitments in all sub-sectors and relevant modes). GATS stands for the GATS commitments. K stands for Korea, J: Japan, C: China. 
For example, K-Singapore is the commitment offered by Korea under Korea-Singapore FTA. Japan-Indonesian FTAA is not included here because index is not available from the dataset
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In short, the level of services commitments in the East Asian FTAs does not reflect the strong 
diplomatic motivations of East Asian integration. First, they are not significantly liberalised in 
comparison with the GATS commitments which was made more than 19 years ago. This means 
that the level of liberalisation is much less than the actual liberalisation under unilateral policy. 
Second, a high degree of consistency within the agreements cannot be seen in the region, reflecting 
the varying levels of economies and different political and economic strategies of each country. 
 
 
Box 3-1: An overview of liberalisation commitments made under the bilateral FTAs 
between Japan and the ASEAN countries 
Below, we highlight the commitments of Japan and the ASEAN countries as a basis of our 
argument in the case study (Chapter 5 and 6). 
Commitments made by Japan: Four strong features can be found from the commitments 
made by Japan. First, the level of Japan’s commitments can be evaluated as GATS-plus in 
most of the cases, but the commitments were made under the level of respective domestic 
regime. Second, in comparison with the commitments Japan made for the FTAs with 
Mexico, Chile and Switzerland which took the negative list approach, the level of 
commitments made for the East Asian countries seems less ambitious. Third, the level of 
commitments reflects the economic development or liberalisation level of the partner 
countries. For example, the commitments made for the Japan-Singapore FTA are the most 
liberalised ones reflecting the level of market openness of Singapore. On the other hand, the 
commitments made for the Japan-Viet Nam FTA are mostly limited. Fourth, movement of 
natural persons is highlighted since specific commitments are separated from the main body 
of services commitments in most of the FTAs (e.g. Thailand, The Philippines, Indonesia and 
Viet Nam). The commitments include improved market access to certain categories of 
professional services which do not exist in the GATS commitments. However, the new 
commitments were made without any legislative and regulatory changes. 
Commitments made by the ASEAN countries: Three strong features can be found from 
commitments made by the ASEAN countries. One is that six countries (Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippine) with the exception of Viet-Nam made GATS-plus 
commitments within the existing regulatory regime.  However, a range of improvement 
varies depending on the countries. Second, the level of commitments of all FTA partners is 
far less than their commitments in the ASEAN services trade agreements (ASEAN 7th 
package). Third, the type of improvements reflect the major requests from Japan. These 
were: (i) relaxing or eliminating restrictions on Mode 3, and (ii) relaxing or eliminating 
restrictions in the services sectors such as after sales services and distribution services in 
order to improve the business environment of the Japanese manufacturing sector and (ii) 
relaxing or eliminating restrictions in the services sector which can contribute to support for 
the supply chains in East Asia (e.g. financial sector, maritime sector and telecommunication 
sector).   
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3.5 Conclusion 
Services trade integration in East Asia is underdeveloped both in terms of market and policy. This 
is a distinctive characteristic of East Asia.  
Section 3.3 demonstrated the economic features of services markets and trade in East Asia. First, 
most of the East Asian countries (except Singapore and The Philippines) are services importing 
countries instead of exporting countries. Second, East Asian countries are not competitive in 
global services trade. In global services trade, the US and the EU are dominant players both in 
terms of imports and exports. Some East Asian countries such as China, Japan and Singapore are 
ranked within the top ten in world services trade exports; however, the volume of exports is very 
limited, which is only one third of that of the US. Third, services market integration is 
underdeveloped in East Asia. A certain level of intra-services trade takes place between China, 
Japan, South Korea and Singapore; however, their major trade partners are the US and the EU. 
Fourth, the economic features of services markets indicate a lack of global competitiveness as well 
as underdeveloped services market integration in the region. In East Asia, whereas Singapore can 
be characterised as a country of a liberal and competitive services market, the other countries are 
not. For example, the competitiveness of the services sector in Japan and South Korea still lags 
behind the manufacturing sector. Some ASEAN countries such as The Philippines and Malaysia 
are gaining competitiveness in some services sectors, however, some uncompetitive sectors are 
remaining in place. Strong government intervention and imperfect competition are also observed 
in other ASEAN countries (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand) and China. As for LDCs (Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar), which are undergoing democratic and decentralisation processes, the services 
sector is still small and underdeveloped at the domestic level. In short, the observations could 
demonstrate a lack of competitiveness in global services markets and underdeveloped services 
trade integration in the region.  
Section 3.4 investigated the policy feature of services trade integration.  First we found that the 
restrictiveness of the actual policies is much higher than the world average in most East Asian 
developing countries except Cambodia. Notably, The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Viet Nam and China are the countries which retain high restrictiveness. Even Japan and South 
Korea retain higher restrictiveness than the OECD average. The results imply that unilateral 
services trade policies in East Asia are not providing sufficiently good conditions for services 
suppliers to do business in the region. Second, in spite of an upsurge of bilateral FTAs in East Asia 
since the 2000s, the margins of preferential treatment are limited in most of FTAs in comparison 
with the GATS commitments. This means that the level of liberalisation is much less than the 
actual liberalisation under unilateral liberalisation. Third, a lack of consistency within the existing 
agreements in the region may become a deadlock on the creation of a consolidated FTA in the 
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region. In conclusion, the policy analysis identified that institutional integration of services trade in 
East Asia is too weak to motivate services suppliers to promote services trade in the region. 
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Chapter 4: Understanding Services Trade 
Decision-making in Practice 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this project is to figure out how interests and institutions in domestic decision-making 
affected the formulation of negotiating positions of Japan and ASEAN for the Japan-ASEAN 
bilateral FTAs. For this purpose, it is important to understand how services trade negotiating 
positions are formulated in practice at the domestic level. This chapter first identifies the nature of 
services trade decision-making in comparison with goods trade decision-making. Then we observe 
services trade decision-making in East Asia by underlining: (i) major actors (policy supply side 
and policy demand side); (ii) interactions between governments and the private sector; and (iii) 
internal coordination of government. We provide general observation of services trade policy-
making as well as observation of East Asia. To explain (ii) and (iii), we provide some examples of 
the countries covered by the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs in order to help understand how 
services trade decision-making in practice takes place in these countries prior to the following case 
study (Chapter 5 and 6). Since Japan’s services trade decision-making is the most developed in 
East Asia, a more detailed explanation is given in comparison with the explanation about ASEAN 
developing countries.  
 
4.2 Complex decision-making in comparison with goods trade 
Before explaining services trade decision-making in practice, we describe the nature of services 
trade decision-making in comparison with goods trade decision-making. There are two differences 
between the decision-making for services trade and that for goods trade. First, inter-governmental 
coordination is more complex, due to the horizontal fragmentation and vertical fragmentation of 
government institutions. For services trade decision-making, more coordination is required in 
comparison with goods trade decision-making process. With regard to horizontal fragmentation, 
many ministries are involved in services trade policy, especially during the domestic policy-
making process and sometimes even the international negotiation process. As explained in Chapter 
2, services covers a wide range of industries which are divided into eleven categories: transport, 
communication, construction, distribution, educational, environmental, financial, health-related 
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and social services, tourism, business, and cultural and sporting services.126 These services sectors 
are all supervised by certain regulatory authorities. Hence, whether for multilateral or plurilateral 
trade negotiations, all of these domestic regulatory authorities play a role as policy-making actors 
and deliver their offensive or defensive interests. In addition to horizontal fragmentation, federal 
states have to suffer vertical fragmentation. Since provincial governments administer the services 
related regulations (e.g. licensing and qualification of professional services, health related services, 
educational services and water or energy related services) at the sub-national level, the sub-
national level regulatory authorities get involved in decision-making. In this case, a provincial 
government may possibly exercise regulatory power during the domestic decision process. Second, 
client relationships between domestic regulatory authorities and domestic services suppliers are 
much stronger in comparison with goods. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is the 
stronger influence of domestic regulation than goods trade.127 The domestic regulatory authorities, 
who are authorised to provide licenses and qualifications, can exercise strong regulatory power to 
services providers. Professional services in Japan and ASEAN are one of the examples where the 
strong client relationship can be observed from this perspective.128 The second reason lies in the 
more direct effects of technological change than in goods trade.129 The competent authorities have 
to rely on sectoral information, which is associated with technological changes, to establish their 
negotiating positions. For example, the movement of natural persons (Mode 4), such as the IT 
engineers, was replaced by cross-border supply (Mode 1) in the business outsourcing services in 
The Philippines thanks to TC innovation in the early 2000s.130  
 
4.3. Identifying actors  
4.3.1 Policy supply side (government) 
 
Lead ministry131 
In many countries either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the International Trade Ministry plays a 
role as a lead ministry for international trade negotiations and its trade policy-making process. This 
is also the case of services trade negotiations. The central duty of the lead ministry is to coordinate 
the inter-government decision-making process and create a country’s unified negotiating positions 
including requests/offers of commitments. Hence, the lead ministry sets up a services trade 
                                                          
126 See the GATS classification explained in Chapter 2: 2.2. 
127 See Chapter 2: 2.2.B. 
128 See Chapter 5 and 6. 
129 See Chapter 2: 2.2.C. 
130 See Chapter 6. 
131 The Observation is derived from the interviews with the East Asian government officials in April 2013 (See 
Appendix 1). 
120 
 
negotiation committee inside the government and invites all relevant ministries and regulatory 
authorities relating to the services sector. In terms of consultations with the services sector, the 
lead ministry would set up consultation meetings with the non-government sectors including the 
business sector. It would also try to keep a good connection with business confederations to grasp 
the general negotiating positions of the market players. While the domestic regulatory authorities 
which supervise sectoral services are possessed of sectoral expertise and information, the lead 
ministry is not, since it does not generally administer any services sector. Therefore, the lead 
ministry has to rely on the expertise of the domestic regulatory authorities. In general, the lead 
ministry’s negotiating power is very limited due to a lack of authorisation power. 
As Table 4-1 shows, in Malaysia and Singapore, it is the Ministry of Trade and Industry which 
leads international trade policy making including services trade, and trade diplomats act as 
professional negotiators. In Indonesia, the Ministry of Trade is the major actor responsible for 
international trade negotiations with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For services 
trade negotiations, the Ministry of Trade acts as a lead ministry. In Thailand, the Ministry of 
Commerce leads international trade negotiations including services. However, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is sometimes designated as a lead ministry such as is the case of FTA negotiations 
with Japan. In The Philippines, the Department of Foreign Affairs represents the country for the 
WTO services trade negotiations while NEDA (National Economic Development Authority) leads 
the services trade negotiations for FTA services trade negotiations. In Japan, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officially represents the country for international trade negotiations 
including services. However, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which 
possesses more expertise on services trade as an economic agency, plays a role as a de-facto lead 
ministry together with the MOFA.  
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Table 4-1: A list of lead ministries in East Asia 
  
Source: the interviews with the East Asian government officials in April 2013 (See 
Appendix 1)  
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Box 4-1: A sequence of the domestic trade policy-making process 
To understand the domestic policy-making process in general, the ‘standard domestic sequence’ of 
economic diplomacy introduced by Bayne (2011) is useful. He divided the process of economic 
diplomacy into seven stages: (1) Identifying the lead department/ministry, (2) External 
consultation, (3) Internal coordination, (4) Political authority, (5) Democratic legitimisation, (6) 
International negotiation, and (7) Ratification of agreement. He explains that the process is 
deliberately simplified to seven stages and that some stages may take place simultaneously and/or 
be repeated as negotiations develop (Bayne 2011, p.44). 
The seven stages are as follows. The first stage is to identify which department/ministry of 
government represents the international negotiations. At the second and third stages, the lead 
ministry proceeds to external consultation (stage 2) in parallel with internal coordination (stage 3). 
At external consultation, the lead ministry as well as the home ministries/agencies responsible for 
the negotiation issues, consults with non-government actors such as the private sector, NGOs and 
academics to establish their positions. Internal coordination is the process through which the lead 
ministry consults on the issues with other government ministries/agencies to reach the official level 
consensus. There are two major steps for the lead ministry during the internal coordination. The 
first step is to decide its own negotiating objectives and tactics and resolve any internal difference 
(Bayne, 2011, p46).  In the case of trade negotiations, the typical domestic tension is between the 
lead ministry, which aims at liberalising the domestic markets, and home ministries/agencies 
which would like to protect the sectors under their supervision. Sometimes, home 
ministries/agencies of sub-national level are involved in the negotiations. The second step is to 
reconcile the interests of other ministries/agencies concerned and adopt a common national 
position where all ministries/ agencies concerned more or less compromise on their positions to 
reach unified national interests. At the fourth stage, ministers become involved in the decision 
process and a political decision is made. The Stage 5 moves to the democratic legitimisation 
through the parliament. During the international negotiation (stage 6), steps 1 to 5 of the domestic 
policy-making process are iterated. As international negotiations proceed, each stage of internal 
coordination process becomes more vibrant. The final stage (stage 7) is the ratification of the 
agreement. The ‘standard domestic sequence’ of trade policy-making processes can be applied to 
the domestic decision-making process for the FTA services trade negotiations. 
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Domestic regulatory authorities132 
 
Given the wide coverage of services trade, the ministries which administer a specific sector are 
asked to input their expertise into services trade policy-making. As a consequence, almost all 
domestic regulatory ministries are involved in services trade policy-making at the domestic level. 
As can be seen from Table 4-2, almost all ministries are involved in services trade negotiations in 
East Asia, although the level of interests differs across ministries. In the case of Japan, some 
domestic regulatory ministries which have strong interests (both in terms of offensive and 
defensive) even participate in the international negotiation process as watchdog of the lead 
ministry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  
 
The degree of involvement in services trade decision-making may differ across agencies 
depending on the type of negotiations or the coverage of negotiating issues. Taking the WTO 
services trade negotiations as an example, the lead ministry (e.g. foreign ministry or ministry of 
international trade) was the main actor in the negotiations for drawing up the architecture of the 
GATS during the Uruguay Round and the GATS review process between 1998 and 2000 because 
the negotiation requires broad international political and economic views, as well as expertise in 
international law. During the sectoral negotiations of the financial sector (1995-1997) and the basic 
telecom sector (1994-1997), the regulatory agencies played a crucial role in domestic policy 
making processes. They even directly presented themselves to the international negotiation process 
at the WTO to stress their interests. Likewise, once the sectoral negotiations started at the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) services negotiations, domestic regulatory authorities showed more 
interest in directly inputting their offensive or defensive interests to the request and offer process. 
 
The history of the WTO services trade negotiations described above indicates that the more 
specific negotiations become, the more likely the degree of involvement of domestic regulatory 
ministries goes up. This can apply to FTA services trade negotiations. Unlike the case of the WTO 
negotiations, where 157 WTO Member countries participate, FTA services trade negotiations, 
where a limited number of countries participate, become more specific. Thus FTA services trade 
negotiations would give domestic regulatory authorities more incentives to become involved in the 
domestic decision-making process. Accordingly domestic regulatory authorities of the offensive 
sectors would become actively involved in the request making process. Likewise, the domestic 
regulatory authorities of the defensive sectors would actively become involved in theoffer making 
process to downgrade the quality of offers. 
 
                                                          
132 The observation is derived from the interviews with the East Asian government officials in April 2013 (See Appendix 
1). 
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Negotiation capacities of domestic regulatory authorities also affect the degree of involvement in 
services trade negotiations. If regulatory ministries are totally occupied with domestic matters and 
no negotiation capacities are left to deal with the international economic matters, services trade 
negotiations are likely to be ignored. Also, the absence of technical knowledge of services 
negotiations would easily induce a backward looking tendency. A lack of negotiation capacities of 
developing countries in comparison with those of developed countries is often pointed out by 
negotiators from developing countries at the WTO services trade negotiations. This can also apply 
to FTA services trade negotiations. For example, while Japan had sufficient negotiation capacities 
for the FTA services trade negotiations in East Asia, ASEAN developing countries suffered from 
limited negotiating capacities. 
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Table 4-2: A list of the domestic regulatory authorities which participate in services trade policy-making in some East Asian countries 
Source: the interviews with the East Asian government officials in April 2013 (See Appendix 1) 
 China Indonesia Japan Malaysia Singapore Thailand The Philippines 
Names of 
domestic 
regulatory 
authorities 
• Ministry of 
Finance 
• Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection 
• Ministry of 
Industry and 
Information 
Technology 
• Ministry of Land 
and Resources 
• Ministry of 
Transportation 
• Ministry of 
Education 
• Ministry of 
Culture 
• Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection 
• Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
• Ministry of 
Human Resources 
and Social 
Security 
• Ministry of Justice 
• Ministry of Land 
and Resources 
• Ministry of 
Transport 
• Ministry of Water 
Resources 
 
• Coordinating 
Ministry for 
Economy 
• Ministry of 
Finance 
• the National 
Development 
Planning Board 
• Ministry of 
Labour 
• Ministry of 
Communications? 
• Ministry of 
National 
Education? 
• Ministry of 
Health? 
• Ministry of 
Information? 
• Ministry of Mines 
and Energy? 
• Ministry of 
Tourism, Art and 
Culture 
 
• Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and 
Industry 
• Ministry of 
Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science & 
Technology 
• Ministry of 
Environment 
• Ministry of Finance 
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• MITI related 
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Malaysia 
Productivity 
Corporation) 
• Ministry of Finance 
related agencies 
(Kazanah Nasional, 
Employees 
Provident Fund) 
• Ministry of 
Domestic Trade, 
Co-operatives and 
Consumerism 
• Ministry of Works 
• Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
• Ministry of High 
Education 
• Ministry of Energy, 
Green Technology 
and Water 
• Ministry of 
Information, 
Communication and 
Culture, 
• SME Corporation 
Malaysia 
 
• Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
• Ministry of 
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Communication and 
the Arts  
• Ministry of Culture 
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Youth 
• Ministry of 
Education 
• Ministry of Finance 
• Ministry of Health 
• Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
• Ministry of Law 
• Ministry of 
Manpower 
• Ministry of the 
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Water resources 
• Ministry of 
Transport 
 
• Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
• Ministry of Finance 
• Ministry of Tourism 
and Sports 
• Ministry of 
Transport 
• Ministry of Natural 
Resources and 
Environment 
• Ministry of 
Information 
Technology and 
Communication 
• Ministry of Energy 
• Ministry of Justice 
• Ministry of Labour 
• Ministry of Culture 
• Ministry of 
Education 
• Ministry of Public 
Health 
• Ministry of Industry 
 
• Department of Trade 
and Industry 
• Department of Finance 
• Department of Foreign 
Affairs 
• Department of Tourism 
• Philippines Professional 
Regulation Commission 
• Central Bank of The 
Philippines 
• Department of 
Education 
• Department of Energy 
• Department of 
Environment and 
Natural Resources 
• Department of Health 
• Department of Labour 
and Employment 
• Department of Justice 
• Department of Tourism 
• Department of 
Transportation and 
Communications 
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4.3.2 Policy demand side 
On the policy demand side, two types of non-state actors, business actors and civil society 
organisations (CSOs), participate in services trade decision-making in practice. Although the 
participation of civil society organisations in trade negotiations has been increasingly becoming 
active over decades, business actors still are privileged in reflecting their interests during 
Government’s consultation processes in many countries (Capling and Low 2010), which is also the 
case for services trade negotiations. Although the business sector was a major actor on the policy 
demand side for FTA services trade negotiations inside East Asia in the 2000s, this section 
provides general observations about services trade decision-making in practice. 
 
A. Business actors 
As for the business sector, business confederations, sector associations (sectoral associations and 
professional associations), and individual firms are identified as major actors of the policy demand 
side in international trade diplomacy.133 In addition to these, one cannot ignore the emerging role 
of services coalitions in services trade diplomacy in the case of developed countries. Although the 
existing type of associations and the degree of involvement in international trade diplomacy vary 
across countries, the strong feature is that roles of the private sector in services trade policy-
making, especially in the area of regulatory lobbying, in the EU and the US are far ahead from 
those in the East Asian countries.134 Thus we include an explanation of the major policy making 
actors for services trade negotiations in the EU and the US by way of comparison. 
 
(i) Business confederations 
Business confederations generally represent a broad cross-sectoral position. They can represent the 
national business positions on services trade in general; however, they normally do not act for a 
specific services sector as they have to generalise their negotiating positions taking into account its 
horizontally wide memberships. In developed countries, we can see influential business 
confederations such as the Japan Business Federations (Keidanren) in Japan, Business Europe (the 
former Union of European Industry and Employers’ Confederations - UNICE) based in Brussels, 
US Council for International Business in the US, Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in the 
UK and Bundersverbund der Deutchen Industrie (BDI) in Germany. They are major actors in 
international economic diplomacy including FTAs. In contrast, negotiating capacities for FTA 
                                                          
133 See Macdonald and Woolcock (2007). 
134 From the interviews with the business lobbyists between 2013 and 2015 (Appendix 1). 
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negotiations of the business confederations in developing countries are inferior to the ones of 
developed countries due to their limited human resources and funding. Chambers of Commerce 
and Industries can represent the voices of SMEs, unlike business confederations representing the 
larger companies. However, the degree of their involvement in FTA policy-making seems limited 
in comparison with the business confederations. One of reasons is that SMEs, especially the local 
SMEs in developing countries, cannot link their business activities with international trade 
negotiations due to their domestically rooted business activities, as well as unawareness of their 
potential as exporters. 
 
(ii) Sector associations (sectoral associations and professional associations) 
Sector associations can act more specifically to reflect their offensive or defensive positions than 
business confederations where cross-sectoral interests have to be marginalised. In the services 
sector, there are two types of sectoral association. One is sector association: such as a banking 
association, insurance association, construction industry association, communication industry 
association and tourism industry association. Taking the example of the WTO services trade 
negotiations, the American and European financial sectors were the major actors promoting 
financial services liberalisation during the Uruguay Round and the sectoral negotiations on 
financial sector following the Uruguay Round. 
The coverage and size of existing sector associations varies across the East Asian countries. In 
general, sector associations in the East Asian countries focus more on domestic economic issues 
than trade issues. For example, even in Japan, which is a country where the sector associations 
cover most of the domestic services sectors, the institutional capacities of sector associations to 
participate the decision-making process are limited to specific organisations such as banking and 
insurance associations. In ASEAN countries, there are associations representing the major service 
sectors such as construction, transportation and financial services. But the level of interests in the 
services trade negotiations and institutional capacities to participate in the policy-making process 
of sector associations were still very limited in the 2000s. 
The other type is the associations which represent professionals such as an architect association, 
nurse association, medical doctor association, engineer association, lawyer association and 
accountant association. Given that these professional associations directly relate to movement of 
natural persons (mode 4) under the GATS, they have been powerful lobbying sources at the WTO 
services trade negotiations ever since the GATS was introduced. One specific example of the 
involvement of professional associations in services trade negotiations was accountants. At the 
multilateral level, the American and European accountant firms and associations actively lobbied 
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their governments to liberalize the accountant markets during and after the Uruguay Round. As a 
result, the Guidelines for Mutual Recognition Agreements or Arrangements in the Accountancy 
Sector were adopted in May 1997. 135  In ASEAN countries, FTA negotiations attract export 
interests of some professional associations such as nurses and care workers. 
 
(iii) Services coalitions 
One of the strong features in services trade diplomacy is the emerging role of services coalitions at 
the global level.136 The first such coalition was the Liberalisation of Trade in Services (LOTIS) 
committee formed in 1981 by British Invisibles. In the US, the American services firms organised 
the “Coalition of Services Industries (CSI)”137 in 1982 to promote services trade liberalisation 
through the WTO and FTAs and enhance global competitiveness of the American services 
industries. CSI is the largest services coalitions across the world in terms of membership, activities 
and structure. It broadly represents the American services firms and associations including the 
financial services, telecommunication services, express delivery services, information and 
technology services, professional services, audiovisual services and distributions/retail services. 
Activities vary from trade policy formulation (e.g. advising the USTR and the Departments of 
Treasury and Commerce, and educating members of the US Congress and staff), providing data 
and analysis of services to advocating services liberalisation at the global level, such as organizing 
the global services summits. 
Following in the footpath of the US, the European Services Forum (ESF) was established in 1998 
to form a consolidated voice of the European services firms and present their interests for the 
services trade negotiations in the WTO and FTA negotiations138. The membership of the ESF 
covers more than 20 services sectors including audiovisual services, business services, 
distribution/retail services, environmental services, financial services, professional services, 
shipping services, telecommunication services and tourism, the coverage of which is apparently 
wider than that of the CSI. In comparison with CSI, ESF concentrates its activities on policy 
making. For example, it publishes substantial numbers of position papers on the WTO and FTA 
negotiations in services which require expertise.139  ESF maintains close contact with the European 
                                                          
135 See the negotiation background at the WTO website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/accountancy_e/accountancy_e.htm). 
136 In addition to the EU, US and East Asia, there are similar types of services coalitions in Chile, Barbados, Canada, 
Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Argentine, and Trinidad and Tobago. The scale of institution and institutional function 
vary among countries. 
137 See the website of CSI: http://uscsi.org/ 
138 The FTA negotiations were incorporated into the mandate after the failure of the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in 
2003. See the website of ESF: http://www.esf.be/ 
139 For example, ESF published twelve position papers in 2011 (e.g. the EU-Indian FTA, EU investment policy towards 
China, EU-Mercosur FTA, EU-Malaysia trade negotiations and financial services liberalisation). 
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Commission and other EU institutions so that the business interests of the European services 
industries are effectively reflected in WTO and FTA negotiations. 
By comparison with active involvement of services coalitions in the US and the EU, the presence 
of services coalitions in East Asia is not strong with the exception of Hong Kong.140 In fact, a 
similar type of forum exists in Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia, however, the scale, scope of 
activities and institutional independency of these forums are incomparably weaker than those of 
the US and the EU. In the case of Japan, responding to strong requests from the CSI (US) to form a 
counterpart organisation in Japan, the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) decided to host the 
Japan Services Network (JSN) in 1999 to promote information exchange among the Japanese 
services firms and develop cooperation with the services coalitions in other countries. Unlike CSI 
(US) and ESF which accommodate their own secretariats to engage actively in multilateral and 
plurilateral negotiations, JSN is only an umbrella committee which belongs to the International 
Trade and Investment Committee of the Keidanren. Members are some of the Keidanren member 
companies which show interest in international services trade negotiation.141 Over a decade after 
its establishment, JSN only joined the international communiqués of the Global Services Network, 
such as the successful WTO services trade negotiations. In fact, it is not JSN but the International 
Trade and Investment Committee of Keidanren which has been a major focal point of services 
trade negotiations at the domestic trade-policy formulation process. In the case of Malaysia, the 
situation is similar to Japan. The Coalition of Services Industries Malaysia,142 established in 2007 
and hosted by the Malaysian International Chambers and Commerce and Industries, also actively 
joins the international communiqué as member of the Global Services Network, however its own 
activities in terms of informational and financial resources are not clear. In Indonesia, Indonesia 
Services Dialogue143 started its activities as an ad-hoc forum in 2010 and became a legal entity in 
January 2015. As described above, services coalitions did not participate in FTA services trade 
negotiations in the 2000s in the case of East Asia. 
 
(iv)  Individual firms 
Individual firms in the services sector can directly express their positions and lobby governments 
to attain their interests, as firms in the manufacturing sector do. In the case of the services sector, 
American and European multinational companies, which achieve strong export competitiveness, 
have been active through WTO services trade negotiations, especially in the area of rule-making. 
                                                          
140 There are also Hong Kong Coalition of Services Industries and Taiwan Coalition of Services Industries in East Asia. 
But these countries are not covered under this research project. 
141 Membership of JSN is not disclosed to public. 
142 See the website of CSI Malaysia at http://csim.com.my/index.html. 
143 See the website of Indonesia Services Dialogue at http://isd-indonesia.org/. 
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In the case of East Asia, there is little active involvement of individual firms as promoters of 
services liberalisation on the offensive side. Rather, defensive lobbying takes place behind the 
scene. Namely China and the ASEAN countries, SOEs/GLCs which try to retain their dominant 
position in the markets act informally to protect their interests. On the whole, lobbying activities of 
individual firms tend to be invisible and difficult to capture by researchers in comparison with 
business organisations or coalitions which make their positions and statements publicly available. 
 
B. Civil society organisations (CSOs) 
The presence of CSOs as actorｓ of trade policy-making is broadly identified among scholars and 
practitioners.144 CSOs started to show their interests in international trade negotiations, such as 
NAFTA and Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, from the mid-
1980s.145  Then the WTO trade negotiations and plurilateral/bilateral trade negotiations which 
spread across the globe from the late 1990s further attracted てぇ CSOs’ attention to trade policy-
making. The CSOs’ interests in trade negotiations can be categorised into three types: (i) strong 
ideological interests which arise from divergent social norms and ideology; (ii) substantial 
concerns about specific negotiation issues such as trade agreements’ impacts on domestic policies, 
culture and the global environment; and (iii) discontent at a lack of transparency in decision-
making processes and strong demands for CSOs’ participation in negotiation processes.146  
With regard to services trade negotiations specifically, the GATS started to receive major 
criticisms from CSOs since the WTO was established in 1995. There are two reasons why services 
trade negotiations tend to draw CSOs’ attention. Firstly, services trade negotiations deal with 
behind the border issues which directly relate to domestic regulations. Secondly, given the wide 
sectoral coverage of the GATS, negotiations include public-related sectors such as public health, 
education, environment and cultural sector (e.g. audio-visual). At the multilateral level, since a 
new round of services trade negotiations started in 2000,147 CSOs started to show substantial 
concerns about the GATS. These include investment related commitments and their effect on 
development; legal obligations of national treatment and market access; privatisation and 
liberalisation of public services (e.g. implication of the GATS negotiations over public water 
distribution); and a country’s right to regulate.148 Furthermore, CSOs are strongly sceptical about 
                                                          
144 See Capling and Low (2010), Halle and Wolfe (2007), Hanegraaff, Beyers and Braun (2011), and Hocking, B. (2004) 
for example. 
145 The WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm 
146 Capling and Low (2010). p6. 
147 See the Article XIX: Negotiation of Specific Commitments of the GATS. 
148 See “GATS -Fact and Fiction” from the WTO website:  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsfacts1004_e.pdf. 
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the on-going TISA (Trade in Services Agreement) negotiations,149 which aim at improving the 
GATS rules and liberalising services markets.150 Likewise, the plurilateral/bilateral services trade 
negotiations under FTAs receive the similar type of substantial criticisms from the CSOs. Because 
a services agreement under FTAs generally aims at a higher level of liberalisation and stronger 
rules than those under the GATS, CSOs worry that services trade provisions might undermine 
public interests, such as consumer safety, environmental protection, human rights and development 
policy.151  
In East Asia, CSOs are not involved in the decision-making process for services trade in 
comparison with the EU and the US for two reasons. First, the CSOs’ access to services trade 
decision-making process is not institutionalised in comparison with the US and the EU. The 
second reason is a lack of capacity. CSOs’ financial and human capacities to engage in trade policy 
debates, especially in East Asian developing countries, are still very limited in comparison with 
those of developed countries. 
It is true that CSOs’ interests in services trade negotiations have been gradually growing over 
decades, both at the multilateral and plurilateral levels in East Asia. However, ideological interests 
against services liberalism are expressed much more strongly than substantial concerns about 
services trade agreements, especially in the ASEAN countries. For instance, in Indonesia, while 
some business organisations such as KADIN (Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) 
and the Indonesian Entrepreneurs Association are privileged to take in part the formal consultation 
process and provide substantial inputs to the government, CSO’s participation to trade policy 
debates is almost absent. Instead of providing policy inputs, Indonesian CSOs focus their activities 
on advocating anti-liberal ideology.152 In the area of services, only a few CSOs, which are funded 
by international donors, show policy interests such as services trade liberalisation and its relation 
with energy policy 153  and labour mobility. 154  In Thailand, the CSOs’ access to trade policy 
consultation was still limited in the 1990s. However, the CSOs in Thailand started to demonstrate 
much stronger resistance to neoliberal economic development under the WTO system and 
accelerated their resistance against ‘Thaksin’s CEO-style management over Thai FTAs’155 from the 
early 2000s. The most powerful anti-liberal advocator among Thai CSOs was ‘FTA Watch’, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Since many of concerns expressed by CSOs are caused by a misunderstanding of the GATS, the WTO Secretariat has 
been trying to disseminate basic understanding of the GATS among civil society. 
149 23 WTO Members join the negotiations. See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/ 
150 See, for example, the article about TISA on the website, Bilaterals.org: http://www.bilaterals.org/?trade-in-services-
agreement-30471 
151 See, for example, CSO’ concerns about Central American Free Trade Agreements and NAFTA. Exchange, G. (2004, 
05). CAFTA rhymes with NAFTA. Industrial Worker Retrieved from 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/195442104?accountid=9630 
152 Chandra and Hanim (2010), p139.  
153 See Chandra and Hanim (2010), p145 and the website of Institute for Essential Service Reform 
(https://humanrightsinasean.info/content/institute-essential-service-reform-iesr.html). 
154 See Chandra and Hanim (2010), p147 as well as the website of Migrant Care (http://migrantcare.net/). 
155 Pongsudhirak (2010), p170. 
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CSO coalition which was established to protest against Thaksin’s trade policy initiatives.156 FTA 
Watch strongly requested CSOs’ participation into the FTA negotiation process to the Thaksin 
government. In terms of substance, FTA Watch was interested in a broad range of negotiating 
issues, including services trade (i.e. public health and consumer protection and investment related 
clauses) and protested against liberalisation. Interestingly, Thai CSOs are generally less critical 
about ASEAN economic integration and intra-Asian FTAs157 than the bilateral FTA negotiations 
which require higher level of liberalisation and wider substantial coverage, such as the Thai-US 
FTA negotiations.158 In South Korea, the CSOs started to protest against neoliberal economic 
development through the Uruguay Round negotiations and the establishment of the WTO. In the 
area of services, the financial services sectoral negotiations which were concluded in 1997 drew 
attention of the South Korean CSOs.159 Since the South Korean government accelerated bilateral 
trade negotiations from the early 2000s, the South Korean CSOs’ frustrations about a lack of 
transparency in decision-making process were escalated. Notably, at the time of the bilateral FTA 
negotiation with the US, the South Korean CSOs organised a series of protests which covered the 
services trade agreement, such as privatisation and liberalisation of the energy and transport 
sectors; and liberalisation of the Korean audio-visual sector (i.e. the reduction of screen quotas for 
the Korean audio-visual industry).160 Since the FTA negotiations with the ASEAN countries did 
not require a higher level of services liberalisation to South Korea, CSOs did not pay particular 
attention to the services negotiations.161 
In short, the CSOs’ participation in the services trade policy-making process in practice can be 
summarised as follows.162 
 CSOs’ participation in the policy-making process differs among countries. While some 
countries institutionalise the CSO’s participation, others rely on informal dialogues. If not, 
CSOs simply resort to street protests. The business sector is institutionally more integrated 
into policy consultation process in comparison with CSOs. 
 In comparison with CSOs in developed countries, CSOs in developing countries suffer from a 
lack of financial and human resources. Thus, their capacities to conduct general research and 
technical knowledge in the GATS are still limited. The CSOs’ participation in policy-making 
in developing countries lags behind that of CSOs’ in developed countries. 
                                                          
156 See the website of FTA Watch (http://www.ftawatch.org/). 
157 Pongsudhirak (2010), p183. 
158 Pongsudhirak(2010), p172-173. 
159 See “The Struggle against neoliberalism in South Korea; History and Lessons” by Korea Alliance against the Korea-
US FTA, the website: http://www.bilaterals.org/?the-struggle-against-neoliberalism. 
160 See “The Struggle against neoliberalism in South Korea; History and Lessons” by Korea Alliance against the Korea-
US FTA, the website: http://www.bilaterals.org/?the-struggle-against-neoliberalism. 
161 From the interview with a South Korean government official. See Appendix 1. 
162 Observations about CSOs’ participation in trade policy-making from the existing literature is summarised in Capling 
and Low (2010), p8. 
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 Organised opposition of CSOs to services trade provisions was developed prior to the WTO 
in the countries where deep regional integration took place, such as the EU internal market for 
services163 and NAFTA164. 
 The oppositions of CSOs against FTAs intensify when a country negotiate comprehensive 
and higher level of bilateral trade agreements with a stronger partner such as the U.S. 
 
4.4 Interactions between governments and the private sector 
4.4.1 General observation165 
Next, we explain how the private sector delivers its positions to government. In the case of 
services trade decision-making, the private sector has started to be involved in economic 
diplomacy from the WTO Uruguay Round where services trade were included as a part of 
multilateral trade system. However, strong demand could be seen only in Canada, the EU and the 
US at the time of Uruguay Round. The private sector in East Asia were still not well aware of 
service trade negotiations. A series of services negotiations and policy discussions which took 
place under the WTO forum after the Uruguay Round globally boosted the private sector’s 
involvement. From the late 1990s, the private sector in East Asia started to participate in WTO 
services trade negotiations. Then, the rise of a global trend of plurilateralism after the failure of the 
WTO Cancun Ministerial accelerated the private sector’s involvement in the FTA services trade 
negotiations. One reason is that the private sector expected FTAs to become an engine of market 
liberalisation and rule-making, which could hardly be expected from the WTO services 
negotiations. Another reason is that governments needed very specific information from the 
private sector, such as existing regulatory barriers of an FTA partner country, as well as technical 
sectoral information to design rules.166  
During the negotiations, the lead ministry proceeds with external consultation with the private 
sector in parallel with internal consultation with other government agents. In general, interaction 
between government and the private sector takes place both in a formal and an informal manner. 
The typical formal procedure of the external consultation process for FTA services trade 
negotiations takes place as follows. First, to form the position of the lead ministry, the lead 
ministry reports the status of the up-coming agenda of an FTA to the private sector counterparts 
                                                          
163 Johansson and Lee (2014). 
164 From the website, Citizens Trade Campaign: http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/blog/2017/01/18/5442/ 
165 The observation of this section is derived from a series of interviews: the interviews with a senior official of METI 
and MOFA, Japan in Tokyo (April 2015); the interviews with counsellors of the Services Trade and Investment Division 
and Trade Policy Division of the WTO secretariat (April 2013 and July 2015); and the interviews with the senior 
officials of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea (April 2013 and July 2015). 
166 See Capling and Low (2010). 
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(e.g. business federations and coalitions of services). Responding to the prospects of upcoming 
negotiations of an FTA, the private sector counterparts establish a relevant forum (e.g. a specific 
working group consists of the companies with strong interests in the issue) to gather views and 
information from individual companies. Through the forum, the private sector counterparts form 
their basic positions including the area of interests, rule-making issues and technical issues to be 
delivered to government.  Once the plurilateral negotiations start, the lead ministry updates the on-
going negotiations and informs the private sector counterpart about the positions of FTA partners. 
In parallel with the formal external consultation procedure led by the lead ministry, the domestic 
regulatory authorities in charge of the services sector independently liaise with their business 
sector counterparts such as the sector organisations, professional organisations and individual 
companies to form their own positions. These individual consultations become a core part of the 
negotiating positions of the domestic regulatory authorities during the internal coordination 
process. The informal part of these interactions, which is usually the main means of lobbying in 
developing countries, is generally difficult for outsiders, including researchers to capture. 
Despite the generalisations provided above, the way external consultation proceeds and the level of 
commitment of the private sector varies across the countries. Consultation processes between 
government and the private sector are generally well established in developed countries such as 
Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand and the US in comparison with ones in developing 
countries. For example, the access to information (e.g. pre-consultation of the negotiations, up-
dating the on-going negotiations status and policy transparency) of government is well 
institutionalised in the EU and the US. The business sector in the EU and the US is also well-
organized to effectively communicate their interests in rule-making areas, specific offensive 
interests at the sub-sectoral level, and substantive technical information. 
 
4.4.2 Observation of East Asia167 
Next, we describe interactions between government and the private sector for services trade 
negotiations. We thus explain how an external consultation system has been developed and 
identify major pro-liberal and anti-liberal forces. In terms of institutions, external consultation 
systems for services trade negotiations in East Asian countries were gradually established through 
                                                          
167 The observation of this section is derived from a series of interviews: the interviews with a senior official of METI 
and MOFA, Japan in Tokyo (April 2015); the interviews with counsellors of the Services Trade and Investment Division 
and Trade Policy Division of the WTO secretariat in Geneva (April 2013 and July 2015); the interviews with the senior 
officials of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea in Geneva (April 2013 and July 2015) and the interviews with senior 
lobbyists of the private sector (From 2013-2015). 
167 See Capling and Low (2010). 
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the WTO services trade negotiations after the Uruguay Round (e.g. financial negotiations and 
DDA) as well as through the FTA activity in East Asia. Governments consult the private sector to 
formulate a country’s negotiating positions which include making requests and offers and 
responding to requests and offers from their negotiating partner countries although the level of 
intimacy between government and the private sector varies depending on the country. In terms of 
lobbying interests, while the American and European private sector has been intensively lobbying 
Governments to liberalise services markets and develop multilateral/plurilateral rules in services, 
the private sector in East Asian has been playing a passive role. From the outward perspective, 
there have been insufficient offensive interests. The first reason is that services suppliers have not 
being globally competitive and have little interest in increasing business chances outside of the 
domestic markets. The second reason is that the private sector in East Asia has not been 
sufficiently aware of potential services exports. The third reason is that they (especially the private 
sector in developing countries) could technically associate their business in practice with the 
services trade agreements. From the inward perspective, the persistent defensive interests of 
protecting domestic markets have been much stronger than offensive interests. These anti-liberal 
interests have been efficiently lobbying government agencies and successfully capture them. 
Amongst East Asian countries, Japan’s external consultation process for services trade 
negotiations is the most institutionalised. In the case of FTA services trade negotiations, the private 
sector participates in negotiations from the pre-negotiation process to the early stage of 
international negotiations. The general formal procedure can be described as follows. At the pre-
negotiation stage, the private sector is invited to become a part of the pre-negotiation feasibility 
study group which is organised by the Japanese government to formulate Japan’s basic positions. 
At the early negotiation stage, the private sector inputs their positions as well as technical issues to 
the government using both the formal and informal routes. Normally, business confederations set 
out their positions to the MOFA and the METI while sectoral associations and professional 
associations input their positions to the supervising regulatory authorities. Once plurilateral 
negotiations on requests and offers start at the international level, the private sector is formally 
shut out from the process. 
While Japan’s external consultation for services trade negotiations is institutionalised, there has 
been a lack of strong interest in comparison with interest in goods trade. During the external 
consultations both at the formal and informal levels, the Japanese government has been facing 
difficulty in finding strong pro-liberal interests in services from the private sector. Although the 
private sector is involved in the domestic policy making process from the preparatory study phases, 
few services providers, with some exceptions (e.g. financial sector and IT sector), have been 
motivated to associate their business activities in practice with the services trade agreements. At 
the informal level, some professional services (e.g. nurses and medical doctors) always deliver 
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their strong defensive interests directly to their domestic regulatory authorities by maximising 
client relationships. 
In comparison with Japan, the external consultation process of developing countries in East Asia is 
still underdeveloped. For example, it was after the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs were concluded 
that the ASEAN countries established the formal external consultation process for services trade 
negotiations. In the case of Malaysia, the Malaysian government changed its policy to activate the 
private sector’s participation in the policy-making process in the late 2000s. Accordingly the 
government established the Malaysia Services Development Council to efficiently collect inputs 
from the private sector. Before establishment of the Malaysia Services Development Council, the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) had difficulty in obtaining information from the sectoral 
associations as well as professional associations, because these associations had direct access to 
the domestic regulatory ministries behind the scenes. When Malaysia started the FTA activity in 
East Asia in the early 2000s, participation of the private sector to services trade policy-making was 
only on an informal basis. Therefore, input from the private sector was very limited. Only the 
defensive lobbying, such as GLCs which generally obtain strong political power and ethnic 
chambers of commerce, captured the domestic regulatory ministries. As export capacities of the 
private sector increased from the late 2000s, the private sector’s inputs gradually became offensive, 
and pro-liberal lobbying started to take place during the external consultation process both at the 
formal and informal levels. 
In The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Viet Nam, the formal external consultation process for 
international trade negotiations was opened to selected business confederations which did not 
cover services sector’s interests. In the area of services, interactions between government and the 
private sector gradually became active by going through their FTA activities in the 2000s. 
However, it was only after conclusion of the bilateral FTAs with Japan that these countries 
established the formal consultation process for services trade negotiations with the private sector. 
At the time of FTA negotiations with Japan, interactions between the private sector and 
government took place at the informal basis. In terms of interests, defensive lobbying has been 
very active in these countries while offensive lobbying has been very limited, especially in 
Thailand and Indonesia. Amongst, SOEs, sectoral associations and the professional associations, 
which own strong client relations with the domestic regulatory authorities, actively lobby their 
defensive positions behind the scenes.  
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4.5 Internal coordination of government 
4.5.1 General observation 
How does the internal coordination of government for services trade negotiations take place in 
practice? We provide general observations on the procedural aspects. The government’s objective 
of internal coordination of government is to get a consensus on the negotiating positions at the 
official level. As described before, services trade negotiations involve many government ministries 
and regulatory authorities as the coverage of the services sector is wide. Hence, horizontal 
bargaining becomes a crucial part of negotiations in formulating a country’s negotiating positions. 
At the first stage of internal coordination, the lead ministry of services trade has to decide 
negotiation objectives and form its negotiation tactics and positions. At the second stage, the lead 
ministry has to receive inputs from the domestic regulatory ministries. At the third stage, the lead 
ministry has to reconcile the internal differences of position among the domestic regulatory 
authorities, and then adopt a unified national negotiating position.168 
The lead ministry follows the general domestic procedure for the FTA services trade policy-
making. At the first stage of internal coordination process, the lead ministry identifies its 
institutional and economic interests (see Table 1-2). For example, an institutional interest of 
services trade negotiations in FTAs would be to achieve a GATS Article V compatible FTA. To 
identify outward economic and inward economic interests, the lead ministry conducts a formal 
consultation together with informal consultations with the private sector. Then the lead ministry 
forms the basic negotiating positions. Before it starts internal coordination with domestic 
regulatory authorities, the lead ministry also devises a strategy to tackle defensive pressures. 
The second and third stage of the internal coordination process involves what we call horizontal 
fragmentation of power of services trade policy-making (vertical fragmentation of power is added 
under a federal system). At the first round of internal negotiations, the lead ministry has to explain 
its negotiating objectives, tactics and basic positions to the domestic regulatory authorities and 
convince them. For example if the lead ministry is in a position to use a negative list approach to 
achieve a high-level agreement, it has to obtain approvals from the domestic regulatory 
authorities. 169  In parallel, it starts collecting all information and requests from the domestic 
regulatory authorities to form basic requests to an FTA partner. These include (i) improving the 
FTA partner’s horizontal commitments and sector and sub-sector commitments by deleting the 
                                                          
168 See Bayne (2011) about trade policy-making process in general and VanGasstek (2011) about services trade policy-
making.  
169 In general, when a country tries to introduce a negative list approach for the first time, the lead ministry faces strong 
resistance from the domestic regulatory authorities since they get terrified by its technical nature, which is binding the 
status-quo liberalisation with a list of exceptions. In the case of Japan, the lead ministry had to make enormous amount 
of effort to convince the regulatory authorities when Japan introduced the negative list approach at the time of Japan-
Mexico FTA (from the interviews which took place in Tokyo, April 2015).  
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provisions of “unbound” or specific limitations; and (ii) increasing the number of sub-sectors with 
“no limitations”. The lead ministry puts all the information together and reframes it in accordance 
with its negotiation strategy and tactics. Once the lead ministry receives the requests from an FTA 
partner, the second round of internal coordination, that is making offers, starts. At the second 
round, the lead ministry has to reconcile conflicts to find out the best balanced package of requests 
and offers which is in line with the country’s negotiating objectives. During the internal 
coordination process, horizontal fragmentation of power gives rise to the use of veto power by 
domestic regulatory authorities with a strong preference of the status-quo. 
 
4.5.2 Observation of East Asia 
Internal coordination of government for FTA services trade negotiations in East Asia follows the 
general practice explained above. To demonstrate an explicit picture, including pro-liberal and 
anti-liberal forces of inter-governmental coordination, we provide the case of Japan as a developed 
country as well as the cases of ASEAN developing countries (The Philippines and Thailand). 
 
Japan170 
The process of inter-government policy coordination of Japan can be summarised as follows. Once 
FTA negotiations start, the negotiation working groups are established at the negotiation topic 
level (e.g. trade in goods, trade in services, agriculture, and TRIPs). The MOFA is responsible for 
a working party on trade in services. The Trade in Services Unit of the MOFA makes the basic 
negotiating positions and consults with the METI and Financial Services Agency. Although the 
METI is not a coordinator, it plays an important role in making negotiating positions. Then the 
MOFA arranges a series of meetings with the domestic regulatory authorities to explain its basic 
negotiating positions and receive inputs from them. More precisely, it played a role as “Madoguchi” 
in Japanese which means a ‘coordinator’ in English. In other words, the level of the MOFA’s 
political power cannot be more than that of a ‘coordinator’.  
Reconciling different positions among the domestic regulatory authorities concerned is 
complicated in the case of Japan. Competitiveness of the services sector lags behind its 
manufacturing sector in Japan due to restrictive regulations, the level of which is higher than the 
OECD average.171 While a few strong offensive ministries persist in opening the services markets 
of FTA partner countries from the outward perspective, most of the domestic regulatory authorities 
                                                          
170 The observation about Japan is mostly derived from the interviews with the senior officials of the MOFA, Japan 
(April 2013) and METI, Japan (April 2015); and from WTO (2004), WTO (2007a), and WTO (2011b).  
171 See Figure 3-26. 
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are strongly afraid of losing regulatory autonomy from the inward perspective. The lead ministry 
has to reconcile the mixed offensive and defensive interests of the domestic regulatory authorities.  
In Japan, most of the domestic regulatory authorities involved in services trade negotiations remain 
generally uninterested in multilateral/plurilateral services trade negotiations with the exception of 
the Financial Services Agency which administers one of the most liberalised financial markets 
among OECD countries. The MOFA tries to materialise the high level of commitments as well as 
the quality of agreements. The METI is more demanding in this perspective. However, when it 
comes to the sector specific issues, the METI faces some difficulties as it prefers to retain its 
regulatory autonomy or protect the interests of domestic industries, inter alia, energy related 
services (electricity, gas and water). The ministries which retain a defensive position in general 
are: the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of 
Education; and Ministry of Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.  For example, the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare shows concerns about liberalisation of the movement of natural 
persons (e.g. licences and qualifications for the medical professionals, such as medical doctors and 
nurses) with the justification that an in-coming labour force has a negative impact on the Japanese 
labour market, including working wages and quality of services. The Ministry of Justice protects 
the Japanese legal service providers and also possesses a defensive position against the Mode 4 
from the immigration perspective.172 Other ministries such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications in charge of the telecommunication sector and the Ministry of Transport and 
Tourism tend to remain passive because of conflicting offensive and defensive factors inside the 
ministry. Given the diverse positions of the domestic regulatory authorities explained above, the 
reconciliation of different positions inside government is challenging for the lead ministry. 
 
The Philippines173 
Internal coordination of government in The Philippines also shows a typical horizontal 
fragmentation of power. The Philippines’ strong feature is that while the country has become a net 
exporter of services since 2006, and some services sector show growing competitiveness,174 de-
facto restrictiveness of the services sector is the highest, and the level of the GATS commitments 
is the second lowest in East Asia.175 When the lead ministry makes the basic negotiating positions 
                                                          
172 The Immigration Bureau of Ministry of Justice administers immigration affairs. 
173 The observation is mostly derived from the interviews with the senior officials of The Philippines (April 2013 and 
July 2015) and from WTO (2005a),WTO (2005b), WTO (2012a), and WTO (2012b). 
174 Other business services (e.g. professional and technical services, and other miscellaneous business) accounted for 
more than half of exports. The business process outsourcing service and IT services sector are also growing fast. See 
Chapter3: Figure 3-13 and WTO (2012a). 
175 See Figure 3-26. 
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at the first stage of internal coordination, it has to consider a right balance between growing export 
interests and the restrictive domestic markets. 
At the second stage of internal negotiations, the lead ministry faces strong defensive inputs from 
domestic regulatory ministries. In the case of The Philippines, Neither the ministries which 
administer uncompetitive sectors (e.g. distribution services) or sectors under imperfect competition 
(e.g. telecommunications), nor domestic regulatory ministries of growing export competitiveness 
can be totally offensive since they have to protect local services suppliers. Let’s consider the 
defensive position of Philippines Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) which is in charge of 
regulating and licensing 46 professions.176 Whereas The Philippines takes offensive positions on 
promoting professional services exports to other East Asian countries, de-facto restrictiveness of 
the professional services sector of The Philippines itself is the highest in East Asia.177 This reflects 
the strong defensive power of PRC. Another example is the Department of Tourism which protects 
domestic tourism services suppliers. Despite the fact that the tourism sector is a major services 
exporters (5.8% to GDP and 10.3 % to employment in 2010) of The Philippines, various 
restrictions in the GATS commitments (e.g. limitation of foreign equity to 40% for the 
accommodation facilities, limitations on the employment of foreigners) still exist. This is because 
the Department of Tourism is afraid that foreign capital would take over local services suppliers. 
Facing resistance of these domestic regulatory authorities, the lead ministry (Department of 
Foreign Affairs for the WTO services negotiations and NEDA for the FTA services trade 
negotiations) tends to yield to domestic concerns rather than strongly pushing its export interests. 
 
Thailand178 
Just as with the previous cases, we can observe horizontal fragmentation of power during inter-
governmental coordination. At the first stage of internal government coordination, the lead 
ministry (Ministry of Commerce), which is a pro-liberal ministry, faces a difficulty in forming the 
negotiating positions since economic interests in exporting services trade is very limited. At the 
second stage of internal coordination process, the lead ministry has to face strong defensive 
interests of the domestic regulatory authorities. In particular, the domestic regulatory authorities 
are totally against investment related liberalisation (Mode 3). One example is the financial sector, 
the restrictiveness of which is the highest in East Asia.179 There are eight “specialized financial 
                                                          
176 See WTO (2012a), P96 
177 See Figure 3-31. Also, The Philippines does not commit the professional services under the GATS. Under the FTAs 
with Japan and South Korea, a wide range of limitations remains in its commitments of the professional services.  
178 The observation is derived from the interviews with the Thai officials (April 2013 and July 2015) and from WTO 
(2007g), WTO (2007h), WTO (2011e), and WTO (2011f). 
179 See Figure 3-27. 
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institutions” (SFIs) controlled by the Government which retain power in the banking sector.180  In 
the insurance sector, the top three companies dominate with a 53% market share.181 The Ministry 
of Finance, which represents vested interests of these financial institutions and companies, does 
not allow new offers to be made in the financial sector. The other example is telecommunications, 
regulated by the Ministry of Information, Technology and Communication. Two state-owned 
telecom companies (TOT Public Company Limited and CAT Telecom Public Company Limited), 
which monopolise the telecom market,182  resist opening markets and introducing competition. 
Therefore, the Ministry of Information, Technology and Communication persistently resists further 
liberalisation. Due to limited export interests in some professional services, the lead ministry has to 
follow the domestic regulatory authorities’ defensive negotiating positions. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to understand decision-making for services trade negotiations in 
practice. We first identified the strong nature of domestic decision-making for services trade 
negotiations. Then we explained the domestic decision-making process by highlighting these three 
issues: (i) the major actors of Government and the private sector; (ii) interactions between 
Government and the private sector; and (iii) internal coordination of government. We provided 
general observations to understand how services trade decision-making develops through 
multilateral/plurilateral services trade negotiations, followed by observations of East Asia in more 
detail.  From these observations, the following features are identified.  
First, domestic decision-making for services trade is more complicated than for goods trade due to 
horizontal and vertical fragmentation of government institutions and strong client relationship 
between domestic regulatory authorities and domestic services suppliers. Second, as for the 
interaction between Government and the private sector, the consultation system between 
Government and the private sector in developed countries is more institutionalised than in 
developing countries. Because of the lack of an institutionalised consultation system, informal 
lobbying making use of client relationships with their regulatory authority tends to be a major 
method of delivering business interests in developing countries. Also, the European and American 
private sectors have been taking an active role in services policy-making since the GATT Uruguay 
Round, and the private sector in East Asia started to participate in the international services trade 
negotiations after the WTO was established. Since East Asian countries joined FTA activity, the 
private sector in East Asia has started to participate more actively in the domestic decision-making 
                                                          
180 See WTO (2011e), P117. 
181 See WTO (2011e), P121. 
182 See WTO (2011e), P127. 
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process. Lastly, inter-governmental coordination can be characterised as horizontal fragmentation 
of power. There is always a conflict between the lead ministry, the position of which is basically 
pro-liberal, and the domestic regulatory authorities, which has a strong preference for the status-
quo.  
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Chapter 5: A Case Study of the Japan-ASEAN 
Bilateral FTAs – Japan’s Perspective 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Why did the services agreements of the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs (Japan-Singapore, Japan-
Malaysia, Japan-Thailand, Japan-The Philippines, Japan-Indonesia and Japan-Viet Nam), which 
were concluded during the 2000s, come to an end with the shallow GATS-plus? In this chapter, we 
analyse how domestic political economy factors influenced the outcomes of services agreements of 
these FTAs. Before arguing the political economy factors in domestic decision-making, we will 
overview the market and policy environments of Japan in the 2000s as the basis of argument. Then 
we will move our arguments on interests and institutions by applying the analytical framework 
which modified the Mattli’s policy demand and supply side model. First, we will analyse interests 
of the policy demand and supply sides in the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. Then, we will 
examine the supply side condition, which is the decision-making process inside government, for 
these bilateral FTAs. We will trace how the domestic regulatory authorities, which preferred the 
status-quo, exercised veto powers through a logic of the veto player model. The analysis of 
interests and institutions is mainly supported by a series of interviews with the Japanese 
government officials, private-sector lobbyists and Japanese trade policy researchers. Lastly, we 
will summarise our findings from the empirical evidence. 
 
5.2 An overview of market and policy environments of Japan in the 2000s 
5.2.1 Market environments  
A liberalised domestic services market with lower productivity than that of the 
manufacturing sector  
The services sector was a major industry in Japan and was continuously growing (see Figure 3-4 
and 3-5 in Chapter 3) through the period of 2000s. It accounted for more than 65 per cent of GDP 
in 2000 and almost 70 per cent of the employment in 2007. However, Total Factor Productivity 
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(TFP) of the services sector has been lower than that of the manufacturing sector and has stagnated 
since the late 2000s.183 We overview some major services sectors of Japan in the 2000s from the 
WTO Trade Policy Review of Japan as follows.184 In general, the trade regime of the services 
sector in Japan was already liberalised in the 2000s except for certain professional services (Mode 
4). 
 
 Financial sector: Although the market was quite liberalised, high concentration and limited 
foreign capital penetration can be observed in some sub-sectors. For instance, the market share 
of the top 3 in the sub-sectors accounted for: banks: 40.7%, life insurance: 55.6%, non-life 
insurance: 65.6%.185 While mutual funds, securities companies and credit rating agencies were 
fully internationalised, the penetration of foreign capital in the banking sector was negligible 
where only one majority foreign owned bank existed. The situation of life-insurance was more 
internationalised as 15 companies were majority foreign owned and domestication of foreign 
insurance companies was taking place. Japan furthermore held the largest bank in the world, 
which was the fully state-owned Japan Post Bank. 
 Telecommunication sector: From the 1980s, Japan launched deregulation and introduced 
competition to the telecommunication sector. Once competition was introduced, the Japanese 
government launched a series of pro-competitive policy reforms in the 1990s. In the late 
2000s, the market was opened to competition where 330 registered carriers and 15,482 
notified carriers (up to January 2012) existed.186 In the mobile services, there were three major 
players: NTT Docomo (45.3%), KDDI (26.4%) and Soft Bank Mobile (21.8%). In the area of 
internet access, non-NTT group and vendor groups penetrated the market (31.7% and 26.0% 
in 2012 respectively). However, NTT which was 33 per cent state-owned by law, remained a 
major player in the fixed telecom services (79.2% in 2012 as a total of NTT West and NTT 
East, both of which are designated as universal service providers). Foreign ownership of NTT 
was 24.2% (2012). 
 Distribution sector: The distribution sector played an important role in the Japanese economy. 
The share in GDP accounted for 13.4 per cent (wholesale: 5.9%, retail: 7.5%) and the share in 
total employment accounted for 17.3 per cent (wholesale: 5.8%, retail: 11.5%). No 
concentration existed in the market. Modern retail chains (e.g. supermarkets and convenience 
                                                          
183 The Japanese government document, “service sangyo no seisansei” (Productivity of the Services Sector of Japan), 
http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai-shimon/kaigi/special/future/wg1/0418/shiryou_01.pdf 
184 Information is basically from WTO, TPR Japan 2011 (WTO 2011b, p86-p110) and TPR Japan 2013 (WTO 2013a) 
which cover the data of services sector in the 2000s.  
185 See WTO (2013a), p86. 
186 A registered carrier is one whose activities go beyond one prefecture. Notified carriers is one whose activities are 
within one prefecture. 
145 
 
stores) were taking over from traditional individually owned retail shops, the market share of 
which being 93.3 per cent and 6.7 per cent respectively. At the same time, the trade regime for 
distribution services in Japan was liberalised.187 While there were major foreign distributers in 
the market, most investors were from the EU and the U.S such as Wal-Mart (U.S), Metro 
(Germany), H&M (Sweden), and IKEA (Sweden). 
 Construction sector: The share in GDP (5.5% in 2010) as well as the share in total 
employment (8.1% in 2010) was shrinking as a part of the structural change of the Japanese 
economy. On the other hand, the large Japanese construction firms were becoming active 
overseas.188 There were 119 foreign affiliates (more than 50% foreign owned). Although the 
markets were opened under the GATS commitments, complex domestic licensing and 
qualification regimes were considered as potential de-facto barriers.  
 
Limited role of services trade in economy 
The role of services trade in economy of Japan was very limited in spite of its significant presence 
in the domestic economy. The share of exports of goods and services in GDP was gradually 
increasing in the 2000s from 10.4 per cent to 17.7 albeit with some fluctuation. The share of 
imports of goods and services in GDP was also increasing with some fluctuation from 9.4 per cent 
and 17.5 per cent during the period.189 While merchandise trade was playing an important role in 
the Japanese economy with Japan remaining the fourth largest exporter and importer of goods in 
world trade, services trade continued to play a limited role. For example, services trade accounted 
for only 5.3 per cent whereas merchandise trade accounted for 24.3 per cent in 2005.190 What is 
more, Japan was constantly experiencing deficits in services trade, with deficits in the following 
major sectors transportation; tourism; insurance; information; culture and entertainment; and 
communication.191 
It is also very interesting to note that the smaller the size of the enterprise, the less important the 
foreign markets are. According to the Bank of Japan,192 whereas large enterprises earned 20-30 per 
cent of total sales from exports between 2000 and 2010, medium sized enterprises and small 
                                                          
187 WTO (2013a), p108. 
188 48 members of the Overseas Construction Association of Japan. However, the association does not cover all 
construction firms. 
189 Both exports and imports in GDP have been further growing up in the 2010s. They accounted for 16.2 per cent for 
exports and 19 per cent for imports in 2014. 
190 See the World Bank indicator available from the website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
191 See JETRO (2014), p14. 
192 See economic data of the Bank of Japan, Percentage of Export Value to Sales, in “Tankan” (Short-term Economic 
Survey of Enterprises in Japan). Large enterprise: Capital of 100 million yen to less than 1 billion yen, Medium-sized 
enterprise: Capital of 100 million yen to less than 1 billion yen, Small enterprise: Capital of 20 million yen to less than 
100 million yen. 
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enterprises earned only around 10 per cent and five per cent respectively. Because more than 90 
per cent of the total business establishment is composed of SMEs in Japan, and almost 80 per cent 
of them belong to the services sector, it is observed that economic activities of the services sector 
are rooted in the Japanese domestic markets. 
  
Regional supply chains in East Asia and the Japanese services suppliers 
Market integration has taken place in the area of manufacturing sector in the case of East Asia.193 
Appreciation of the Japanese Yen as a result of the Plaza Code in 1985 accelerated foreign direct 
investment by the major Japanese manufacturers in the ASEAN countries, Taiwan and China. 
Following the major manufacturing companies, Japanese intermediate product manufacturers 
invested in the Region. In this way, chains of production of intermediate products and assembling 
them within the Region to export to the major global market such as the EU, Japan and the US 
were gradually established (Fukao, Ishido, and Ito 2003).  
In comparison, the integration process of services trade is far behind trade in goods. 194  It is 
observed that the major type of trade and investment in East Asia from the 1990s to the late 2000s 
was “manufacturing-related services” to supplement the regional supply chains established by the 
Japanese manufacturing companies in East Asia. 195  To support the Japanese manufacturers’ 
business in East Asia, some large Japanese services enterprises such as financial services, transport 
services, logistic services and business related services started business in the Region. This means 
that most of the Japanese services suppliers were conducting ‘Business to Business (B to B)’ type 
of business, targeting Japanese manufacturing companies as clients. In the case of the general 
insurance sector,196  it started business to support the major Japanese manufacturing companies 
invested in East Asia from the late 1980s. However, financial regulatory reforms in Japan from the 
late 1990s to the early 2000s accelerated competition in the Japanese financial markets, which 
made the major general insurance companies more inward -looking to retain shares in the domestic 
market. The Asian financial crisis in 1998 further accelerated these inward-looking attitudes. As a 
result of the domestic regulatory reforms and the Asian financial crisis, the Japanese general 
insurance companies started to retreat from the foreign markets including East Asia during the 
2000s. The situation was similar for other ‘manufacturing-related services’ suppliers. ‘B to B’ in 
East Asia was stagnating during the 2000s when the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs negotiations 
were taking place.  
                                                          
193 See description of development of regional supply chains in East Asia in Chapter 3. 
194 See Chapter 3. 
195 The observation is based on the interviews with the Japanese private sector and the Japanese government officials 
which took place during the fieldwork in Tokyo in April 2015. 
196 From the interview with the General Insurance Association of Japan, which took place in April, 2015. 
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Apart from the manufacturing related services, some Japanese services sectors, such as the 
distribution services (e.g. wholesale services and retail services), construction services, education 
services and restaurant services started to target the domestic markets of some East Asian countries 
in the early 2000s.197 The major destinations were China, followed by Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea and Viet Nam. This ‘Business to Consumer (B to C)’ type of 
business, which provided services to end-users, was gradually increasing from the late 2000s. 
Especially with reference to SMEs, one survey198 shows that ‘B to C’ type of companies such as 
Japanese restaurants, educational services, and beauty salons started to expand their business in 
Asian markets from the late 2000s. It was the early to middle of 2010s when many of these ‘B to C’ 
type of companies shifted from the initial stage to the expansion stage of investment. 
As can be seen from the above, the outward business incentive of the Japanese services sector from 
the 1990s was mainly ‘B to B’ to serve the Japanese manufacturing companies invested in East 
Asia. However, their outward business incentive was chilled in the early 2000s. The reasons can be 
explained from the domestic and international perspectives. From the domestic perspective, 
domestic regulatory reforms which took place in the 1990s were the major factor. Incumbents, the 
major Japanese services suppliers, had been enjoying economies of scale and the well-matured 
services markets in Japan. However, the regulatory reforms during the 1990s allowed market 
penetration by new players and accelerated competition inside Japan. Accordingly, both the 
incumbents and new players had to focus on domestic markets. From the international perspective, 
the services markets in East Asia were still not fully developed to attract investment, and 
economies of scale were not sufficient to make a profit (except in China). Additionally, the Asian 
financial crisis in 1998 further reduced the ASEAN markets and made them less attractive. 
However the trend is changing in the 2010s. From the late 2000s, the major Japanese services 
suppliers started to revise their business strategies and to become outward-looking for two reasons: 
(i) The markets in the ASEAN countries are growing due to further economic development and (ii) 
the Japanese markets are shrinking due to low fertility rates and accelerated ageing in society.199 
What is critical here is that this dynamic change of markets had not yet taken place at the time 
when the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs were negotiated from the beginning to middle of the 2000s. 
 
In short, the market environment of Japan in the 2000s can be summarised as follows. First, the 
role of the services sector in the Japanese economy was constantly increasing over the 2000s while 
                                                          
197 See JETRO (2011) and JETRO (2013). 
198 See Chuushokigyou Kibanseibikikou (2014), Chushou service sangyo niokeru kaigaitennkai no jittai to kadai 
(Foreign business strategy of the Japanese SMEs), from 
http://www.smrj.go.jp/keiei/dbps_data/_material_/b_0_keiei/chosa/pdf/h25serviceboueki.pdf 
199 See the survey in JETRO (2011) and JETRO (2013). 
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services sector’s productivity was lower than that of the manufacturing sector. Second, services 
markets in Japan were liberalised in terms of trade policy regimes, except for some professional 
services. Third, Japanese services suppliers, which had expanded ‘B to B’ type of business in East 
Asia in the late 1990s, were stagnating during the 2000s due to an increase in domestic market 
competition, as well as the effects of the Asian financial crisis. In our analysis of interests in the 
section 5.3, we will see that specific interests of services trade negotiations for Japan-ASEAN 
FTAs reflect the market environment in the 2000s. 
 
5.2.2 Policy environments 
Japan, as a locomotive of bilateral FTAs 
Now, we overview policy environments in Japan. Japan became aware of using FTAs as economic 
diplomacy from the late 1990s and shifted its orbit of economic policy from multilateralism to 
plurilateralism from the beginning of the 2000s (Table 5-1). During the 2000s, Japan focused on 
creating bilateral FTAs with the ASEAN countries one by one. Japan concluded seven bilateral 
FTAs with Singapore (2002), Malaysia (2006), Thailand (2007), Brunei (2007), Indonesia (2008), 
The Philippines (2008) and Viet Nam (2009) all of which include trade in services chapter.200  
The background of negotiations can be summarised as follows. The Japan-Singapore FTA was the 
first FTA for Japan in its history. In 1999, Japan accepted the proposal by Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong to start initial consultations for the Japan-Singapore FTA. The feasibility study by the 
private sector, government and academic to start negotiations201 was completed in 2000 and the 
bilateral negotiations started in 2001.202 Straight after concluding the FTA with Singapore, Japan 
started bilateral talks with Thailand, The Philippines and Malaysia as they showed positive interest 
in a bilateral comprehensive FTA like the one Singapore had concluded with Japan.203 Initial 
consultations and feasibility studies started in May 2002 with Thailand, in August 2002 with The 
Philippines and in May 2003 with Malaysia. The bilateral negotiations started from January 2004 
with Malaysia and February 2004 with Thailand and The Philippines. The agreements were signed 
first with Malaysia in December 2005 followed by The Philippines in September 2006 and 
Thailand in April 2007. It took some time for Indonesia to launch its FTA activity. In 2003, 
President Megawati of Indonesia and Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan agreed to start initial talks 
on the possibility of a bilateral FTA between Japan and Indonesia. The bilateral feasibility study 
group started in January 2005 and published its report in May 2005. The two countries launched 
                                                          
200 In addition to the bilateral FTAs in East Asia, Japan concluded the FTAs with Mexico (2005), Chile (2007), and 
Switzerland (2009). 
201 See Governments of Japan and Singapore (2000). 
202 See Oike (2007). 
203 See Oike (2007). 
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bilateral negotiations in July 2005. In the case of Viet Nam, Japan was waiting for Viet Nam’s 
accession to the WTO. Once Viet Nam had become a WTO member in November 2006, the two 
countries immediately started negotiations (January 2007). 
In parallel with the bilateral approach, Japan also took the plurilateral (which is called ASEAN 
plus one) approach of creating the ASEAN-Japan FTA, which covered the LDCs in the region 
such as Lao PDR, Myanmar and Cambodia. The ASEAN-Japan FTA entered into force between 
2008 and 2010 without the trade in services and investment chapters.204 The negotiations of the 
Japan-South Korean FTA which had started in 2003 were suspended for a bilateral political reason 
and no progress has been made since then. The China-Japan-South Korean FTA was not yet 
negotiated in the 2000s. It was November 2012 when Japan launched negotiations with China and 
South Korea for the FTA. 
 
 
Table 5-1: Japan’s FTAs concluded in the 2000s in East Asia 
 
Japan-Singapore FTA Negotiations started in 2001 
Signed in January 2001 
In effect in November 2002 
Japan-Malaysian FTA Negotiations started in January 2004 
Initial agreement in May 2005 
Signed in December 2005  
In effect in July 2006  
Japan-Thailand FTA Negotiations started in February 2004 
Initial agreement in September 2005 
Signed in April 2007 
In effect in November 2007 
Japan-Brunei FTA In effect in July 2008  
Japan-Indonesian FTA Negotiations started in July 2005 
Initial agreement in November 2006 
Signed in August 2007 
In effect in July 2008  
Japan-The Philippines FTA Negotiations started in February 2004 
Initial agreement in November 2004 
Signed in September 2006  
In effect in December 2008 
Japan-ASEAN 
 *No trade in services agreements 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, Singapore, and Viet Nam: Dec 
2008 
Brunei: January 2009 
Malaysia: February 2009 
Thailand: June 2009 
Cambodia: December 2009  
The Philippines:  July 2010 
Japan-Viet Nam Negotiations started in January 2007 
Signed in December 2008 
In effect in October 2009 
  
  
                                                          
204 The negotiations of services trade and investment to be incorporated into the ASEAN-Japan FTA was reached in the 
basic agreement in 2014, however, they are not yet signed in 2015. 
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Regional hegemonic rivalry between China and Japan – Gradualism vs. Liberalism 
As a part of the dynamic trend of FTAs, the regional hegemonic rivalry of China and Japan in 
creating FTAs inside East Asia from the early to middle of 2000s (see Figure 5-1) should be 
described. The reason is that it was understood that regional hegemonic rivalry between China and 
Japan indirectly affected the quality of services trade agreements of the Japan-ASEAN FTAs from 
a series of interviews with Japanese government officials205 as well as Oike206 (2007). Since this 
research focuses on analysing political economy factors in the decision-making which formed the 
negotiating positions, we explain this international factor as the policy environment of Japan. 
 
Figure 5-1: Regional hegemonic rivalry – China versus Japan creating FTAs with ASEAN in 
the 2000s 
 
 
During the early negotiation stage in the 2000s, Japan originally envisaged using FTAs in East 
Asia as a driving force of domestic reforms of the negotiating partners. In other words, the basic 
negotiating position of Japan was creating high-quality FTAs with a comprehensive coverage and 
high level of commitments based on liberalism in trade and investment.207 The idea could be 
somewhat materialised in Japan’s first FTA with Singapore (2002) given that Singapore was a 
                                                          
205 The meetings taken place in Tokyo in April 2015 
206 Ambassador Oike was in charge of FTA negotiations from 2001 to 2007 for six years at the MOFA, Japan. 
207 Except for the agricultural liberalisation of Japan as pointed out in Mulgan (2008) and Solis (2010). 
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totally open and liberal economy. Accordingly, the Japanese government considered the Japan-
Singapore bilateral FTA as a Japanese model of FTA to be widely applied in East Asia. After 
concluding the FTA with Singapore, the Japanese government started domestic strategic 
discussions to decide a way to create further FTAs with other ASEAN countries. Then it entered 
bilateral negotiations with Malaysia, The Philippines and Thailand in the beginning of 2004. The 
negotiations of the Japan-ASEAN FTA were started in April 2005. 
 
While Japan created its first FTA with Singapore and embarked on the pre-negotiations with three 
countries (Malaysia, The Philippines and Thailand) for bilateral FTAs in conjunction with the 
Japan-ASEAN FTA, China approached the ASEAN to create the China-ASEAN FTA. In 2000, 
the Chinese Prime Minister proposed the China-ASEAN FTA to ASEAN. In contrast to the 
Japanese “liberalism” approach, the Chinese approach was “gradualism” which strongly reflected 
the progressive economic development aspect by focusing solely on goods trade. China’s idea was 
that the agreement starts from the Early Harvest (elimination/reduction of tariffs) of goods trade 
with exclusion of other issues including services and investment. The ASEAN countries welcomed 
China’s proposal as ASEAN itself was applying progressive liberalisation to the ASEAN 
economic integration based on the ideology of “gradualism”. In this regard, China and ASEAN 
could smoothly reach an agreement. The framework of the China-ASEAN FTA which covered 
solely trade in goods was signed in 2002 and entered into force in 2003. 
 
China’s approach to ASEAN for the China-ASEAN FTA dramatically changed the negotiating 
positions of the ASEAN countries toward the Japan-ASEAN FTAs. The FTA negotiations 
between ASEAN and Japan were totally stuck from 2004 to early 2005 for more than one year 
because the ASEAN countries strongly resisted the Japanese approach of comprehensive and high 
quality FTA based on “liberalism”. According to Oike (2007), the trade negotiators of the ASEAN 
countries expressed the situation as “generous China versus selfish Japan”. In fact, the Japanese 
negotiators were criticised by the ASEAN negotiators so that Japan was in danger of losing a 
strong tie between ASEAN and Japan which had been growing through the Japan-ASEAN foreign 
diplomacy of over a half century. 
  
Summing up, the Japanese government originally aimed at achieving substantial and 
comprehensive liberalisation through the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs as well as the Japan-
ASEAN plurilateral FTA based on the ideas of liberalism. However, due to regional hegemonic 
rivalry between China versus Japan in creating FTAs in East Asia from the early to middle part of 
the 2000s, Japan was persuaded to yield and accept the second best option of gradualism. The 
decision accordingly affected the services trade negotiations of these agreements. We have to 
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understand that, in addition to domestic factors, there was an external factor at the international 
level which affected the outcomes of services trade agreements.208 
 
 
5.3 Interests 
Based on an overview of economic and policy environments, we now move to analyse the political 
economy factors which formed Japan’s negotiating positions for the bilateral Japan-ASEAN FTAs. 
As we explained in Chapter 1, we apply the policy demand and supply model, which was reframed 
from Mattli (1999a), to examine interests and institutions. The first is about interests of policy 
demand and supply sides. Interests are categorised into general motivations and specific interests 
in services trade. 
 
5.3.1 Policy demand side interests  
A. General motivations209 
Dispelling competitive disadvantage at the global markets 
The original incentives which drove the Japanese business sector towards FTAs were negative 
effects caused by NAFTA (1994), MERCOSUR (1995) and EU enlargement (1995). The Japanese 
companies were either facing discriminative treatments or lost out business opportunities under 
these existing plurilateral regimes. In the late 1990s, the Japanese private sector was dissatisfied 
with Japan’s economic diplomacy since the Government relied solely on the WTO system without 
any FTA strategies. The Keidanren emphasised that since North American and European countries 
were pursuing FTAs more aggressively, the Japanese government needs to dispel the competitive 
disadvantage being suffered by Japanese companies. 210  For the Japanese business sector, 
promoting institutional integration through FTAs was necessary in order to compete with 
American and European companies in global markets. And expectations in terms of content were 
to achieve high-quality NAFTA-type FTAs, which would go beyond the WTO in terms of 
coverage, as well as the level of commitments, in order to dispel competitive disadvantage. 
When the Japanese government finally launched informal negotiations for the Japan-Singapore 
bilateral FTA in 2000, anxiety about losing international competitiveness was mounting among 
                                                          
208 We will further explain this point in 5.5.3 as well as Chapter 7: 7.3 which explains analytical constraints of this 
research.  
209 From the interviews with the private sector lobbyists which took place in Tokyo in April 2015. And from Keidanren 
(2000a). 
210 Keidanren (2000a). 
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Japanese companies. The weakness of APEC as an institution for promoting liberalisation, as well 
as for rule-making also frustrated them and strengthened their desire to conclude the first FTA 
negotiation as early as possible. Since Asia as a region of top priority from the Japanese business 
strategy point of view, the Keidanren urged the Japanese government to start other FTA 
negotiations with any Asian countries following Singapore. Speedy conclusion of FTAs was now a 
high priority for the Japanese business sector in order to compete with American and European 
companies in Asia. 
 
Strengthening regional production and distribution networks in ASEAN 
In the case of NAFTA, the Japanese companies, which already invested in Mexico, were 
discriminated against in terms of access to the US and Canadian markets in goods trade. To 
counteract these discriminatory effects, the Japanese business sector strongly urged the Japanese 
government to start FTA negotiations with Mexico.211 In comparison with the defensive economic 
motives behind the Japan-Mexico FTA, the Japanese private sector was driven by pro-active 
economic motives towards the FTAs with ASEAN.212 As described before, vertically specialized 
intra-industry trade was already established through FDI by the Japanese firms in East Asia (Fukao, 
Ishido and Ito 2003; and Kimura 2006a). Although ASEAN governments, namely Malaysia, 
Thailand and The Philippines, were attracting Japanese manufacturing companies’ investments, 
from the industrial and development policy perspectives, further liberalisation in some protected 
sectors (e.g. high import tariffs of inter-mediate electronic products and automobile products, and 
local content requirement) were needed to enhance business activities. Also, legal commitments of 
autonomous liberalisation were expected to increase legal predictability and stabilise business 
activities. Furthermore, WTO-plus rule-making which includes investment, intellectual properties, 
government procurement, standards and competition, was necessary to improve the business 
environment of the Japanese manufacturing sector. For the reasons above, the Japanese 
manufacturing sector strongly requested institutional integration, which supports existing regional 
supply chains. 
  
                                                          
211 Keidanren (1999). 
212 See Sollis and Urata (2007). 
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B. Specific interests in services trade 
Next, we describe the major actors’ specific interests in services trade negotiations for the FTAs 
with ASEAN and their institutional characteristics (Table 5-2). 213  The major actors include 
business confederations, sectoral associations, professional associations and individual firms. 
  
a. Business confederations 
Keidanren214: The Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) is the largest and the most powerful 
business organisation in Japan with a membership consisting of 1309 individual companies, 112 
sector base associations and 47 regional economic associations.215 The organisation was the initial 
promoter of Japan’s FTA activity and was playing a major role in inputting the private sector’s 
positions covering a whole range of negotiation issues during the decision-making process for the 
FTAs with ASEAN. As a part of its activity, it represented business interests for services trade 
negotiations. Three features can be identified from its in-house services trade policy-making. One 
is that the Keidanren established a position for Japanese business society which took into account 
the long-term economic prosperity of Japan. The Keidanren secretariat drafted proposals based on 
institutional and economic rationales that even member companies were unaware of. In the case of 
services trade negotiations, it was the Keidanren secretariat which advocated the importance of 
services trade agreements. Second, the manufacturing sector had been historically playing a central 
role in domestic and international policy-making within the organisation while the services sector 
was playing a modest role. As a result, the interests of most vocal Japanese manufacturing firms 
which established regional supply chains in the East Asian countries were strongly reflected in 
FTA policy-making. Third, the position did not reflect interests of a specific sector in detail. This 
also reflected little input per se, to open markets of the FTA partner countries from each services 
sector, and its passive engagement in services policy-making activity within the house in the 
Keidanren. 
As for specific interests in services trade negotiations with ASEAN, The Keidanren secretariat 
initiated policy interests. These included: (i) achieving high-quality GATS-plus agreements and 
(ii) eliminating the negative effects caused by existing FTAs and attaining a level playing field vis 
a vis FTA partner countries’ existing trade and investment agreements.216 For example, at the time 
of negotiations for the Japan-Thailand bilateral FTA, the Keidanren requested the level playing 
                                                          
213 The observation is based on a series of interviews with the Japanese private sector individuals, the researchers of the 
Japanese think-tanks, and the Japanese government officials which took place in April 2015. See Appendix 1. 
214 The observation is based on the interviews with a senior secretariat member of the Keidanren (April 2015). See 
Appendix 1. 
215 See Keidanren’s website: http://www.keidanren.or.jp/profile/pro001.html 
216 See Keidanren (2000a), Keidanren (2000b), and Keidanren (2002a). 
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field of national treatment which Thailand had accorded to American companies under the US-
Thailand bilateral economic treaty. 217 
With regard to the major economic interests, two characteristics can be identified. The first is that 
economic interests lay in Mode 3 (investment). Eliminating restrictive requirements of Mode 3 
such as restrictions of foreign ownership (e.g. legal entity and branch rights) and nationality 
requirements were especially highlighted. The second is that sectoral interests were related to 
services sectors which assisted regional supply chains established by the Japanese manufacturing 
sector. One example is realising open and competitive markets in order to support post-investment 
business activities in distribution, financial and infrastructure-related sectors. Another example is 
improving the business environment of a whole logistic process to back up intra-company trade. 
Interestingly, the Keidanren has been in favour of opening the Japanese market of professionals 
and highly skilled personnel because the Japanese companies suffered labour supply shortages as a 
result of the shrinking Japanese population. The Keidanren was also in a position to make use of 
FTAs to solve the ageing society problems such as a shortage of nurses and care-workers.218 In this 
regard, the Keidanren supported requests from the ASEAN countries, such as receiving foreign 
nurses and care-workers and extensions of a category in some professional services based on the 
requests. 
 
The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry219: In comparison with the Keidanren, the 
Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry presents not only large sized companies but SMEs. The 
nation-wide Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry is composed of 514 regional chambers of 
commerce which amount to 1.27 million enterprises.220 The organisation does not enjoy strong 
lobbying power as the Keidanren does. Its policy-making is more prioritised on domestic issues 
rather than international issues including trade negotiations. On the other hand, the organisation 
has a potentially strong informative power in favour of the services enterprises as 90 per cent of 
SME members belong to the services sector. Nevertheless, SMEs showed little interest in the FTA 
services trade negotiations at the time of bilateral FTAs with ASEAN, despite the fact that some 
members were actively expanding business in East Asia.  
Similar to the Keidanren, the secretariat of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry advocated the 
importance of services trade negotiations to member companies and drafted its basic positions.  
The organisation was interested in eliminating the negative effects caused by existing plurilateral 
                                                          
217 Keidanren (2002b). 
218 Keidanren (2004). 
219 The observation was derived from the interview with a senior secretariat of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (April, 2015). See Appendix 1. 
220 From the Website of the Japan Chamber of Commerce: http://www.jcci.or.jp/about/jcci/index.html 
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trade arrangements. It also supported strengthening preferential treatments vis-à-vis external 
regions in general. Its economic interests in principle included: (i) improving market access of 
SMEs and (ii) enhancing the business environment of SMEs that had already invested in these 
countries.  
 
b. Sectoral associations221: Almost all services sectors have their sectoral association at the 
national level as well as local level.  Some national sector associations are members of the 
Keidanren and others are not. The major Japanese sector associations generally retain close 
relations with the domestic regulatory authorities which administer their sector. Even if an 
organisation is a member of the Keidanren, it will normally lobby its regulatory authority directly 
in addition to the Keidanren in order to input their specific sectoral interests.  
Interests in the bilateral FTAs with ASEAN varied depending on the sector and level of cross-
border activities. The Japanese Ship owners’ Association, and the Overseas Construction 
Association of Japan are interested in levelling up the GATS commitments of ASEAN countries 
since the level ASEAN countries’ commitments were extremely low level. The Japan Information 
Technology Services Industry Association was specifically interested in improving Mode 1 related 
commitments of ASEAN countries. The Engineering and Consulting Association of Japan (Kaigai 
Consulting Kyokai, in Japanese) had an interest in promoting MRAs for engineering related 
services especially with Singapore. The wholesale association lobbied the regulatory authority 
directly to improve the post investment environment and to facilitate movement of business 
personnel. Yet, exporting interests toward ASEAN countries of the sectoral associations generally 
remained low profile because they were either satisfied with the economies of scale of the 
Japanese market or were completely occupied with surviving intensified competition after a series 
of domestic deregulations. For example, the business strategy of some sectoral associations, such 
as the Japanese Bankers Association and the Life Insurance Association of Japan, were completely 
inward looking after going through the domestic financial reforms which took place in the 1990s 
and the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. In terms of improving Japan’s GATS commitments, some 
sectoral associations, such as the association which represents the Japanese construction firms 
(Zenkoku Kensetsugyo Kyoukai, for which no English name exists), showed anti-liberal interests. 
The reason why some sectoral associations opted for the status-quo was so that they could avoid 
collective action problems, by jointly seeking the status-quo, rather than seeking to adjust any 
regulatory changes.  
                                                          
221 The observation was derived from the interviews in Tokyo with the senior lobbyists of the sectoral associations (April 
2015), the senior officials of the domestic regulatory authorities (April 2015), and a senior research offices of Mizuho 
Research Institute (April 2013)  . 
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c. Professional associations222：Most professional associations in Japan are not members of the 
Keidanren. Professional associations have strong client relationships with their regulatory 
authorities since their activities represent a specific profession. As for the bilateral FTAs with 
ASEAN, they strongly protected their market from penetration by the ASEAN professionals. 
Namely, the Japan Nursing Association (Nihon Kangoshi Kyoukai), the association which 
represents care-workers (Nihon Kaigohukushishi Kyokai, for which no English name exists) and 
the Japan Medical Association (Nihon Ishi-kai) displayed strong anti-liberal interests. They 
insisted that medical services should be provided by Japanese nationals for non-economic reasons. 
According to them, medical services are a special domain which should be excluded from 
international trade negotiations including FTAs since the service is directly linked with a human 
life. Accepting foreign medical service professionals would cause communication problems which 
might trigger a fatal accident because foreign professionals might not speak Japanese fluently. 
They showed a strong concern that accepting foreign medical services professionals would 
downgrade the quality of the Japanese medical system. In this way, they justified their positions. 
As a matter of fact, medical services-related professionals were mostly afraid of a decrease in pay 
caused by accepting the lower wage ASEAN professionals. While the professional associations 
showed strong defensive interests in receiving some professionals to the Japanese markets, they 
did not hold any offensive interests toward the ASEAN markets. 
 
d. Individual firms223: A sector where strong rivalry among Japanese services suppliers exist does 
not normally depend on its sectoral association. Rather, an individual company lobbies its 
regulatory authority behind the scenes. For instance, dominant players, or players with high market 
concentration, individually input their positions to the competent regulatory authorities to protect 
their market share in Japan. Examples are NTT groups in the telecom sector and Japan Post Bank 
and Japan Post Insurance in the financial sector. In the case of Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs, they 
strongly lobbied only when Japan had bilateral negotiations with Singapore. Since other ASEAN 
developing countries did not own globally competitive telecom and financial sector, they did not 
show defensive interests. Another interesting case is an incumbent: the services suppliers which 
have already invested in an FTA partner country. When the incumbent had started business under 
preferential treatment individually provided by a host country government, it personally lobbies its 
domestic regulatory authority behind the scenes. Its interest is to maintain the status-quo in terms 
                                                          
222 The observation was derived from the interviews with the Japanese government officials (April 2013) and a senior 
research offices of Mizuho Research Institute (April 2013). See Appendix 1. 
223 From the interviews with the METI officials (April 2013). See Appendix 1. 
 
158 
 
of market access commitments of an FTA partner country (host country) to maintain its 
preferential status vis-a-vis its Japanese services competitors. At the same time, it opts for 
improving post investment environments to protect its on-going business in a host country. In the 
case of Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs, this situation was observed in some sectors including the 
postal and courier services, transport services and the distribution services. 
Also, some individual companies which do not belong to any business lobbying associations could 
directly lobby their regulatory authority. In the case of the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs, this case 
applied to the franchising of some Japanese restaurants, a bridal service company and some 
education-related service companies which were expanding their business in East Asia from the 
2000s. Yet, at the time of Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTA negotiations, these companies were still not 
aware that FTAs can be one of the policy options to promote their business and legally stabilise the 
FDI environments. 
 
Table 5-2: Policy demand side –Specific interests in services trade negotiations of major 
players and its institutional characteristics 
 
Actors Interests Institutional characteristics 
Japan Business 
confederation: 
Keidanren 
Economic interests: 
 Improve market access conditions 
in Mode 3 for the Japanese 
services suppliers (e.g. financial 
services, transport services, and 
distribution services).  
 Improve post-investment business 
environment in the host countries 
for the distribution, financial and 
infrastructure-related sectors 
 Improve environments of a whole 
logistic process to back-up the 
regional supply-chains 
 Make use of FTAs to solve labour 
shortage problems of the 
professionals and highly skilled 
personnel. 
 Receiving some medical related 
professionals (e.g. nurses and 
care-workers) 
 
Policy interests: 
 Eliminate negative effects caused 
by partner country’s existing 
FTAs and other economic 
agreements and require a level 
playing field 
 Strengthen preferential treatments 
vis-à-vis external regions by 
GATS-plus commitments 
 
 
Most powerful lobbying group 
 
Members composed of both the 
manufacturing sectors and services 
sectors and industry organisations (e.g. 
sector organisations and professional 
organisations) 
 
Represents interests from long-term 
prosperity of Japan 
 
Services sectors are not active in terms 
of policy-making in comparison with 
the manufacturing sector 
Business 
confederation: 
Economic interests: 
 Improve market access for SMEs 
The powerful lobbying group 
representing SMEs all over Japan 
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The Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Industry 
which plan to start business in 
East Asia 
 Enhance business environments of 
SMEs already doing business with 
the ASEAN countries 
 
Policy interests: 
 Eliminate negative effects caused 
by partner country’s existing 
FTAs and other economic 
agreements and require a level 
playing field 
 Strengthen preferential treatments 
vis-à-vis external regions by 
GATS-plus commitments 
 
 
 
Many of member companies belong to 
the services sector 
Sectoral associations Economic Interests:  
 Eliminate investment related 
restrictions (e.g. capital 
participation, nationality 
requirement) 
 Promote MRAs (only the case 
with Singapore) 
 Improve transparency of domestic 
regulations (e.g. standstill of 
current regulations) 
 Facilitate movement of business 
personnel (e.g. immigration 
procedure, entry visa) 
 Avoid erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs 
 
Policy interests: 
 Strengthen preferential treatments 
vis-à-vis external regions 
 
 
Strong client relations with the 
regulatory authority 
 
Some organisation have experts relating 
to the cross-border business issues, 
others not 
Professional 
Associations 
Economic interests: 
 Avoid erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs caused by 
liberalising a professional service 
(including MRAs) 
 No offensive interests towards the 
ASEAN markets 
 
Policy interests: 
 Against GATS-plus commitments 
in Mode 4 
 
Strong client relations with the 
regulatory authority 
 
Some organisations have experts 
relating to the cross-border business 
issues, others not 
Individual firms Economic Interests:  
 Avoid erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs 
 Protect its business in a host 
country vis-à-vis Japanese 
competitors in the case of an 
incumbent 
 
Policy interests: 
 Case by case 
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C. Interest representation – How were policy demand side interests delivered in the decision-
making process? 
In the previous section, we explained the institutional character of the major actors and their 
interests in Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. Then the next step is to assess how these interests were 
delivered to the Japanese government during the decision-making process. At the stage of initial 
studies, it was mainly two business confederations: the Keidanren and The Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry that were involved in setting out the broad negotiating positions which 
included the strategic approach of rule-making and areas of interests (i.e. Modes and sectors) to the 
government.  Once negotiations started, the Japanese government collected specific requests from 
the sectoral associations, professional associations and individual firms in order to prepare sectoral 
negotiations with an FTA partner. The analysis below focuses on explaining how major business 
actors were involved in the decision-making process in order to demonstrate how these interests 
were reflected in the each ministry’s position making. The observation is derived from a series of 
interviews with Japanese government officials and Japanese private sector individuals, the 
government documents, the private sector’s policy papers and articles written by trade negotiators.  
 
Japan-Singapore FTA (in effect 2002) 
The private sector demanded a comprehensive and high quality FTA covering services trade in 
general. And it expected that the Japan-Singapore FTA would become a model for the following 
FTA negotiations. However, the private sector had difficulty in identifying their business interests 
which could technically fit in the services trade agreement for two reasons. First, given that the 
Japan-Singapore FTA was the first set of FTA negotiations for Japan, the private sector had no 
experience of being involved in domestic decision-making for FTAs. At the pre-negotiation stage, 
the Keidanren showed specific interest relating to the services sector in the two areas: (i) relaxation 
of some regulatory restrictions in the financial market to further improve the business 
environment; and (ii) promotion of regulatory harmonisation between Japan and Singapore in the 
Information and Technology sector, distribution sector and financial sector in order to enhance 
international competitiveness.224 However, there was no strong offensive push of liberalisation 
toward Singapore in detail once preparations for the sectoral request and offer negotiations started. 
A significant difference from other ASEAN countries was that Singapore was a substantially 
highly liberalised market in terms of market access (MA) and national treatment (NT). 
In terms of inward liberalisation, the Keidanren requested the Japanese government to make use of 
the Japan-Singapore FTA to accelerate domestic structural reforms to revive economic 
                                                          
224 See Keidanren (2000b). 
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competitiveness of the Japanese economy which had suffered more than a decade of economic 
recession from the 1990s.225 However, it did not specifically highlight the services sector. Since 
Singapore did not request any specific market access for professional services, professional 
associations remained silent during the decision-making process.  
 
Japan-Malaysian FTA (in effect 2006), Japan-Thailand FTA (in effect 2007) and Japan-The 
Philippines FTA (in effect 2008)226 
Since the FTA negotiations with Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines started after Japan had 
gone through FTA services trade negotiations with Singapore and Mexico, the technical capacities 
of the Japanese private sector were improved by comparison with the time of the FTA negotiations 
with Singapore. At the business confederation level, either the Keidanren or the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry set out its positions to the MOFA and the METI. Demarcation was made 
between both organisations according to the bilateral committee of which they were in charge. The 
Keidanren worked for the Japan-Thailand FTA since the organisation had the Japan-Thailand 
bilateral committee whereas the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry worked for the Japan-
Malaysian FTA as well as the Japan-The Philippines FTA as the Chamber of Commerce had the 
Japan-Malaysia bilateral committee and the Japan-The Philippines bilateral committee. At both 
business federations, the economic interests of the private sector were nebulous in services trade. 
For example, the Keidanren requested a high standard FTA with comprehensive coverage 
including services trade initiated by the secretariat, yet a strong interest in services trade 
negotiations was not expressed by member companies at the time of the Japan-Thailand FTA. 
Consequently, the Keidanren prioritised the manufacturing sector, namely improving the business 
environment of the regional supply chains established by Japanese manufacturing companies. The 
situation of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry was basically the same. While the 
manufacturing companies which engaged in intra-industry trade in Malaysia and The Philippines 
were enthusiastic about eliminating high tariffs and enhancing trade and investment rules, services 
suppliers showed little interest. Thus, the organisation emphasised its strong interest in the 
manufacturing sector to the Japanese government. 
At the sector association level, associations replied to the questionnaires from their regulatory 
authority to identify the difficulties confronting them in Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines as 
a part of the preparation process for sectoral request and offer negotiations. Some sectors, namely 
the distribution sector, ICT sector, financial sector and maritime sector, showed a certain degree of 
                                                          
225 See Keidanren (2000b). 
226 The observation was derived from the interviews with the Keidanren secretariat (April 2015), the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry secretariat (April 2015), senior lobbyists of the sector associations (April 2015), and the MOFA 
officials (April 2013 and April 2015). See Appendix 1. 
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interests. They emphasised trade and investment barriers which they were confronted with. For 
example, the distribution sector was facing problems with the strict conditions on after-sales 
services. In the case of Malaysia, some sectors suffered from licensing problems as the domestic 
regulatory authorities exercised strong discretionary powers. For example, a Japanese department 
store could open the first shop, however, it had difficulties in opening a second shop due to the 
licensing autonomy of the Malaysian domestic regulatory authority. The Japanese banking sector 
had a similar problem in Malaysia. Pro-bumiptura policies such as the requirement of a certain 
equity share by bumiputra were the major problems. The Philippines was the most transparent in 
terms of the legal institutions in the services sector. However, the problem was that the 
Constitution of The Philippines provided some restrictions on Mode 3 related services. Thailand 
was the most complicated case in the services sector because the domestic legal and regulatory 
system was not transparent and so left much room for discretion at the political and 
ministries/agencies level. For example, restrictions relating to investment such as a permitted share 
of foreign capital were not clear from the regulation. While some services suppliers showed 
interests in eliminating Mode 3 related restrictions, other services suppliers hesitated to make 
requests on Mode 3. The latter had already invested in Thailand, either with an exceptional 
permission from Thai Government, or were making use of the legal ambiguity. 
From the inward perspective, some sectors such as energy services, public-related services, 
medical related services and professional services showed basic defensive interests. Professional 
services associations were among the most vocal actors. Since Thailand and The Philippines 
requested entry of some professionals into Japan, some Japanese professional service associations, 
namely the Japan Medical Association, the Japanese Nursing Association and the association of 
care-workers strongly lobbied the Ministry of health, Labour and Welfare not to make any 
compromises in making any GATS-plus commitments. They insisted that the safety of Japanese 
healthcare would be threatened by foreign nurses and care-workers. They also claimed that foreign 
nurses and care-workers would derive employment opportunities from them and bring down the 
minimum wages. On the pro-liberal side, the Keidanren was showing awareness of labour 
shortages in some manufacturing sectors, as well as services sectors, and requested that the 
Japanese government should accept foreign professionals through the FTA negotiations. Yet, the 
Keidanren’s request was not accompanied by lobbying in action. In this regard, anti-liberal forces 
overcame pro-liberal forces. 
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Japan-Indonesian FTA227 
The Japanese private sector’s policy-making experience in FTA services trade negotiations had 
been further accumulated through the negotiations with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and The 
Philippines. Since the negotiations for the Japan-Indonesian FTA took place after the negotiations 
with these four ASEAN countries, the Japanese private sector was becoming more aware of 
services trade negotiations. Yet the Japanese manufacturing sector remained a vocal offensive 
lobbyist. Apart from accumulated decision-making experience of the Japanese private sector in 
FTA services trade negotiations, Indonesia’s protectionism was increasing business concerns in 
terms of context. For instance, the Keidanren for the first time wrote an independent chapter for 
services trade in its FTA position paper.228 The Keidanren showed concern about protectionism in 
Indonesia and emphasised the importance of improving commitments in the ‘manufacturing-
related services sectors’ as Japan was the largest investor in Indonesia. The Keidanren also 
requested to eliminate or reduce restriction on Mode 3 (e.g. a limitation of equity share, and 
conditions for capital participation). Among the pure services sectors, the distribution sector (lease, 
convenience store, and franchise business) was targeted as priority. At the sector association level, 
the construction sector, ICT sector, transportation sector, distribution sector, financial services 
sector, and legal services sector delivered their business concerns to the MOFA and the METI. 
They claimed that the Indonesian government quite frequently changed its investment related 
regulations in response to domestic vested interests, and that implementation of law and 
regulations at the local government level was arbitrary and lacked transparency. Because of 
Indonesia’s protectionism, Japanese investors tried to improve legal certainty and predictability 
through FTA services trade and investment agreements. 
From an inward perspective, there was a political battle between pro-liberal forces and anti-liberal 
forces. At the time of FTA negotiations with Indonesia, The Keidanren responded positively to the 
request from Indonesia regarding entry and temporary stay of some professionals (e.g. Indonesian 
nurses and care-workers, professionals working in tourism and hotel services) and requested the 
government to make changes to domestic regulations if necessary. The organisation also asked the 
Japanese government to propose some technical cooperation relating to professional services. On 
the anti-liberalisation side, many professional associations acted defensively against accepting 
Indonesian professionals. Among medical related professional associations, namely the Japanese 
Nursing Association and the association of care-workers, they again made collective efforts to 
strongly resist any regulatory changes, by directly lobbying their regulatory authority, the Ministry 
                                                          
227 The observation was derived from the interviews with the Keidanren secretariat (April 2015), the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry secretariat (April 2015), senior lobbyists of the sector associations (April 2015), the METI 
officials (April 2015) and the MOFA officials (April 2013 and April 2015). See Appendix 1. 
228 See Keidanren (2006). 
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of Health, Labour and Welfare. In contrast, the Keidanren’s positive appraisal of accepting some 
professionals where a labour supply shortage existed was not accompanied by lobbying in action. 
Lobbying of professional associations, which maximised client relationship with its regulatory 
authority, was strong enough to overcome the pro-liberal force. 
 
Japan-Viet Nam FTA229 
Since Viet Nam made high level commitments in services trade for the WTO accession (January 
2007), the private sector did not pay special attention to the Japan-Viet Nam FTA in terms of 
services. The major business organisations such as the Keidanren and Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry focused more on trade in goods, namely rules of origin. The Japanese 
Nursing Association and the association of care-workers remained defensive, although they 
accepted to offer commitments, the level of which was the same as that which Japan had made for 
the FTAs with The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. 
 
5.3.2 Policy supply side interests  
A. General Interests 
There are three general motivations for negotiating FTAs with ASEAN which affected the services 
trade negotiating positions of Japan. One is the pressure of speedy conclusion of FTAs to catch up 
the global FTA trends as well as to take a lead in developing an FTA network in East Asia. The 
second is a strong motive of creating FTAs to support regional supply chains established by 
manufacturing companies in East Asia. The last is limited interest in locking-in domestic services 
reforms by using Japan-ASEAN FTAs. 
 
FTA catch-up incentives and political rivalry in developing FTA network in East Asia230 
As explained in the previous section, the Japanese private sector started FTA lobbying to the 
Japanese government from the late 1990s to dismantle economic disadvantages caused by FTAs in 
which the EU and U.S were involved. The private sector suggested adopting a dual economic 
diplomacy which encompasses both multilateralism and plurilateralism. The private sector’s 
lobbying prompted the METI to catch up with the FTA activities of the EU and the US. 
                                                          
229 From the interviews with the Keidanren secretariat (April 2013) and the MOFA officials (April 2013). See Appendix 
1. 
230 From a series of interviews with the Japanese government officials (April 2013 and April 2015) and the WTO 
secretariat (April 2013 and July 2015) . See Appendix 1. 
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Nevertheless, at the early stage of business lobbying, the economic diplomacy elites of the MOFA 
still prized multilateralism and the Ministry kept the position that Japan’s economic diplomacy had 
to rely on multilateralism. It was just after Japan had gone through 1997-98 Asian financial crisis 
and the failure of the WTO Seattle Ministerial in 1999 when the Japanese government finally 
shifted its position from multilateral trade diplomacy to the dual trade diplomacy encompassing 
both multilateralism and plurilateralism. Then the Japanese government immediately accepted a 
request from Singapore to start a feasibility study for the Japan-Singapore FTA.  
The Japanese government had to aim for a speedy conclusion of FTAs with ASEAN for two 
reasons. The first reason was strong requests from the Japanese business sector to dismantle the 
economic disadvantage of not having any FTAs and to institutionally back up the Japanese 
companies’ business activities at the global level. However, Japan’s domestic coordination to start 
negotiating the Japan-Mexico FTA was stuck due to domestic protectionism of agriculture in the 
early 2000s. The situation irritated the Japanese business sector who urged the Japanese 
government to conclude the first FTA. The second reason was a strong diplomatic motivation to 
take a leadership in developing FTA network in East Asia including political rivalry with China. 
Time pressure of the policy supply side as a consequence induced the government to give up high-
quality services trade agreements at the final stage of negotiations with some ASEAN countries, 
which we will explain later (5.4.2).   
 
FTAs for the manufacturing sector231 
In terms of content, the Japanese government committed itself to achieving an FTA which assured 
the business activities of the Japanese manufacturing companies which had established regional 
supply chains and gave further incentives to the market. To achieve the aim, the Japanese 
government prioritized four areas. One was reducing or abolishing the high tariffs imposed on 
intermediate products. The second was to establish high-quality investment rules to protect 
existing Japanese manufacturing companies in the ASEAN by introducing a separate investment 
chapter. The third was protecting intellectual property rights of the Japanese manufacturing 
companies. The fourth was creating a system to support these business activities which cannot fit 
in the typical FTA structure. Therefore the Japanese government established a separate chapter to 
improve the business environment. Attention was not paid to services trade in the government’s 
policy priority in substance. 
 
                                                          
231 From a series of interviews with the Japanese government officials which took place in April 2015 in Tokyo. See 
Appendix 1. Also from Watanabe (2013), p226 and Solis and Urata (2007), p231.  
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Weak incentive of locking-in services reforms232 
In contrast to the strong diplomatic motives and market motives mentioned above, the incentive to 
lock-in services reforms was too weak. When the Japanese government discussed Japan’s FTA 
strategies in the late 1990s, it envisaged using FTAs as engine of domestic structural reforms. 
Since the Japanese economy had been stagnating from the early 1990s and the country was 
suffering from a declining population and ageing society, pro-policy reform academics and policy 
makers, namely the METI and the MOFA, underlined the need for structural reforms under FTAs. 
The major target of structural reforms was agriculture and fishery products. In addition, movement 
of natural persons, medical, educational and other services were included in the policy discussions. 
The MOFA emphasised that these were the issues which top-down political initiatives needed. 
However, pro-reform forces were limited to the MOFA and the METI. The two ministries faced 
strong anti-reform forces during the domestic-decision making process (see 5.4). 
  
B. Specific interests in services trade 
As previously described, inter-governmental coordination is characterised by the dominance of 
bureaucrats during a whole process as well as wide participation of the domestic regulatory 
ministries and agencies. As for Japan’s seven bilateral FTAs with the ASEAN countries, we 
analyse below the kind of specific interests in services trade that the participating ministries and 
agencies possessed (see Table 5-3). 233 
  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA): The MOFA obtained four policy interests. Achieving 
high-quality GATS-plus services agreements was the MOFA’s top priority. At the time of the FTA 
negotiations with Singapore, the MOFA aimed to make a high-quality GATS type services trade 
agreement which could be used as a model of the following bilateral FTA negotiations in East Asia. 
Since the Japanese government had gained technical capacities of using a negative list approach 
for the FTA services trade agreement after concluding the FTA negotiations with Mexico in March 
2004, the MOFA’s motivation was even upgraded to use a negative list approach for the FTA 
negotiations with Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia when the negotiations started in early 2004. 
The reason was that these countries retained a huge gap between the autonomous liberalisation 
level and the GATS commitment level. The negative list was an appealing policy approach as it 
ensured standstill commitments in principle.  Second, in order to show Japan’s commitment to 
                                                          
232 From MOFA (2002). Nihonn no FTA Senryaku (Japan’s FTA strategy), from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/fta/summary.html; Oike (2006) p27; and Solis and Urata (2007), pp231-232. 
233 The observation is based on a series of interviews with the Japanese government officials (April 2013 and April 2015). 
See Appendix 1. 
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multilateralism, the MOFA seriously took into account legal compatibility with the GATS Article 
V (Economic Integration). One example was compliance with the requirement of substantial 
sectoral coverage provided in Article V: 1 (a).234 Third, the MOFA had a strong incentive to 
eliminate discriminatory treatment caused by trade and investment related agreements which FTA 
partner countries had previously agreed with the third parties (e.g. Treaty of Amity and Economic 
Relations between Thailand and the US conclude in 1966). Lastly, the MOFA was interested in 
using FTAs to stimulate structural reforms in Mode 4, namely receiving foreign professionals 
where Japan suffered a shortage of supply.  
In terms of economic interests, the MOFA was motivated to maximise business opportunities for 
Japanese companies. For the request and offer negotiation process in practice, the MOFA had to 
collect the liberalisation requests or information on the regulatory barriers from the Japanese 
companies, as much as possible, since business requests strengthen the negotiating power of the 
MOFA at negotiations with an FTA partner country. From the WTO services trade negotiations, 
the Japanese government was well aware that the export interests of major ASEAN counries, such 
as The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia lay in Mode 4. The MOFA understood that FTA 
negotiations with the ASEAN countries would become a deal between Japan’s interests in Mode 3 
and the ASEAN’s interests in Mode 4. In this regard, the MOFA tried to collect requests on Mode 
3 from the Japanese private sector as much as possible. 
 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI): The METI basically shared the policy 
interests of the MOFA. The first priority of the METI was to improve the level of commitments up 
to the substantial liberalisation since the Ministry was not happy with the ASEAN’s policy space 
between substantial liberalisation and the level of the GATS commitments. Applying a negative 
list approach was ideal for the METI to achieve its goal. Secondly, the METI was motivated to 
eliminate discriminatory treatments arising from the existing trade and investment related 
agreements of the FTA partner countries. The ministry tries to achieve a level playing field for the 
Japanese companies in the ASEAN countries. Third, the Ministry was in favour of using FTAs to 
stimulate services sector’s reform in the area where an FTA partner country had strong 
competitiveness. In the case of FTAs with ASEAN, it supported the relaxation of the market 
access restrictions of the medical related professional services, such as nurses and care-workers, 
since the Japanese market was suffering the supply shortage due to ageing population.  
                                                          
234 According to GATS V (Economic Integration), an FTA should have substantial sectoral coverage in terms of number 
of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply. In order to meet this condition, agreements should not provide 
for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply. 
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The METI’s economic interests were more strategic and pro-active than the MOFA’s because the 
ministry was responsible for designing strong Japanese services sectors from an economic strategy 
perspective. Therefore the METI was motivated to strengthen the Japanese companies’ 
international competitiveness using the FTAs with the ASEAN countries. Given that the METI 
mainly represents the whole manufacturing sector, it was interested in relaxing or diminishing 
restrictions in the manufacturing-related services sector in order to improve the business 
environment of the Japanese manufacturing sector in ASEAN. In the area of services, it 
administers only distribution and energy. As a delegated authority of the distribution sector, it 
especially showed offensive interests in liberalising the distribution sector in ASEAN. In general, 
the METI’s position on the energy sector was defensive but the Ministry was not pre-occupied 
with protecting the Japanese energy markets regarding the bilateral FTAs with ASEAN since none 
of these countries showed interests in penetrating into the Japanese energy markets. 
 
Financial Services Agency: The policy interest of the Financial Services Agency was to pursue its 
regulatory objectives, since the financial sector specifically requires market confidence, stability of 
the financial system and consumer protection. In comparison with other regulatory agencies, the 
regulatory autonomy of the financial services agency was quite clear and protected.  FTAs with 
ASEAN was an opportunity for the Financial Services Agency to strengthen preferential treatment 
for Japanese financial services providers vis-à-vis financial services providers from external 
regions. Since regulatory policies in ASEAN countries, with the exception of Singapore, were 
unpredictable, the Financial Services Agency supported applying the negative list approach and 
legally ensuring standstill status.  
As for economic interests, the Agency had specific incentives to develop and enhance business 
opportunities for Japanese banks and insurance companies in ASEAN. As the financial markets in 
the ASEAN countries, except Singapore, were heavily closed to the foreign suppliers, the Agency 
held offensive interests against the FTA partners to improve market access in Mode 3. The Agency 
was also interested in improving transparency, since the Japanese financial sectors had problems 
with authorisation in practice. From the inward perspective, the Agency had nothing to protect 
since the Japanese financial market was completely open in terms of market access and national 
treatment. 
 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication: The ministry covers a wide range of ICT 
services which include postal and courier services, telecommunication services and audio-visual 
services. As the telecom sectors in Japan require minimal registration formalities and are basically 
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open to competition as a result of regulatory reforms, administration of the telecommunication 
sector by the Ministry was the minimal level such as providing a universal service.235 On the other 
hand, postal and courier services were heavily regulated. Therefore, the Ministry’s major policy 
interest was to protect regulatory autonomy and to pursue its regulatory objectives in the area of 
postal and courier services. 
In terms of economic interests, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication aimed at 
opening the telecommunication sectors in the ASEAN countries, most of which were still heavily 
shielded from competition. From the inward perspective, the Ministry’s general position was to 
protect NTT as a major capital owner (33%). In the case of the FTA negotiations with ASEAN, the 
Ministry did not have to protect NTT as FTA partners did not show export interests in the area. 
 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare: The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare is one of 
the ministries with strong regulatory autonomy in Japan. In the labour policy area, the Ministry 
aims at protecting employment of Japanese nationals and minimum wages. Therefore, the ministry 
was completely against Mode 4 negotiations which went above the GATS commitments. The 
ministry also held a very strong regulatory objective, which was to protect Japanese consumers’ 
health and safety in the medical related services. Given its sectionalism, the Ministry detested any 
international negotiations which intervenes in their regulatory autonomy and regulatory objectives. 
When Japan negotiated bilateral FTAs with ASEAN, Japan was suffering a shortage of nurses and 
care-workers due to its ageing society. However, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
persistently kept defensive positions on receiving foreign professionals for three reasons. The first 
was the policy incentive of protecting strong regulatory autonomy of administering licensing and 
professional qualifications in the health and social services. The second was that the ministry had a 
strong incentive to protect vested interests, which were the interests of Japanese nurses and care-
workers asking for the regulatory authority to shield the Japanese medical services sectors from 
market penetration by the foreign services suppliers. The third was the incentive of protecting the 
Japanese labour markets to retain average wages and the quality of professionals from the labour 
policy perspective.  
 
Ministry of Justice: Similar to Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the Ministry of Justice 
maintained strong regulatory autonomy in the area of temporary movement of natural persons and 
some legal services as administrator of licences and qualifications. Since the Ministry’s regulatory 
                                                          
235 See WTO (2013) p95.  
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objective is to ensure security of the Japanese society, it does not accept any trade negotiations 
which would interfere its regulatory concerns. In this regard, the Ministry of Justice resisted 
changing regulations relating to horizontal commitments of Mode 4. The Ministry also held a 
specific economic incentive to protect Japanese law firms, professional lawyers and solicitors from 
market penetration of foreign law-firms and lawyers. In the case of the FTA negotiations with 
ASEAN, legal services was not the issue as ASEAN countries did not show interests in the area. 
Thus, Ministry of Justice’s interest was to maintain the status-quo, which is to maintain horizontal 
commitments of Mode 4 under the GATS. 
  
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism: Since this Ministry covers a wide 
range of services including construction services, transport services and tourism services, the basic 
policy interest of the Ministry was to protect regulatory autonomy when it comes to trade 
negotiations. For the Ministry, pursuing regulatory objectives in the construction services, 
transport services and tourism services was the priority. 
 
In terms of economic interests, the Ministry’s interests were intricate as it covers a wide range of 
services sectors. In the area of the construction services, there was strong incentive to expand the 
Japanese construction firms’ business in East Asia including ASEAN. On the other hand, as far as 
the domestic market is concerned, there was a strong incentive to protect the market power of the 
major Japanese constructing companies. In the tourism sector, although the Japanese markets were 
open, the Ministry possessed strong incentive to maintain the quality of services relating to hotels 
and tourism management as the regulatory authority. Therefore, the ministry was persistently 
against the requests from Indonesia i.e. improving market access to professionals relating to hotel 
management. In contrast, the Ministry maintained the offensive economic interests to promote 
liberalisation of maritime sectors in East Asia in order to improve logistics which was the core part 
of supply chains in East Asia. 
 
Ministry of Education and other culture-related domestic regulatory authorities: Like other 
domestic regulatory ministries, the Ministry of Education and other culture-related domestic 
regulatory authorities (e.g. Ministry of Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and Agency for 
Cultural Affairs) tried to protect regulatory autonomy of its policy domain. In terms of economic 
interests, the Ministry of Education had an interest in promoting trade and investment of the 
Japanese education-related services in ASEAN. And the culture-related domestic regulatory 
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authorities were interested in promoting Japanese culture such as Japanese animations, films and J-
Pop. On the other hand, these regulatory authorities were reluctant to certify a new category of 
educational and culture related-professionals (e.g. Thai instructors teaching Thai dance, music and 
cuisine). The reasons was that the Ministry was afraid that any regulatory changes would interfere 
their regulatory objectives of ensuring the quality of services. 
  
In summing up, there were three types of policy actors in terms of interests. One is the pro-liberal 
ministries which tried to achieve high-quality agreement and high-standard market liberalisation 
commitments including sectoral reforms. The METI and the MOFA were advocates of services 
trade agreement belonging to this group. Their interests in services trade negotiations were much 
stronger than other ministries. The second is anti-liberal ministries which completely denied any 
domestic regulatory changes and held no interest in the FTA partner’s services market. The 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Ministry of Justice belonged to this group. Their 
defensive interests made a relatively strong incentive to participate in the negotiations. The third 
group is the ministries which had both pro-liberal and anti-liberal interests due to a wide coverage 
of services sector. The majority of the domestic regulatory authorities belonged to this group. They 
were not highly motivated to participate in sectoral liberalisation negotiations since they were 
afraid that they might have to make compromises in areas they wished to defend, in return for 
getting liberalisation commitments from ASEAN. 
  
Table 5-3: Policy supply side – Specific interests in services trade negotiations of the major 
players 
 
Actors Interests 
MOFA 
(Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) 
Policy interests: 
 Strengthen preferential treatments (minimum GATS-plus) vis-à-vis external 
regions=NAFTA type negative list approach 
 Achieve the GATS Art.V compatible FTAs 
 Eliminate discriminative treatments caused by existing trade related 
agreements of a partner country 
 Use FTAs to stimulate structural reforms in Mode 4 
 
Economic interests:  
 Reflect the interests of the Japanese services suppliers (e.g. Mode 3) 
 
METI 
(Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry) 
Policy interests 
 Strengthen preferential treatments (minimum GATS-plus) vis-à-vis external 
regions=NAFTA type negative list approach 
 Eliminate discriminative treatments caused by existing trade related agreements 
of a partner country 
 Achieve the GATS Art.V compatible FTAs  
 Use FTAs to stimulate structural reforms in Mode 4. 
 
Economic interests 
 Relax or diminish  restrictions in the manufacturing related service sectors of  
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host countries 
 Promote trade and investment of the Japanese distribution sector  
 Protect the Japanese energy services markets (potentially, but not in the case of 
bilateral FTAs with ASEAN) 
Financial Services 
Agency 
Policy interests 
 Pursue its regulatory objectives 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Strengthen preferential treatment (minimum GATS-plus) vis-à-vis external 
regions in the financial sector =NAFTA type negative list approach 
 
Economic interests 
 Promote trade and investment of the Japanese financial sectors in East Asia to 
support the Japanese manufacturing sector 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and 
Communications 
Policy interests 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Pursue its regulatory objectives 
 Strengthen preferential treatment (minimum GATS-plus) vis-à-vis external 
regions in the telecommunication sector 
 
Economic interests 
 Promote the trade and investment interests of the Japanese ICT providers 
 Protect NTT as a major capital owner (33.3%) 
Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare 
Policy interests 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Pursue its regulatory objectives 
 
Economic interests 
 Protect the Japanese professionals in the medical sector (e.g. nurses, care-
workers, medical doctors) 
 Protect the Japanese labour markets: (a) avoid unemployment and (b) retain 
average wages  
 
Ministry of Justice Policy interests 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Pursue its regulatory objectives 
 
Economic interests 
 Protect the Japanese law-firms and lawyers, certified under the Japanese law, 
from penetration of foreign law-firms and lawyers 
 
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism 
Policy interests 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Pursue its regulatory objectives 
 
Economic interests 
Construction: 
 Promote investment of the Japanese construction sector and the construction- 
related sector in East Asia 
 Protect the market power of the Japanese major constructing companies in the 
domestic markets from market penetration by non-Japanese suppliers 
 Protest against receiving construction-related professionals or engineers from 
East Asia (except from Singapore) 
Tourism: 
 Maintain the level of the professional qualifications relating to hotels and tourism 
(e.g. Against professional workers in hotel and tourism from Indonesia) 
Transport 
 Achieve GATS-plus commitments in the maritime sector 
 Improve logistics for supply-chains in East Asia for the Japanese manufacturing 
companies 
Ministry of Education Policy interests 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Pursue its regulatory objectives 
 
Economic interests 
 Reluctant to certify a new category of educational related-professionals (e.g. Thai 
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instructors teaching Thai dance, music, cuisine) and to promote MRAs with East 
Asian countries in the education related-services 
 Promote trade and investment of the Japanese education related services 
providers in East Asia 
Other domestic 
regulatory authorities 
 
e.g. Ministry of Culture, 
Sports, Science and 
Technology 
 
Agency for Cultural 
Affairs 
Policy interests 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Pursue its regulatory objectives 
 
Economic interests 
 Promote the Japanese culture 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Ideas 
‘Manufacturalism’ - Japan as a country of manufacturing 
There was an idea which significantly influenced the interests of the Japanese government as well 
as the Japanese private sector. Not only the market reality of regional supply chains established by 
the Japanese manufacturers in East Asia, but also the idea of ‘manufacturalism’ shaped the 
interests of actors who participated in domestic decision-making for FTA negotiations with 
ASEAN. The idea of ‘manufacturalism’ is deeply embedded in Japanese society. There are 
historical and cultural reasons for this. First, ‘monodzukuri’ (manufacturing in English), 
historically deemed to be a virtue in Japan, was transformed from ‘takumi’ (artisan or 
craftsmanship) to technology. In Japanese society, professionals, who are engaged in 
‘monodzukuri’, are highly respected. The second is the leading role of the manufacturing sector in 
Japanese economic development after World War II. For example, the manufacturing sector’s 
cumulative nominal GDP between 1955 and 1960 accounted for 132.5 per cent led by the steel 
industry and machinery industry and 100.3 per cent between 1960 and 1965 led by growing 
exports of the machinery sectors.236 While economic developments of the US and the UK were led 
by the non-manufacturing sector, economic development of Japan was led by the manufacturing 
sector. 237  The manufacturing sector-led growth formed the societal idea that manufacturing 
constitutes the base of strength of the Japanese economy.  
When Japan negotiated the bilateral FTAs with ASEAN, the embedded ideas of ‘manufacturalism’ 
formed the basic negotiating stance of both the policy demand side and the policy supply side. For 
instance, the business executives of large sized Japanese companies believed that “Japan was a 
country of manufacturing”. And they thought that they were major players of the Japanese 
                                                          
236 See Yoshikawa, H and Miyagawa, S. (2009). Sangyou Kouzou no Henka to Sengo Nihon no Keizai Seichou 
(Changes in Industrial Structure and Post-war Economic Growth in Japan), RIETI, p5-6, available at:  
http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09j024.pdf 
237 See Yoshikawa, H and Miyagawa, S. (2009), p10. 
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economy and that they had to keep leading Japan. This would be one of reasons why Japanese 
manufacturing companies were major policy-making players inside the Keidanren, whereas the 
services suppliers were passive. On the government side, the METI, which devised the economic 
strategy of Japan, put especially great emphasis on the roles of the Japanese manufacturing sector 
in development. For example, in “Monodzukuri Hakusho 2005” (White Paper on Manufacturing) 
which was annual publication of METI, emphasised the importance of teaching a ‘monodzukuri’ 
spirit at the early stage of education. 238  Whenever they started trade negotiations, the 
manufacturing sector was the first issue to be considered. A top negotiator of the Japanese 
government at the time of the Japan-ASEAN FTAs declared that the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs 
were for goods and, in this regard, the mission was achieved.239 
 
5.4 Institutions – Supply side condition 
5.4.1 Domestic decision-making structure for Japan-ASEAN FTA services trade negotiations 
and the logic of veto players 
The interests of domestic regulatory authorities described in the previous section can be 
summarised as a strong preference of the status-quo. Next, we explain the domestic decision-
making structure for the Japan-ASEAN FTA services trade negotiations by applying the logic of 
veto players. Table 5-4 summarises the institutional characteristics of the policy supply side actors. 
In the case of the services decision-making process, the agenda setter is MOFA which leads 
services trade negotiations representing Japan as well as the METI which works together with 
MOFA mainly representing the business federations. Veto players are domestic regulatory 
authorities which participate in the domestic-decision making process. These include Financial 
Services Agency; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; 
Ministry of Education and culture related authorities. For the veto players, the status-quo meant no 
changes in regulations or any substantial changes in the level of liberalisation.240 
There are five reasons why domestic regulatory authorities had a strong preference for the status-
quo: 
(i) First, domestic regulatory authorities have legitimate objectives for regulation, which is 
resolving market failures (i.e. market power, imperfect and asymmetric information, externalities 
                                                          
238 See METI (2005), Monodzukuri Hakusho 2005 (White Paper on Manufacturing 2005), available at: 
http://www.meti.go.jp/report/downloadfiles/g51115a10j.pdf 
239 The interview took place in April 2015 in Tokyo. See Appendix 1. 
240 It should be noted that the position of the status-quo for the Japanese domestic regulatory authorities and that of many 
ASEAN countries are different. The status-quo of the ASEAN countries was to maintain the level of GATS 
commitments to maintain a policy space (see Chapter 6). 
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and public goods).241 For example, all domestic regulatory authorities have to protect consumers 
from imperfect and asymmetric information and maintain the quality of services. Regulations in 
Japan such as licensing, technical standards, qualification requirements, prudential regulations are 
mutualised as well as complicated at the same time. Ministries which are in charge of network 
industries (e.g. communication services, postal services and transport services) have to deal with 
network externalities which are common economic failures in network industries after privatisation. 
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, which administers health and medical services and 
professional services in these sectors strongly reflects the public goods nature, as their regulatory 
objective is to ensure the health and safety of Japanese nationals. Because market failures provided 
legitimate reasons to regulate, the Japanese domestic regulatory authorities did not allow any 
international trade negotiations to intervene in its regulatory autonomy. 
(ii) The second reason is sectoral segmentation. Each domestic regulatory authority is in charge of 
a specific sectoral economy and market. There exists a clear demarcation between ‘international 
matters’ which embrace economic diplomacy and ‘domestic matters’ within an authority. Basically, 
policy makers of domestic regulatory authorities are underpinned by the notion of ‘domestic 
matters’. For them, it is very hard to admit that the sectors, which they administer, embrace 
‘international matters’, including international services trade negotiations. And it is hard to 
associate their tasks with economic diplomacy such as FTAs. Namely, domestic regulatory 
authorities do not consider that liberalisation under an FTA is a way to reform the economic 
inefficiency of a specific sector or a way to make regulatory reforms. 
(iii) Third, there was no incentive for policy reforms or regulatory reforms by using bilateral FTAs 
with ASEAN. Prior to the bilateral FTA negotiations with ASEAN, a series of deregulation and 
regulatory reforms, which was called ‘Kisei Kaikaku’, had already taken place in the major 
services sectors from the 1990s. The WTO sectoral negotiations in the financial sector and 
telecommunication sector also accelerated structural reforms in the sector. Therefore, domestic 
regulatory authorities did not perceive FTAs as a policy device to promote further policy reforms 
or regulatory reforms. 
(iv) Fourth, in the area where pro-reform policy makers considered that policy reforms were 
needed to stimulate the Japanese economy (e.g. health and social services), domestic regulatory 
authorities were completely captured by vested interests due to their strong client relationship. This 
was the case of health services-related professionals including nurses and care-workers. As 
explained before, these professional associations collectively insisted that the safety of the 
Japanese health-care were in danger. They also appealed to politicians behind the scene to entirely 
capture the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. 
                                                          
241 See explanation about market failures in Chapter 2: 2.4.1. 
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(v) The fifth reason was insufficient export interest to make a bargain. As previously explained, in 
comparison with goods trade negotiations, services trade liberalisation is less visible and it 
technically more difficult to make concessions.242 This heterogeneous nature of services, brought 
about weak interest in the domestic regulatory authorities for liberalising ASEAN markets in 
general. In addition, there was no strong lobbying in terms of exporting services. 
All through the inter-governmental coordination process, all domestic regulatory authorities 
exercised veto power to maintain the status-quo for the reasons mentioned above. The agenda 
setters: the MOFA and the METI which aimed at high-quality services agreements could not break 
through ‘policy stability’, which means the difficulty for a significant change of the status-quo 
(Tsebelis 2002, p37) for two reasons. The first reason was horizontal fragmentation of power. All 
domestic regulatory authorities obtained regulatory power equally (see Table5-3). The Financial 
Services Agency is a typical case of a Ministry with a strong negotiating power as it exercises 
regulatory autonomy as the supervisory authority for all financial sectors, which is deemed to be 
vital for a stable macro economy. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare also obtains strong 
negotiating power as the Ministry is in charge of the backbone of people’s life, such as 
employment, health and safety. A wide participation of domestic regulatory authorities with strong 
regulatory power in services trade decision-making strengthened the status-quo forces as the veto 
power model entails that ‘policy stability’ is strengthened as the number of veto players increases. 
The second reason was the agenda setters’ weak political power.  In the case of the MOFA, 
domestic political power of attaining its aim was quite weak as the ministry had no authorisation 
power. The MOFA could play a role only as coordinator without any designated ruling power such 
as changing domestic regulations. Likewise, the METI’s political power was weak although it 
envisaged improving productivity of the Japanese services sector from the perspective of users (e.g. 
manufacturing sector) or end-users (individual consumers).243 In practice, the METI did not obtain 
the political power necessary to override the regulatory domains of the other domestic regulatory 
ministries.   
 
Table 5-4: Policy supply side -Institutional characteristics 
Actors Institutional characteristics 
MOFA 
(Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) 
No authorisation power 
 
Coordinator of services trade negotiations without designated ruling power 
 
Diplomatic negotiators without specific economic and sectoral expertise 
                                                          
242 See explanation in Chapter 2. 
243  From interviews with the WTO secretariat which took place in April 2013 (Appendix 1). They pointed out that 
ministries with authorisation and regulatory autonomy can exercise stronger political power than the ministry which 
protects consumers’ benefits such as METI of Japan. 
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METI 
(Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and 
Industry) 
Represent the Japanese private sector both in goods and services 
 
Higher priority on manufacturing sector than services sectors in terms of policy 
making 
 
Regulatory ministry for distribution sector and energy sector 
 
Devise Japan’s services industrial strategy in general from improving productivity and 
international competitiveness point of view, without implementation power as a 
regulatory authority 
 
Represent end users 
 
Financial Services 
Agency 
Exercises strong regulatory autonomy as supervisory authority for all financial sectors 
including licensing 
 
Possesses strong political power as supervisory authority of the major economic 
sectors 
 
Represents the interests of Japanese financial sectors 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and 
Communications 
Regulatory ministry for ICT sectors with minimal registration formalities 
 
Represent the NTT groups 
 
Devise Japan’s ICT-related policy 
 
Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare 
Strong regulatory autonomy: administer licensing and qualifications in the medical and 
welfare sector 
 
Represents the health and welfare related professionals (e.g. nurses, care-workers) 
 
Devise the Japanese labour market policy 
 
Devise the Japanese health services policy 
Ministry of Justice Strong regulatory autonomy: administer licensing and qualifications of legal-related 
professional (e.g. Lawyers, solicitors) 
 
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, 
Transport and 
Tourism 
Strong regulatory autonomy in construction and transport 
 
Represents the Japanese construction companies and construction-related professionals 
and engineers 
 
Devise the Japanese infrastructure policy 
 
Promote inward tourism to Japan 
 
Represents the Japanese maritime sector, and air-transport sector 
 
Devise a sectoral policy of transport 
Ministry of Education Represent education related services and professionals 
 
Strong regulatory autonomy in education related-services 
 
Devise the education policy 
 
Other domestic 
regulatory ministries 
 
e.g. Ministry of 
Culture, Sports, 
Science and 
Technology 
 
Agency for Cultural 
Affairs 
Represent culture related services and professionals 
 
Strong regulatory autonomy in culture related-services 
 
Devise the culture related policy 
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5.4.2 How did domestic regulatory authorities obstruct the lead ministry?  
How did the domestic regulatory authorities obstruct initiatives of the MOFA and the METI for 
making high-quality services agreements through inter-governmental coordination process for the 
Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs? We trace the inter-governmental coordination process of the 
following FTAs: Japan-Singapore, Japan-Malaysia, Japan-Thailand, Japan-The Philippines, Japan-
Indonesia and Japan-Viet Nam. The analysis is extracted from a series of interviews with Japanese 
government officials and Japanese private sector individuals, government documents, the private 
sector’s policy papers and articles written by trade negotiators. The policy-making process is 
divided into two stages: one is the domestic policy-making stage and the other is the bilateral 
negotiation stage. 
 
Japan-Singapore FTA (in effect 2002) 
Domestic policy-making stage: The basic negotiating position of the MOFA was to achieve a 
comprehensive and high quality FTA so that it could be used as a model for the subsequent 
negotiations with other ASEAN countries. The MOFA and the METI aimed at achieving a higher 
margin of the GATS-plus and comprehensive rules with a focus on investment. However, both 
ministries faced difficulties in achieving their blueprint for three reasons. One is that the Japan-
Singapore FTA was the first FTA for Japan. Since the domestic regulatory authorities had no prior 
experience of making FTAs, they could hardly understand how their domestic policy and 
regulatory framework were associated with the services trade agreements in an FTA. Because of 
this, “the domestic regulatory authorities became extremely nervous about the negotiations” 
according to a senior official of the MOFA who was in charge of the Japan-Singapore FTA. The 
domestic regulatory authorities’ major concern was that the Japan-Singapore FTA might interfere 
with their policy and regulatory domain. Accordingly, the MOFA had to spend quite some time 
interpreting the possible services trade chapter in an FTA and describe its relation with domestic 
regulatory policy and institutions to the domestic regulatory ministries. A second reason was 
Singapore’s liberal and opened economy. The domestic regulatory ministries anticipated that they 
might be requested to take regulatory actions. Among them, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications; and the Ministry of Culture, Sports, Science and Technology became notably 
defensive since these were the areas where Singapore had strong competitiveness. A third reason 
was that there were limited substantial requirements from the private sector to push the blueprint of 
the MOFA and the METI. Given a lack of offensive pressure from the private sector, the domestic 
regulatory authorities were further demotivated. 
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During the internal government coordination to prepare requests to Singapore, the Financial 
Services Agency and Transport department of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism showed offensive interest in several services sectors (e.g. banking services and transport 
services). Thus, the priority was set to (i) make a high level disciplines and commitments in the 
financial sector since Singapore was playing an important role in Asia 244 ; (ii) upgrade 
commitments in the maritime sector to improve supply chains in East Asia; and (iii) improve 
GATS commitments in the manufacturing related services such as distribution.245  
Bilateral negotiation stage: Both Japan and Singapore tried to achieve as high a margin of the 
“GATS-plus” offers as possible from their counterpart. Singapore did not accept relaxation of 
certain financial restrictions which would have required domestic regulatory changes. The MOFA 
official recalled, however, that was Japan that struggled more in making concessions than 
Singapore did. The MOFA could hardly change the attitude of the domestic regulatory authorities 
to maintain the status-quo. 
 
Japan-Malaysian FTA (in effect 2006), Japan-Thailand FTA (in effect 2007) and Japan-The 
Philippines FTA (2008) 
Domestic policy-making stage: After concluding the Japan-Singapore FTA, the Japanese 
government was motivated to use FTAs as a driving force for domestic structural reforms in the 
ASEAN countries, as emphasised by Prime Minister Koizumi in his speech delivered in 2002.246 In 
addition, the Japan-Mexico FTA (in effect September 2004), which took the NAFTA style 
negative list approach in the services trade agreement, endorsed a more ambitious position of the 
MOFA and the METI. The MOFA247 thought that applying the NAFTA type negative list services 
agreement to the FTAs with Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines became technically possible 
for Japan thanks to institutional experience from the Japan-Mexico FTA. The METI was more 
ambitious than the MOFA in terms of getting a higher level of commitments from the partner 
countries. The METI’s position was to achieve commitments from these countries up to the level 
of substantial liberalisation, whether actual interests from the Japanese private sector existed or 
not.248 The METI also aimed at a high level investment chapter encompassing both goods and 
services. Other offensive actors from the outward perspective were the Financial Services Agency 
                                                          
244 Japan-Singapore made substantially GATS-plus liberalisation in the financial sector. For example, Singapore 
increased the number of licences for full-banking services, eliminated limits of issuing licences for wholesale banking. 
Japan liberalised intermediary insurance services and expanded the scope of activities in trans-national security services. 
245 See http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/singapore/kyotei/kyotei.pdf 
246 The Speech of Prime Minister Koizumi titled “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia – A sincere and Open Partnership 
(January 2002), available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html 
247 A meetings with the MOFA senior officials in April 2015. See Appendix 1. 
248 A meeting with the METI official in April 2015. See Appendix 1. 
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for the financial sector, the METI for the distribution sector and the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communication for the telecommunication sector. 
From the inward perspective, the domestic regulatory authorities’ negotiating positions remained 
basically unchanged. Their strong preference for maintaining the status-quo could not be 
challenged either by the MOFA or the METI. They shielded themselves from any domestic 
regulatory changes to pursue their regulatory objectives and protected their regulatory autonomy. 
On the other hand, the domestic regulatory authorities were not as unnecessarily defensive as they 
had been at the time of the Japan-Singapore FTA negotiations. Thanks to the previous FTAs with 
Singapore and Mexico, the domestic regulatory authorities accumulated basic knowledge about the 
FTA services trade negotiations and its linkage with their policy and regulatory domain.249 They 
realised that FTAs with the ASEAN countries would not become a threat to Japanese markets for 
two reasons. One was that Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines were developing countries 
without export capacities in the services sectors except for some professional services. The other 
reason is that Japan went through a series of domestic structural reforms and autonomous 
liberalisation from the 1990s. They realised that there were huge gaps between the substantial 
liberalisation and the Japan’s GATS commitments. Nevertheless, there were some ministries 
which showed defensive positions in Mode 4. The Ministry of Justice basically rejected making 
any GATS-plus horizontal commitments in Mode 4 with the ASEAN countries. The Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare most strongly resisted liberalising the movement of professionals in 
the health related services sectors. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
took defensive positions for the Japanese construction-related professionals and engineers. 
Ministry of Culture, Sports, Science and Technology had negative positions against making 
commitments in a new category of culture and sports related professionals. 
Bilateral negotiation stage: The MOFA was confronted by two major obstacles in making high-
level GATS-plus FTAs. The first basic obstacle was caused by the ASEAN side (Malaysia, 
Thailand and The Philippines). The idea of achieving high quality agreements was completely 
rejected by the three countries. According to anecdotes of a Japanese government official, when 
the Japanese negotiators proposed the negative list approach to Thailand at the first bilateral 
negotiation, the Thai delegates showed deep embarrassment and immediately left the negotiating 
table.250 Even further, Thailand proposed to treat the services trade issues as a Built-in-Agenda like 
the one in the China-ASEAN FTA. Likewise, the request of Japan to make an investment chapter 
encompassing both manufacturing and services was completely rejected by all three countries. The 
reason was that the investment chapter took a more liberal approach by application of the negative 
list approach. They insisted that services-related investment and manufacturing-related investment 
                                                          
249 From the interview with the MOFA senior officials (April 2015). See Appendix 1. 
250 From the interview with the MOFA senior officials (April 2015). See Appendix 1. 
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should be separated and that services related investment should be incorporated into Mode 3 
(investment) of the GATS type agreement. Because of the strong resistance from Malaysia, 
Thailand and The Philippines, the Japanese government had to give up applying the negative list 
approach251 and incorporating the services related investment into the investment chapter. 252 
The second obstacle arose from the defensive positions of the Japanese domestic regulatory 
authorities in Mode 4. For Thailand and The Philippines, the market access of some professional 
services to Japan was their only interests (Malaysia did not show a particular interest in 
professional services). In the case of Thailand, Japanese domestic regulatory ministries resisted 
relaxing the restrictions of entry and temporary stay of Thai care-workers; Thai spa therapists; 
Thai cooks; and Thai instructors who teach Thai classical or traditional dance, Thai music, Thai 
cuisine, Thai boxing, Thai languages and Thai spa services. Among these, the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare specifically strongly resisted changing any regulations relating to Thai 
certified care-workers and Thai spa therapists. From The Philippines, entry and temporary stay for 
Philippine nurses and care-workers were requested. Again the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare persistently protested against any regulatory changes in the area. The MOFA tried to elicit 
compromises from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry to make a substantial deal 
with Thailand and The Philippines in the area of the Japanese interests (e.g. the manufacturing 
related services and Mode 3). However, the MOFA could hardly find any compromise from the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare persistently 
echoed that acceptance of entry of nurses and care-workers would significantly reduce (i) the 
quality of health services in Japan and (ii) wages of the Japanese professionals. To solve the 
problem of a serious shortage of nurses for the Japanese elderly society, the Ministry stuck to the 
impractical idea of encouraging nurses who had become housewives to come back to the labour 
market by increasing wages. In the end, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare nodded its 
head to accept the requests of nurses and care-workers, on condition that the arrangements did not 
require any legal changes. Accordingly, a solution arose accepting natural persons who seek a 
qualification as nurses and care-workers under the Japanese law253 as ‘trainees’ with many detailed 
requirements, including the qualifications following Japanese language courses and professional 
training courses to become nurses and care-workers which Japanese students take. The duration of 
stay in Japan as ‘trainees’ was up to 3 years for nurses and 4 years for care-workers. For those who 
pass the Japanese national examination of nurses and care-workers, they are entitled to work in 
                                                          
251 The level of modification from the negative list approach differed among the three countries as described in Chapter 3. 
252 For Japan, the investment chapter was more important than the services trade chapter because the Japanese 
government was pushed by strong lobbying from the Japanese manufacturers. On the other hand, the services sector was 
not supported by the real interests from the Japanese services sector. Malaysia and The Philippines also basically 
understood the importance of endorsing FDI in manufacturing sector by the investment chapter. 
253 The ones who seek access to Japan as ‘trainee’ of nurses or care-workers have to obtain the qualification of nurses or 
care-workers under the Philippine and Thai law. 
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Japan up to seven years for ‘training’ purpose.254 By accepting the foreign nurses and care-workers 
as ‘trainees’, no legal changes were required.255 Other than the professional services, Thailand also 
requested Japan to change Japan’s domestic legislation so that Japanese tourists could use 
Japanese medical insurance when they have to receive medical treatments in Thailand. However, 
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare totally rejected the offer. 
Strong resistance to Mode 4 by the Japanese domestic regulatory authorities made it more difficult 
for the MOFA and the METI’s positions to draw concessions in Mode 3 from Thailand and The 
Philippines. Facing strong defensive positions of the three countries at the initial stage of bilateral 
negotiations (i.e. rejection of applying the negative list approach and incorporation of services 
related investment into the investment chapter), the METI negotiators, which was the most 
ambitious ministry in achieving the high-quality GATS-plus FTAs, were under great stress. To 
induce any substantial results, the METI had to focus on liberalising Mode 3 in the 
‘manufacturing-related services’ sectors in order to improve the business environment of the 
regional supply chains established by Japanese manufactures. The METI persuaded the FTA 
partners that a better business environment in the services sector (e.g. the distribution and 
telecommunication) would attract further FDI in the manufacturing sector. Services negotiations 
came to a deadlock as Thailand and The Philippines were unsatisfied with the Japanese defensive 
positions in Mode 4 while Japan was unsatisfied with the ASEAN’s protectionism in general as 
well as hard positions in making concessions in Mode 3. 
At the final stage of bilateral negotiations, the MOFA declined to make a package deal of 
agreements instead of adhering to a high-quality GATS-plus agreement. As previously described, 
the Japanese government was under a huge pressure of competing FTA networking in East Asia. 
Also, there was strong pressure from the Japanese business sector for early conclusions of FTAs 
following the ones with Singapore and Mexico. The primary goal of the MOFA as lead ministry 
was to create an FTA. Being left out and becoming a loser in the FTA networking competition in 
East Asia was the worst scenario, which had to be avoided whatever the cost. At the same time, the 
Japanese government had to achieve its first priority of supporting the Japanese manufacturing 
sector to enhance its regional supply chains in East Asia in terms of context. Therefore at the final 
stage of international negotiations, the MOFA gave up drawing more commitments from the 
ASEAN countries. One of the METI officials, who was in charge of services trade negotiations 
with Malaysia, was upbraided by a Japanese head negotiator for failing to grasp the wide picture of 
foreign diplomacy and ordered to immediately stop pressing Malaysia to make commitments.256 
                                                          
254 The limit of duration was abolished in 2010. 
255 From the interview with a counsellor of the WTO secretariat (April 2013). 
256 From the interview with a former services negotiator of the METI who negotiated Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs 
(April 2015, in Tokyo). 
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This anecdote reveals the pressure employed by the Japanese head negotiators to complete an FTA 
as a package, instead of adhering to the quality of services trade chapter.  
 
Japan-Indonesian FTA (2008) 
Domestic policy-making stage: From the outward perspective, the METI257 evaluated that Japan’s 
negotiating tactics with Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines were not realistic. According to a 
METI official,258 the level of achievement was such that while Japan requested 10 points, only two 
out of ten were accepted by the partner countries at the time of FTA negotiations with Malaysia, 
Thailand and The Philippines. The METI considered that requesting detailed commitments across 
whole services sectors without strong requests from the Japanese private sector was neither 
convincing to FTA partner countries nor economically beneficial to Japan. To make the requests 
from Japan more powerful, the METI proposed to target two specific issues which would bring 
about practical benefits to both countries. One was to improve commitments in manufacturing 
related-services, namely liberalisation of Mode 3. The METI thought that Japan could convince 
Indonesia that improving the quality of manufacturing related-services was necessary for Indonesia 
not only to be tightly integrated in regional supply chains but also to induce further investment in 
the manufacturing sector in order to create employment and boost the economy. Second was the 
improvement of commitments directly related to two major Japanese services companies already 
invested in Indonesia (e.g. distribution services) because they were suffering day to day business 
uncertainty such as frequent changes of legislations and arbitrary and opaque licensing procedures. 
From the inward perspective, the consensus was made during the coordination process of 
government that the commitments of Japan should be basically the same level as the bilateral 
FTAs with Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines unless Indonesia made higher level 
commitments. Therefore, ‘policy stability’ of the domestic regulatory authorities was ensured in 
principle. 
Bilateral negotiation stage: Like Thailand and The Philippines, Indonesia showed its interests in 
Mode 4.259 In addition to nurses and care-workers, the country requested mutual recognition of 
qualifications in tourism and hotel services, spa services, food-and beverage-related services and 
seafarers. The Ministries of Health, Labour and Welfare; and Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism refused to accept mutual recognition of professional services suggested by Indonesia. 
Consequently, Japan’s offers in Mode 4 became the same as the ones for Thailand and The 
                                                          
257 From the meetings with the METI senior officials (April 2015) in Tokyo. See Appendix 1.  
258 From the meeting which took place in April 2015 in Tokyo. See Appendix 1. 
259 From the meetings with the Indonesian government officials (April 2013 and July 2015). See Appendix 1. 
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Philippines. The METI260 was namely in charge of persuading Indonesia that making a binding 
commitment to a better market access in Mode 3 to Japanese services suppliers in manufacturing-
related services would attract more FDI from Japan, which would create employment. 
Nevertheless, the METI could not get a positive response from the Indonesian government, mainly 
due to Japan’s defensive positions in Mode 4. With regard to providing legal certainty for existing 
Japanese investors in Indonesia, Japan could hardly draw concessions since the Indonesian 
government was completely captured by domestic vested interests.  
 
Japan-Viet Nam FTA (2009)261 
Domestic policy-making stage: The MOFA’s negotiating position was to welcome Viet Nam’s 
firm commitments in implementing its GATS commitments. Since there was little gap between 
substantial liberalisation and the GATS commitments of the Viet Nam, the MOFA and the METI 
decided to offer technical cooperation instead of pushing further liberalisation, with the exception 
of the distribution sector where the Japanese private sector’s offensive interests existed. From the 
domestic regulatory authorities’ point of view, there was no difficulty in providing the same level 
of commitments as the bilateral FTAs previously concluded with the other ASEAN countries. Like 
the case of negotiations with Indonesia, ‘policy stability’ of the domestic regulatory authorities 
was secured at an early stage of negotiations. 
Bilateral negotiating stage: Like the cases of Thailand, The Philippines and Indonesia, the 
movement of natural persons was Viet Nam’s only interest. Viet Nam requested Japan to liberalise 
entry and temporary stay of the Viet Namese nurses and care-workers certified in Viet Nam. It also 
requested entry and temporary stay for IT-related professionals certified in Viet Nam. The 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare had no difficulty in applying the level of commitments 
made for the other ASEAN countries to Viet Nam. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications refused to accept IT-related professionals certified in Viet Nam. In short, the 
Japanese domestic regulatory authorities kept the status-quo without making any regulatory 
changes in Mode 4. 
 
5.5 Findings 
In the previous sections (5.3 and 5.4), we argued how interests and institutions during the decision-
making process shaped the negotiating positions of Japan by applying the modified policy demand 
                                                          
260 From the meeting with a METI senior official (April 2015). See Appendix 1. 
261 From the meeting with a MOFA senior official (April 2015). See Appendix 1. 
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and supply side model of Mattli (1999a). As for the policy supply side condition, we explained 
how the domestic regulatory authorities obstructed the lead ministry through the logic of veto 
player. Below, we highlight our findings (Table 5-5). 
 
Table 5-5: Political economy factors in decision-making which shaped the Japan’s 
negotiating positions – Interests and Institutions 
 
 
Interests 
Policy demand side:  
• nebulous offensive interests of the Japanese services enterprises vs. strong 
defensive interests of nurses and care-workers  
Policy supply side: 
• Policy interests of the MOFA and the METI to achieve high-quality services 
agreements vs. Strong preference of the status-quo and defensive interests in 
Mode 4 of the domestic regulatory authorities 
• Strong influence of general interests 
 Ultimate goal is concluding an FTA 
 Achieving an FTA which helps and enhances regional supply chains for the 
Japanese manufacturing companies 
 
The idea of ‘manufacturalism’ constituted interests of both policy demand and supply 
sides. 
 
Institutions 
(Supply 
side 
condition) 
• The veto power of domestic regulatory authorities, due to horizontal 
fragmentation of government, hindered the lead ministry. 
 Weak political power of the MOFA and the METI to achieve high-level services 
agreements: No authorisation power, nebulous interests of the private sector 
 Strong political power of the domestic regulatory authorities to achieve policy 
stability (=the status-quo): regulatory power 
 Strong defensive force in Mode 4: Strong client relationship with the 
professional associations (e.g. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Ministry 
of Justice)  
 
 
5.5.1 Interests 
a. Policy demand side interests 
Nebulous offensive interests in services vs. strong defensive interests in some professional 
services 
While there was a strong demand from the manufacturing sector to strengthen the business 
environment in ASEAN to enhance regional supply chains, interest in services trade was nebulous. 
During a series of bilateral FTA negotiations with the ASEAN countries in the 2000s, the structure 
of domestic interest had always been the same. Whereas Japanese manufacturing companies 
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strongly lobbied the Japanese government with their clear offensive interest in enhancing regional 
supply chains in East Asia, interests in services trade were weak and ambiguous. Two powerful 
business federations: the Keidanren and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry Japanese 
requested higher liberalisation in services trade in general. 262  However, the position was not 
supported by substantial strong business interests of member companies and sectoral organisations. 
The secretariats of the Keidanren and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry had to face 
difficulty in finding out the real business interests from their member companies at the time of 
position making. The situation seemed nebulous for the secretariats of the both organisation.263 
While liberalising the ASEAN services markets were secondary offensive interests, some 
professional services (e.g. nurses and care-workers) actively lobbied their regulatory ministry, the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, with strong defensive interests. 
 
Reasons for nebulous interests 
The question is why was the Japanese private sector’s interest in services trade negotiations 
nebulous when Japan negotiated bilateral FTA with ASEAN during the 2000s? In other words, 
why could the Japanese private sector not show strong business interests in detail, while it showed 
interest in high-quality GATS-plus agreements in general? Looking back at the nebulous offensive 
interests in services trade in the 2000s, three reasons can be identified. First, the type of business 
which the Japanese services suppliers engaged in the ASEAN countries was ‘B to B’. The clients 
of these ‘B to B’ were not the local suppliers, but the Japanese manufacturing companies with 
investments in the countries. Because the Japanese services suppliers went to the ASEAN 
countries as a part of the business package offered by a host country, they did not suffer particular 
problems in the host countries. Secondly, underdeveloped services markets in the ASEAN 
countries (except Singapore) were not attractive enough for the Japanese services suppliers to 
penetrate the markets. In addition, the ASEAN economies had also not yet fully recovered from 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis by the early 2000s and their markets were not attractive enough. 
Thirdly, most of the Japanese services companies had to prioritise domestic markets in their 
business strategy. Because of a series of domestic regulatory reforms which had taken place during 
the 1990s initiated by the Japanese government, as well as the WTO sectoral liberalisation in the 
financial and telecommunication sectors, the Japanese services markets were highly exposed to 
competition. Consequently, the major services players, who had been incumbents of the markets, 
were preoccupied with surviving intensified competition in the domestic markets in the 2000s.  
                                                          
262 See Keidanren 2000a, for example. 
263 From the intervieww which took place in Tokyo, in April 2015. 
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On the other hand, one has to be aware that market factors are not enough to give a full 
explanation of the nebulous offensive interests of the Japanese private sector. One should not 
ignore the fact that there were non-economic factors behind this. As a result of a series of 
interviews with the lobbyists of the Japanese private sector, three strong reasons were identified: 
One was the complicated, outdated, and limited structure of the GATS. As for the complicated 
structure of the GATS, many criticised four modes of supply. From the private sector’s perspective, 
the definition of modes did not matter in the real business. The conditions of investment in terms 
of market access and regulatory environment after investment was the core issue for any business, 
whether manufacturing or services. Therefore, it was meaningless for them to separate services-
related investments (Mode 3) from the manufacturing-related investments. Many sectors also 
criticised the GATS for being outdated and meaningless from the business point of view. The most 
significant case is the ICT sector. Since the content of business had been radically changing in the 
ICT industry due to technological advances from the early to late 2000s, the industry started to 
realise the limitation of the GATS, such as the old classification developed in the early 1990s, the 
structure of the commitments, and major disciplines. 264  Since FTAs apply the GATS style 
agreement, the ICT sector was not motivated to use an FTA. Two business confederations also 
pointed out the limitations of the GATS. According to the Keidanren, most of the problems which 
the Japanese companies faced in the ASEAN countries were related to domestic regulations issues 
which were beyond the capacity of the GATS style agreement to cope with. The Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry reported the fact that some SMEs with international competition, which 
had expanded their business in East Asia during the 2000s (e.g. Japanese franchised family 
restaurants; Kumon: after school maths and reading school; and a Japanese wedding ceremony 
company) did not expect anything from the GATS, mostly because of the complicated and 
outdated nature of the GATS. 
The second non-economic factor was forum choice. The Japanese companies distinguished several 
types of private economic diplomacy, in accordance with situations: 
(i) An investor-host country government diplomacy: According to some lobbyists265, there are 
many cases where the ASEAN governments provided exceptional market access to a specific 
company from their industrial policy point of view. Japanese companies were no exception. 
For example, a major Japanese land transport company was doing business in Malaysia under 
an exception of the limited market access to foreign companies. The Japanese banking sector 
also preferred to lobby a host country on its own considering the sensitivity of the host 
countries.  In some cases, the incumbents, the Japanese companies which had already invested 
                                                          
264 From an interview with a lobbyist of the Japanese ICT organisation which took place in April 2015 in Tokyo 
265 Some pointed out the issue, such as Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (interviewed on 20 April 2015), the 
Keidanren (interviewed on 24 April 2015).  
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prior to Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTA negotiations, enjoyed vested interests in preferential 
treatment provided by the host country and kept silent during the domestic decision-making 
process. 
(ii) Sectoral forum-host country diplomacy: The private sector endeavours to maintain 
consistently good relationships with the host countries using the international sectoral forum 
as a means of diplomacy. These forums are mutually beneficial for both sides. The private 
sector can raise policy or regulatory problems they are encountering and alert the host 
countries to any negative economic effects these policies or regulations may cause. Host 
country regulatory authorities can acquire technical information which helps them design 
domestic regulatory systems. 
(iii) Acting as a local supplier: Once a company is localised, it tends to join the domestic sector 
association or business federation. For example, some Japanese financial enterprises became 
core members of the local sector associations in the ASEAN countries and were actively 
involved in their activities. According to them, lobbying activity as a local services supplier 
through the domestic sector association is sometimes a more useful way to solve the problems 
they face, rather than using the GATS-type trade negotiations. 
The third non-economic factor was a business method inherent in Japanese companies. In 
comparison with European or American companies, Japanese companies historically had an 
approach of adapting themselves to the host country’s regulatory systems, institutions and culture 
instead of trying to change them. Even more, Japanese companies sometimes made use of the host 
countries’ complicated regulatory environment to establish advantageous positions against their 
global competitors. A typical case are general trading enterprises (‘Shosha’ in Japanese) operating 
a wide variety of business at a global level both in trade in goods and services.266 They esteem 
domestic values or social systems of host countries, rather than challenging them by using 
multilateral or plurilateral trade negotiations. 
 
  
                                                          
266 For example, Mitsubhishi Corporation develops and operates businesses across virtually every industry including 
industrial finance, energy, metals, machinery, chemicals, living essentials, and environmental business. MC's current 
activities are expanding far beyond its traditional trading operations as its diverse business ranges from natural 
resources development to investment in retail business, infrastructure, financial products and manufacturing of 
industrial goods (from the website of the Mitsubishi Corporation:  http://www.mitsubishicorp.com/jp/en/about/). 
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b. Policy supply side interests 
Policy interests of the MOFA and METI to achieve high-quality services agreements vs. the 
status-quo interests of the domestic regulatory authorities 
In terms of specific interests in services trade negotiations, both the MOFA and METI, which led 
the services trade negotiations on behalf of Japan, had strong policy interests in achieving high-
quality services agreements. Especially after concluding the Japan-Mexico FTA, they were 
motivated to apply the NAFTA type negative list approach to the bilateral FTAs with Malaysia, 
Thailand and The Philippines. However, the policy interests of both ministries were not supported 
by the strong business interests, as explained in the previous section. 
From the inward perspective, the MOFA and METI were pro-reform minded. They expected to 
use the bilateral FTAs with ASEAN to lock-in domestic services reforms including Mode 4, 
medical and educational services. In comparison, the domestic regulatory authorities showed 
strong interests in the status-quo of their policy and regulatory environments. Their interests were 
pursuing regulatory objectives and protecting their own regulatory autonomy. The domestic 
regulatory authorities showed negative positions on Mode 4. Among the domestic regulatory 
authorities, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare strongly refused to accept nurses and care-
workers at the time of negotiating FTAs with Thailand and The Philippines. 
 
Strong influence of general interests 
Once bilateral negotiations took place, the lead ministries were confronted with difficulties in 
drawing concessions from the FTA partners. This was not only because of the ASEAN’s 
antagonism against the high-quality services agreements (i.e. the negative list approach), but also 
because Japan could not make substantial concessions to accept some professional services in the 
interests of ASEAN such as nurses and care-workers. At the final stage of bilateral negotiations, 
the top negotiators of the Japanese government instructed the Japanese services trade negotiators to 
give up pushing the ASEAN countries for two reasons. One reason was that ultimate goal of the 
Japanese government was to materialise an FTA. A speedy conclusion was required because of the 
private sector’s strong FTA catching-up incentives, as well as strong diplomatic incentive for 
leading competitive bilateralism in East Asia. The second reason was that bilateral FTAs with 
ASEAN were primarily for the manufacturing sector. The government had to institutionally 
support regional supply chains established by the Japanese manufacturing companies as expressed 
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as “Mono no FTAs (in Japanese)” which means the FTAs solely serves for trade in goods.267 
Achieving high-quality services agreements was not included in its general motivations. 
 
C. Ideas 
The idea of ‘manufacturalism’ 
The idea of ‘manufacturalism’ influenced the interests of the business lobbyists as well as policy 
makers. The services sector had been the major sector of the Japanese economy for decades. A 
share of GDP of services had reached 60 per cent in 1987 and was showing steady growth. When 
Japan negotiated the bilateral FTAs with ASEAN, a share of GDP reached 70.0 per cent (2003).268 
However, the idea of ‘manufacturalism’ was deeply emended in the Japanese society. The 
‘monodzukuri’ spirit was culturally deemed a Japanese virtue. In addition, the fact that Japan’s 
economic development over half a century had relied heavily on the Japanese manufacturing sector, 
reinforced the idea of ‘manufacturalism’. Both the policy demand and supply sides did believe that 
the ‘monodzukuri’ (manufacturing) was the source of Japan’s vitality and creativity and that the 
dynamic manufacturing sector was a backbone of the Japanese economy. And the policy supply 
side, especially the METI, held the view that it was the government who had to institutionally 
support Japanese manufacture’s global competition. This belief was reflected in the interests of 
business people and policy makers during the domestic-decision making for the bilateral FTA 
negotiations with ASEAN countries. Consequently, services trade was ideologically neglected 
from the early stage of strategy-making to the domestic-decision making. 
 
5.5.2 Institutions (Supply side condition) 
Horizontal fragmentation of government and veto power of the domestic regulatory 
authorities 
Critical was the institution which channelled interests. As described in Chapter 4, services trade 
covers a wide array of sectors and many domestic regulatory ministries/agencies with a regulatory 
power are involved in the negotiations. Due to the horizontal fragmentation of government, the 
domestic regulatory authorities exercised veto power during the decision-making process for the 
bilateral FTA negotiations with the ASEAN countries. As a consequence, they forced the MOFA 
and METI to retreat on their positions which aimed to achieve high quality services trade 
agreements with ASEAN countries. The mechanism of veto power can be summarised as follows. 
                                                          
267 From the interview with a METI official who represented the METI during the time of Japan-ASEAN bilateral 
negotiations (April 2015, in Tokyo). 
268Source: World Bank data, Services, etc., value added (% of GDP), available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TETC.ZS?page=5 
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First of all, the MOFA and METI were institutionally too weak to achieve their aims of achieving 
high-quality GATS-plus FTAs. Although the MOFA was assigned as the lead ministry, it was 
simply a coordinator without any authorisation power in practice. The METI, which devise Japan’s 
economic strategy including services, mainly represents consumers of the services suppliers (i.e. 
manufacturing companies and end-users). Its regulatory power is limited to the distribution sector 
and energy sector. Because of sectoral segmentation and regulatory autonomy, the METI could not 
interfere in the policy areas of other regulatory authorities. In addition to a lack of authorisation 
power, their positions of achieving high-quality GATS-plus agreements became weak because of 
the intangible interests of the Japanese private sector. Secondly, all domestic regulatory authorities 
held strong political power to achieve ‘policy stability’ thanks to their regulatory power. The 
domestic regulatory authorities could easily justify their positions on the ground of legitimate 
objectives for regulations, which is to resolve market failures. Thirdly, in the area of Mode 4, some 
regulatory authorities such as Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare showed strong defensive 
power by exercising strong client relationships with some professional associations (i.e. nurses and 
care-workers). Because horizontal fragmentation of power created a veto power of the domestic 
regulatory authorities, the positions of the MOFA and METI of achieving the high-quality services 
agreements both failed. 
 
5.5.3 External factors 
The case study of Japan examined how interests and institutions in the domestic decision-making 
process shaped Japan’s negotiating positions for the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. From a series 
of interviews with trade negotiators who were involved in the FTAs with the ASEAN countries, 
however, we found that there was one international political factor which affected the result of the 
services trade negotiations. In the case of the FTA negotiations with Malaysia, Thailand and The 
Philippines, regional hegemonic rivalry, which was explained as China versus Japan (Figure 5-1), 
strongly affected the positions of these countries. Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines did not 
accept the liberalism approach (substantial and comprehensive liberalisation) proposed by Japan 
because China approached them taking a gradualism approach which suspended services 
liberalisation. Under great pressure from Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines on one hand, and 
the domestic pressure for the speedy conclusion of an FTA on the other hand, the Japanese 
government had to compromise and accept the second best option of ‘gradualism’ for the sake of 
the ultimate goal of materialising an FTA. We will further discuss the issue in Chapter 7.269  
 
                                                          
269 See 7.3 Analytical constraints and 7.5 Areas for future research in Chapter 7. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter empirically analysed how interests and institutions shaped the Japan’s negotiating 
positions for the bilateral FTAs with ASEAN. We first observed, as a base of arguments, the 
market and policy environments in the 2000s when the Japan-ASEAN FTAs were negotiated and 
concluded. In the markets, regional supply chains in East Asia established by Japanese 
manufacturing companies from 1990s were further developed in the 2000s. To support these 
Japanese manufacturing companies, the major Japanese services suppliers (e.g. financial sector, 
distribution sector and transport sector) conducted ‘B to B’ (business to business) type of business 
in East Asia. The services either targeted local services suppliers or the local consumers were still 
extremely limited at the time. From the policy perspective, regional hegemonic rivalry between 
China versus Japan in creating FTAs with the ASEAN was highlighted. China’s FTA strategy 
toward ASEAN based on gradualism (progressive liberalisation) was completely in conflict with 
the Japan’s FTA strategy toward the ASEAN, based on the liberalism (substantial and 
comprehensive liberalisation).  
Second, we examined how interests and institutions shaped the Japan’s negotiating positions for 
the bilateral FTAs with ASEAN, by applying a demand and supply side model modified from the 
model in Mattli (1999a). On the policy demand side, whereas there were secondary offensive 
interests from the Japanese private sector across the services sectors, strong defensive interests of 
nurses and care-workers were significant. On the policy supply side, the MOFA as lead ministry 
and the METI as a main offensive player, held policy motivations to achieve high level services 
agreements encompassing domestic services reforms. However, horizontal fragmentation of 
government created veto power of the domestic regulatory authorities with a strong preference for 
the status-quo. And the domestic regulatory authorities reduced the negotiating positions of the 
MOFA and METI. While the MOFA was the lead ministry without any authorisation power, the 
domestic regulatory authorities owned regulatory power. The domestic regulatory ministries 
exercised a strong veto power to retain policy stability during the decision-making process. The 
most powerful defendant was the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare which acted to protect 
the Japanese nurses and care-workers. At the bilateral negotiation stage, the MOFA was 
confronted with difficulties in drawing concessions from the ASEAN countries, not only because 
of ASEAN protectionism but also for domestic reasons. One was the Japanese private sector’s 
nebulous interests in liberalising the ASEAN markets. The other was the defensive positions for 
Mode 4 of some domestic regulatory authorities. At the final stage of bilateral negotiations, the 
MOFA had to prioritise a speedy conclusion of an FTA with a focus on goods trade. As a 
consequence, the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs resulted in the shallow GATS-plus FTAs.  
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Chapter 6: A Case Study of JAPAN-ASEAN 
Bilateral FTAs - The ASEAN countries’ 
Perspective 
 
 
  
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the domestic factors which shaped ASEAN’s negotiating 
positions for the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. This chapter covers the countries which concluded 
the bilateral FTAs with Japan in the 2000s: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, 
Indonesia and Viet Nam. The argument follows the same procedure as that of Chapter 5. As a basis 
of argument, we will first overview the market and policy environments of these countries in the 
2000s. Second, we will move to the policy demand and supply side analysis of the Japan-ASEAN 
bilateral FTAs from the ASEAN’s perspective. As in Chapter 5, we will apply the analytical 
framework which modified the model in Mattli (1999a). We will identify general incentives 
behind creating the FTA as well as specific interests in services trade agreements. Then we will 
analyse institutions (supply side condition) to see how interests are shaped through inter-
governmental coordination. The analysis of interests and institutions are mainly supported by a 
series of interviews with the ASEAN government officials, private sector lobbyists and researchers, 
including the trade policy experts of the WTO secretariat. Lastly, we will summarise our findings. 
 
6.2 An overview of market and policy environments of ASEAN countries in the 
2000s  
ASEAN as a region of diversity 
We observed in Chapter 3 (3.3) that East Asia is a region of diversified economies. Now we focus 
on the characteristics of ASEAN before providing an overview of market and policy environments 
of the Region in the 2000s. ASEAN can be identified as a region of diversity since history, the size 
of population, the development level, the type of governing and economy, religions and 
geographic features of these countries are all different. Singapore is the only high–income country 
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(GNI per capita US$55,150)270. The country can be expressed as a city-state which has to rely on 
importing food and energy for domestic consumption. The government is very efficient and the 
economy is highly competitive with an open market. Malaysia is following Singapore. It is 
currently in a transition period from an upper-middle-income (GNI per capita US$10,660) to a 
high income country. The multiracial population of 25.08 million271  is comprised of Malays, 
Chinese, Indian and other ethnic groups. The government has a grip on the economic activities that 
leads to a lack of private dynamisms. Thailand is an upper-middle-income country (GNI per capita 
US$5,410) with a population of 67.22 million, most of whom are Buddhist. The country went 
through volatile politics over the last decade with slow policy development. Indonesia is lower-
middle-income (GNI per capita US$3,650) with a huge and growing population of 252.8 million, 
most of whom are Muslim. The country possesses immense natural resources. Governance of the 
country is not straightforward due to 34 provinces retaining strong administrative power and the 
unique geography of several hundreds of islands. The Philippines is also a lower-middle-income 
country (GNI per capita US$3,440) with a relatively large population of 100.1 million, most of 
whom are Catholic. Whereas highly educated human resources with the high English proficiency 
are an advantage, the wealth is concentrated among some of the richest people and economic 
growth is not equally distributed to the bottom. 272  The central government has limited 
administrative capacity like Indonesia. Viet Nam is a lower-middle-income country (GNI per 
capita US$1,890) with 90.73 million population. It is a socialist country that has been shifting from 
a centrally planned economy to a market economy guided by Doi Moi in late 1980s. Although the 
country is a late comer to the world economy, which acceded the WTO in 2007, it is recognised as 
one of the fastest growing countries in East Asia.  
 
6.2.1 Market environments 
Economic modernisation accompanied by steady economic growth 
The strong economic feature of the region in the 2000s was economic modernisation which was 
accompanied by steady economic growth. Although the countries were in different economic and 
political conditions, all had recovered from the 1997-98 Asia financial crises by the early 2000s 
and similarly showed steady economic growth during the 2000s except 2009 due to the 2007-08 
global financial crisis (see Figure 6-1). We can observe economic structural shifts in each country 
                                                          
270 According to the World Bank classification which is revised every year based on a GNI per capita, countries are 
classified into high-income country, upper middle-income country, middle-income country, lower-middle-income 
countries, and low-income countries. As of 1 July 2014, low-income economies are $1,045 or less in 2013; middle-
income economies are more than $1,045 but less than $12,746; high-income economies are $12,746 or more. Lower-
middle-income and upper-middle-income economies are separated at a GNI per capita of $4,125. 
271 The source of data of population is World Development Indicator, The World Bank.   
272 According to Forbes Asia, the 40 richest absorbed 76% of absolute rise in GDP in 2011. 
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by looking at the sectoral composition of GDP273 and employment by sector274 as described below.  
Services were becoming a major player of the economies of each country in the 2000s, although 
the size differed reflecting the level of development and the type of economy. 
 Singapore: Up to the point when the economy of Singapore was seriously stressed by the 
2007-08 global financial crisis, it recorded high economic growth with between 8-10 per 
cents. Singapore has been a services sector oriented economy, the share of which was already 
65% of GDP in 2003. Services generated more than 70% of employment in the 2000s  
 Malaysia: Although economic growth slowed down in the beginning of the 2000s, its 
economy still maintained high growth of 5-6 per cents, up to the 2007-08 global financial 
crisis. The country started as an oil and gas producing country. Then its economy transformed 
to export-oriented manufacturing. Transformation started from unskilled and labour intensive 
manufacturing and reached the technology-intensive goods which composed the upper end of 
the value-chain in the middle 2000s. Because of the limited population, the Malaysian 
economy still relied on export oriented manufacturing and inward FDI in the manufacturing 
sector up to the middle of the 2000s. At the same time, the economy started to shift to 
services. The output of the services sector accounted for nearly half (43% in 2000) of GDP 
and more than 50% of employment was created in the services sector in the 2000s.   
 Thailand: The economy of Thailand was seriously hit by the 2007-08 global financial crisis. 
Otherwise, it maintained around 4-5 per cents economic growth during the 2000s. The share 
of the services sector in GDP (49% in 2000) slowly declined while the share of the 
manufacturing sector slowly increased during the 2000s. The share of services in total 
employment had been increasing from the 1990s and reached around 38% in the middle of 
the 2000s. 
 The Philippines: Since the economy resumed after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, GDP 
growth stayed between 4 and 8 per cents in the 2000s. The services sector became the major 
driver of economic growth, as well as the highest growing sector of the Philippine’s economy. 
Most of the growth in the early 2000s was attributed to overseas remittances which was a 
traditional source of The Philippines’ growth. Output of the services sector accounted for 
52% of GDP in 2000. Almost a half of total employment was created in the services sector 
                                                          
273 The source of data is World Development Indicator, The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/topic/economy-and-
growth 
274 The source of data are ILO and ADB (2014). ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and 
shared prosperity, p32, http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/42818/asean-community-2015-managing-
integration.pdf 
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whereas that of the manufacturing sector accounted for only 10%. The Philippines suffered a 
high unemployment rate of 11% to 12% in the early 2000s. 
 Indonesia: Strong domestic demand with economies of scale helped Indonesia recover from 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Since then Indonesia has showed stable economic growth 
between 4 and 6 per cents during the 2000s driven by steady domestic consumption and 
global demand for commodities. Although the economy was growing, the pace of long-term 
growth was slower than that of Malaysia, which used to be at the same development level in 
the 1960s. The reason was that Indonesia failed to become a part of global or regional supply 
chains unlike other ASEAN countries.275 Whereas employment in the services sector was 
increasing from the 1990s (31% in 1992) to 2000s (36% in 2003), the structural shifts were 
not observed in terms of sectoral composition of GDP. Manufacturing stayed as a major 
sector (46%) followed by services (40%). The economy suffered from high unemployment 
rate of over 9% from the beginning of the 2000s. Personal and regional income disparities 
were also widening instead of shrinking. 
 Viet Nam: Viet Nam maintained consistently high economic growth between 6 and 8 per 
cents driven by the growing export-oriented sector and strong domestic investment in the 
2000s. Its economy was not so much affected by the 2007-08 global financial crisis. 
Structural changes slowly took place with a shrinking agriculture sector combined with 
growing manufacturing and services sectors. Its manufacturing exports were still dominated 
by foreign firms in the 2000s, and value creation by local firms and workers was limited.276 In 
the 2000s, the services sector, the labour productivity of which was higher than other sectors, 
became one of the major sectors of the economy (39% in 2000) together with the 
manufacturing sector (37% in 2000). A major source of employment was the agricultural 
sector which accounted for 60% (2003) while employment in the services sector accounted 
for only 23% (2003). 
 
                                                          
275 See Ohno (2015). 
276 See Ohno (2009). 
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Figure 6-1: GDP Growth (2000-2014)
 
Source: World Development Indicators: GDP Growth,   
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/1W?display=graph 
 
State owned enterprises (SOEs) and local SMEs as major providers of services 
In ASEAN countries, SOEs and local SMEs were major players in the services sector in the 2000s. 
In terms of output, SOEs dominated the major services sectors, although the level of involvement 
varied among countries depending on the process and speed of privatisation. SOEs of Indonesia 
and Thailand dominated key services such as the financial, telecoms, transportation, infrastructure, 
broadcasting, water and other services. Viet Nam’s economy was characterised as state capitalism 
where SOEs dominated a wide range of sectors. In the case of Malaysia, government linked 
corporations (GLCs) exercised market power in the major services sectors such as 
telecommunications, banking, energy, transportation, infrastructure and real estate development. 
In terms of the number of services suppliers, local SMEs made up the majority in many ASEAN 
countries. Although no data on the share of establishment of SMEs in the services sector in each 
ASEAN country is available, a study277 shows that about 86.5% (2003) of total SMEs in the 
ASEAN countries belonged to the services sector. Since the share of SMEs of total business 
establishments accounted for 99.4% (Singapore in 2012), 97.3% (Malaysia in 2011), 99.8% 
(Thailand in 2012), 99.6% (The Philippines in 2011), and 99.9% (Indonesia in 2011),278 we can see 
the significant presence of SMEs which belong to the services sector. Except for the key 
infrastructure-related services sector such as banking, telecom, energy and transportation, where 
SOEs and GLCs dominate the markets, most of the services sector were SMEs dominant in the 
number of establishments.  
                                                          
277 Tulas Tambuman (2009). Development of Small and Medium Enterprises in ASEAN countries, Readworthy. 
278 ERIA (2014). ASEAN SME Policy Index 2014 –Towards Competitive and Innovative ASEAN SMEs, June 2014, 
from http://www.eria.org/publications/research_project_reports/FY2012-no.8.html 
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Limited role of services trade in the economy  
The role of services trade in the economy was still limited in the 2000s, with the exception of 
Singapore. Economic development in most of ASEAN countries was mainly driven by goods 
exports from the 1980s. For example, a major industry of Thailand was electronics which 
accounted for more than three quarters of total merchandise exports. Likewise, in The Philippines 
exports were heavily concentrated in electronics, among which more than two-thirds were 
Box 6-1: SOEs and SMEs in ASEAN - the linkage with development policy 
 
SOEs and development policy: A study done by OECD (2015) found that there is a strong 
linkage between development policy and the presence of SOEs in the services economy. 
ASEAN countries have been using state-owned assets as a means of development. 
Singapore was a pioneer which successfully used government-linked corporations (GLCs) 
though a government investment company, which was called Tamasek, for its economic 
development since 1960. The other ASEAN countries copied Singapore’s SOE strategy, 
first Malaysia and The Philippines followed by Indonesia and Viet Nam. In Malaysia, the 
situation became more complicated than Singapore as GLCs closely related to Bumiputra 
policy which gave preference to the ethnic Malays. The reforms of Kazanah, which was the 
government’s investment holding arm, took place from 2004. Nevertheless, Kazanah 
remains highly political, taking an interventionist approach to GLCs. OECD (2015) points 
out that SOEs in ASEAN countries have been a source of economic inefficiency and low 
productivity with widespread corruption. 
SMEs and development policy: SME development is the third pillar of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint. At the national level, SME policy has been one of 
the pillars of development policy. However, many ASEAN countries had been facing 
difficulties in modernising and developing SMEs, including those in the services sector. 
According to Ohno (2009), an extreme case is Indonesia. The Indonesian government has 
been shielding local SMEs from competition under its FDI policy. Consequently SMEs 
were protected from global competition and stayed small and inefficient. In the 
manufacturing sector, SMEs are not involved in global supply chains, unlike SMEs in 
Thailand and Viet Nam. SME support is organised by a state-level ministries including the 
Ministry of Industry of Indonesia, however, decentralisation diminished the power to 
implement SME-related policies at the state level.  
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electronic equipment. Unlike Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines and Viet Nam, Indonesia 
depended on exports of natural resources.279  
On the other hand, the share of world exports of commercial services between 2000 and 2013 
(Figure 6-2) 280  demonstrates that export competitiveness in services trade in many ASEAN 
countries modestly increased. For example, The Philippines became a net exporter of services in 
2006. Thanks to its comparative advantages of English language and human resources, call centres 
started to grow in the late 1990s. Then the business process outsourcing (BPO) industry attracted 
foreign services suppliers and grew as a major export industry in the 2000s. Full-time employment 
increased by 340 per cent from 2000 to 2009 (100,000 workers in 2000 to 443,000 workers in 
2009) and BPO revenues increased by almost 400 per cent from 2004 to 2009 (US$1.5 billion in 
2004, US$7.2 billion in 2009) in the BPO industry.281 Thailand also started to experience a trade 
surplus in services in the 2000s, although the share of world exports of commercial services 
dropped in the middle of the 2000s. The major services exports of Thailand were passenger 
transportation and travel services, which accounted for more than a half of revenue (about 65% 
between 2002 and 2006)282. 
 
Figure 6-2: Share of World Exports of Commercial Services: 2000, 2005 and 2013 (%) 
 
Source: WTO trade statistics 
 
                                                          
279 WTO (2008a), WTO (2009a), WTO (2011e), WTO (2012a) and WTO (2013b). 
280 The services trade data can show only cross-border trade (Mode 1 under the GATS) as recorded in national balance of 
payments statistics. Mode 2 (consumption abroad), Mode 3 (investment) and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons) are 
not included. 
281 Yi (2012). 
282 See WTO (2007g). 
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The role of FDI in the services sector gradually increased in the 2000s, however, the IPN related 
investment in the manufacturing sector was playing a central role in most of the ASEAN 
countries. In Malaysia, FDI in the manufacturing sector, which used to occupy two-third of total 
FDI in the middle of 1990s, declined to around 38% in the beginning of the 2000s. FDI in the 
services sector increased from the beginning of the 2000s and diversified from the financial and 
business sectors to wholesale and retail; hotels; transport and communications; and high value-
added services (e.g. regional headquarters and R&D).283 In Thailand, inward FDI increased with 
an average growth rate of 21 per cents between 2002 and 2006. Manufacturing remained the 
largest recipient of FDI, followed by services (e.g. retail and wholesale trading, non-bank 
financial institutions, and real estate activities).284 Viet Nam became an attractive destination for 
foreign investors after the WTO accession in 2007 and experienced an upsurge in FDI inflows.285 
Nevertheless, most foreign investors were in the manufacturing sector. Unlike Malaysia, Thailand 
and Viet Nam, Indonesia was not considered as a manufacturing base for regional or global value 
chains. The country was one of the popular destinations of FDI thanks to abundant natural 
resources and economies of scale.  
The major green field investors in ASEAN have been the EU, Japan and the US. Among these, 
Japan was a notably important investor for Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Viet Nam. For 
instance, the major investors of Thailand were: Japan (30%), ASEAN member countries (27%), 
the EU (14%) and the US (8%) in the middle of 2000s. Whereas the presence of Japan in the 
manufacturing sector was high, investment in the services sector was dominated by the US and 
EU.286  
 
6.2.2 Policy environments 
A. Domestic policy 
Impacts of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis on services trade and investment policy regimes 
In the 2000s, trade and investment regimes of the services sector in ASEAN were closed to global 
competition in comparison with the relatively open regimes in the manufacturing sector. There 
were two reasons for this. One was the impact of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. The 
manufacturing sector had been a strong driving force of economic modernisation in East Asia. 
After going through the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN countries reconfirmed that integrating their 
economies into regional/global supply chains in the manufacturing sector was the first policy 
                                                          
283 WTO (2006a). 
284 WTO (2007g) and WTO (2011e). 
285 JETRO (2014). 
286 JETRO (2014). 
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priority in order to create a solid foundation for economic modernisation. In this regard, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Viet Nam particularly focused on attracting FDI in the assembly-type 
manufacturing sector (e.g. automobiles, electronics, motorcycles and industrial machinery).287 The 
other reason was scepticism of the Washington Consensus among the ASEAN policy makers after 
the Asian financial crisis. Especially from a development policy perspective, policy makers shared 
the view that it is not trade liberalisation but other policies, such as human development, that play 
the most important role in strengthening the domestic services sector.288 
 
Development/industrial policy for economic modernisation – a dearth of policy makers’ 
interest in services 
Economic modernisation and sustainable growth was the key policy goal for ASEAN countries 
although the level of development differed among them. During the 2000s, development and 
industrial policy of most of the ASEAN countries spotlighted the technology transfer through FDI. 
The services sector was not strategically incorporated in development and industrial policy except 
in Singapore and Malaysia. This was owing to classic concepts of industrial policy which 
neglected the emergent role of the services sector in the world economy.289 In many ASEAN 
countries, industrial upgrading had been discussed in the narrow domain of the manufacturing 
sector with little attention to the services sector. According to Ohno (2009), Malaysia, Thailand 
and Viet Nam were in the catching-up industrialisation process in the manufacturing sector in the 
2000s (see Figure 6-3). Viet Nam, which was a late-comer to the global economy, was situated at 
stage one, assembling imported key parts and materials and exporting to regional/global markets. 
The country attracted manufacturing FDI because of abundant unskilled cheap labour. Value-
added parts were still all dominated by foreign companies. Malaysia and Thailand had already 
successfully shifted to stage two where local supporting industries began to increase thanks to 
technology transfer by foreign investors. Indonesia and The Philippines were distinguished from 
Thailand and Malaysia due to low performance in industrial modernisation. They were still 
struggling to climb up the technical ladder from stage one to stage two although they were ahead 
of Viet Nam. The critical point is that there is a glass ceiling, what is called the ‘middle income 
                                                          
287 Singapore is the exception as it became a high income country through high-value services. 
288 From a series of interviews with the ASEAN government officials. Many expressed the opinion that service trade 
liberalisation was just a part of industrial and development policy. 
289 In the 2000s, a role of services sector was underestimated or poorly discussed among economists in East Asia. For 
example, Ohno (2009, p41) pointed out that Low-income countries may receive FDI in mining, telecoms, power, tourism, 
or property development. While such projects based on locational advantages are lucrative for investors and can 
generate jobs for the poor and provide basic infrastructure for the nation, these alone cannot put the country on a 
dynamic path of structural transformation as manufacturing does.  
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trap’290, between stage two and stage three. It is observed that if a country fails to upgrade its 
human capital, it cannot climb up to stage three where high quality goods can be produced locally 
with accumulated skills and technology. 
From the industrial policy perspective, the ‘middle income trap’ constituted great threats for the 
ASEAN policy makers in the 2000s. For instance, Viet Nam’s main interest was attracting more 
FDI to accumulate production experience for technology transfer and localisation. The situation 
was more serious for Malaysia and Thailand as there was a glass ceiling to the step-up from stage 
two to stage three. Consequently, upgrading human capital became the main policy from the 
development and industrial perspective. 
 
Figure 6-3: East Asia - Stages of Catching-up Industrialisation in the Area of Manufacturing 
in the 2000s 
 
Source: Ohno (2009), p28 
 
 
What does this catching-up industrialisation process of ASEAN countries in the 2000s imply in 
relation to the services sector? Interestingly, ‘manufacturing-related services’ and BPO (e.g. 
                                                          
290 According to Ohno (2015), ‘middle income trap’ is defined as a situation where an economy is unable to create new 
value beyond what is delivered by given advantages including natural, demographic, and geographic factors as well as 
external factors (e.g. trade, aid and foreign investment). 
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R&D, product design, distribution and marketing) become more important from stage three, as 
can be seen from Figure 6-3, although the classic industrial policy did not pay attention to the role 
of services. Up to stage two, what Government can consider relating to services is to improve the 
quality of infrastructure-related services (e.g. financial sector, telecom and transportation) in 
order to attract more manufacturing FDI. After reaching stage two, Government would consider 
that human capital is the key to further catching-up to stage three which includes ‘manufacturing-
related services’ and BPO. According to the classic concept of industrial policy, policy makers 
hardly noticed the role of services, and consequently did not strategically incorporate the services 
sector into their industrial policy. 
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291 
Box 6-2: Industrial policy and trade & investment policy in the 2000s – Malaysia and 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Industrial policy: Malaysia implemented its Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) 1996-2005 
focused on the concept of ‘manufacturing plus plus’ to climb up the value-added in 
manufacturing. The latter half of the 2000s, the Malaysian government shifted the focus from 
low value-added to high value-added industry and ‘knowledge-based industry and services’ to 
generate stable economic growth and compete with neighbouring countries in Asia. 
Accordingly, the government promoted domestic and foreign investments in selected areas: 
high-technology manufacturing, ICT, biotechnology, education, and tourism. For the purpose, 
the government emphasised the importance of education and human capital. 
Trade and investment policy: Malaysia overcame the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis by prudent 
macroeconomic and structural reforms in the key sectors including the financial sector. 
Although Malaysia did not turn its position to protectionism in terms of trade and investment 
policy, it became more policy selective for development purposes. Trade and investment 
regimes for the manufacturing sector were relatively open, except for the automotive industry 
which was heavily regulated and gave preference tor Malaysian domestic industries. The 
Malaysian government promoted FDI incentives such as pioneer status and investment tax 
allowances to foreign companies to establish a position as a “gateway to the ASEAN market” in 
the manufacturing sector. 
Services trade and investment was also identified by Government as one of the key drivers of 
economic growth, namely, tourism, health education, Islamic finance and information and 
communication technology (ICT)-related and manufacturing-related services. However, a 
cautious approach was taken for services liberalisation in comparison with agriculture and 
manufacturing. Namely, restrictions on FDI (e.g. foreign capital participation to investment in 
banking services, health services, and energy and water supply) persisted during the 2000s. 
 
Indonesia 
Industrial policy: The Government undertook major restructuring and reform after the Asian 
financial crisis 1997-98. After Indonesia recuperated from the crisis, the country was suffering 
from high employment rates and rigid economic structure which depended on exporting natural 
resources. The Indonesian government was seeking a way to make a leading industry, ‘national 
champions’, in the value-added manufacturing sector which could be a part of global supply 
chains. But the industrial policy lacked consistency and effectiveness. 
Trade and investment policy: Likewise, its trade and investment policy in the 2000s was 
incoherent; the pendulum was going back and forth between liberalisation and protection. In the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, FDI liberalisation was once accelerated including a 
revision of the Investment List covering specific sectors (a negative list of foreign capital 
participation) in 2000. From the middle of 2000s, however, the policy trend became elusive. A 
new Investment Law was enacted in March 2007 together with revision of the Investment List. 
The principle of the new Investment Law was to promote foreign investment to boost the 
economy. However, the contents were based on the economic nationalist approach. For 
instance, new restrictions were introduced in the sectors where the investments of Japanese 
companies already existed (e.g. transport, retail, consulting, intermediate services, interpretation 
business). The new restrictions forced investors to adopt the new legal requirement in detail, 
such as a new cap on foreign participation, stricter ownership limitation, requirement on JV with 
the local SMEs, and certain divestment requirements. Interestingly, Indonesia introduced new 
restrictions in the services sectors necessary to support the Japanese manufacturing companies, 
such as distribution, logistics, commission agency, retail. The Indonesian government’s aim was 
to compel Japanese manufacturing investors to use the local services suppliers. 
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B. Plurilateral policy 
ASEAN as a hub for creating FTAs in East Asia 
The period of the 2000s can be characterised as an era where ASEAN became a hub for creating 
FTAs in the Region (see Table 6-1).292 For ASEAN countries, accelerating ASEAN economic 
integration and enhancing economic relations with their neighbouring countries in Asia was vital 
for economic recovery from the Asian financial crisis293 and for establishing their position in the 
regional/global supply chains in the manufacturing sector. The ASEAN first involved Japan 
followed by China, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, taking the form of bilateral 
agreements which were often expressed as ‘ASEAN+ 1’. With regard to relations with Japan, most 
of the ASEAN countries concluded a bilateral FTA before ‘ASEAN+ Japan’ was concluded. This 
was because each ASEAN country wished to strengthen a particular economic tie with Japan to 
compete with other ASEAN rivals. Among the ASEAN countries, Singapore and Thailand had 
also been active in making bilateral FTAs with other ‘ASEAN+ 6’ partners (Australia, China, 
India, New Zealand, and South Korea).  
For ASEAN countries, the decision to create FTAs with China embraced a special survival 
strategy.  From the early 2000s, the emergence of China in the global market became a source of 
threats as well as opportunities for ASEAN countries. In addition to economic modernisation, 
ASEAN countries had to design industrial policies that took into account compatibility with China. 
Many created a production partnership with China to remain a part of the regional or global supply 
chains in order to avoid direct competition. For instance, the Malaysian government promoted 
relocating labour-intensive manufacturing to China recognising that the country was no longer 
cost-competitive as a labour-intensive manufacturing site. 294  ASEAN countries also had to 
consider the areas of exports to China to make use of its economies of scale. In terms of coverage 
and quality, ‘ASEAN+ 1’ type FTAs highlighted trade in goods and sometimes left trade in 
services aside as a future agenda. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
292See Kawai and Wignaraja (2009a), for example. 
293 See Oike (2007), p13. 
294 See WTO (2006a) and WTO (2006b). 
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Table 6-1: ASEAN countries’ FTAs in Asia  
*The year: the agreement entered into force 
 Singapore Malaysia Thailand The Philippines Indonesia Viet Nam 
 
Before 
and 
during 
the 
2000s 
AFTA: 1992 signed 
AFAS:1995 signed 
 
NZ-Singapore: 2001 
 
Japan-Singapore: 2002 
 
Australia-Singapore: 2003 
 
India-Singapore: 2005 
 
South Korea-Singapore: 2006 
 
China-ASEAN: goods 2005 in 
effect, services 2007 in effect 
 
Japan-ASEAN: 2008 
 
South Korea-ASEAN: goods in 
effect 2008, services in effect 
2009 
 
China-Singapore: 2009 
 
AFTA: 1992 signed 
AFAS:1995 signed 
 
China-ASEAN: goods 
2005 in effect, services 
2007 in effect 
 
 
Japan-Malaysia: 2006 
 
Japan-ASEAN :2008 
 
South Korea-ASEAN: 
goods in effect 2008, 
services in effect 2009 
 
 
 
 
AFTA: 1992 signed 
AFAS:1995 signed 
 
Thailand-Lao PDR: 1991 
 
China-Thailand: 2003 
 
China-ASEAN: goods 2005 in 
effect, services 2007 in effect 
Australia-Thailand:2005 
 
NZ-Thailand:2005 
 
Japan-Thailand:2007  
 
 
Japan-ASEAN :2008 
 
South Korea-ASEAN: goods in 
effect 2008, services in effect 
2009 
 
 
 
 
AFTA: 1992 signed 
AFAS:1995 signed 
 
China-ASEAN: goods 2005 
in effect, services 2007 in 
effect 
 
Japan-Philippine: in effect 
2008 
 
Japan-ASEAN: 2008 
 
South Korea-ASEAN: goods 
in effect 2008, services in 
effect 2009 
 
 
AFTA: 1992 signed 
AFAS:1995 signed 
 
China-ASEAN: goods 2005 in 
effect, services 2007 in effect 
 
Japan-Indonesia: 2008 
 
Japan-ASEAN :2008 
 
South Korea-ASEAN: goods in 
effect 2008, services in effect 
2009 
 
 
AFTA: became member in 
1995 
AFAS:1995 signed 
 
China-ASEAN: goods 2005 in 
effect, services 2007 in effect 
 
Japan-ASEAN FTA:2008 
 
South Korea-ASEAN: goods in 
effect 2008, services in effect 
2009 
 
Japan-Viet Nam: 2009 
 
 
 
 
2010s 
Australia and NZ-ASEAN: 
2010 
 
India –ASEAN: 2010 
 
TPP: FA signed 2010 
  
RCEP: negotiation 2013 
Singapore-Taipei, China: 2014 
Australia and NZ-ASEAN: 
2010 
 
India –ASEAN: 2010 
 
NZ -Malaysia: 2010 
 
India-Malaysia: 2011 
 
TPP: FA signed 2010 
Australia-Malaysia: 2013 
 
RCEP: negotiation 2013- 
 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, 
China: negotiation 
 
Australia and NZ-ASEAN: 
2010 
 
India –ASEAN: 2010 
 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, China: 
negotiation 
 
Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation: 
negotiation 2014- 
  
Thailand-India: negotiation 
2014- 
 
RCEP (Regional 
Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership): negotiation 2013- 
Australia and NZ-ASEAN: 
2010 
 
India –ASEAN: 2010 
 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, China: 
negotiation 
 
RCEP: negotiation 2013- 
 
Australia and NZ-ASEAN: 
2010 
 
India –ASEAN: 2010 
 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, China: 
negotiation 
 
Indonesia-India: negotiation 
2011- 
 
Indonesia-Australia: 
negotiation 2012- 
 
Indonesia-South Korea: 
negotiation 2012- 
Australia and NZ-ASEAN: 
2010 
 
India –ASEAN: 2010 
 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, China: 
negotiation 
 
- 
 
*services and investment of Japan-ASEAN was not included in 2008 (currently under negotiations). 
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Limited services integration under AFAS (ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services)  
Since ASEAN countries established the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, ASEAN has 
applied gradualism to liberalise and integrate the region taking into account diversity in history, 
development, policy, and economics among the member countries. First ASEAN started from 
reducing and eliminating tariffs under the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff Scheme (CEPT). When most Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs were negotiated, from the 
beginning to the middle of the 2000s, the achievements of ASEAN were limited to trade in goods 
and some areas of investment. As for the trade in goods, old ASEAN Members eliminated most 
applied intra-ASEAN tariffs except for sensitive products. Certain progress was made in the area 
of investment after the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) was 
signed in 1998. There were several reasons for this.295 First, each country acknowledged a role of 
investment in developing value chains. Second, the investment authorities which were in charge 
of investment promotion dealt with the negotiations. Third, especially after the Asian financial 
crisis, ASEAN countries had to re-appeal for FDI which was otherwise attracted to China. 
In comparison, the progress on services was very limited since the AFAS (ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services) was signed in 1995. There was always a huge gap between the 
ambitious political targets agreed at the ministerial level and its implementation. From 1996 to 
2007, four rounds of negotiations took place, the results of which produced six packages of 
commitments scheduled under AFAS.296 Even though the ASEAN services liberalisation was 
based on gradualism, in 2007 the ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Blueprint to establish the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which included achieving free flow of services by 
2015. 297  From 2007, the ASEAN members had to comply with the pre-set liberalisation 
parameters under the AEC Blueprint. The 7th package (2009) was signed under this negotiation 
modality. According to Fukunaga and Ishido (2012), the level of commitments under the AFAS 
5th Package (2006) was still not substantially GATS-plus.  And from the 7th Package of 
commitments onwards, the level of commitments became substantially GATS-plus. In the area of 
professional services, six Mutual Recognition Agreements, such as engineering services (2005), 
nursing services (2008), architectural services (2007), surveying qualifications (2007), and 
medical practitioners (2009), entered into force during the 2000s. However, most of them were 
still at the initial stage of implementation during the 2000s.298 
                                                          
295 See Oike (2007). 
296 These are: 1st Package (1997)  and 2nd Package (1998) as a result of 1st Round of negotiations (1996-98); 3rd Package 
(2001) as a result of 2nd Round of negotiations (1999-2001), 4th Package (2004) as a result of 3rd Round (2002-2004); 5th 
Package (2006) and 6th Package (2007) as a result of 4th Round (2005-2007).  
297 ASEAN failed to meet the target of achieving free flow of services by 2015. 
298 The AFAS 8th Package was signed in 2010. The 9th package was still under negotiation at the time of writing (2016) 
despite the fact that the initial target date of completion was 2012. 
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The critical point here is the dynamic relations between the liberalisation process under the 
AFAS and Japan-ASEAN FTAs. Interestingly, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, 
and Indonesia signed bilateral FTAs with Japan before the ASEAN Blue Print was adopted in 
2007. The only exception was Viet Nam. As described in Chapter 5 (Table 5-1), the bilateral 
negotiations between Japan-Malaysia, Japan-Thailand, Japan-The Philippines and Japan-
Indonesia took place between 2004 and 2006. This was the period when ASEAN had the 4th 
Round of negotiations which resulted in the 5th Package and the 6th Package. This indicates that 
the ASEAN countries negotiated bilateral FTAs with Japan before ASEAN itself achieved 
substantial GATS-plus under AFAS (7th Package in 2009). 
 
6.3 Interests   
Now we move to investigate interests and institutions in domestic decision-making which 
affected the negotiating positions of ASEAN for the bilateral FTAs with Japan by applying the 
policy demand and supply side model. We first look at the policy demand side interests followed 
by policy supply side interests. Interests are categorised into two types: general motivations and 
specific interests in services trade. Among ASEAN countries, we spotlight Malaysia and The 
Philippines as examples of explaining specific interests. We selected these two countries for the 
following reasons. First, Malaysia’s economy was the most developed of all ASEAN countries, 
with the exception of Singapore (6.2.1), since the country was successfully catching up 
industrialisation process in manufacturing (Figure 6-3). Although the government identified 
services as key drivers of the economy, the Malaysian government still took a cautious approach 
to services trade liberalisation in comparison with goods trade liberalisation in the 2000s (Box 6-
2). Second, The Philippines was selected as a net exporter of services with a growing 
comparative advantage in BPO industry (6.1). In comparison with Malaysia and Thailand, the 
country made slow progress in caching up industrialisation in the area of manufacturing (Figure 
6-3). The analysis is mainly derived from a series of informal interviews with government 
officials and researchers from ASEAN countries.299 
 
  
                                                          
299 The interviews with the ASEAN governments and the private sector and trade experts took place between 2013 and 
2015 (Appendix 1). 
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6.3.1 Policy demand side interests 
A. General motivations 
As IPE literature argued (e.g. Ravenhill 2010, Sally and Sen 2011), policy supply side incentives 
to join the FTA bandwagon were much stronger than demand side incentives in the case of 
ASEAN. Unlike the Japanese business sector, business confederations in ASEAN did not have the 
capacity to formulate trade policy strategies. They depended heavily on governments to do the job. 
However, a series of informal interviews revealed that once governments decided on a specific 
bilateral FTA partner and launched the process of negotiating position-making, the policy demand 
side expressed either offensive or defensive general interests to the policy supply side.  
  
Boosting goods exports to Japan and enhancing technology transfer through FDI 
As Japan was a high-income country with strong trade and investment linkage with ASEAN, the 
private sector in ASEAN welcomed its government’s initiative to negotiate an FTA with Japan. 
For the ASEAN private sector, the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTA was a chance to reduce or 
eliminate tariffs and boost exports. Once ASEAN countries launched the decision-making process, 
strong interests in exports were expressed on a sectoral basis. In the case of Thailand, the textiles 
and garments, food, and jewellery industries were interested in boosting its exports. In Malaysia, 
the wood products, plastics, garments and palm oil industries were strongly motivated to boost 
exports to Japan. The sectoral organisations were only interested in tariffs and no interest was 
shown in the area of rule-making. 
In addition to expectations for trade, the private sector in Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, 
Indonesia and Viet Nam drew attention to the role of FDI as a means of technology transfer from 
Japanese manufacturers (e.g. auto and auto-parts industries, electrical and electronics industry). 
For example, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) requested the Government to 
promote FDI from Japan in order to facilitate a transfer of science technology from Japan. KADIN 
considered that technology transfer was necessary for enhancing competitiveness of SMEs and 
developing human resources in Indonesia.300 The ASEAN private sector had a clear motivation to 
use the bilateral FTA with Japan to catch up the industrialisation of manufacturing.301 
 
                                                          
300 See “Japan-Indonesia EPA the Joint Study Group Report” (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/indonesia/summit0506/joint-3-2.pdf). 
301 From the interviews with the ASEAN government officials (April 2013 and July 2015) in Appendix 1. Also see 
“Japan-Malaysia EPA the Joint Study Group Report” (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/malaysia/joint0312.pdf) 
and “Japan-Thailand EPA the Task Force Report”   (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/thailand/joint0312.pdf).  
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B. Specific interests in services trade 
With the exception of Singapore, the private sector’s offensive interests in services trade were very 
limited in ASEAN when the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs were negotiated. Below, we explain the 
major actors’ specific interests in services trade negotiations with Japan and their institutional 
characteristics by taking Malaysia and The Philippines as examples.302 
 
Malaysia (Table 6-2)303 
In Malaysia, there is a business confederation called the National Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Malaysia (MCCIM) which was established in 1962. The Federation is composed of 
five members: Malay Chamber of Commerce Malaysia; Malaysian Associated Indian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry; The Associate Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia; 
Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers; and Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry.304 Although MCCIM is a powerful lobbying group, the organisation is not active in 
international trade negotiation matters except for the ASEAN issue. Rather than taking collective 
action as MCCIM, individual members directly lobby their voice to government for international 
trade negotiations, which was the case of the Japan-Malaysian FTA,   
When the services trade policy-making for the Japan-Malaysian FTA took place in the early to 
mid-2000s, the Malaysian private sector was still not aware of services trade negotiations in terms 
of exports.305 For example, the Federation of Malaysia Manufacturers (FMM), which is the most 
powerful lobbying group for the international trade matters in Malaysia representing 2800 
manufacturing companies and industrial service companies, showed strong interests in trade in 
goods negotiations. The Federation was keen to attract FDI and enhance technology transfer from 
Japan to climb up the technology ladder of economic development. On the other hand, it retained a 
defensive position against liberalising the Malaysian automotive sector and steel sector. 306  In 
contrast with its strong interest in trade in goods negotiations, the Federation did not pay attention 
to services trade negotiations. There are three reasons for this. First, the organisation 
predominantly represented the voice of manufacturers, since the Federation consisted mostly of 
manufacturers. The second reason is a lack of awareness. The Japan-Malaysian FTA was the first 
FTA which substantially embodied services trade. When Malaysia negotiated the ASEAN-China 
Framework Agreement prior to the FTA negotiations with Japan, services trade had opted out of 
                                                          
302 See the reasons for selecting Malaysia and The Philippines in the introductory paragraph of 6.3. 
303 From the interviews with the Malaysian government officials between 2013 and 2015 and the interviews with the 
trade experts of the WTO secretariat who is in charge of Malaysia (April 2013 and July 2015). See Appendix 1. 
304 From the website of MCCIM (http://nccim.cmshosted.net/?page_id=20). 
305 From the interview with the Malaysian senior government official (October 2015). 
306 Postigo (2016). 
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future negotiations. Therefore, the Federation had no prior experience of FTA services trade 
negotiations. When Malaysia had started a decision-making process for the FTA with Japan, the 
Federation did not catch onto the idea that facilitating some services, such as distribution, 
transportation and financial services, was important to attract more FDI in the manufacturing 
sector. Thirdly, the Malaysian services suppliers were mostly satisfied with the domestic market 
and did not have export incentives although the services sector was growing in Malaysia in the 
2000s. 
In contrast to a dearth of offensive interests, strong defensive interests were expressed from the 
ethnic chambers of commerce (i.e. Malay Chamber of Commerce Malaysia; Malaysian Associated 
Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and the Associate Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry of Malaysia), sectoral associations, professional associations and GLCs. From the 
policy interest point of view, all of them were against making GATS-plus commitments due to a 
lack of technical knowledge about the GATS in the first place, since the Japan-Malaysian FTA 
was de facto the first FTA which covered services trade.307 
In terms of economic interests, ethnic chambers of commerce, sectoral associations, and 
professional associations articulated defensive positions. The three ethnic chambers of commerce 
showed serious concern that the Japan-Malaysian FTA might negatively change the business 
conditions of specific ethnic groups. They were equally interested in protecting ethnically owned 
SMEs from services liberalisation. In addition, the Malay Chamber of Commerce Malaysia flatly 
refused to make any changes of the investment-related provisions provided in the Bumiputera 
favouring policies (e.g. foreign equity participation and nationality requirement). The organisation 
was afraid that the Japan-Malaysian FTA might open the Pandora’s Box of social and development 
policy which was especially set up for the Bumiputera. The organisation was also keen to protect 
GLCs, since GLCs in Malaysia had a strong linkage with Bumiputera favouring policies. 
Sectoral associations were afraid of erosion of rents and adjustment costs. They showed a strong 
interest in retaining investment related restrictions (e.g. foreign equity participation and nationality 
requirements). Professional associations were against liberalising professional services to protect 
the Malaysian professionals in the local professional markets while they showed no export interest. 
At the individual company level, GLCs tried to avoid erosion of rents and adjustment costs. While 
they were keen to protect their domestic market, they did not have any export interest to Japan. 
In summary, the Malaysian private sector was not interested in exporting services to Japan both in 
terms of sectors and modes of supply. On the other hand, it showed strong defensive interests. In 
terms of policy interests, the private sector became extremely cautious about making GATS-plus 
                                                          
307 From the interview with the Malaysian senior government official (October 2015). 
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commitments since the Japan-Malaysian FTA was the first FTA which encompassed services trade 
for Malaysia and it had no expertise in FTA services trade in negotiations. In terms of economic 
interests, defensive interests reflected strong fear of erosion of rents and adjustment costs which 
might be caused by increasing services imports and services related investment by the Japanese 
services suppliers. In this context, protecting the Bumiputera favouring policies from the FTA with 
Japan became a major incentive for defensive forces. 
 
Table 6-2: Policy demand side: Malaysia – Specific Interests in services trade negotiations of 
major players and its institutional characteristics 
 
Actors Interests Institutional characteristics 
Business 
confederation: 
National Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Industry of Malaysia 
(NCCIM) 
 
Economic interests: 
 No specific interests in services 
trade  
 
 
Powerful lobbying group but not active 
in terms of international trade 
negotiations, except ASEAN matters 
 
Business 
Confederation: 
Federation of 
Malaysian 
Manufacturers (FMM) 
Economic interests: 
 No specific interests in services 
trade  
 
 
 
Most powerful lobbying group in terms 
of international trade negotiations 
 
Members are only from the 
manufacturing sectors 
 
Very limited or no expertise in services 
trade negotiations 
Business 
Confederation: Ethnic 
chambers of 
commerce (Malay, 
Chinese and Indian)  
 
 Malay Chamber of 
Commerce 
Malaysia 
 
 The Associate 
Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce and 
Industry of 
Malaysia 
 
 Malaysian 
Associated Indian 
Chambers of 
Commerce and 
Industry 
Economic interests: 
 Protect economic activities of a 
specific ethnic group (Malay, 
Indian or Chinese) 
 Protect GLCs (e.g. Bumiputera 
favouring policies) from services 
liberalisation 
 Protect ethnically owned SMEs 
 No export interests 
 
Policy interests: 
 Against GATS-plus  commitments  
 
 
The powerful lobbying organisations 
representing ethnic groups 
 
Many member companies belong to the 
services sector 
 
Very limited or no expertise in services 
trade negotiations 
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Sectoral associations 
Economic interests:  
 Retain investment related 
restrictions (e.g. foreign equity 
participation, nationality 
requirement) 
 Avoid erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs 
 No export interests  
 
Policy interests: 
 Against GATS-plus commitments  
 
 
Strong client relations with a regulatory 
authority 
 
Very limited or no expertise in services 
trade negotiations 
 
 
Professional 
Associations 
Economic interests: 
 Avoid erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs caused by 
liberalising a professional service 
(including MRAs) 
 No export interests  
  
Policy interests: 
 Against GATS-plus commitments 
 
Strong client relations with a regulatory 
authority 
 
Very limited or no expertise in services 
trade negotiations 
 
 
Government linked 
companies (GLCs) 
Basic institutional interests: 
 Against GATS-plus commitments 
 
Economic Interests:  
 Retain investment related 
restrictions (e.g. foreign equity 
participation, nationality 
requirement) 
 Avoid erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs 
 No export interests 
 
Retain strong political power 
 
Strong client relations with a regulatory 
authority (Khazanah Nasional and 
Employees Provident Fund) 
 
Very limited expertise in services trade 
negotiations  
 
 
 
The Philippines (Table 6-3)308 
Like the case of Malaysia, the Japan-The Philippines FTA was the first FTA which substantially 
covered services trade agreements for The Philippines. Thus, the private sector was not initially 
fully aware of the services trade segment of the agreement. Since the Philippine private sector had 
little idea on how FTA services trade agreement would make an impact on them, a high degree of 
scepticism arose. However, a significant difference from the Malaysian private sector was a strong 
interest in Mode 4 and growing BPO industry at home. Therefore, the negotiating positions of the 
Philippines private sector were not as defensive as those of Malaysia. 
There are two main business confederations in The Philippines: the Federation of Philippines 
Industries and the Philippines Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Federation of Philippines 
Industries, which was the most established lobbying actor in general, consists of both the 
                                                          
308 From the interviews with the Philippine government officials and lobbyists between 2013 and 2015 and the interviews 
with the trade experts of the WTO secretariat in April 2013. See Appendix 1. 
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manufacturing and services sector. However, its strong interests lay in boosting goods exports to 
Japan and promoting technology transfer through FDI from Japan. Since the organisation was not 
well aware of services trade negotiations with Japan, it was not in favour of making GATS-plus 
commitments. Nevertheless, it was not completely against it. In comparison, The Philippines 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which was the powerful lobbying group representing SMEs, 
were more defensive. Its primary concern was erosion of rents and adjustment costs which might 
be consequently brought by the Japanese companies’ market penetration, especially in Mode 3. To 
shield SMEs from competition, the organisation showed defensive positions against making 
GATS-plus commitments. 
The sectoral associations also retained negative interests against accelerating plurilateral sectoral 
liberalisation from the inward perspective. The logic was the same as the case for Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. They were afraid that the Japanese companies’ market penetration might 
cause erosion of rents and adjustment costs to a specific services sector. From the outward 
perspective, there was a lack of export interest among the sectoral associations. Although the 
Philippines BPO industry was fast growing in the 2000s, their interest in the Japan-The Philippines 
FTA was intangible. There were two reasons for this. The first reason is that growth of the BPO 
industry was mainly market driven with some policy support (e.g. tax incentives and unilateral 
liberalisation of the IT sectors). Therefore, there was no particular need for an FTA as a policy 
device. The second reason is a lack of proactive players which could represent the BPO industry. 
The Business Processing Association of The Philippines (BPAP) was established in 2004. Yet the 
organisation has not grown as a lobbying actor from the early to middle of the 2000s when the 
domestic decision-making for the bilateral FTA with Japan took place. 
The Philippines business sector’s interests in the FTA with Japan was limited to some professional 
services. However, the situation was more complicated. Whereas some professional services 
associations and The Philippines Association of Service Exporters had strong interests to improve 
market access of the Philippine professionals to Japan such as nurses and care workers, they were 
totally defensive in terms of accepting Japanese professionals into their domestic market. There are 
two reason for this. The first reason is that the Philippine professionals were protected from the 
foreign services professionals under the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of The Philippines.309 
The second reason is public opinion. The professional organisations asserted that the Filipino 
citizens need services provided by Filipinos, not by foreigners.310 
                                                          
309 Under the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of The Philippines – Article XII, Section 14, it is provided that [t]he 
practice of all professions in The Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens.  
310 The Philippines socio economic sensitivity about professional services was expressed from a series of interviews 
including the Philippine trade policy makers and individual lobbyists of the private sector. There was a culture in The 
Philippines that parents strongly wish their children to become a professional such as medical doctor or lawyer. The 
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In short, the Philippine private sector’s interests were limited to Mode 4 for some professional 
services. By contrast, there was a strongly articulated defensive interest to protect the local SMEs 
from the Japanese investment (Mode 3) and the Philippine professionals from penetration by 
foreign professionals (Mode 4). From the inward perspective, a lack of understanding on FTA 
services trade liberalisation caused scepticism and aroused defensive interests since it was the first 
FTA which encompassed services trade for The Philippines. From the outward perspective, it was 
not only a lack of capacity to associate business activities with the GATS, but also indifference to 
services trade negotiations as a policy device to expand business in the growing BPO industry, that 
was observed. 
 
Table 6-3: Policy demand side: The Philippines – Specific Interests in services trade 
negotiations of major players and its institutional characteristics 
 
Actors Interests Institutional characteristics 
Business 
confederation: 
The Federation of 
Philippines Industries 
 
 
Economic interests: 
 No specific interests in services 
trade 
 
 
Policy interests: 
 Not in favour of GATS-plus 
Powerful lobbying groups involved in 
the formal consultation process 
 
Members composed of both the 
manufacturing and services sectors and 
industry organisations (e.g. sector and 
professional organisations) 
Business 
Confederation: 
Philippine Chamber of 
Commerce and 
Industry 
 
Economic interests: 
 Shield SMEs from competition 
 Avoid erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs 
 
Policy interests: 
 Against GATS-plus commitments 
The powerful lobbying group 
representing SMEs 
 
Many member companies belong to the 
services sector 
Sectoral associations 
 
Economic interests:  
 Retain investment related 
restrictions (e.g. foreign equity 
participation, nationality 
requirement) 
 Avoid erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs 
 
Strong client relations with a regulatory 
authority 
 
 
Professional 
Associations 
 
 
Economic interests: 
 Improve the Philippine 
professionals’ access to the 
Japanese markets 
 
 Facilitate movement of business 
personnel (e.g. immigration 
 
Strong client relations with a regulatory 
authority 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
public concern was that trade liberalisation of professional services would deprive potential opportunities of the 
Philippine nationals. 
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procedures, entry visa) for IT 
engineers 
 
 Protect the Philippine professional 
services markets from the Japanese 
professionals 
 
Philippine Association 
of Service Exporters 
Economic interests: 
 Improve the Philippine 
professionals’ access to the 
Japanese markets 
 Facilitate movement of business 
personnel (e.g. immigration 
procedures, entry visa) for IT 
engineers 
 Protect the Philippine professional 
services markets from the Japanese 
professionals 
 
Strong client relations with a regulatory 
authority 
 
 
 
C. Interest representation – How were policy demand side interests delivered to the policy 
supply side in the decision-making process? 
Next, we describe how the policy demand side interests were delivered to the policy supply side in 
the decision-making. In comparison with Japan’s business lobbying, two differences are 
identified.311  First, is a lack of technical capacities for services trade negotiations in general. 
Although ASEAN governments started to identify the private sector’s interests for the WTO 
services trade negotiations, as well as for the AFAS negotiations from the late 1990s, the capacity 
of the ASEAN private sector to analyse a complex relationship between business activities and 
GATS-type services trade agreements was still underdeveloped in comparison with that of the 
Japanese private sector.  For example, no policy position papers were produced by the business 
lobbying groups in ASEAN for the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. Second, the formal consultation 
process between Government and the private sector was not yet institutionalised with exception of 
Singapore when the bilateral FTA negotiations with Japan took place from the early to middle 
2000s. For example, in Thailand and Malaysia, a consultation mechanism with the private sector 
was institutionalised in 2007. At the time of Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs, input from the private 
sector was mostly delivered through informal consultations. In other words, governments and the 
private sector consultation process took place behind the scenes. Namely, strong client 
relationships between the domestic regulatory authorities and the private lobbying groups 
prevailed in each country during the decision-making process for the bilateral FTA with Japan. 
                                                          
311 From the interviews with the ASEAN government officials which took place between 2013 and 2015 (Appendix 1). 
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Based on understanding two significant differences from Japan, we describe how major actors of 
the private sector delivered their interests to the governments.  
Inward perspective: Once the private sectors in Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines and Indonesia 
got to know that Japan aimed at GATS-plus high-quality services trade agreements, their concerns 
were magnified. The issue here is that these countries were unilaterally liberalising their services 
sector and keeping sufficient policy space between unilateral liberalisation and multilateral 
liberalisation. As we demonstrated in Chapter 3 (See Figure 3-33 and 3-34), ASEAN’s GATS 
commitments are very modest. 312  In particular, the level of unilateral liberalisation in The 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and even Singapore was not distributed under the 
multilateral trade system while these countries promoted unilateral liberalisation after the Uruguay 
Round. Since the DDA reached deadlock, the private sector was not threatened by the multilateral 
services trade negotiations in the 2000s. But they realised that it might not be the case for the FTA 
services trade negotiations. Consequently, the private sector in these countries strongly opposed 
GATS-plus FTA. In Malaysia, the three ethnic chambers of commerce (Malays, Chinese and 
Indian) maximised its lobbying power to the Malaysian government to deliver their defensive 
positions. Amongst them, the Malay Chamber of Commerce emphasised that the Bumiputera 
favouring policy was a social and cultural issue which could not be interfered with by any FTAs. 
In Thailand and The Philippines, the professional associations were the strongest defendants. The 
major professional associations in The Philippines claimed that even under the AFAS, it did not 
allow the import of any professionals such as nurses from other ASEAN countries.313 In all four 
countries, GLCs and SOEs flatly refused to ease restrictions of Mode 3. Since GLCs and SOEs 
were very political, their lobbying involved a top layer of politicians. 314 Sectoral associations 
which were afraid of erosion of rents and adjustment costs directly lobbied to their regulatory 
authority not to make any GATS-plus commitments. 
Outward perspective: In contrary to strong business lobbying to protect the domestic markets, 
business lobbying which represented export interests were almost absent. In Malaysia, the private 
sector showed no interest in exporting services to Japan.315 In Thailand and The Philippines, most 
                                                          
312 According to the index of the level of commitments of the GATS, the score of The Philippines, Thailand and 
Indonesia account for less than 20 (full commitments is 100), that of Malaysia accounts for 27 while that of Singapore 
and Viet Nam account for 38 and 34 respectively. As a comparison, the score of Japan, South Korea, and China account 
for 53, 49, and 39. The index of both the EU and the US accounts for 55. The index indicates that the level of 
commitments of the ASEAN countries, especially The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia and Malaysia, are very 
modest. 
313 There are seven MRAs under AFAS but none of them has been implemented to date. 
314 According to the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2005 
(http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2005/0/#results), Singapore was the one of most transparent countries 
(ranked 5th), but other ASEAN countries were not (Malaysia ranked 39th, Thailand: 59th, Viet Nam: 107th, The 
Philippines: 117th and Indonesia: 137th). The close relationship between political and business circles exists in general. 
315 In the case of Indonesia, market access of some professional services to Japan was initiated by the Indonesian 
government. As the Japan-Thailand FTA and Japan-The Philippines FTA were already signed, the Indonesian 
government had to provide a level playing field to the Indonesia private sector. 
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of the domestic services suppliers were inactive. It was only the professional associations which 
actively lobbied the lead ministry, as well as the domestic regulatory authorities to improve access 
to the Japanese markets while they defended domestic markets. 
In short, representation of strong defensive interests overwhelmed offensive interests in the case of 
ASEAN countries with the exception of Singapore. Defensive forces maximised strong client 
relationships with domestic regulatory authorities to deliver their interests and successfully 
captured them.  
 
6.3.2 Policy supply side interests  
A. General motivations316 
There are three types of general motivations for Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs which influenced 
the services trade negotiating positions of ASEAN countries. The first is a strong diplomatic 
initiative with the absence of substantial strategy in content. The second is a strong motivation to 
boost goods exports and enhance technical transfer through FDI.  The third is a lack of motivation 
to use a bilateral FTA with Japan to lock-in domestic reforms. 
 
Strong diplomatic initiative with absence of substantial strategy 
In ASEAN, the FTA policy strategy was mostly initiated by strong diplomatic motives. ASEAN 
governments were motivated to use bilateral FTAs as a means of strengthening diplomatic 
relations with their major non-ASEAN partners. Singapore first jumped into its bilateral FTA 
project, followed by Thailand after going through the Asian financial crisis 1997-98, a failure of 
the WTO Seattle Ministerial 1999, and slow the liberalisation progress of AFTA. Then 
competitive bilateralism triggered Malaysia, The Philippines and Indonesia to launch their FTA 
project.317 Since Japan was a major political and economic partner for ASEAN countries, strong 
foreign policy motives inspired them to create a bilateral FTA with Japan. However, foreign policy 
aspirations were not accompanied by a substantive economic strategy with the exception of 
Singapore. At first, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, Indonesia and Viet Nam joined the 
bilateral FTA activity without a substantive economic strategy that included services trade. 318 
 
                                                          
316 From the interviews with the ASEAN government officials which took place between 2012 and 2015 and the 
interviews with the trade policy experts of the WTO secretariat in April 2013 and July 2015. See Appendix 1. 
317 Solis, Stallings and Katada (2009). 
318 Sally (2005), Sally (2006) and Sally (2009). 
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Boosting goods exports and enhancing technical transfer through FDI  
Once ASEAN governments started to plan an economic strategy during the preparation process for 
a bilateral FTA with Japan, they considered that the FTA with Japan was an opportunity to boost 
goods exports and FDI.319 As for trade, ASEAN countries, with the exception of Singapore, were 
interested in boosting trade in goods. For example, Malaysia was interested in improving market 
access for textiles, chemical products and agricultural products. The Malaysian government 
expected Japan to provide technical assistance of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) to apply the 
Japanese SPS standards in order to export Malaysian agricultural products to Japan. Indonesia was 
interested in tariff elimination in relation to organic chemicals, plastic bags, glass products, textiles 
and footwear. In addition to improving market access in goods trade, ASEAN governments always, 
with the exception of Singapore, were interested in enhancing technology transfer through FDI 
from Japanese manufacturers. Since their industrial and development policies for economic 
modernisation focused on the manufacturing sector and lacked the services industry perspective 
(see 6.2.2), ASEAN governments were motivated to make use of a bilateral FTA with Japan to 
climb up the technical ladder. Consequently, ASEAN governments conceived the idea of 
requesting technical assistance from Japan as a package deal for improving the investment 
environment. A strong focus on goods trade, namely technical transfer through FDI in the 
manufacturing sector, resulted in disregard for the services trade negotiations. 
No motivations to lock-in domestic reforms 
In comparison with keen interests in boosting exports in goods and FDI in manufacturing, ASEAN 
governments had little incentive for domestic reforms to achieve further market liberalisation.320 
There were three major reasons for this. One is that strong foreign diplomacy aspirations for FTA 
activity did not entail economic strategic discussions at the domestic level. The second reason was 
the influence of the China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, since the Framework Agreement, 
which was concluded just before ASEAN countries started the bilateral FTA negotiations with 
Japan, endorsed gradualism without domestic reforms. Therefore, the idea of gradualism became 
the basis of the ASEAN’s FTA policy. Thirdly, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines and Indonesia 
were motivated to tailor the bilateral FTA with Japan to its development and industrial policy. 
Since development and industrial policy was primary in their policy agenda, a trade agenda such as 
an FTA could not become a reason to change the pace of economic development and designs of 
industrial policy which focused on the manufacturing sector. In this way, services sectoral reforms 
were not associated with the bilateral FTAs with Japan.  
                                                          
319 From the interviews with the ASEAN government officials between 2013 and July 2015 as well as the interviews 
with the Japanese government officials in April 2015. See Appendix 1. 
320 See Oike (2007), p23. 
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B. Specific interests in services trade 
Next, we examine the specific interests in services trade of the major actors in the domestic 
decision-making process by taking examples of Malaysia and The Philippines.321 Like the case of 
Japan, bureaucrats dominated the whole process of FTA services trade policy-making with a wide 
participation of domestic regulatory authorities. 
 
Malaysia (Table 6-4) 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (MITI) and MIDA (Malaysian Investment 
Development Authority): In Malaysia, the Ministry of International 322Trade and Industry (MITI) 
is in charge of planning and implementing international trade and investment policy including 
FTAs. For trade policy-making, the MITI serves as a lead ministry of the national consultations for 
multilateral and plurilateral negotiations. However, for the Japan-Malaysian FTA, the MIDA 
(Malaysian Investment Development Authority),323 which was the MITI-related agency promoting 
investment, was designated exceptionally as the lead ministry of the services trade negotiations. 
Since the MIDA was simply an economic planning agency, it did not administer any services 
sector. 
MIDA’s negotiating interests basically reflected that of the MITI. The only difference was that the 
MIDA gave more focus on development and industrial perspective than the MITI did. With regard 
to the policy interests, the MITI and the MIDA were not interested in going beyond the AFAS 
style FTA which applied the GATS positive list approach based on gradualism. It was not keen to 
commit the substantial GATS-plus level of liberalisation either. There were two reasons why the 
lead ministry (MIDA) and the MITI were passive about bilateral services trade negotiations with 
Japan. First, since an FTA with Japan was the first FTA which substantially included services 
trade negotiations, both agencies were very cautious about its economic and social impacts. 
Secondly, no substantial export interests to Japan were expressed by the Malaysian private sector. 
Although the two agencies had obtained policy incentives to eliminate discriminatory treatment 
caused by the Japan-Singapore FTA, as well as strengthening preferential treatment vis-à-vis other 
                                                          
321 See the reasons of selecting Malaysia and The Philippines described in the introductory paragraph of 6.3. 
322 From the interviews with the Malaysian government officials which took place between 2013 and 2015; the 
interviews with the Japanese government officials who was in charge of Japan-Malaysian FTA in April 2015; and the 
trade policy experts in charge of Malaysia at the WTO secretariat in April 2013 and July 2015. 
323 There are three MITI agencies which have trade-related functions: the Malaysian Investment Development Authority 
(MIDA) which promotes Malaysia’s manufacturing and services sectors; the Malaysian External Trade Development 
Corporation (MATRADE) which is responsible for export promotion; and the Malaysia Productivity Corporation (MPC) 
which monitors and improves the productivity and competitiveness of the economy. 
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ASEAN Members in general, the absence of substantial export interests to Japan diminished their 
bargaining incentives. 
In terms of specific economic interests, the MIDA, as an investment authority, had a strong 
incentive to promote FDI in the manufacturing sector from Japan to accelerate technology transfer. 
However, FDI in the services sector was not included in its interests. MIDA’s basic position was 
that any liberalisation of the services sector should be introduced gradually in accordance with 
Malaysia’s economic and industrial policy. In the early 2000s, Malaysia’s industrial and 
development policies were still focusing on the manufacturing sector. As one of the MITI-related 
agencies, the SME Corporation Malaysia, which was the central coordinating agency for SME 
development, showed concerns about liberalising services markets as the national SME master 
plan324 did not include market liberalisation as a policy option to strengthen SMEs. 
 
Ministry of Finance and its related agencies: The Ministry of Finance possessed strong political 
power as a supervisory authority of the financial sector. Given that Malaysia was a developing 
country, the incentives of Ministry of Finance to protect the Malaysian financial institutions from 
foreign capital was still quite strong. Also, as a regulator of the financial services, it had a strong 
incentive to protect its regulatory autonomy. In addition to this, the Ministry of Finance had to 
represent the positions of Kazanah Nasional325 as well as Employees Provident Fund of Malaysia 
since they were the Ministry of Finance-related agencies. Kazanah Nasional and Employees 
Provident Fund, which obtained strong political power, were in favour of bumiputera policy and 
had a strong interest in shielding GLCs from liberalisation.  For these reasons, the Ministry of 
Finance, Kazanah Nasional and Employees Provident Fund had a strong preference for no more 
commitments than Malaysia had made under the GATS. 
 
Other domestic regulatory ministries: Other domestic regulatory ministries, which administrated 
services sectors, owned more defensive interests than those of MIDA. Since the domestic 
regulatory authorities possessed strong regulatory autonomy in administering licences and 
qualifications in its regulatory sectors, they were afraid that an FTA with Japan might invade their 
policy domains. Therefore, no domestic regulatory authorities wanted to make commitments 
                                                          
324 For instance, the Malaysian Government highlighted six areas in the SME Masterplan (2012): innovation and 
technology, human capital development, access to financing, access to markets, legal and regulatory environment, and 
infrastructure.  
325 Kazahah Nasional was established as Malaysia’s sovereign national fund. It is a government agency related to 
Ministry of Finance which invests the commercial assets of the Government of Malaysia. Its president has a big 
influence on management. Its portfolio companies encompass a wide range of services sectors (e.g. financial institutions, 
infrastructure and construction, tourism and leisure sector, transportation, logistics, healthcare, real estate, and 
environmental services). 
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beyond what Malaysia had made under the GATS. From the economic perspective, the domestic 
regulatory authorities had difficulty in associating Malaysia’s national economic plan with FTA 
services trade negotiations with Japan. They were concerned that any new commitments with 
Japan might require changes in Malaysia’s national economic plan, which gave priority to 
manufacturing industries. Since the domestic regulatory authorities were in a position which 
viewed international trade negotiations as just a part of their industrial and development plans, 
they strongly wished to avoid any changes in development and industrial plans and to keep 
development of the services sector under their control. Accordingly, the domestic regulatory 
ministries were interested in protecting domestic services suppliers, most of which were SMEs, 
from market liberalisation and competition. From the outward perspective, the domestic regulatory 
authorities did not have any offensive economic interest in services, since no specific export 
interests were articulated from the private sector. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: International trade negotiations were outside the mandate of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia. The Ministry had a strong incentive to strengthen security 
by promoting bilateral FTAs in Asia in general, however, the Ministry was not involved in 
thematic negotiations, including services trade negotiations. 
 
Table 6-4: Policy supply side –  Specific interests in services trade negotiations of major 
players, Malaysia 
 
Actors Interests 
MITI 
Policy interests: 
 Make the AFAS-compatible FTA (GATS style) based on gradualism 
 Moderate GATS-plus commitments 
 Eliminate discriminatory treatments caused by the Japan-Singapore 
FTAs 
 Strengthen preferential treatments vis-à-vis other ASEAN Members 
 Achieve Malaysia’s economic development plan by using the FTA 
 
Economic interests:  
 Protect major domestic services suppliers and SMEs 
 
METI related agencies 
(1) MIDA (Malaysian 
Investment Development 
Authority) 
(2) MATRADE(Malaysian 
External Trade 
Development 
Corporation) 
Policy interests 
 Achieve Malaysia’s development and industrial plan by using the FTA 
 Make the AFAS-compatible FTA (GATS style) based on gradualism 
 Moderate GATS-plus commitments 
 Eliminate negative effects caused by the Japan-Singapore FTAs 
 Strengthen preferential treatments vis-à-vis external regions (e.g. 
ASEAN competitors) 
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(3) SME Corporation 
(4) MPC (Malaysia 
Productivity Corporation) 
 
Economic interests:  
 Protect major domestic services suppliers and SMEs 
 
Ministry of Finance 
Policy interests 
 Pursue regulatory objectives 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Commitments not more than Malaysia had made under the GATS 
 
Economic interests 
 Strengthen competitiveness of the Malaysian financial sector while 
protecting the government-related financial institutions 
 
Ministry of Finance related 
agencies 
(1) Khazanah Nasional 
 
(2) Employees Provident Fund 
 
Policy interests 
 Commitments not more than Malaysia had made under the GATS 
Economic interests 
 Protect Bumiputera related enterprises from market liberalisation 
Other domestic regulatory 
ministries 
(Ministry of Domestic Trade; 
Ministry of Co-operatives and 
Consumerism; Ministry of High 
Education; Ministry of Energy, 
Green Technology and Water; 
and Ministry of Information, 
Communication and Culture) 
Policy interests 
 Pursue regulatory objectives 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Commitments not more than Malaysia had made under the GATS 
 
Economic interests 
 Implement Malaysia’s national economic plan from an industrial and 
development perspective, without any interference from FTA 
negotiations 
 Protect major domestic services suppliers and SMEs 
 
 
 
The Philippines (Table 6-5)326 
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA): The NEDA was designated as the lead 
ministry of services trade negotiations for the Japan-The Philippines FTA. It was expected that the 
NEDA, which is the authority in charge of forming social and economic policies, could grasp The 
Philippines’ services sectors from the horizontal perspective. In terms of policy, NEDA’s 
preference was the GATS style services agreement which strongly reflects gradualism. The 
Authority envisaged the elimination of discriminative treatments caused by the Japan-Singapore 
FTA and to establish stronger positions to compete with other ASEAN competitors. In contrast to 
its ambition, the NEDA was not motivated to make substantial GATS-plus commitments. The 
strongest economic interest of the NEDA was to enhance economic ties with Japan in order to 
achieve The Philippines’ development objectives. Thus, attracting FDI to promote technology 
                                                          
326 From the interviews with the Philippine government officials which took place between 2013 and 2015; the 
interviews with the Japanese government officials who was in charge of Japan-Philippine FTA in April 2015; and the 
trade policy experts in charge of the Philippine at the WTO secretariat in April 2013 and July 2015. 
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transfer in the manufacturing sector became NEDA’s top priority as an economic planning agency. 
As for specific economic interests in services, Mode 4 was only export interests of the NEDA. The 
NEDA considered that an FTA was not necessary for further growth of the Philippine services 
sector, such as BPO industry, since the growth was mainly market-driven with step by step 
unilateral liberalisation in key infrastructure-related services sectors such as telecommunications.  
 
Department of Trade and Investment (DTI): The DTI mostly shared NEDA’s interests. The 
difference was that the Department focused more on promoting trade and investment policy than 
development policy, even though, the incentives of the DTI in services trade policy-making were 
limited as it did not administer any services sector. For example, the Department was not so keen 
on high-quality GATS agreements while it had a certain interest in eliminating discriminative 
treatments caused by the Japan-Singapore FTA. From the economic point of view, the Department 
thought that the Japan-The Philippines FTA was an opportunity to promote exporting professional 
services (Mode 4). 
   
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA): In general, the department considered FTAs from the 
foreign policy perspective such as strengthening the Japan-Philippine bilateral relationship and 
catching up with Singapore and Thailand’s FTA activity. As the DFA represents The Philippines 
for the WTO multilateral trade negotiations, it had strong incentives to achieve GATS Article V 
compatible FTAs from the policy point of view. Since The Philippines was showing strong interest 
in Mode 4 at the WTO services trade negotiations, the DFA was motivated to use the bilateral FTA 
with Japan to improve the market access of some professional services. At the same time, it was 
concerned about the brain drain problem of The Philippines. Therefore, it was not in favour of 
using trade negotiations in some professional services, such as medical doctors, where a supply 
shortage was occurring. 
 
Central Bank of The Philippines: The Central Bank of The Philippines was also actively 
involved in services trade negotiations as the monetary policy and supervising authority of the 
financial institutions in The Philippines. The bank had a strong interest in pursuing its regulatory 
objectives. Therefore, the Bank was in position of maintaining the GATS level commitments. On 
the other hand, its negotiating position was more relaxed than other departments of the government 
since the Bank was the designated independent regulatory power to change regulations derived 
from the 1987 Philippines Constitution. In terms of the economic interests, the Bank protected 
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domestic financial institutions from the industrial policy perspective. Export interests were absent 
since The Philippines financial sector was not competitive enough to export services or promote 
investment to Japan, where the market was already open.  
 
The Philippines Professional Regulation Commission (PRC): The PRC is responsible for 
regulations and licensing of 46 professions including nurses. It obtains strong political power as a 
licensing authority of professionals. Therefore, its major focus was to pursue its regulatory 
objectives and to protect its regulatory autonomy. The Commission held specific economic 
interests, such as promoting market access for some Philippine professionals (nurses, care-workers 
and IT specialists) to the Japanese market, and getting the best deal with regard to qualification 
requirements. On the other hand, the Commission in general strongly rejected improving the 
market access for any foreign professionals to the Philippine professional markets by referring to 
Article XII, Section 14 of the 1987 The Philippines constitution which prohibits foreign 
professionals’ practice in The Philippines. 
 
Other domestic regulatory departments: Other domestic regulatory departments (e.g. 
Department of Finance, Department of Tourism, and Department of Energy) did not hold any 
strong interests in services trade negotiations. Their focus was pursuing their regulatory objectives 
and protecting their regulatory autonomy. Basically they did not want to make more commitments 
than The Philippines had made under the GATS, since they were captured by vested interests (e.g. 
SOEs, oligopolists and SMEs). Namely, they were against making commitments in Mode 3 in 
order to protect their domestic services suppliers from Japanese companies’ market penetration. 
The domestic regulatory departments adhered to the 1987 Philippines constitution, which provides 
services trade related protective measures (e.g. restrictions on capital participation) to reject 
liberalising commitments under Mode 3. 
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Table 6-5: Policy supply side – Specific interests in services trade negotiations of major 
players, The Philippines 
Actors Incentives 
NEDA (National 
Economic and 
Development Authority) 
Policy interests: 
 Achieve The Philippines’ development and industrial plan by using the FTA 
 Make the AFAS-compatible FTA (GATS style) based on gradualism 
 Moderate GATS-plus commitments 
 Eliminate discriminative treatments caused by the Japan-Singapore FTAs 
 Strengthen preferential treatments vis-à-vis other ASEAN Members 
 
Economic interests 
 Protect major domestic services suppliers and SMEs 
 Improve market access and qualification requirement conditions for some 
professional services providers 
 
DTI (Department of 
Trade and Investment) 
Policy interests: 
 Make the AFAS-compatible FTA (GATS style) based on gradualism 
 Moderate GATS-plus commitments 
 Eliminate discriminative treatments caused by the Japan-Singapore FTAs 
 Strengthen preferential treatments vis-à-vis other ASEAN Members 
 
Economic interests 
 Improve market access and qualification requirement conditions for some 
professional services providers 
 
 
 
DFA (Department of 
Foreign Affairs) 
Policy interests 
 Achieve GATS Art. V compatible FTAs 
 
Economic interests 
 Improve market access and qualification requirement conditions for some 
professional services providers, while avoiding a brain drain from The Philippines 
 
Central Bank of The 
Philippines 
Policy interests 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Pursue regulatory objective 
 Commitments not more than The Philippines had made under the GATS 
 
Economic interests 
 Protect domestic financial institutions from competition 
 Strengthen the competitiveness of the Philippine financial sectors  
 
The Philippines 
Professional Regulation 
Commission (PRC) 
Policy interests 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Pursue regulatory objective 
 Commitments not more than The Philippines had made under the GATS 
 
 
Economic interests 
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 Promote market access and qualification requirement conditions for some 
professional services (e.g. nurses and care workers) 
 Protect the domestic professional services market from the Japanese professional 
services suppliers 
Other domestic regulatory 
ministries 
(e.g. Department of 
Finance; Department of 
Tourism; Department of 
Energy; Department of 
Information and 
Communications 
Technology; Department 
of Education; Department 
of Environment and 
Natural Resources; 
Department of Health; 
Department of Labour 
and Employment; and 
Department of 
Transportation and 
Communications) 
Policy interests 
 Pursue regulatory objectives 
 Protect regulatory autonomy 
 Commitments not more than The Philippines had made under the GATS 
Economic interests 
 Implement the 1987 Philippines constitution and national economic plan from 
the industrial and development perspective 
 Protect SOEs, oligopolists and SMEs 
 
 
 
6.3.3 Ideas 
Gradualism: Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines and Indonesia 
Since ASEAN was established in 1967, economic integration has been promoted based on 
gradualism.327 Starting from trade in goods, ASEAN countries gradually liberalised their markets 
and implemented domestic reforms step-by-step at the national level. In this way, market 
liberalisation was reconcilably conducted in line with each country’s strong underpinning 
developmental interests. The approach of progressive liberalisation based on gradualism was 
transferred from trade in goods to trade in services (AFAS) by applying GATS type progressive 
liberalisation. During four rounds of negotiations which took place between 1997 and 2007, 
implementation at the member country level fell behind the initial targets, and the integration 
programme for services trade was repeatedly delayed. Clearly, ASEAN style gradualism was 
deeply rooted among ASEAN policy makers.328 
In addition to AFAS, the 1997-98 Asian financial crises further amplified ASEAN gradualism.  
Whilst the Asian financial crisis triggered East Asian regionalism, the experience of contagious 
economic turmoil ironically consolidated the idea of gradualism amongst trade policy makers and 
the private sectors in ASEAN countries. In addition, ASEAN signed the ASEAN China 
                                                          
327 Acharya (1997), Dent (2007a), and Dent (2008a). 
328 At the interviews which took place between 2013 and 2015 (see Appendix 1), all ASEAN policy makers stressed an 
importance of AFAS style gradualism. 
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Framework Agreement in 2002, just before Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines started the 
FTA negotiations with Japan. The trade-light FTA with China locked in the idea of gradualism 
into ASEAN’s FTA activity.     
When ASEAN countries negotiated a bilateral FTA with Japan, the idea of gradualism constituted 
the backbone of policy-makering and reflected the negotiating positions of ASEAN in designing 
services trade agreements. Consequently, Thailand, Malaysia and The Philippines persistently 
denied the Japanese proposal of applying the negative list approach and insisted on applying the 
GATS approach based on gradualism. For the reasons described above, the substantial and 
comprehensive liberalisation, which Japan tried to achieve did not fit the idea of gradualism 
embedded among the ASEAN policy makers in the 2000s. 
 
Developmentalism with a notion of strong sovereignty: Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines 
and Indonesia 
Relating to gradualism, developmentalism329 with a notion of strong sovereignty greatly affected 
policy-making in services for the bilateral FTA with Japan. For ASEAN policy makers, services 
trade liberalisation was just part of development/industrial policy as we previously described 
(6.2.2). In addition to the traditional developmental approach of governments in ASEAN, the 
lessons from the Asian financial crisis, including the IMF programme after the crisis enhanced the 
notion of sovereignty.330 Many ASEAN countries opened financial markets and promoted market 
oriented financial markets from the late 1980s ushered in by the World Bank. Whereas short-term 
foreign capital flow cascaded into the markets, their financial system reforms (e.g. market 
infrastructure and regulatory system) were far behind the speed of liberalisation. When the Asian 
financial crisis happened, the domestic financial system could not cope with huge withdrawal of 
speculative lending by the global financial suppliers and spill-over outflow of short-term foreign 
capital. The lessons which ASEAN policy makers learnt was that domestic reforms and 
implementation fell behind radical liberalisation would result in economic crisis. What was more, 
there were strong criticisms of the IMF programme implemented after the crisis. The ASEAN 
policy makers strongly believed that services policy and the speed of liberalisation should be 
decided by themselves to achieve each country’s socioeconomic development. As a result, they 
became extremely cautious about international interferences, including binding services 
liberalisation under FTAs. While they opted for the unilateral liberalisation in accordance with 
their national economic development agenda, they retained a policy freedom to be resilient from 
                                                          
329 See Dent (2008a), p49. 
330 Many government officials of Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines and Indonesia expressed scepticism on the IMF 
programme in the late 1990s and its influence on economic policy including trade and investment. 
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the exogenous factors of economies (e.g. regional or global financial crisis). 331  Summing up, 
because of their ideas of developmentalism with a strong notion of sovereignty, ASEAN policy 
makers wanted to retain policy space between the substantial services liberalisation at the 
unilateral level and their commitments under the FTA. 
 
As described above, gradualism and developmentalism with a notion of strong sovereignty were 
embedded in Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. Nevertheless, we have to note 
that these ideas were not embedded in Singapore and Viet Nam. Singapore was an open economy 
based on liberalism. Viet Nam was a unique case, as it strongly locked in their economic reforms 
under the multilateral trade system at the time of its accession to the WTO in 2007. As the country 
was a late comer to the global economy, it radically turned to liberalism at the time of WTO 
accession. In the area of services, the country committed almost up to the level of substantial 
liberalisation with a little policy space left over. While the Viet Namese government esteemed 
development and industrial policy as a supreme policy agenda, it was based on economic 
liberalism to compete with China. 
 
6.4 Institutions –Supply side condition 
6.4.1 Domestic decision-making structure for Japan-ASEAN FTA services trade negotiations 
and the logic of veto players 
In the previous sections (6.2 and 6.3), we analysed the incentives of the policy demand and supply 
side actors involved in the domestic decision-making. Now, we examine how interests were 
shaped through institutions in accordance with our policy demand and supply side model. Since 
we analysed Malaysia and The Philippines as examples of demand and supply side interests in the 
previous sections (6.2 and 6.3), we now analyse institutions by taking examples from these two 
countries. We first clarify who was an agenda setter and who were veto players by applying the 
logic of veto players. In the case of Malaysia, the agenda setter was the MIDA, the lead ministry of 
services trade negotiations for the FTA with Japan. Similarly, the agenda setter of The Philippines 
was the NEDA, which led the services trade negotiations. Veto players were domestic regulatory 
authorities which participated in the decision-making process.332 Next, we clarify the location of 
the status-quo. For the domestic regulatory authorities of Japan, the status-quo meant no changes 
                                                          
331 For example, Thailand reassured “prudent management of the economy” and “a step-by-step market liberalisation” as 
explained by the ambassador of Thailand at the TPR meeting at the WTO in 2007. See WTO (2007i), p4-5. 
332 As for the agenda setter and veto players of each ASEAN country, see Table 4-1 for the agenda setter and table 4-2 
for the veto players. 
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in regulations and a substantial liberalisation level. Unlike Japan, the status-quo of ASEAN was 
located at the GATS commitment level. Since Japan is a developed country with a substantially 
open market in the trade policy context, location of the status-quo was much higher than that of 
ASEAN.  In comparison, ASEAN countries, with the exception of Singapore, were developing 
countries where the level of development of the services sectors was far behind that of Japan. 
Therefore, the lower level of status-quo can be understood as a logical outcome. There are five 
reasons why the domestic regulatory authorities in ASEAN had a strong preference for the status-
quo:333 
(i) First, the domestic regulatory authorities had a strong preference for maintaining a policy space 
between the level of unilateral liberalisation and that of international trade commitments. As 
previously described, the idea of developmentalism with a notion of sovereignty was intensified in 
ASEAN as a consequence of the Asian financial crisis 1997-98. It was right after the economy was 
recuperating from the crisis, when ASEAN countries started FTA negotiations with Japan. The 
domestic regulatory authorities wanted to take a firm grip on their industrial and development 
policy in order to stay resilient from any unexpected exogenous factors of economies.334 Also, 
binding GATS-plus was like opening a Pandora’s Box of liberalisation for ASEAN since the 
bilateral FTA with Japan was the first FTA which substantially covered services trade. They were 
afraid that creating a precedent case of substantive GATS-plus with Japan, subsequent FTA 
negotiations with other countries would further diminish their policy sovereignty. For this reason, 
the domestic regulatory authorities became more cautious about making liberalisation 
commitments beyond their commitments under the GATS. 
(ii) Second, domestic regulatory authorities were afraid that FTA services trade negotiations might 
step into their regulatory concerns. Exactly similar to the case of Japan, each domestic ministry 
had strong regulatory autonomy. They could justify the existence of domestic regulations in 
response to market failures, even when the regulations were dually used to protect domestic 
services suppliers. 
(iii) The third reason is sectoral segmentation. In the case of ASEAN, each ministry implemented 
development and industrial policy in its sectoral domain. For instance, enhancing SMEs capacities 
was one of the important tasks for domestic regulatory authorities. They thought that making new 
sectoral commitments may accelerate FDI from Japan and endanger the presence of local SMEs. 
The domestic regulatory authorities simply wanted to focus on developing domestic SMEs from 
the industrial policy perspective without any pressure caused by the GATS-plus agreements.   
                                                          
333 From the interviews with the ASEAN government officials between 2013 and 2015 (Appendix 1). 
334 During a series of interviews with the ASEAN government officials (2013 and 2015, see Appendix 1), the importance 
of retaining the gap between the level of unilateral liberalisation and that of commitments under WTO/FTA trade 
negotiations, as policy space, was emphasized. This means a politically and economically comfortable degree of policy 
freedom to cope with exogenous factors of economies. 
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(iv) The fourth reason is the presence of national policy based on developmentalism and 
nationalism. In the case of Malaysia, Bumiputera favouring policy directly related to protection of 
GLCs as well as Mode 3 liberalisation. In The Philippines, 1987 Constitution, which provided the 
protectionist trade related clause, became a shield of discriminative trade and investment measures 
in Mode 3 and Mode 4. The FTA with Japan was not powerful enough to challenge these national 
policies. 
(v)  The last was a lack of incentive or limited interest in bargaining due to the lack of international 
competitiveness of the domestic services suppliers, except for Singapore. In the case of Malaysia, 
the private sector showed no export interests. Mode 4 was only offensive interest for The 
Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. 
 
As with Japan, interests of domestic regulatory authorities in ASEAN reflected a strong preference 
for the status-quo and exercised veto power against policy changes during the decision-making 
process. Consequently, there were very limited offers, which were beyond the GATS. Why could 
the preference of status-quo give strong influence on the results? There were two reasons for this. 
The first reason was horizontal fragmentation of power. According to the veto power model, as the 
number of veto players increases, ‘policy stability’ is increased as previously explained. 335 
Domestic regulatory ministries in ASEAN obtained not only strong regulatory power but also 
strong political power to implement development and industrial policy (see example of Malaysia: 
Table 6-6 and The Philippines: 6-7). A wide participation of these regulatory authorities with 
political power intensified veto power. Second, the lead ministries were too weak to overpower 
‘policy stability’. The lead ministries were not delegated any power of authorisation for the FTA 
services negotiations. They simply functioned as coordinators of the decision-making process. In 
addition, the lead ministries in many ASEAN countries did not administer any specific services 
industries nor implement trade related regulations. In Malaysia, the MIDA was the authority to 
promote inward FDI (Table 6-6). In The Philippines, the NEDA was simply the planning agency 
which devised economic and social policies for development (6-7). They did not have the political 
or regulatory power which was necessary to break through ‘policy stability’.  
 
  
                                                          
335 See 5.4.1. 
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Table 6-6: Policy supply side -Institutional characteristics, Malaysia 
Actors Institutional characteristics 
MITI 
Devise trade and investment policy of Malaysia 
 
Regulate no services sector, thus no regulatory power in services 
METI related agencies 
(5) MIDA (Malaysian 
Investment 
Development 
Authority) 
(6) MATRADE(Mala
ysian External 
Trade 
Development 
Corporation) 
(7) SME Corporation 
(8) MPC (Malaysia 
Productivity 
Corporation) 
 
 
(1) MIDA: 
 
Coordinator of services trade negotiations without designated ruling power 
 
Promote inward FDI to Malaysia 
 
Higher priority on manufacturing sector than services sectors to achieve the 
economic development plan 
 
(2) MATRADE: 
Promote Malaysian exports 
 
(3) SME Corporation: 
Track the implementation of the national SME master plan 
Ministry of Finance 
Exercise strong regulatory autonomy as supervisory authority for all financial 
sectors, including licensing 
 
Possess strong political power as supervisory authority of the major economic 
sectors 
 
Represent the interests of Malaysian financial sectors 
Ministry of Finance 
related agencies 
(1) Khazanah Nasional 
 
(2) Employees Provident 
Fund 
 
Obtain strong political power 
 
Retain strong influence on the privatisation process 
 
Retain strong influence on investment related policy 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
No interests and no influence on services trade policy-making 
Other domestic 
regulatory ministries 
(e.g. Ministry of 
Domestic Trade, Co-
operatives and 
Consumerism, Ministry 
of Works, Ministry of 
High Education, 
Ministry of Energy, 
Green Technology and 
Water, Ministry of 
Information, 
Communication and 
Culture) 
Strong regulatory autonomy, administer licensing and qualifications in its 
regulatory sectors 
 
Represent professional services in its regulatory sectors 
 
Implement sectoral industrial and development policy 
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Table 6-7: Policy supply side -Institutional characteristics, The Philippines 
Actors 
Type and level of political power 
NEDA (National 
Economic and 
Development 
Authority) 
Devise social and economic policies from a development perspective 
 
No authorisation power 
 
Coordinator of services trade negotiations without designated ruling power 
 
Devise The Philippines’ services industrial strategy and development strategy without 
implementation power 
 
DTI (Department of 
Trade) 
Main regulatory body for trade 
 
Devise trade and investment policy of The Philippines 
 
Promote investments 
 
Regulate no services sector, thus no regulatory power in services 
 
Department of 
Finance 
Exercises strong regulatory autonomy as supervisory authority for all financial sectors 
including licensing 
 
Possesses strong political power as supervisory authority of the major economic sectors 
 
Represents the interests of The Philippines’ financial sectors 
Philippines 
Professional 
Regulation 
Commission (PRC) 
Regulate and license 46 professions 
Central Bank of The 
Philippines 
Exercise strong regulatory autonomy as supervisory authority for all financial sectors 
including licensing 
 
Possess strong political power as supervisory authority of the major economic sectors 
 
Represent the interests of The Philippines’ financial sectors 
Other domestic 
regulatory ministries 
Strong regulatory autonomy, administer licensing and qualifications in its regulatory 
sectors 
 
Represents professional services in its regulatory sectors 
 
Implement sectoral industrial and development policy 
 
 
6.4.2 How did domestic regulatory authorities obstruct the lead ministry?  
Next, we demonstrate how domestic regulatory authorities actually blocked initiatives of the lead 
ministry during the decision-making process, through tracing the decision-making process of the 
Japan-Malaysian FTA and the Japan-The Philippines FTA. The decision-making process is 
divided into two stages: the first is the domestic decision-making stage and the second is the 
bilateral negotiation stage. The analysis below relies mostly on a series of interviews with the 
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ASEAN government officials, private sector individuals and trade policy researchers, including the 
WTO.336 
 
Japan-Malaysian FTA 
Domestic decision-making stage: In Malaysia, the bilateral FTA with Japan was perceived as a 
great opportunity to enhance technology transfer from the Japanese manufacturers for two reasons. 
The first reason is the emergence of China in the early 2000s. The MITI had to reconsider 
Malaysia’s technical advantages to compete with China on the global markets. The second reason 
is that the domestic regulatory ministries wished to enhance technology transfer in order to avoid 
the middle income trap in implementing development and industrial policy. The general position 
of Malaysia hugely affected the MIDA’s negotiating position making for services trade 
negotiations. While the Agency highlighted the bilateral FTA with Japan as a policy device to 
enhance technology transfer as an authority which promoted inward FDI, it took a cautious 
approach to services trade related investment (Mode 3). This is because the MIDA considered that 
it was not the Japanese services suppliers but the domestic services suppliers who should enjoy 
growing services demand in Malaysia. Consequently, the MIDA decided to (i) apply the GATS 
style positive list approach based on gradualism and (ii) achieve only a modest level of GATS-plus 
commitments. 
When the pre-negotiation process for the Japan-Malaysian FTA started in 2002 driven by the 
Malaysian government’s strong economic diplomacy impetus, the Malaysian private sector was 
not well aware of services trade. From the outward perspective, the MIDA could not get any 
offensive input from the Malaysian private sector. Due to a lack of economies of scale, earning 
foreign currencies through trade was one of the main pillars of Malaysia’s economic development 
strategy. In the early 2000s, trade was heavily dependent on exporting commodities and 
manufactured products. Since the Government was well aware that the services sector was 
important for boosting its economy, it had launched the sectoral reforms in the major services 
sectors (e.g. the financial sector and the telecommunication sector) from the late 1990s in order to 
improve competitiveness. Nevertheless, in the beginning of the 2000s, the services sector in 
Malaysia was not yet ready to expand its business to foreign markets, including these of Japan. 
Due to a lack of offensive export interests, MIDA’s bargaining incentive in the services sector 
became very weak. 
                                                          
336 A series of interviews with the ASEAN government officials took place in April 2013 and July- December, 2015 (see 
Appendix 1). 
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From the inward perspective, domestic regulatory authorities were not in favour of services trade 
negotiations in principle. First, they simply detested the fact that international trade negotiations 
interfered with their policy domains. They were deeply concerned that the FTA services trade 
negotiations with Japan might challenge their regulatory autonomy, namely to deal with market 
failures. For example, the Ministry of Health and the professional agencies persistently emphasised 
that maintaining a quality of services for consumers was the first policy priority. Second, domestic 
regulatory authorities insisted that healthy growth of the services sector should be guided by 
national economic development policies, which did not include FTA services liberalisation. They 
were aware that the services sector was becoming an important segment of the economy following 
the manufacturing sector in Malaysia. When Malaysia negotiated the FTA with Japan, the 
domestic regulatory ministries were implementing the Second Industrial Master Plan (1996-2005) 
which focused on achieving an industrialisation level abundant with skills, technology and human 
capital. In order to improve competitiveness in services, the domestic regulatory ministries thought 
developing human capital was far more important than liberalising the market. 
What is more, the Asian financial crisis 1997-98 immensely influenced the negotiating positions of 
the domestic regulatory authorities. After Malaysia suffered massive evacuation of foreign capital, 
including portfolios, and recuperated from the crisis in the early 2000s, the Malaysian government 
took a prudent approach to economic policy. In particular, the domestic regulatory authorities 
learned from the financial crisis that it was not the responsibility of the international forces (i.e. 
IMF and international negotiations) but the Malaysian government to hold a grip on the pace of 
services sectoral reforms and liberalisation. Taking into account the degrees of competitiveness of 
each service sector, Malaysia started to liberalise some sectors step by step on a unilateral basis at 
the beginning of the 2000s. These included telecommunications, finance, private higher education, 
ICT, and certain manufacturing-related services.337 Nevertheless, because of the reasons mentioned 
above, domestic regulatory authorities strongly preferred to retain sufficient policy flexibility 
between the level of unilateral liberalisation of these sectors and the level of GATS commitments 
with Japan.  
Bilateral negotiation stage: As for designing a services trade agreement, Japan’s suggestion to 
apply the negative list approach was repugnant to the Malaysian domestic regulatory authorities. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that ASEAN services integration should be put first 
before other economic diplomacy, therefore, accepting the negative list approach was totally out of 
the question from the foreign policy perspective. The domestic regulatory ministries were horribly 
afraid of legal and economic impacts that a negative list approach would bring about for their 
policy domain. Since the MIDA was in a position to apply the gradualism approach in line with 
                                                          
337 WTO (2009a) and WTO (2009b). 
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AFAS, there were no conflicts between the MIDA and the domestic regulatory authorities to 
decide Malaysia’s position on this. 
At the sectoral request and negotiation stage, the MIDA had to face massive opposition from the 
domestic regulatory authorities. They did not allow concessions in respond to Japan’s sectoral 
liberalisation requests. Amongst the domestic regulatory ministries, the Ministry of Finance, which 
was politically the most powerful ministry, showed strong resistance to reviewing the ethnic 
favouring policy of Bumiputera, which was directly related to GLCs. The GLCs issue was highly 
political because the political party retained majority ownership through the Khazanah Nasional. 
Neither the Khazanah Nasional nor the Employees Provident Fund allowed any changes relating to 
the ethnic Bumiputera favouring policies, such as changing equity caps on Mode 3; requirements 
of hiring Malay nationals; and accelerating the privatisation process. Other domestic regulatory 
authorities, which were lobbied by ethnic chambers of commerce, also retained their defensive 
position against liberalisation commitments in Mode 3, in order to protect local SMEs and the 
Bumiputera favouring policies. In other words, domestic regulatory authorities used the 
Bumiputera favouring policies as the shield for investment protection. 
Facing strong resistance from the Ministry of Finance and other domestic regulatory ministries, the 
MIDA could hardly make concessions. Consequently, the MIDA was forced to further downgrade 
its negotiating positions. In the end, Malaysia made commitments in only 72 sub-sectors out of 
155 sub-sectors while Japan made commitments in 140 sub-sectors.338 
 
Japan-The Philippines FTA 
Domestic policy-making stage: For The Philippines, catching up with Singapore and Thailand in 
creating a bilateral FTA network was the priority of its FTA activity. A substantial economic 
strategy did not accompany its strong diplomatic incentive in the first place. When The Philippines 
and Japan initially agreed to start negotiating the bilateral FTA, DTI policy makers thought that the 
Japan-The Philippines FTA should be used as a policy device to encourage technology transfer 
through FDI, since The Philippines was suffering from a lack of FDI investment in the 
manufacturing sector in comparison with other ASEAN countries. The NEDA, which is the 
development policy planning agency, underlined the importance of technology transfer in the 
manufacturing sector from the industrial and development perspective and positioned goods trade 
negotiations as the primary negotiating agenda. As for the services trade negotiations, the NEDA 
supported a gradual approach as in the case of Malaysia. The reason was that the pace of domestic 
reforms in the services sector was very slow in The Philippines because of its domestic political 
                                                          
338 See Oike (2006), p33. 
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economy, namely strong opposition from the incumbents and a cosy relationship between political 
and business circles. In this regard, the NEDA decided to (i) apply the GATS style positive list 
approach based on gradualism and (ii) achieve moderate GATS-plus commitments. 
Even for The Philippines, which was experiencing growing services exports in the 2000s, interests 
in services trade under the Japan-The Philippines FTA were very limited in comparison with goods 
trade. From the outward perspective, it was only the professional services-related regulatory 
authorities (e.g. Philippines Professional Regulatory Commission) which showed offensive export 
interests. Even in the context of professional services, the NEDA had to take into account a 
balance between the interests of professionals, who wanted to work abroad and a brain drain of 
highly skilled people, since the brain drain issue was already a social concern of The 
Philippines.339 Because there was no migration policy in The Philippines, migration of Philippine 
professionals was historically market-driven instead of policy-driven. While the Philippine 
government tried to arrange better access and a better working environment for the Philippine 
professionals who wished to work in Japan, it had to improve the domestic environment to 
encourage them to return. Since nurses and care-workers were domestically oversupplied, the 
NEDA selected them as a negotiation deal. 
The domestic regulatory authorities which administered the growing services sectors, or sectors of 
high-priority for development, did not show any particular export interest, since they thought that 
services trade liberalisation was not a policy device to enhance competitiveness. One example is 
the domestic regulatory authorities which administer the BPO industry with high economic 
potential, such as the Department of Information and Communications Technology. In The 
Philippines, the telecommunication sector reforms, which took place in the 1990s, enhanced the 
back-bone infrastructure. From the early 2000s, the dynamic growth of the BPO industry was 
mainly driven by markets with some policy incentives (e.g. tax). For example, call centre 
operations shifted to The Philippines to benefit from the low-cost and highly educated population. 
In this regard, the domestic regulatory ministries considered that education and human 
development were crucial to strengthen the international comparative advantage of the BPO 
industry. Services trade negotiations under FTAs were not included in their policy options. 
Similarly, the Department of Tourism did not show any interest in services trade negotiations, 
although promoting tourism was part of the national economic and development plan of The 
Philippines.340 For the Department of Tourism, improving infrastructure, customer services and 
strategic advertisement was far more important than improving market access under Mode 3 in the 
                                                          
339 In The Philippines, both the number of medical professionals and local wages of these professionals had already 
decreased in the 2000s. Medical professionals use a working experience at hospitals in The Philippines as a career pass, 
and moved to higher paying jobs abroad. Accordingly, the hospitals in The Philippines started to avoid overinvesting 
expected migrants. From “Who’s to blame for brain drain”, July 2007, available at: 
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/brain_drain. 
340 WTO (2005) and WTO (2012a). 
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tourism sector. For reasons mentioned above, NEDA’s bargaining incentive in the services sector 
as weakened. 
From the inward perspective, the domestic regulatory authorities took defensive positions against 
services liberalisation in general. They strongly rejected any interference from trade negotiations 
with their industrial policy and regulatory domains. They used investment related nationalist 
clauses in the 1987 Constitution of The Philippines (e.g. restriction of foreign ownership to 40% 
with minor adjustment by subsequent legislation) as a shield from liberalisation in Mode 3. The 
professional services regulatory authorities (e.g. Philippines Professional Regulatory Commission) 
also used the 1987 Constitution to protect Philippine professionals. They kept firmly defensive 
positions against improving market access of professional services to The Philippines. 
 Bilateral negotiation stage: The reaction to Japan’s request to apply the negative list approach 
was exactly the same as Malaysia’s. All government departments and agencies participating in the 
decision-making strongly rejected the negative list approach. For example, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs strongly insisted that even the AFAS use the GATS-type progressive liberalisation. While 
the NEDA decided to reject Japan’s request to use the negative list, it persuaded the domestic 
regulatory authorities that The Philippines should make better commitments than Malaysia had 
made under the Japan-Malaysian FTA to position the country above the level playing field. In the 
end, the domestic regulatory authorities agreed to apply what is called the hybrid approach (a 
mixture between the positive approach and negative approach) to take a lead from the other 
ASEAN rivals. 
With regard to the sector-specific requests, the NEDA could act only as a coordinator since it was 
a planning agency without any regulatory power. DTI, which was the major ministry formulating 
trade and investment policy, administered only the manufacturing sector. Therefore, DTI could not 
insist on changing regulations to promote liberalisation even it found economic benefits there. 
Facing the domestic regulatory authorities’ strong resistance against making concessions in Mode 
3, the NEDA had to downgrade the level of achievement as originally envisaged. As a result, The 
Philippines made commitments in 73 sub-sectors, while Japan made commitments in 140 sub-
sectors.341 
 
6.5 Findings 
In the previous sections (6.3 and 6.4), we examined the political economy factors in the decision-
making process which shaped ASEAN’s negotiating positions for bilateral FTAs with Japan by 
                                                          
341 See Oike (2006), p33. 
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applying our policy demand and supply model modified from the model in Mattli (1999b).  We 
first examined the policy demand and supply side interests for the bilateral FTA with Japan. Then 
we looked at the institutions as supply side condition. Below, we extract our findings (Table 6-6). 
 
6.5.1 Interests 
A. Policy demand side interests 
Strong expectations in boosting goods exports and enhancing inward investment from the 
Japanese manufacturing companies 
For the private sector, general motivations for negotiating an FTA with Japan were to boost 
exports in goods and enhance investment relations in the manufacturing sector. While the focus 
was on the manufacturing sector, there was a dearth of awareness about services trade negotiations 
in the first instance. Since the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement was the only FTA activity 
that entered into force prior to the FTA with Japan, and the Framework Agreement excluded the 
services chapter, the private sector in Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines and Indonesia, was not 
well aware of the services segment of FTA negotiations. 
 
Limited export interests in Mode 4 vs. strong defensive interests 
From the policy demand perspective, there were no, or only limited interests, in exporting services 
to Japan, with the exception of Singapore. As we saw in the market environment (6.2.1), ASEAN 
countries in general did not possess export competitiveness in the global markets. In terms of the 
bilateral services trade with Japan, improving the condition of entering the Japanese market in 
some professional services was the offensive interest for the private sector only in Thailand and 
The Philippines. In Indonesia and Viet Nam, such a strong offensive interest did not actually exist 
in the private sector. Rather, it was the government’s initiatives that set out to gain the level 
playing field in terms of the Japan-Thailand FTA and the Japan-The Philippines FTA.  
While there were limited offensive interests, strong defensive interests existed among import 
competing services suppliers, with the exception of Singapore. As an overview of the market 
environments demonstrated (6.2.1), SMEs dominated the services suppliers in terms of numbers in 
the ASEAN countries. Massive fears arose among the local SMEs once the government announced 
the FTA with Japan. GLCs and SOEs were other strong defensive forces. They were afraid that the 
government might accelerate GLC reforms or a privatisation process, by using an FTA with Japan. 
These defensive lobbyists, who were afraid of possible erosion of rents and adjustment costs, 
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maximised client relationships with their domestic regulatory authority behind the scenes to 
deliver their interests. 
 
B. Policy supply side interests 
Influence of general motivations at the initial stage of the decision-making process  
After Singapore joined the FTA bandwagon, competitive bilateralism triggered other ASEAN 
countries to launch FTA activity. Because of strong diplomatic incentives, they jumped into a 
bilateral FTA with Japan without a strategy of substance. Once they started to devise negotiating 
positions, enhancing technology transfer thorough FDI from Japan was set up as the policy priority. 
For most ASEAN countries, FDI in the manufacturing sector, especially IPN related investments 
from Japan, had been playing a crucial role in their economic development since 1980s. After 
recuperating from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, ASEAN countries needed to ensure that the 
manufacturing sector was strong to make their economic development more resistant to a global 
economic crisis. To cope with the emergence of China on the global economy was another 
challenge for them. Especially for some ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, policy 
makers were concerned about a middle income trap of economic modernisation. For these reasons, 
the central economic objective of the bilateral FTA with Japan became enhancing technology 
transfer through FDI from Japanese manufacturing firms. This directly affected negotiating 
positions in services trade. 
 
Policy interests of the lead ministry to apply the AFAS style gradualism vs. strong defensive 
interests of domestic regulatory authorities against the GATS-plus  
In comparison with Japan, motivations of the lead ministry of each ASEAN country in services 
trade negotiations were rather weak. In principle, the lead ministry wished to apply AFAS style 
gradualism. From the outward perspective, the lead ministry was not supported by strong demand 
in the private sector. Due to the limited interest in Mode 4 from the private sector, bargaining 
incentives of the lead ministry became quite weak. From the inward perspective, the lead ministry 
aimed at a level of commitments moderately GATS-plus, which were not accompanied with 
domestic reforms.342 In ASEAN countries, the services sector reforms could not be associated with 
the FTA negotiations since the reforms were managed under the national development & industrial 
agendas. In the 2000s, each ASEAN country was at different stages of sectoral reforms including 
                                                          
342 Since most ASEAN countries retained a large gap between the level of unilateral liberalisation and the level of the 
GATS commitments, making GATS-plus commitments without domestic reforms was technically possible. 
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privatisation, introduction of competition, and sectoral regulatory reforms. In the case of Malaysia, 
through the privatisation process of the IT sector in the early 2000s, the government strategically 
accepted some globally competitive IT players in order to introduce competition. Also, a strong 
political economy (e.g. political relations between SOEs and politicians, and reallocation of 
employment) was always involved during the privatisation process in every ASEAN country. 
Accordingly, the lead ministry thought that it was economically and politically irrational to link 
the privatisation process with a bilateral FTA with Japan. In addition, there were no top-down 
initiatives from a head of state or a ministerial level to use the FTA with Japan as a locking-in 
device of further services sector reforms. 
Interests of the domestic regulatory authorities were extremely defensive. In terms of exports, 
interests were limited to Mode 4 (or nothing in Malaysia). From the inward perspective, they 
simply rejected making GATS-plus commitments. FTA services trade liberalisation was not 
necessary for the domestic regulatory authorities for three reasons. Firstly, the domestic regulatory 
authorities preferred to retain a significant policy flexibility between the unilateral liberalisation 
level and FTA liberalisation level, which was based on developmentalism with strong notions of 
sovereignty intensified. The second reason was that services trade liberalisation was not an 
appealing policy option for domestic regulatory authorities to develop the domestic services sector. 
One example was BPO industry. The Philippines was already becoming internationally 
competitive in some BPO industries such as call-centres. To enhance competitiveness of BPO 
industry, the Government considered education (human resources) and infrastructure to be of the 
greatest importance. Another example is Mode 3 (investment). Domestic regulatory authorities 
were relying on other policy options to attract foreign investments in the services sector such as 
investment promotion (e.g. tax heaven and tax reduction) as well as host country-investor 
diplomacy.343 For domestic regulatory authorities, binding Mode 3 (e.g. majority share of foreign 
capital) under the FTA with Japan was unnecessary. The third reason was a defensive interest 
against changing socio-economic policy or the Constitution. Malaysia and The Philippines had 
specific cases that hindered services liberalisation. In the case of Malaysia, strong defensive 
interests against abolishing the Bumiputera favouring policy affected its negotiating positions. The 
Bumiputera policy was considered as an important pillar of its Malaysia’s socioeconomic and 
development agenda. By providing the favourable conditions, such as creating opportunities of 
employment, technology transfer and enhancing export capacities, the government was 
encouraging the participation of the Bumiputera tribes in economic activities. There were no 
incentives for the Malaysian government to change the Bumiputera favouring policy for the sake 
of the bilateral FTA with Japan. In the case of The Philippines, the 1987 Philippines Constitution 
which includes some trade protectionist provisions was the bottle neck to domestic reforms and 
                                                          
343 See Chapter 5, 5.5.1. 
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services negotiations. Defensive interests used the Constitution as a shelter from competition. 
There was no high-level political incentive to break through the powerful vested interests rooted in 
Philippine society by using the bilateral FTA with Japan. 
 
C. Ideas 
Gradualism as well as developmentalism, with notions of strong sovereignty prevailed in the 
ASEAN countries. Exceptions are Singapore, whose trade policy has been consistently based on 
liberalism, and Viet Nam which shifted from developmentalism to neo-liberal ideas of integrating 
its economy into the world economy through liberalisation at the time of its WTO accession. Since 
the progress of services liberalisation was so slow inside the ASEAN, the AFAS style gradualism 
was deeply implanted in policy makers of Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. 
Therefore, the idea of gradualism could not be drastically changed for the sake of bilateral FTAs 
with Japan. Likewise, a long-standing notion of developmentalism influenced their services 
policy-making. The ASEAN policy makers perceived services trade liberalisation as a part of 
development/industrial policy. In addition to developmentalism, a notion of sovereignty was 
hammered into trade policy makers through the painful lessons of the Asian financial crisis. There 
existed a strong belief that services policy and the speed of liberalisation should be decided not by 
international negotiations such as FTAs, but by themselves. Therefore, the ASEAN policy makers 
greatly hesitated to make commitments that reduce the policy space between the level of 
substantial liberalisation and the level of commitments under the GATS at the time of the Japan-
ASEAN bilateral FTAs.  
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Table 6-8 (1): Political economy factors in decision-making which shaped the ASEAN’s negotiating positions - Interests 
 Singapore Malaysia The Philippines Thailand Indonesia Viet Nam 
 
Interests 
Policy demand 
side and supply 
side: 
 
Strong offensive 
interests with 
limited 
defensive 
interests 
 
Ideas 
Liberalism 
Policy demand side: 
 Defensive interests 
(e.g. GLCs) with no 
offensive interests 
 
Policy supply side: 
• Limited interests  of 
the lead ministry vs. 
strong defensive 
interests of domestic 
regulatory authorities 
• No incentives to 
abolish the 
Bumiputera favouring 
policy 
• Influence of general 
interests 
 Strong diplomatic 
incentive with 
absence of strategy 
in substance  
 Boost trade and FDI 
with technology 
transfer 
 No incentives to 
lock-in domestic 
reforms 
 
 
Ideas: 
 Gradualism 
 Developmentalism 
with notions of strong 
sovereignty 
Policy demand side: 
• Strong defensive 
interests with limited 
offensive interests in 
some professional 
services 
 
Policy supply side: 
• Offensive interests 
only in Mode 4 vs. 
strong defensive 
interests of domestic 
regulatory authorities 
• No incentives to 
change the 
Constitution 
• Influence of general 
interests 
 Strong diplomatic 
incentive with 
absence of strategy 
in substance 
 Boost trade and FDI 
with technology 
transfer 
 No incentives to 
lock-in domestic 
reforms 
 
Ideas: 
 Gradualism 
 Developmentalism 
with notions of strong 
sovereignty 
Policy demand side:  
• Strong defensive 
interests with limited 
offensive interests in 
some professional 
services 
 
Policy supply side:  
• Offensive interests 
only in Mode 4 vs. 
strong defensive 
interests of domestic 
regulatory authorities 
• Influence of general 
interests 
 Strong diplomatic 
incentive with 
absence of strategy 
in substance 
 Boost trade and FDI 
with technology 
transfer 
 No incentives to 
lock-in domestic 
reforms 
 
 
 
 
Ideas: 
 Gradualism 
 Developmentalism 
with notions of strong 
sovereignty 
Policy demand side: 
• Strong defensive 
interests 
 
Policy supply side:  
• Little interests of the 
lead ministry vs. 
strong defensive 
interests of domestic 
regulatory authorities 
• Influence of general 
interests 
 Strong diplomatic 
incentive with 
absence of strategy 
in substance 
 Boost trade and FDI 
with technology 
transfer 
 No incentives to 
lock-in domestic 
reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideas: 
 Gradualism 
 Developmentalism 
with notions of strong 
sovereignty 
 
Policy demand side: 
• Welcomed the Viet 
Nam’s WTO 
accession 
• No interests in 
services in general 
 
 
Policy supply side:  
• No incentives and 
capacities to make 
commitments 
more than the 
ones made for the 
WTO accession 
 
• General interests:  
 Boost trade and 
FDI with 
technology 
transfer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideas: 
 Radical shift to 
liberalism 
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Table 6-8 (2): Political-economy factor in decision-making which shaped the ASEAN’s negotiating positions - Institutions 
 Singapore Malaysia The Philippines Thailand Indonesia Viet Nam 
Institutions 
(Supply side 
condition) 
 Veto power of 
domestic 
regulatory 
authorities due to 
horizontal 
fragmentation of 
government 
regressed the lead 
ministry 
 
 Weak political 
power of Ministry 
of Trade and 
Industry to 
achieve high-level 
services 
agreements: No 
authorisation 
power  
 Strong political 
power of the 
domestic 
regulatory 
authorities to 
retain policy 
stability (=the 
status-quo 
regulatory 
environments) 
 
 
 
 Veto power of 
domestic regulatory 
authorities due to 
horizontal 
fragmentation of 
government regressed 
the lead ministry 
 
 Weak political power 
of MIDA to achieve 
reasonably GATS-plus: 
No authorisation 
power  
 Strong political 
power of the 
domestic regulatory 
authorities to retain 
the status-quo (GATS 
commitments) 
 Strong defensive 
force of Khazanah 
Nasional and 
Employees Provident 
Fund to protect 
Bumiputera favouring 
policy: strong client 
relationship with GLCs 
and Ethnic Chamber 
of Commerce 
 Veto power of domestic 
regulatory authorities 
due to horizontal 
fragmentation of 
government regressed 
the lead ministry 
 
 Weak political power of 
NEDA to achieve 
reasonably GATS-plus: 
No authorisation power  
 Strong political power 
of the domestic 
regulatory authorities to 
retain the status-quo 
(GATS commitments) 
 Strong defensive force 
to protect 1987 
Philippines constitution 
(e.g. professional 
services and investment 
related clause): strong 
client relationship with 
Professional 
Associations 
 
 Veto power of 
domestic 
regulatory 
authorities due to 
horizontal 
fragmentation of 
government 
regressed the lead 
ministry 
 
 Weak political 
power of Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 
to achieve 
moderate GATS-
plus: No 
authorisation 
power  
 Strong political 
power of the 
domestic 
regulatory 
authorities to 
retain the status-
quo (GATS 
commitments) 
 Strong defensive 
force to protect 
SOEs and SMEs: 
strong client 
relationship with  
sectoral 
associations  
 
 Veto power of 
domestic 
regulatory 
authorities due to 
horizontal 
fragmentation of 
government 
regressed the lead 
ministry 
 
 Weak political 
power of Ministry 
of Trade to 
achieve moderate 
GATS-plus: No 
authorisation 
power  
 Strong political 
power of the 
domestic 
regulatory 
authorities to 
retain the status-
quo (GATS 
commitments 
 Strong defensive 
force to protect 
SOEs and SMEs: 
strong client 
relationship with  
sectoral 
associations  
 
 
* Not Applicable as 
Japan welcomed 
Viet Nam’s WTO 
accession and the 
level of services 
trade 
commitments 
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 6.5.2 Institutions (Supply side condition) 
Horizontal fragmentation of government and veto power of the domestic regulatory 
authorities 
As in the case of Japan itself, almost all domestic regulatory ministries in ASEAN countries were 
involved in the service policy-making process for an FTA with Japan. A wide participation of 
domestic regulatory ministries in the decision-making process created horizontal fragmentation of 
power. And horizontal fragmentation of power strengthened the preference of the status-quo 
among domestic regulatory ministries. By exercising veto power, the regulatory authorities 
successfully levelled down the negotiating positions of the lead ministry and blocked making 
concessions to Japan. We summarise the mechanism of veto power as follows. 
First of all, political power of the lead ministry was too weak to achieve its interests. The lead 
ministry could only put together the positions of domestic regulatory ministries, as a coordinator 
without authorisation power. In the case of ASEAN, a ministry which was designated as the lead 
ministry of services trade negotiations with Japan was either a trade ministry or a development 
related authority which did not administer any specific services sector. In addition, very limited 
interests in services trade exports of the private sector weakend the lead ministry’s negotiating 
power. By contrast, all domestic regulatory ministries, which were endowed with regulatory power, 
were strong enough to maintain the status-quo (keeping the GATS level commitments). First, they 
could justify their defensive position by using legitimate objectives for regulations, as well as its 
sectoral segmentation in implementing industrial and development policy. Secondly, the domestic 
regulatory ministries were well captured by domestic vested interests. The lead ministry could not 
intervene in a strong client relationship between the domestic regulatory ministries and the private 
sector, namely GLCs/SOEs and the professional associations.  
In this way, the domestic regulatory authorities exercised veto power against making GATS-plus 
commitments. The strong political power of maintaining “policy stability” forced the lead ministry 
to retreat further in its negotiating positions. 
 
6.5.3. Other issues 
The analysis above is a summary about our findings which applied to Malaysia, The Philippines, 
Thailand and Indonesia. We have to note that the situations of Singapore and Viet Nam were 
different. In the case of Singapore, which is an open and liberal economy, the country had a 
comparative advantage in services trade. Thus, there were strong economic interests in improving 
services trade and investment relations with Japan unlike the other ASEAN countries. 
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Viet Nam’s case was unique because the country started FTA negotiations with Japan immediately 
after joining the WTO (2007). For the WTO accession, Viet Nam was forced to make higher 
commitments than other ASEAN countries which had become the WTO Members under the 
GATT system.344 The country also committed itself to use the WTO as political leverage for 
economic reforms. Consequently, very limited policy flexibility between the level of substantial 
liberalisation and the level of the GATS commitments was left. Privatisation of SOEs was the only 
issue left over for future international trade negotiations. The Viet Namese private sector was also 
quite different from the private sector in Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines and Indonesia. It is 
true that the private sector was afraid of being exposed to global competition at the time of the 
WTO accession. However, the Viet Namese private sector perceived that this would be the only 
way to compete with China and to make the Viet Namese economy globally competitive. 
Therefore, they welcomed the country’s accession to the WTO and tried to make use of 
international economic agreements as business opportunities. Since Japan embraced the high level 
commitments which Viet Nam had made for the WTO accession in 2007, it proposed technical 
assistance to implement Viet Nam’s WTO commitments under the Japan-Viet Nam FTA. For 
these reasons, cooperation featured strongly under the Japan-Viet Nam FTA. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter empirically demonstrated how interests and institutions shaped the negotiating 
positions of ASEAN for the bilateral FTAs with Japan by applying our policy demand and supply 
side model. 
We first provided the policy and market environments of the ASEAN countries in the 2000s as a 
basis of argument. Although ASEAN is a region of diversity, we could see some common features. 
In terms of markets, after recuperating from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, ASEAN countries 
were going through steady economic growth accompanied by economic modernisation. Although 
the presence of the services sector was becoming important in terms of economic outputs and 
employment, the role of the services trade in the economy was still limited, with the exception of 
Singapore and The Philippines. Also, the services sector was still dominated by SOEs and/or 
GLCs in terms of output and by SMEs in terms of the number of suppliers. The role of FDI in the 
services sector gradually increased from the early 2000s, however, the major investors were the 
US and the EU (Japan was the major investor in the manufacturing sector). In terms of policy, 
economic modernisation and economic growth was the key policy area for the ASEAN 
governments. In many ASEAN countries, catching-up industrialisation policy focused on 
                                                          
344 See Figure 3-34. 
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technological transfer and localisation in the manufacturing sector with little attention to the 
services sector. Whereas ASEAN governments unilaterally liberalised services, and sectoral 
reforms took place in the infrastructure services, there was a huge gap between the substantial 
liberalisation and the level of the GATS commitments. At the ASEAN level, services integration 
under AFAS did not make substantial progress. It was only the 7th package of commitments (2009) 
onwards when the level of commitments became substantially GATS-plus. 
Based on the overviews of markets and policy environments in the 2000s, we conducted the policy 
demand and supply side analysis. On the policy demand side, there was no interest or very limited 
export interest in certain professional services. On the other hand, strong defensive interests 
against the market liberalisation including the professional associations, sector associations and 
GLCs/SOEs, lobbied the domestic regulatory ministries by maximising its client-relationship with 
its regulatory ministry. On the policy supply side, the basic positions of the lead ministry in 
ASEAN became rather weak influenced by general motivations for the bilateral FTAs with Japan, 
including strong diplomatic incentive with a lack of strategy in substance, enhancing technological 
transfer through IPN related investments in the manufacturing sector. The lead ministry aimed at 
an AFAS-compatible FTA based on gradualism. On the other hand, domestic regulatory 
authorities showed strong defensive interests against making GATS-plus commitments for several 
reasons (e.g. protecting its regulatory autonomy; retaining policy space between the unilateral 
liberalisation level and the commitment under the FTA with Japan; and protecting import- 
competing services suppliers). 
As in the case of Japan, horizontal fragmentation of government created a veto power of the 
domestic regulatory authorities with a strong preference for the status-quo (not more than the 
GATS commitments). Although the lead ministry in ASEAN countries did not hold high 
incentives like the lead ministry of Japan, it faced strong resistance from the domestic regulatory 
authorities against making the GATS-plus commitments during the bilateral sectoral negotiations. 
Due to the private sector’s lack of export interest, as well as having no authorisation power, the 
lead ministry could hardly convince the domestic regulatory authorities to make concessions to the 
liberalisation requests from Japan. In this way, domestic regulatory authorities’ resistance pushed 
the lead ministry’s negotiating positions further back. Consequently, the Japan-ASEAN bilateral 
FTAs resulted in the shallow GATS-plus FTAs.  
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Chapter 7: Findings and Evaluation of Research 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In spite of an upsurge of bilateral FTAs in East Asia from the beginning of the 2000s, policy-led 
services integration does not take place in East Asia. This research investigated the political 
economy reasons why the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs concluded in the 2000s resulted in 
shallow GATS-plus services trade agreements. Given that barriers to services trade emanate from 
domestic regulations, we assumed that domestic factors would have significant effects on the 
results of the negotiations. Then we analysed interests and institutions in the domestic decision-
making of Japan and ASEAN by applying our policy demand and supply side model reframed 
from Mattli (1999a) in Chapter 5 and 6. This final chapter concludes this study in the following 
order. First, we test two hypotheses based on the results of the case study. Then we review the 
project from the analytical and methodological point of view. Lastly, we consider areas for future 
research. 
 
7.2 Testing hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis: The Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs concluded in the 2000s resulted in shallow 
GATS-plus FTAs because of political economy impediments in domestic decision-making: (i) 
limited pro-liberal interests, versus strong anti-liberal interests, both on the policy demand 
and supply sides and (ii) policy supply side constraints characterised as a horizontal 
fragmentation of power in combination with domestic regulatory authorities’ veto power 
against policy changes to the status-quo. 
 
This research project postulates first that policy demand and supply side interests act as a 
prerequisite to forming national negotiating positions to promote plurilateral services trade 
liberalisation and, second, that the domestic decision-making structure provides critical conditions 
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to shape interests. Below, we assess whether the empirical evidence of Japan (Chapter 5) and 
ASEAN (Chapter 6) support the hypothesis.  
 
Interests 
With regard to interests, the empirical evidence of Japan and ASEAN can be summarised as 
follows. On the policy demand side, the defensive interests of the import-competing services 
suppliers and incumbents in the imperfect competition, who were afraid of the erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs, overwhelmed weak export interests. On the policy supply side, strong diplomatic 
incentives to join the FTA bandwagon and strong interests in goods trade negotiations undermined 
the countries’ negotiating positions on services trade. Also, there were limited or no incentives to 
lock in domestic reforms by arising from the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs. Thus, the empirical 
evidence of Japan and ASEAN supports the hypothesis on interests. However, the empirical 
evidence revealed that the interests of Japan and those of ASEAN were different in detail, 
reflecting the level of development as well as market and policy environments in the 2000s.  
In the case of Japan, export interests in services trade were unclear. This is not only due to a lack 
of global competitiveness in the Japanese services sector, but also due to a lack of interest in 
international services negotiations in general for some reasons (e.g. technical limits of the GATS 
as a negotiation tool, forum choice of the private economic diplomacy, and the business method of 
Japanese companies). Although the policy demand side interests of Japan were not as defensive as 
those of ASEAN countries, some professional services (i.e. nurses and care workers), who were 
afraid of erosion of rents and adjustment costs, actively lobbied to their regulatory authority 
(Ministry of Health, labour and Welfare) with a stress on maximising a strong client relationship. 
Consequently, defensive interests prevailed over unclear offensive interests in Japan. As for the 
policy supply side, the lead ministry had a strong interest in achieving high-quality GATS-plus 
FTAs in terms of both coverage and the level of commitments and was motivated to lock in 
domestic reforms in the areas of medical related professionals (i.e. nurses and care workers). 
However, strong defensive forces of the domestic regulatory authorities conquered the pro-reform 
incentives. In addition, general motivations to create the FTAs with ASEAN further undermined 
the negotiating positions for services trade at the final stage of negotiation deals with ASEAN 
countries. First, the desire to dismantle economic disadvantages of the Japanese private sector and 
to take a lead in developing an FTA network in East Asia, became a strong diplomatic incentive 
for speedy conclusion of FTAs with ASEAN. From the economic perspective, enhancing regional 
supply chains in the manufacturing sector was the most important negotiation issue backed by the 
strong offensive lobbies of Japanese manufacturers. Finally, we should note that the idea of 
‘manufacturalism’, which is strongly embedded in the Japanese society, influenced the interests of 
the business lobbyists as well as policy makers.  
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On the ASEAN side, export interests existed only in limited professional services while almost all 
domestic services suppliers (i.e. GLCs, SOEs and local SMEs) were afraid of erosion of rents and 
adjustment costs. Since the private sector in ASEAN, with the exception of Singapore, had never 
experienced FTA services negotiations before the bilateral FTA with Japan, massive fears mostly 
arose from risk aversion due to a lack of understanding the potential impact. For ASEAN 
governments, there was no substantial strategy in services trade in the first instance since ASEAN 
countries jumped into FTA activity with a strong diplomatic incentive. With regard to the bilateral 
FTA with Japan, enhancing technology transfer by attracting IPN related investments in the 
manufacturing sector was identified as a strong economic motivation from the development and 
industrial policy perspective. There were also no incentives to lock-in domestic reforms using the 
bilateral FTA with Japan because services sector reforms were implemented under 
development/industrial policy agendas. Also, politics was deeply involved in the GLCs and SOEs 
reform process. Lastly, we have to note that ideas of gradualism and developmentalism with 
notions of strong sovereignty formed the basic stance of the ASEAN’s passive attitudes towards 
FTA services liberalisation. 
 
Institutions (Supply side condition) 
With regard to institutions, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis. The empirical evidence 
demonstrated that the services trade policy-making structure, namely a wide participation of 
domestic regulatory authorities in the decision-making process (horizontal fragmentation of 
power), constituted a fundamental blockage in the way of Japan-ASEAN FTA services 
liberalisation. Domestic regulatory authorities, with strong regulatory concerns and a strong 
preference for protecting import-competing services suppliers, exercised a veto power against 
policy changes in the status-quo both in Japan and ASEAN. Consequently, the lead ministry’s 
negotiating positions were set back and liberalisation concessions offers were hardly made. 
Horizontal fragmentation of power created by a wide participation of domestic regulatory 
authorities in domestic decision-making was the key both in Japan and ASEAN since horizontal 
fragmentation of power enabled domestic regulatory authorities with a strong preference for the 
status-quo to exercise veto power. Given the lead ministry’s lack of authorisation power, policy 
stability could not be changed by the lead ministry. Whereas the logic of veto power applies to 
both Japan and ASEAN, we find two significant differences between the Japan’s situation and the 
ASEAN’s situation. One is the level of the status-quo as well as the reasons behind the domestic 
regulatory authorities’ strong preference for the status-quo. The other is the level of the lead 
ministry’s negotiating positions. 
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In the case of Japan, the level of the status-quo for the domestic regulatory authorities meant 
maintaining substantial liberalisation. In other words, ‘policy stability’ meant no changes in the 
domestic regulatory environments. And the reasons why the domestic regulatory authorities had a 
strong preference for the status-quo were: (i) regulatory concerns (i.e. maintaining strong 
regulatory autonomy and pursuing their regulatory objectives) and (ii) protecting defensive 
interests in Mode 4 (Japanese nurses and care workers). The lead ministry aimed at high-quality 
services trade agreements accompanied with domestic reforms in some sectors including the 
medical services. However, the domestic regulatory authorities exercised a veto power against 
making any regulatory changes in the area of professional services. Since the lead ministry was 
simply a coordinator without any authorisation power, the lead ministry could not break through 
‘policy stability’. As a result, the concessions for ASEAN were made under the existing legal 
framework without any regulatory changes.    
In the case of ASEAN, the level of the status-quo located by the domestic regulatory authorities 
was the GATS commitments level (or moderate GATS-plus), which was significantly lower than 
that of Japan. The domestic regulatory authorities wanted to retain the status-quo where no GATS-
plus commitments were made. The reasons were not merely regulatory concerns (i.e. maintaining 
regulatory autonomy and pursuing regulatory objectives) and protecting defensive interests in a 
certain sector or mode against erosion of rents as in the case of Japan. Rather, defensive interests 
of the domestic regulatory authorities in ASEAN covered a wide range of sectors and modes of 
supply for three reasons. These included: (i) a strong desire to retain policy space between the 
unilateral liberalisation level and the FTA commitment level, in order to be resilient in the face of 
exogenous economic factors; (ii) little motivation to use services trade liberalisation as a policy 
device for developing the domestic services sector; and (iii) defensive interests against changing 
socio economic policy or the Constitution. The lead ministry of ASEAN countries was also not 
motivated to make high-quality services trade agreements as the lead ministry of Japan did. The 
lead ministry preferred the AFAS type services agreements based on gradualism. Due to a lack of 
interest in the policy demand side, the negotiating power of the lead ministry became very weak. 
Since the domestic regulatory authorities exercised a veto power against making GATS-plus 
commitments, the lead ministry could hardly make concession offers to Japan. 
In short, the empirical evidence of Japan and ASEAN demonstrated that the domestic regulatory 
authorities with a strong preference for the status-quo pushed back the lead ministry’s negotiating 
positions and blocked the making concessions by exercising a veto power. Since the lead ministry 
did not hold any authorisation power, it had to yield to the negotiating positions of the domestic 
regulatory authorities. The empirical evidence also indicated, in further detail, that the level of the 
status-quo set by domestic regulatory authorities and the level of the negotiation target set by the 
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lead ministry reflect the economic development level as well as market and policy environments in 
the 2000s.  
 
What do our findings reveal? 
The findings above epitomise the fact that both interests and institutions (supply side condition) 
became political economy impediments to FTA services trade integration in East Asia. In other 
words, two layers of political economy impediments constrained policy-led services trade 
integration in East Asia. The question then is: do these domestic political economy impediments 
reflect the distinctive characteristics of East Asia or simply the heterogeneity of services? The 
answer is that while institutions do reflect the heterogeneous nature of services, interests of the 
policy demand and supply sides mostly reflect the distinctive characteristics of East Asia.  
The first layer of impediments is the decision-making institutions which reflect the heterogeneity 
of services. This is a horizontal fragmentation of power that creates a veto power of domestic 
regulatory authorities. Because the heterogeneity of services equally applies to all countries and 
regions, it is an unavoidable political economy impediment when a country negotiates services 
trade both at the plurilateral level and the multilateral level. In comparison with trade in goods 
negotiations, we should properly understand this institutional complexity at the domestic level.  
The second layer of political economy impediments is interests which mostly reflect the distinctive 
characteristics of East Asia. Let us start with Japan. On the policy demand side, there were two 
reasons for nebulous interests.345 The first is the economic relation between Japan and ASEAN. 
The major business activity was ‘B to B’ in the manufacturing-related services sector in the 2000s. 
But ‘B to B’ business was stagnating in the early to middle of the 2000s due to escalating 
competition in the Japanese markets and diminished market attractiveness of ASEAN due to 
aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. The weak services trade relation between Japan 
and ASEAN countries, with the exception of Singapore revealed the distinctive characteristics of 
East Asia. The second reasons are non-economic. The Japanese business method of trying to adapt 
themselves to the host countries’ regulatory systems and culture as well as a strong preference for 
private economic diplomacy with the host country’s government rather than trade negotiations can 
be identified as a specificity of Japan. On the policy supply side, the following general interests in 
FTAs affected the negotiating positions of Japan. These are: (i) the ultimate goal was concluding 
FTAs to champion FTA bilateralism in East Asia and (ii) the primary focus was to support 
regional supply chains for Japanese manufacturers. Both strongly reflect the distinctive 
characteristics of Japan. Furthermore, we have to note that the ideas of ‘manufacturalism’, which is 
                                                          
345 See the explanation of reasons of unclear interests in 5.5. 
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a unique characteristic of Japan, strongly influenced the formation of interest both on the policy 
demand and supply sides. 
Next, let us explain ASEAN’s distinctive characteristics. On the policy demand side, a lack of 
export competitiveness and limited comparative advantage in Mode 4 resulted in negligible 
interests in pro-liberalisation. In addition, strong government intervention and imperfect 
competition as well as uncompetitive local SMEs became a powerful force against services 
liberalisation. These can be understood as typical characteristics of developing countries rather 
than of ASEAN in particular. On the policy supply side, four distinctive characteristics of ASEAN 
can be identified. First, general incentives for FTAs, which affected the negotiating positions of 
ASEAN: both (i) strong diplomatic incentive; and (ii) enhancing technology transfer through FDI 
in the manufacturing sector, reflect strong characteristics of ASEAN. Second, strong support of the 
GATS-type services trade agreement was greatly influenced by the AFAS, which is based on 
gradualism. For ASEAN, AFAS became the model for regional services trade integration.346 Third, 
resistance to making commitments in services reflects the policy environment of ASEAN. As the 
evidence of high regulatory barriers in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Viet Nam347 illustrates, 
ASEAN governments have a clear tendency to use domestic regulations as a protection measure. 
Lastly, a strong preference for retaining policy space between the level of unilateral liberalisation 
and commitments under the FTA reflects an ideology of developmentalism with a firm notion of 
sovereignty in ASEAN countries. 
In short, while the institutional factor reflects the heterogeneity of services, interests mostly reflect 
the distinctive characteristics of East Asia. The heterogeneity of services constituted the first layer 
of impediment and the distinctive characteristics of East Asia constituted the second layer of 
impediment. From our research, we can conclude that the double layered impediments of domestic 
political economy significantly undermine services trade integration in East Asia. 
 
7.3 Analytical constraints 
A significant feature of this study was to address the lacuna in IPE literature on the East Asian 
FTA activity. As described in Chapter 1, there exists some IPE literature on domestic factors, 
however, contributions are still limited and require further development. From the analytical point 
of view, this research project has made two major contributions. One is that this research project 
                                                          
346 AFAS was referred as “ASEAN style” by many ASEAN government officials during a series of interviews which 
took place in 2015. 
347 See Chapter 2. 
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pioneered the introduction of a thematic approach348 to IPE scholarly work on East Asian FTA 
activity. Before this research, a complete analysis of domestic factors and their effect on outcomes 
of a specific thematic agreement did not exist.349 Second, we modified Mattli’s policy demand and 
supply side model to better reflect the strong influence of policy supply side interests in the FTA 
activity of East Asia.  
While this project could make analytical contributions to the IPE literature on the East Asian FTA 
activity, the research reveals two analytical constraints. The first constraint is the policy demand 
and supply side model. The modified analytical framework allowed us to analyse interests of both 
policy demand and supply sides and the supply side condition (institutions). Since horizontal 
fragmentation of power during inter-government coordination was identified as the heterogeneity 
of services trade negotiations, the analytical framework, which spotlighted the decision-making 
institutions of the policy supply side, could well explain the complex governmental decision-
making process. Nevertheless, the policy demand and supply side model itself had a structural 
constraint since the model cannot reflect institutions of the policy demand side. In actual fact, the 
policy demand side institutions, that is how interests of the policy demand side are delivered to the 
policy supply side in the decision-making process, affect shaping the policy supply side interests. 
In our argument, we balanced out the constraint by incorporating the analysis of policy demand 
side institutions into our discussion of policy demand side interests as ‘interest representation’.350 
The second constraint is that within the analytical framework, which focused on domestic factors, 
international factors became exogenous despite the fact that domestic factors and international 
factors are intertwined in reality. In the case of Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs, a strong regional 
hegemonic rivalry between China and Japan in East Asia regionalism (see Dent, 2008) impacted 
on the negotiations. China, an emerging economy and political power of the Region, proposed to 
ASEAN to create the ASEAN-Chinan FTA in 2000. China’s proposal was quite appealing for 
ASEAN as the agreement took the early harvest approach excluding services. Since the shallow 
ASEAN-China framework agreement entered into force in 2003, Thailand, The Philippines, and 
Malaysia have made use of the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement to resist the high-quality 
services agreements (i.e. a negative list approach) proposed by Japan. While they showed deep 
appreciation of the China’s diplomacy in esteeming developmental interests of ASEAN, they 
condemned Japan’s diplomacy as forcing Anglo-market-liberalism onto ASEAN. As a result, 
                                                          
348 As long as the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs are concerned, there was no single case of the cross-sector concessions 
at the international negotiation level (Oike 2007). Therefore, the analytical framework which focused on domestic 
decision-making for services trade negotiations had a strong correlation with the results of negotiations.  
349 One of reasons would be perhaps the quality analysis of agreements and commitments requires a legal disciplinary 
approach as well as technical knowledge in a particular economic issue. 
350 See Chapter 5:5.3.1.C and Chapter 6:6.3.1.C. 
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Japan had to withdraw their proposal of high-quality services agreements from the negotiation 
table.351 
 
7.4 Methodological limitations 
The methodological strength of this research lay in providing empirical studies of both signatories 
of the bilateral FTAs: Japan and ASEAN. As pointed out in Chapter 1 (1.2.2), observation of 
simply one signatory cannot demonstrate the strong correlation between domestic factors and the 
outcomes of the negotiations. By analysing the domestic factors of both signatories of a bilateral 
FTA, we were able to establish more clearly a causal link between domestic factors and the results 
of negotiations in comparison with studies which provided only one signatory case study such as 
Solis (2010 and 2013). 
While we attempted the best possible methodology to analyse international political economy of 
services trade integration in East Asia, there have been three methodological limitations as 
outlined below. 
 
Limits of qualitative interviews 
This project selected the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs as a case study. Accordingly, the case 
study had to cover seven countries. These were: Japan and six ASEAN countries (Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, Indonesia and Viet Nam) which concluded bilateral FTAs 
with Japan. This research project benefitted from the network that the researcher had established 
through previous positions at UNCTAD, the Japanese government as well as the Keidanren. The 
network was especially useful for accessing Japanese government officials, private sector 
individuals and policy analysts at the international organisations. 
In comparison, the researcher faced difficulties in having access to ASEAN government officials 
as well as private sector individuals of ASEAN countries. This was not only because the researcher 
did not have such an intensive network as the one with Japan, but also because the policy-making 
practices of ASEAN countries were not so open. For example, the qualitative interviews with 
ASEAN government officials that did materialise were the ones which were supported by Japanese 
senior government officials or senior officials of international organisations. It should be noted that 
even with this support, only half of the attempted appointments materialised in the end. ASEAN 
government officials and private sector individuals seemed fearful of unveiling the facts or their 
                                                          
351 See Chapter 5: 5.4 and 5.5.3. 
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thoughts even under full assurance of confidence. As a result, the sample size of interviewees of 
ASEAN was smaller than that of Japan. 
 
Limits of qualitative analysis 
Qualitative analysis was employed as the major method of this research project. While this enabled 
us to provide rich explanations on actors involved in the services decision-making process, 
collection of qualitative data over seven countries (Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, The 
Philippines, Indonesia and Viet Nam) was extremely time consuming. Amongst these, collecting 
the same level of qualitative data over six ASEAN countries was extremely difficult. To make the 
research project manageable within a fixed timeframe, the author had to carefully examine the 
amount of qualitative data to be collected and estimate time and procedure to collect the data 
during the research design process. 
 
Limited primary and secondary sources of information about services trade policy-making 
of ASEAN countries in comparison with those of Japan 
The author of this work had the privilege of using the Japanese language as a mother tongue for 
collecting primary and secondary sources of information which are not available in English. On the 
other hand, collecting primary and secondary sources of information about services trade policy-
making of ASEAN countries could not reach the level of achievement for the case study on Japan 
(Chapter 5). This was mainly because records of trade policy-making practice as well as policy-
related information (e.g. negotiation records, policy papers of the private sector, detailed 
information on the government websites) were very limited in developing countries. In addition, 
non-English speaking ASEAN countries (i.e. Thailand, Indonesia and Viet Nam) had limited 
sources of information in English in the area of our analysis. 
 
7.5 Areas for future research 
From this research project, two areas for future study can be identified. First, one could develop 
this research project to a process tracing analysis. This means that one could apply the analytical 
framework of this project to examine the impact of domestic political economy factors on the 
ASEAN++ type of FTAs in East Asia, such as currently negotiated ASEAN plus six (Regional 
Economic Partnership (RCEP)). Second, one could include the international factors, which are 
treated as exogenous factors under this project, into the analytical framework.   
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Political economy of the domestic decision-making and its impacts on the outcomes of RCEP 
This project provided a snapshot of the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs negotiations which took 
place in the 2000s to examine how domestic political economy factors influenced the outcomes of 
FTA negotiations. Since ASEAN plus one type of FTAs were negotiated in the 2000s, market and 
policy environments have been gradually changing. Consequently, domestic political economy 
factors would be reshaped from the 2000s. For instance, the interests of the governments as well as 
the private sector would gradually evolve in response to environmental changes. Given the socio-
economic diversities in East Asia, offensive interests in FTA services trade negotiations may grow 
in some countries whilst offensive interests in other countries may stay with the status-quo in other 
countries. As for the domestic decision-making structure, horizontal fragmentation of government, 
which is considered as a heterogeneity of services trade policy-making, is likely to remain. The 
services trade negotiations require the participation of almost all domestic regulatory ministries 
during the domestic policy-making process. And a lead ministry without an authorisation power 
would continuously face difficulties in drawing negotiating flexibility from the domestic 
regulatory authorities with political power. It is expected that as FTA negotiating matters go 
deeper into domestic regulatory issues, so there would be more resistance to protect their 
regulatory autonomy from the domestic regulatory authorities. As for ideas, they cannot be 
radically changed. However, they can gradually evolve over time as the market and policy 
environments change at the domestic and international level. 
In this regard, the result of this research project can be used as phase one of the process tracing 
research about impacts of domestic political economy on FTA services trade negotiations in East 
Asia (Figure 7-1). By conducting process tracing analysis, we can further develop the argument on 
whether the heterogeneity of services, or distinctive characteristics of East Asia, are stronger in 
nature. The RCEP would become a good case study once the negotiations are completed. 
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Figure 7-1: Areas for future research – Process tracing research on the impact of domestic 
political economy 
 
 
Incorporating international political economy factors into endogenous factors  
This research project illuminated the impact of domestic political economy factors on the 
negotiating outcomes, since domestic regulations are the central negotiating issues in the case of 
services trade, as described in terms of the heterogeneity of services in Chapter 2. On the other 
hand, from the empirical evidence, we found that Sino-Japan regional hegemonic rivalry in 
forming FTAs was also an important factor which negatively influenced the outcomes of Japan-
ASEAN bilateral FTAs in the 2000s. Grossman and Helpman (1995) underlined that international 
interdependence sets the parameters for the domestic political contest, while the domestic political 
environment constrains the actions that governments can take internationally (Grossman and 
Helpman 1995, p668). In this regard, incorporating international political factors into endogenous 
factors of an analytical framework can develop debates on the political economy of services trade 
integration in East Asia. 
For example, a theory of FTA championship (Dent 2007) would be a useful theory from this 
perspective. According to Dent (2007), there exist three types of FTA models in the Asia-Pacific 
region. One is the US’s ‘asymmetric neo-liberal’ FTA model (Dent 2007, p464) which is based on 
strong market liberalism with a wide scope of coverage in the non-tariff issues without economic 
co-operation considerations. The second is Japan’s FTA model which basically shares the US 
approach with strong economic co-operation considerations. The third is China’s ‘developing 
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country’ FTA model which applies gradualism with a simple FTA framework focusing on trade in 
goods liberalisation. 
Another theory is asymmetric power among FTA members and its influences on the FTA 
provisions. Dent (2010b) spotlighted the changing nature of FTAs in the Asia Pacific region, 
which is a transition from market access negotiations to negotiations and contestations of 
commercial regulatory provisions. He detected that asymmetric power among FTA members 
influences the ‘FTA templates’ (e.g. scope, coverage and nature). A major power can enforce its 
preferable ‘FTA templates’ and draw more concessions from smaller countries. For example, the 
US could force the most comprehensive, WTO-plus type of FTA which includes non-tariff issues 
such as investment, intellectual property, competition, environment standards and government 
procurement. 
In the 2000s, China’s ‘developing country’ FTA model was strongly supported by ASEAN 
countries and negatively influenced the outcomes of services trade negotiations in the Japan-
ASEAN FTAs. As for RCEP, which model, either Japan’s model, China’s model or the US model, 
would champion designing services trade agreements and determining the level of commitments? 
In the 2010s, the TPP, which applies the US model, can be considered as a potential international 
factor which may trigger services integration in East Asia under RCEP. As seven countries 
(Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Viet Nam) out of 17 RCEP 
participating countries have already joined the TPP, political and/or economic domino effects of 
TPP are likely to take place sooner or later.  Currently, South Korea, which already has a bilateral 
FTA with the US, shows strong interest in participating in the TPP. Indonesia also showed an 
intention to join the TPP. 352 Consequently, the influence of the US model will become stronger. 
However, from the theory of asymmetric power among FTA members and its influences on the 
FTA provisions, RCEP would not be able to achieve a high-level services agreement like the one 
for the TPP due to the absence of the US. 
In short, domestic political economy factors constitute the fundamental impediments to services 
integration in East Asia. However, if one inserts the systemic international factors into an 
analytical framework in addition to the domestic factors, the argument would become more 
powerful and comprehensive.  
 
  
                                                          
352  The President Widodo of Indonesia showed interests in joining the TPP at the bilateral summit meeting with 
President Obama of the US which took place in 26 October, 2015. However, questions remain as to the domestic 
capacities of market liberalisation in Indonesia. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
Services trade integration in East Asia lags far behind goods trade integration. The objective of this 
research project was to find out the political economy reasons for why policy-led integration does 
not take place in spite of a rise in FTA activity in the Region from the early 2000s. To investigate, 
we highlighted domestic political economy determinants since trade barriers lie behind borders in 
the case of services trade. 
First of all, we presented the research design (Chapter 1). We described the state of the art of the 
IPE literature on the FTA activity in East Asia and its limitations. Then we explained the 
hypotheses and the analytical framework to explain the domestic political economy factors. In 
Chapter 2, we conceptualised services trade by spotlighting the heterogeneity of services trade in 
comparison with goods trade in order to associate the heterogeneous nature of services with our 
political economy debates. In Chapter 3, we demonstrated underdeveloped services trade 
integration in East Asia in terms of the market and policy, that are the distinctive characteristics of 
East Asia.  Chapter 4 served to understand the services trade decision-making in practice in order 
to facilitate the debates on interests and institutions in the domestic decision-making process in the 
following chapters of the case study. In our case study (Chapter 5 and 6), we examined interests 
and institutions in the decision-making process for the Japan-ASEAN bilateral FTAs concluded in 
the 2000s. We applied our refined policy demand and supply model in combination with the veto 
player model to analyse supply side conditions. We first examined the case from Japan’s 
perspective (Chapter 5) followed by ASEAN’s perspective (Chapter 6). Then the final chapter 
(Chapter 7) reviewed our research project. 
In conclusion, the empirical evidence of Japan and ASEAN basically supported our hypotheses on 
interests and institutions. From the findings, we conclude that there exist two layers of 
impediments to services trade integration in East Asia. Whereas the institutional impediments 
reflect the heterogeneity of services, interests mostly reflect the distinctive characteristics of East 
Asia. The heterogeneity of services constituted the first layer of impediment and the distinctive 
characteristics of East Asia constituted the second layer of impediment. The double layered 
impediments of domestic political economy significantly undermined policy-led services trade 
integration in East Asia. 
 
  
261 
 
Bibliography  
 
Acemoglu, D. Kremer, M. and Mian, A. (2007). Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments. 
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 24 (2), 1-34. 
Acharya, A. (1997). Ideas, identity, and institution‐building: From the ‘ASEAN way’ to the 
‘Asia‐Pacific way'?, The Pacific Review, 10(3), 319-346. 
Aggarwal, V.K. and Koo, M.G. (2005). Beyond Network Power? The Dynamics of Formal 
Economic Integration in Northeast Asia. The Pacific Review, 18 (2), 189-216. 
Aggarwal, V.K. and Chow, J. T. (2010). The perils of consensus: How ASEAN's meta-regime 
undermines economic and environmental cooperation, Review of International Political Economy, 
17:2, 262-290. 
Aggarwal, V. K. and Lee, S. (2011). The Domestic Political Economy of Preferential Trade 
Agreements in the Asia-Pacific. In Aggarwal, V. K. and Lee, S. (Ed.). Trade Policy in the Asia-
Pacific –The Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions (pp.1-28), Springer. 
Akamatsu, K. (1935). Trend of Japanese Trade in Woollen Goods. Journal of Nagoya Higher 
Commercial School, 13: 129–212. 
Andenas, M. and W. H. Roth (Ed.) (2002). Services and Free Movement in EU Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Ando, M. (2006). Fragmentation and Vertical Intra-Industry Trade in East Asia. The North 
American Journal of Economics and Finance, 17 (3), 257-281. 
Ando, M. (2009). Impact of FTAs in East Asia: CGE Simulation Analysis. RIETI Discussion 
Paper Series 09-E-037. Tokyo: Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
ASEAN secretariat and World Bank (2015). ASEAN Services Integration Report -A Joint Report 
by the ASEAN secretariat and the World Bank. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.  
Asian Development Bank (2008). Emerging Asian Regionalism -A Partnership for Shared 
Prosperity. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
262 
 
Atras, P and Robert, R. and Staiger, W. (2012). Offshoring and the role of Trade Agreements. 
American Economic Review 2012, 102 (7), 3140–3183.  
Balassa, B. (1961). The Theory of Economic Integration, Homewood, III.: R. D. Irwin. 
Baldwin, R. E. (1993). A Domino Theory of Regionalism. Working Paper 4465, Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Baldwin, R.E. (2006a). Implications of European Experiences with Regionalism for Future 
Economic Integration in Asia. Paper written for Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet 
Office, Japan; presented at “Tokyo Meeting and Open Forum for International Economic Issues,” 
23 January 2006, Tokyo. 
Baldwin, R.E. (2006b). Multilateralizing Regionalism: Spaghetti bowls as Building Blocks on the 
Path to Global Free Trade. The World Economy 29 (11), 1451-1518. 
Baldwin, R. E. (2008). Sequencing and Depth of Regional Economic Integration: Lessons for the 
Americas from Europe. The World Economy, 31 (1), 5-30. 
Baldwin, R.E. (2008). Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism. The 
Singapore Economic Review, 53 (3), 449-478. 
Baldwin, R.E. (2009). Sequencing Regionalism: Theory, European Practice, and Lessons for Asia. 
Presented at the conference “Institutions for Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific: Study 
Finalization Workshop,” Jointly organized by Asian Development Bank and Shanghai Academy of 
Social Sciences, 2-3 December 2009, Shanghai. 
Barnard, C. and Deakin, S. (2002). Market Access and Regulatory Competition. In Barnard, C. and 
Scott, J (Ed), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing. 
Bayene, N. (2011). Economic Diplomacy in Practice: Domestic Decision-Making. In Bayene, N. 
and Woolcock, S. (Ed.). The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making and negotiation in 
International Economic Relations (pp. 41-58). Ashgate.  
Bayne, N and Woolcock, S. (Ed.). (2011). The New Economic Diplomacy –Decision-Making and 
Negotiation in International Economic Relations. Ashgate.  
Besso, K. (1999) The ‘ASEAN way'?, The Adelphi Papers, 39:325, 39-51. 
 
263 
 
Bhagwati, J. N. (2008). Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine 
Free Trade. Oxford; Oxford University Press. 
Bowles, P. (2002). Asia’s Post-Crisis Regionalism: Bringing the State Back in, Keeping the 
(United) States Out. Review of International Political Economy, 9 (2), 244–70. 
Brunnermeier, M.K., Crockett, A., Goodhart, C.A., Persaud, A. and Shin, H.S. (2010), The 
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation. Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11. 
London: CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy Research). 
Capling, A. and Low, P. (2010). The Domestic Politics of trade Policy-Making: State and Non-
state Actor interactions and forum choice. In Capling, A. and Low, P. (Ed.). Governments, Non-
State Actors and Trade Policy-Making –Negotiating Preferentially or Multilaterally? (pp.4-28). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chandra, A. C. and Hanim, L. (2010). Indonesia. In Capling, A. and Low, P. (Ed.). Governments, 
Non-State Actors and Trade Policy-Making –Negotiating Preferentially or Multilaterally? (pp125-
160). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Christen, E., François, J., and Hoekman, B. (2011). Modelling Market Access in Services. Paper 
prepared for PECC Conference 2011, Hong Kong. 
http://www.pecc.org/component/eventlist/details/194-pecc-adbi-services-trade-new-approaches-
for-the-21st-century 
Copeland, B. and Mattoo, A. (2008). The Basic Economics of Services Trade. In Mattoo, A. Stern, 
R. M and Zanini, G. (Ed.). A handbook of International Trade in Services (pp. 84-129). Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press,  
Corbett, J. and Umezaki. S. (Ed.). (2009). Deepening East Asian Economic Integration. In ERIA 
Research Project 2008, No.1, Tokyo: ERIA. 
Cornish, M. and Findlay, C. (2011). Services Liberalisation in the ‘ASEAN Plus’ Free Trade 
Agreements, In ASEAN +1 FTAs and Global Value Chains in East Asia. ERIA Research Project 
2010, No.29, Jakarta: ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia). 
Cowhey, F, P. and Aronson, D, J. (2008). Trade in Services –Telecommunications. In Mattoo, A. 
Stern, R. M and Zanini, G. (Ed.). A handbook of International Trade in Services (pp.389-436), 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,. 
264 
 
Damuri, R,D. (2014). Services Sector Development and Improving Production Network in 
ASEAN. CSIS Working Paper Series, Economics Working Paper 01-2014, WPECON-201401. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
Deadorff, A. (1985). Comparative Advantage and International Trade and Investment in Services. 
In Robert M. Stern (Ed.). Trade and Investment in Services: Canada and U.S. perspectives. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Deadorff, A. (2001). International Provision of Trade Services, Trade and Fragmentation. Review 
of International Economics, 9(2), 233-248. 
Dee, P. (2005). East Asian Economic Integration and its Impact on Future Growth. Pacific 
Economic Papers, No. 350, 2005. 
Dee, P., Findlay, C. and Ochiai, R (2007). Services in Free Trade Agreements, RIETI Discussion 
Paper Series 07-E-015. Tokyo: The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Dee, P. (2009). Barriers to Trade in Health and Financial Services in ASEAN, ERIA Discussion 
Paper Series, ERIA-DP-2009-11. Jakarta: ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and 
East Asia). 
Dee, P. (2010a). Deepening East Asian Economic Integration in Services. ERIA Policy Brief, No. 
2010-01. October 2010. Jakarta: ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia). 
Dee, P. (2010b). Services Liberalisation toward the ASEAN Economic Community. In Urata, S. 
and Okabe, M. (Ed.). Tracing the Progress towards the ASEAN Economic Community (pp.27-87). 
ERIA Research Project Report 2009, No. 3. Jakarta: ERIA (Economic Research Institute for 
ASEAN and East Asia). 
Dee, P. (2011). Services Liberalisation towards an ASEAN Economic Community. In Urata, S. 
and Okabe, M. (Ed.). Toward a Competitive ASEAN Single Market: Sectoral Analysis, ERIA 
Research Project Report 2010 No. 3, Jakarta: ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and 
East Asia). 
Dent, C. M. (2003). Networking the region? The emergence and impact of Asia-Pacific bilateral 
free trade agreement projects. Pacific Review, 16(1): 1-28. 
Dent, C. M. (2005). Bilateral free trade agreements: boon or bane for regionalism in East Asia and 
the Asia-Pacific?. European Journal of East Asian Studies 4 (2): 287-314. 
265 
 
Dent, C. M. (2006). The New Economic Bilateralism in Southeast Asia: Region-Convergent or 
Region-Divergent?. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.6, 81-111. 
Dent, C. M. (2007a). Full circle? Ideas and ordeals of creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific. The Pacific Review, 20 (4), 447– 474. 
Dent, C.M. (2007b) The International Political Economy of ASEAN economic integration and 
bilateral FTAs. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 26 (1): 51-75. 
Dent, C. M. (2008a). East Asian Regionalism. London and New York: Routledge. 
Dent, C. M. (2008b). The Asian Development Bank and Developmental Regionalism in East Asia, 
Third World Quarterly, 29(4), 767-786. 
Dent, C. M. (2010a). Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific a Decade on: Evaluating the Past, 
Looking to the Future. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.10, 201-245. 
Dent, C.M. (2010b). Freer Trade, More Regulation? Commercial Regulatory Provisions in Asia-
Pacific Free Trade Agreements. Competition and Change, 14 (1), 48-79. 
Djordjevic, M. (2002). Domestic Regulation and Free Trade in Services A Balancing Act. Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration, 29 (3), 305-322. 
Dobson. D (2001). Deeper Integration in East Asia: Regional Institutions and the International 
Economic System. World Economy, 24 (8),  995–1018. 
Drake, W. J and Nicolaïdis, K (1992). Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: “Trade in Services” 
and the Uruguay Round. International Organization, 46(1), 37-100. 
Drake-Brockman, J. and S. Stephenson (2012). Implication for 21st Century Trade and 
Development of the Emergence of Services Value Chains. Geneva: Study for the International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. 
Drake-Brockman, J. and Stephenson, S. (2014). The Services Trade Dimension of Global Value 
Chains: Policy Implications for Commonwealth Developing Countries and Small States. 
Commonwealth Trade Policy Discussion Papers, ISSN 2313-2205 2014/04. 
Dur, A. (2008a). Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU. European Union Politics, 9 (4), 
559-576.  
266 
 
Dur, A. (2008b). Interest Groups in the European Union; How Powerful Are They?. West 
European Politics, 31 (6), 1212-1230. 
Egger, P. and Lanz, R. (2008). The Determinants of GATS Commitment Coverage. The World 
Economy, 31 (12): 1666-1694. 
Esty, D.C. and Geradin, D. (2001). Regulatory Co-Opetition. In Esty, D.C. and Geradin, D. (Ed.). 
Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration Comparative Perspectives. Oxford University 
Press. 
Ethier, W. J. (1998). Regionalism in a Multilateral World. The Journal of Political Economy, 106 
(6), 1214-1245. 
Fawcet, L. (2004). Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism. 
International Affairs, 80 (3), 429-446. 
Feketekuty, G. (1988). International Trade in Services –An Overview and Blueprint for 
Negotiations. An American Enterprise Institute, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company.  
Findlay. C. and Warren (2000). Impediments to Trade Services –Measurement and Policy 
Implications. London: Routledge. 
Fink, C and Nikomboriak, D. (2007). Rules of Origin in Services: A Case Study of Five ASEAN 
Countries. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4130, World Bank. 
Fink, C. (2008). PTAs in Services: Friends or Foes of the Multilateral Trading System?. In 
Marchetti, J. and Roy, M. (Ed.). Opening Markets for Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in 
Bilateral and WTO Negotiations (pp.113-148). Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University 
Press. 
Fink, C. and M, Molinuevo (2008a). East Asian Free Trade Agreements in Services: Key 
Architectural Elements. Journal of International Economic Law, 11 (2), 263-673. 
Fink, C. and M, Molinuevo (2008b). East Asian preferential trade agreements in services: 
Liberalization content and WTO rules. World Trade Review, 7 (4), 641-674. 
François, J and Wooton. (2001) Market Structure, Trade Liberalisation and the GATS, European 
Journal of Political Economy. 17 (2), 389-402. 
François, J. and Wignaraja, G. (2008). Economic Implications of Asian Integration. Global 
Economy Journal, 8 (3), Article 1. The Berkeley Electronic Press. 
267 
 
François, J and Hoekman, B. (2010). Services Trade and Policy. Journal of Economic Literature, 
48 (3), 642-92. 
François, J and Wooton, I. (2010) Market Structure and Market Access. The World Economy, 33 
(7), 873-893, 
Fuchs, D. (2007). Business Power in global Governance. Boulder, Colo : Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc. 
Fukao, K., Ishido, H. and Ito, K. (2003). Vertical Intra-Industry Trade and Foreign Direct 
Investment in East Asia. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 17 (4), 468-506. 
Fukunaga, Y and Ishido, H (2012). Liberalization of Trade in Services; Toward a Harmonized 
ASEAN++ FTA. ERIA Policy Brief, No. 2012-02. Jakarta: ERIA (Economic Research Institute 
for ASEAN and East Asia). 
Fukunaga, Y (2015). Assessing the Progress of ASEAN MRAs on Professional Services. ERIA 
Discussion Paper Series, ERIA-DP-2015-21. Jakarta: ERIA (Economic Research Institute for 
ASEAN and East Asia). 
Fung, K. C. and Alan, S. (2008). Political Economy of Services Liberalisation and the Doha 
Round. Pacific Economic Review, 13 (1), 124-133. 
Gareffi, G. and Sturgeon, T.J. (2009). Measuring Success in the Global Economy: International 
Trade, Industrial Upgrading, and Business Function Outsourcing in Global Value Chains. 
Transnational Corporations 18 (2), 1-35 
Gasiorek, M. and Holmes, P. (2008). Globalisation and Deep Integration. The Centre for the 
Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex. 
Ghani, E., Grover, A., and Kharas, H. (20011) Services with a smile: A new growth engine for 
poor countries. 4 May 2011, from http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6459 
Gloria O. Pasadilla (2008). Financial Services Integration in East Asia: Lessons from the European 
Union. Discussion Paper Series No.2008-31. Manila: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 
Governments of Japan and Singapore (2000). Kyoudo Houkokusho, Nitchi-Singapore Sinjidai 
Keizai Renkei Kyoutei (Report of the Joint Study Group on Japan-Singapore FTA), from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/singapore/kyotei/kyotei.pdf 
268 
 
Governments of Japan and Malaysia (2002). Japan Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement –
Joint Study Report, from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/malaysia/joint0312.pdf 
Governments of Japan and Philippine (2003). Japan Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement -
Joint Coordinating Report, from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/joint0312.pdf 
Governments of Japan and Thailand (2003). Japan Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement -
Taskforce Report, from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/thailand/joint0312.pdf 
Governments of Japan and Indonesia (2005). Japan Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement 
Joint Study Group Report, from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/indonesia/summit0506/joint-3-2.pdf 
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1995). The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements. The American 
Economic Review, 85 (4), 667-690. 
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (2002). Interest Groups and Trade Policy Making. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gruber, L. (2000). Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Guan, B. T. C. (2011). Japan-China Rivalry: What role does the East Asian Summit Play?. Asia 
Pacific Viewpoint, 52 (3), 347-360. 
Haas, Ernst B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Haas, Ernst B. (1964). Beyond the Nation-State. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Haas, Ernst B. (1975). The obsolescence of regional integration theory. Barkley: Institute of 
International Studies, University of California. 
Halle, M. and Wolfe, R. (Ed.) (2007). Process Matters: Sustainable Development and Domestic 
Trade Transparency. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
Hanegraaff, M., Beyers, J., and Braun, C. (2011). Open the door to more of the same? The 
development of interest group representation at the WTO, World Trade Review, 10(4), 447-472. 
269 
 
Hamanaka, S. (2009). The Building Block versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism: From 
the Perspective of Services Trade Liberalisation in Asia. Working Paper Series of Regional 
Economic Integration, No. 28. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Harms, P. Mattoo, A. and Schunknecht, L. (2003). Explaining Liberalization Commitments in 
Financial Services Trade. Review of World Economics, 139 (1), 82-113. 
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P. (1985). Market Structure and Foreign Trade; increasing returns, 
imperfect competition and the international economy. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 
Henderson, J., Dicken, P., Hess, M., Coe, N. and Yeung, H.W.C. (2002). Global production 
networks and the analysis of economic development. Review of International Political Economy 9 
(3), 436–64. 
Heydon, K and Woolcock, S. (2009). The Rise of Bilateralism Comparing American, European 
and Asian Approached to Preferential Trade Agreements. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Hicks, R. and Kim, S. Y. (2012). Reciprocal Trade Agreements in Asia: Credible Commitment to 
Trade Liberalization or Paper Tigers?. Journal of East Asian Studies, 12 (1), 1-29. 
Hill, I. (1977) “On Goods and Services”. Review of Income and Wealth, 24 (4), 315-338 
Hindley, B. and Smith, A. (1984). Comparative Advantage and Trade in Services. The World 
Economy 7 (4), 369-390. 
Hiscox, M. J. (2007). The Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies.  In Ravenhill, J (Ed). 
Global Political Economy (pp. 95-133). New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hocking, B. (2004). Changing the Terms of Trade Policy-making: From the “Club” to the 
“Multistakeholder” Model, World Trade Review 3(1), 3-26 
Hoekman, B (1996). Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services. In Martin, W, and 
Winters (Ed.). The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries. L. A., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hoekman, B., Mattoo, A. and Sapir, A. (2007). The political economy of services trade 
liberalisation: a case for international regulatory cooperation?. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
23 (3), 367-391. 
270 
 
Hoekman, B. and Mattoo, A. (2008). Services Trade and Growth. In Marchetti, J and Roy, M. 
(Ed.). Opening Markets for Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO 
Negotiations (pp.21-58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hoekman, B and Mattoo, A. (2011). Services Trade Liberalisation and Regulatory Reform: Re-
invigorating International Cooperation. Policy Research Working Paper 5515. Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank. 
Honma, M. and Mulgan, A. G. (2015). The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hufbauer, G. C, Jensen, B, Stephenson et al. (2012). Framework for the International Services 
Agreement. Policy Brief. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics,  
Ishido, H. (2011). Liberalisation of Trade in Services under ASEAN+N and Bilaterals; A Mapping 
Exercise. In ERIA Research Project. Comprehensive Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia, 
2010, No.1. Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia. 
James, S. (2009). A Service to the Economy Removing Barriers to Invisible Trade. Centre for 
Trade Policy Studies, No.38, Feb, 4, Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute. 
Jensen, J. B. (2011). Global Trade in Services –Fear, Facts, and Offshoring. Washington, D.C.: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
JETRO (2011). Dai 1kai Service sangyo no Kaigai tenkai jittai chousa (the first report of the 
Japanese services sector doing business abroad). Tokyo: JETRO (Japan External Trade 
Organization). 
JETRO (2013). Dai 2kai Service sangyo no Kaigai tenkai jittai chousa (the second report of the 
Japanese services sector doing business abroad). Tokyo: JETRO (Japan External Trade 
Organization). 
JETRO (2014). Sekai Boueki Toshi Houkokusho 2014 (Report on World Trade and Investment). 
Tokyo: JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization). 
Jiang, Y. (2010). China's pursuit of free trade agreements: Is China exceptional?. Review of 
International Political Economy, 17 (2), 238-261. 
Kahler, M. (1995). International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings.  
271 
 
Katzenstein, P. J. (2006). East Asia-Beyond Japan. In P. J. Katzenstein & T. Shiraishi (Ed.). 
Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism (pp. 1–33). Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Kawai, M. (2007). Evolving Economic Architecture in East Asia. The Kyoto Economic Review 76 
(1), 9-52. 
Kawai, M. and Wignaraja, G (2007). ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6: Which Way Forward?. ADB 
Institute Discussion Paper No.77. Manila: Asian Development Bank.  
Kawai, M. and Wignaraja, G (2008). Regionalism as an Engine of Multilateralism: A Case for a 
Single East Asian FTA. Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 14. Manila: 
Asian Development Bank. 
Kawai, M. and Wignaraja, G (2009a). Asian FTAs: Trends and Challenges. ADBI Working Paper 
Series No. 144. Manila: Asian Development Bank Institute. 
Kawai, M. and Wignaraja, G (2009b). Asian “Noodle Bowl” Is it serious for Business?. No.136 
April 2009, ADBI Working Paper Series. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. 
Kawai, M. and Wignaraja, G (2010). Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects, and Challenges. ADB 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 226. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Keidanren (1999).  Nitchiboku jiyubouekikyoutei no wagakunisangyoukai eno eikyouni kansuru 
houkokusho (Report of possible effects of the Japan-Mexico FTA), April 1994, from 
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/pol226/honbun.html#p1 
Keidanren (2000a). Jiyuubouekikyoutei no sekkyokutekina suishin wo nozomu, (Urgent Call for 
Active Promotion of Free Trade Agreements –Towards a New Dimension in Trade Policy), July 
2000, from http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2000/033/index.html 
Keidanren (2000b). Nippon Singapore Jiyubouekikyotei eno kitai (The Keidanren’s position paper 
on Japan-Singapore FTA), October, 2000, from 
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2000/049.html 
Keidanren (2002a). Nichi ASEAN Houkatsuteki Keizai Renkei Kouso no Soukigutaika wo 
Motomeru (The Keidanren’s position paper on the Japan-ASEAN FTA), September 2002, from  
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2002/054.html 
272 
 
Keidanren (2002b). Nichi Tai Keizairenkeikyotei no Souki Koshoukaishi wo Motmeru (The 
Keidanren’s position paper calling for starting negotiations for the Japan-Thailand FTA), May 
2003, from http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2003/042.html 
Keidanren (2004). Keizairenkei no kyouka ni muketa kinkyu teigen (The Keidanren’s position 
paper on strategic policy promoting Economic Partnership Agreement), March 2004, from  
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2004/020/honbun.html 
Keidanren (2006). Nitchi-Indonesia Keizairenkeikyoutei no souki teiketsu ni kitaisuru (The 
Keidanren’s position paper calling for early conclusion of the Japan-Indonesian FTA), June 2006, 
from http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2006/041.html 
Kimura, F. and Ando, M. (2005). The economic analysis of international production / distribution 
networks in East Asia and Latin America: the implications of regional trade arrangements. 
Business and Politics, 7 (1): Article 2.   
Kimura, F. (2006a). International Production and Distribution Networks in East Asia: Eighteen 
Facts, Mechanics, and Policy Implications. Asian Economic Policy Review, 1 (2), 326-344. 
Kimura, F. (2006b). Bilateralism in the Asia-Pacific: An Economic Overview. In Aggarwal, K.V. 
and Urata, S. (Ed.). Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and 
Implications (pp.50-71). S. Routledge. 
Kimura, F. (2008). The Strategic Framework for Deepening Integration. A Paper for ERIA 
Research Project ‘Deepening East Asian Economic Integration. Jakarta: ERIA (Economic 
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia). 
Kirkegaard, J.F. (2012). Transactions: A New Look at Services Sector Foreign Direct Investment 
in Asia. ADB Economics Working Paper Series. No 318. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Kopstein, J, and Lichbach, M. (Ed) (2005). Comparative Politics, Interests, Identities, and 
Institutions in a Changing Global Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lawrence R. Z. (1996). Regionalism, Multilateralism and Deeper Integration. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings. 
Li, D. Moshirian, F. and Sim, A. (2005). Intra-Industry Trade in Financial Services. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 24 (7), 1090-1107. 
Low, L (2004). A Comparative Evaluation and Prognosis of Asia Pacific Bilateral and Regional 
Trade Arrangements. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 18 (1), 1-11. 
273 
 
Macdonald, K and Woolcock, S. (2007). Non-State Actors in Economic Diplomacy. In Bayne, N. 
and Woolcock, S. (Ed.). The new economic diplomacy: decision-making and negotiation in 
international economic (p77-92). Ashgate.  
Manger, M. (2005). Competition and bilateralism in trade policy: the case of Japan's free trade 
agreements. Review of International Political Economy, 12 (5), 804-828 
Manger, M. (2014). The Economic Logic of Asian Preferential Trade Agreements: The Role of 
Intra-Industry Trade. Journal of East Asian Studies, 14 (2), 151-184. 
Mansfield, E. L. and Milner, H. (Ed.). (1999). The Political Economy of Regionalism. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Mansfield, E. L. and Reinhardt, E. (2003). Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects 
of GATTWTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements. International 
Organization, 57 (4), 829-862. 
Marchetti, J. A. and Roy, M. (2008). Services Liberalisation in the WTO and in PTAs. In 
Marchetti, J. A. and Roy, M. (Ed.). Opening Markets for Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors 
in Bilateral and WTO Negotiations (pp.21-58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mattli, W. (1999a). ‘Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes’. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 6 (1), 1-27. 
Mattli, W. (1999b). The Logic of Regional Integration. Europe and Beyond. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Mattoo, A. and Fink, C. (2004). Regional Agreements and Trade in Services: Policy Issues. 
Journal of Economic Integration, 19 (4), 742-779. 
Mattoo, A. (2005). Economics and Law of Trade in Services. World Bank Working Paper, 
February 2005. Washington. D.C.: World Bank. 
Mattoo, A. and Amin, M. (2006). Do Institutions Matter More for Services?, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 4032. Washington. D.C.: World Bank. 
Mattoo, A. and Copeland, B. (2008a). The Basic Economics of Services Trade. In Mattoo, A, 
Stern, R. M., and Zanini, G. (Ed.). A handbook of International Trade in Services (pp.84-129). 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.  
274 
 
Matto, A and Mishra, D. (2008b). Foreign Professionals and Domestic Regulation. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 4782, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Mattoo, A. and Sauve, P. (2008c) Regionalism in Services Trade. In Mattoo, A, Stern, R. M., and 
Zanini, G. (Ed.). A handbook of International Trade in Services (pp.221-286). Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Mattoo, A. and Sauve, P. (2010). The Preferential Liberalisation of Services Trade. NCCR Trade 
Regulation, Working Paper 2010/13.  
Mattoo, A., Goswami, G. O., Gputa, P., and Saez, S. (Ed.). (2012a). Exporting Services: A 
Developing Country Perspective. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.  
Mattoo, A., Borchert, I. and Gootiz, B. (2012b). Guide to the Services Trade Restrictions Database. 
Policy Research Working Paper 6108, Washington, D.C.: World Bank,  
Mattoo, A., Borchert, I. and Gootiz, B. (2012c). Policy Barriers to International Trade in Services: 
Evidence from a New Database. Policy research Working Paper 6109, Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank. 
Maurer, A. and Tschang, F.T. (2011). An Exploratory Framework for Measuring Services Value-
added. A paper prepared for PECC Conference, Hong Kong, 2011, from 
http://www.pecc.org/component/eventlist/details/194-pecc-adbi-services-trade-new-approaches-
for-the-21st-century 
McGuire, G and Findlay, C. (2005). Services Trade Liberalisation Strategies for APEC Member 
Economies. Asia Pacific Economic Literature, 19 (1), May 2005. 
Melvin J.R. (1989) Trade in Services: A Theoretical Analysis. Montreal: The Institute for 
Research on Public Policy. 
Miroudot, S., Sauvage, J. and Sudreau, M. (2010). Multilateralising Regionalism: How 
Preferential Are Services Commitments in Regional trade Agreements?. OECD Trade Policy 
Working Papers No. 106, Paris: OECD. 
Milner, H. (1999). The Political Economy of International Trade. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 2, 91-114. 
Miller, G. J. (2005). The political Evolution of Principal Agent Models. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 8, 203-25. 
275 
 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2008). Service sangyo kaigaitennkai jittai chousajigyo 
(A survey of the Japanese services sectors doing business in Asia). Tokyo: METI. 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (2014). Hukouseibouekihoukokusho (Report 
on Unfair Trade Practice). Tokyo: METI.  
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (2015). Hukouseibouekihoukokusho (Report 
on Unfair Trade Practice). Tokyo: METI. 
Mulgan, A.G. (2008). Japan’s FTA Politics and the Problem of Agricultural Trade Liberalisation. 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62 (2), 164-78. 
Munakata, N. (2006). Has Politics Caught up with Markets? In Search of East Asian Economic 
Regionalism. In P. j. Katzenstein and T. Shiraishi (Ed.). Beyond Japan; The Dynamics of East 
Asian Regionalism (pp.130-157), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,  
Nabers, D. (2003). The Social Construction of International Institutions: The Case of ASEAN+3. 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 3 (1), 113-36. 
Narine, S. (2006). The English School and ASEAN. The Pacific Review, 19:2, 199-218. 
Ng, F. and Yeats, A. (2003). Major Trade Trends in East Asia: What are their Implications for 
Regional Cooperation and Growth?. Policy Research Working Paper 3084, Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank. 
Nordas, H. K. and H. Kox (2009). Quantifying Regulatory Barriers to Services. OECD Trade 
Policy Working Paper No. 85. Working Party of the Trade Committee, Trade and Agriculture 
Directorate. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Nyahoho, E. (2010). Determinants of Comparative Advantage in the International Trade of 
Services: An Empirical Study of the Hecksher-Ohlin Approach. Global Economy Journal, 10 (1) 
Article 3, 1-22. 
Ochian R., Dee P., and Findlay C. (2007). Services in Free Trade Agreements. RIETI Discussion 
Paper no. 07-E-015. Tokyo: Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). 
Odell, J.S.  (2000). Negotiating the World Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
OECD (1999). An Assessment of the Costs for International Trade in Meeting Regulatory 
Requirements. TD/TC/WP(99)8/FINAL. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). 
276 
 
OECD (2015). State-Owned Enterprises in the development process. Paris: OECD publishing.  
OECD (2015). OECD Economic Surveys Indonesia. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). 
Ohno, K. (2009). Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap: Renovating Industrial Policy Formulation in 
Viet Nam. ASEAN Economic Bulletin. 26 (1), 25-43.  
Ohno, K. (2015). The quality of industrial policy as a determinant of income tracks. Paper 
prepared for Singapore Economic Policy Review Conference 2015.  
Oike, A. (2006). Nihon no EPA koushou no tenkai to tenbou –Nihongata EPA no kakuritsu to 
aratanaru chousen (Analysing the EPA of Japan and its future –A challenge of the Japanese EPA 
model). Boueki to Kanzei, 2006(12), 24-39. 
Oike, A. (2007). Higasi Asia wo Butaitosuru Kakkoku no Koubou –Keizairenkeikousho wo 
meguru shudouken arasoi (Regional rivalry of the East Asian FTA). Boueki to Kanzei, 2007 (9), 
10-40. 
Organization for Small & Medium Enterprises and Regional Innovation, JAPAN (2008). Chushou 
service sangyo niokeru kaigaitennkai no jittai to kadai (A survey of the Japanese SMEs’ doing 
business abroad and their future prospect), from 
http://www.smrj.go.jp/keiei/dbps_data/_material_/b_0_keiei/chosa/pdf/h25serviceboueki3.pdf 
Ozeki. H. (2008). Development of De Facto Economic Integration. A Paper for ERIA Research 
Project ‘Deepening East Asian Economic Integration. Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for 
ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). 
PECC and ADBI (2011). Services Trade –Approach for the 21st Century. Report of the Task Force 
established by the Asian Development Bank Institute and the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council. 
Pongsudhirak, T, (2010). Thailand. In Capling, A. and Low, P. (Ed.). Governments, Non-State 
Actors and Trade Policy-Making –Negotiating Preferentially or Multilaterally? (pp161-185). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Postigo, A. (2016). Institutional spillovers from the negotiation and formulation of East Asian fee 
trade agreements. Review of International Political Economy, 23 (3), 1-39 
Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. 
International Organization, 42 (3), 427-460. 
277 
 
Rajan, S. (2005). Trade liberalization and the new regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: taking stock of 
recent events. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 5 (2), 217-233. 
Ram Upendra Das. (2009). Imperatives of Regional Economic Integration in Asia in the Context 
of Developmental Asymmetries: Some Policy Suggestions. ADBI Working Paper Series No.172, 
Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Ravenhill, J. (2003). The New Bilateralism in the Asia Pacific. Third World Quarterly, 24 (2), 
299-317 
Revenhill, J. (2006). The Political Economy of the New Asia-Pacific Bilateralism: Benign, Banal. 
Or simply Bad?. In Aggarwa, K.V. and Urata, S (Ed). Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-
Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications (pp.27-49). New York and London: Routledge.  
Ravenhill, J. (2007). Regionalism. In Ravenhill, J (Ed). Global Political Economy (pp.172-206). 
New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ravenhill, J. (2008a). The move to preferential trade on the Western Pacific Rim: Some initial 
conclusions. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 62 (2), 129-150. 
Ravenhill, J. (2008b). Fighting irrelevance: an economic community ‘with ASEAN characteristics’. 
The Pacific Review, 21 (4), 469-488. 
Ravenhill, J. (2010). The 'new East Asian regionalism: A political domino effect'. Review of 
International Political Economy, 17 (2), 178- 208. 
Rincon-Aznar, A., Graf, N., Peterson, I., Schwarzbauer, W., Sellner, R., Siebert, S., and Yildirim, 
C. (2010). Regulation and Economic Performance; Literature Review. SERVICECAP Review 
Paper 4. 
Ross. B (2003). Regulations Confronting Trade in Services. In Sampson, G. P. and Woolcock, S. 
(Ed.), Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Economic Integration: The Recent Experience (pp.253-
274), Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press. 
Roy, M., Marchetti, J. and H. Lim (2007). Services Liberalization in the New Generation of 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): How Much Further than the GATS?. World Trade Review, 
6 (2): 155-192. 
Roy, M. (2010). Endowments, Power, and Democracy: Political Economy of Multilateral 
Commitments on Trade in Services. Staff Working Paper ERSD-2010-11, June 2010, Geneva: 
WTO. 
278 
 
Roy, M. (2011). Services Commitments in Preferential Trade Agreements: An Expanded Dataset. 
Staff Working Paper ERSD-2010-18, Geneva: WTO. 
Sally, R. (2005). Whither Trade Policies in Southeast Asia? The Wider Asian and Global Context. 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 22 (1), 92-115. 
Sally, R. (2006). FTAs and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia. Asian Economic 
Policy Review, 1 (2), 306-321.  
Sally, R. (2007). Thai Trade Policy: From Non-discriminatory Liberalisation to FTAs. The World 
Economy, 30 (10),  1594–1620. 
Sally, R. (2009). Regional Economic Integration in Asia: The Track Record and Prospects. ECIPE 
Occasional Paper No. 2/2010. 
Sally, R. and Sen, R. (2011). Trade Policies in Southeast Asia in the Wider Asian Perspective. The 
World Economy, 34 (4), 568-601. 
Sapir, A. and Luts, E. (1981). Trade in Services: Economic Determinants and Development- 
Related Issues. World Bank Staff Working Paper, No.480. Economic Analysis and Projections 
Department. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Sauve, P. (2006). Been There, Not (Quite) (Yet) Done That: Lessons and Challenges in Services 
Trade. NCCR Working Paper, No.2006/18. 
Sen, R. (2006). ‘New Regionalism’ in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Emerging Regional 
and Bilateral Trading Agreements involving ASEAN, China and India. Journal of World Trade, 40 
(4), 553-596. 
Shiroyama, H. et al. (Ed.) (1998). Chuuoshoucho no seisaku keisei katei (Policy-making inside the 
Japanese ministries). Tokyo: Chuuo Daigaku Shuppanbu. 
Soesastro, H. (2003). An ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN+3: How Do They Fit 
Together?. Pacific Economic Paper No.338. Australia-Japan Research Centre Asia Pacific School 
of Economics and Government. 
Soesastro, H. (2006). Regional Integration in East Asia: Achievements and Future Prospects. Asian 
Economic Policy Review, 1 (2), 215-234 
Solis, M. and Urata, S. (2007). Japan’s New Foreign Economic Policy: A Shift Toward a Strategic 
and Activist Model?. Asian Economic Policy Review, 2 (2), 227-245. 
279 
 
Solis, M., Stallings, B. and Katada, S.N. (2009). Competitive regionalism FTA diffusion in the 
Pacific Rim. Basingstoke England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Solis, M. (2010). Can FTAs deliver market liberalization in Japan? A study on domestic political 
determinants. Review of International Political Economy, 17 (2), 209-237. 
Solis, M. (2013). Business advocacy in Asian PTAs: a model of selective corporate lobbying with 
evidence from Japan. Business and Politics, 15 (1), 87–116. 
Soonhwa Yi (2012). Reaching the World through Private Sector Initiative: Service Exports from 
The Philippines. In Mattoo, A. and Saez, S. (Ed.). Exporting Services –A Developing Country 
Perspective. Washington, D. C.: World Bank Publications. 
Stephenson, M. S. (2003). Perspectives on Services Regulatory Issues. PECC Services Study 
Group. 
Stephenson, S and Robert, M. (2011). Evaluating the Contributions of RTAs to Governance of 
Services Trade. Papers prepared for the PECC conference. 
Stephenson, S (2013), Global Value Chains, the New Reality of International Trade. E15 
Initiative, Global Value Chains Group: Proposals and Analysis, Bali, December. 
Terada, T. (2009). Competitive regionalism in Southeast Asia and beyond; role of Singapore and 
ASEAN. In M. Solis, B. Stallings and S. Katada (Ed.). Competitive regionalism: FTA diffusion in 
the Pacific Rim (pp. 161-180). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Trachtman. J. P., (2003). Addressing Regulatory Divergence Through International Standards: 
Financial Services. In: Mattoo, A. and Sauve, P. (Ed). Domestic Regulation & Services Trade 
Liberalisation (pp, 27-39). Washington, D. C.: World Bank; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
Turrini A. and T. Ypersele (2006). Legal Costs as Barriers to Trade. CEPR Working Paper 
No.5751, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Urata. S. (2001). Emergence of an FDI-Trade Nexus and Economic Growth in East Asia. In 
Stiglitz, J and Yusuf, S. (Ed.). Rethinking the East Asian Miracle (pp.409-459), New York; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
280 
 
Urata. S. (2002). A shift from Market-led to Institution-led Regional Economic Integration in East 
Asia. Paper presented at the RIETI international conference, ‘Asian Economic Integration’, April 
2002, Tokyo. 
Urata, S. (2009). Japan's Free Trade Agreement Strategy. Japanese Economy, 36 (2), 46-77. 
Urata, S. (2011). Nihon no Tsushosenryaku no Kadai to Shouraitenbou (Japan’s trade policy 
strategy and its prospect). In Urata. S (Ed.). Nihon no Tsushosenryaku no Kadai to Shouraitenbou 
(pp.1-20). Tokyo: The 21st Century Public Policy Institute.  
Urata, S. and Kozo, K. (2003). The Impacts of an East Asian FTA on Foreign Trade in East Asia. 
NBER Working Paper No. W10173. 
Urata, S. and Okabe, M. (2007). The Impacts of Free Trade Agreements on Trade Flows: An 
Application of the Gravity Model Approach. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 07-E-052. Tokyo: 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.  
USTR (2003). National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers of the USTR. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Trade Representative. 
USTR (2004). National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers of the USTR. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Trade Representative. 
USTR (2005). National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers of the USTR. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Trade Representative. 
USTR (2006). National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers of the USTR. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Trade Representative. 
USTR (2007). National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers of the USTR. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Trade Representative. 
VanGrasstek, C. (2011).The Political Economy of Services in Regional Trade Agreements. OECD 
Trade Policy Working papers No.112. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). 
Watanabe, Y. (2013). Seido teki wakugumi (Policy framework), In Kuroiwa, I (Ed.). Higashi Asia 
togo no keizaigaku (Economics of East Asian Integration), (pp.211-244). Tokyo: Nihonhyoronsha. 
Webber, D. (2001). Two funerals and a wedding? The ups and downs of regionalism in East Asia 
and Asia-Pacific after the Asian crisis. The Pacific Review, 14 (3), 339-372 
281 
 
Webber, D. (2010). The regional integration that didn't happen: cooperation without integration in 
early twenty-first century East Asia. The Pacific Review, 23 (3), 313-333 
Woll, C. and Artigas, A. (2007). When trade liberalisation turns into regulatory reform: The 
impact on business-government relations in international trade politics. Regulation and 
Governance, 1 (2), 121-138. 
Woll, C. (2008). Firm Interests: How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Woolcock, S. (2011). Factors Shaping Economic Diplomacy: An Analytical Toolkit. In Bayne, N. 
and Woolcock, S. (Ed.). The New Economic Diplomacy –Decision-Making and Negotiation in 
International Economic Relations (pp.17-39). Ashgate. 
WTO (2004). Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat, Japan, WT/TPR/S/142. Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2005a). Trade Policy Review: The Philippines, Report by the Secretariat, 
WT/TPR/S/149/Rev.1. Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2005b). Trade Policy Review: The Philippines, Report by The Philippines, WT/TPR/G/149. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2005c). Trade Policy Review Report: The Philippines, Minutes of the Meeting, 
WT/TPR/M/149. Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2006). Trade Policy Review: Malaysia, Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/156/Rev.1). 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2006a). Trade Policy Review: Malaysia, Report by Malaysia (WT/TPR/G/156). Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2006b). Trade Policy Review Report: Malaysia, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/156.  
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2007a). Trade Policy Review Report: Japan, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/175. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2007b). Trade Policy Review: Japan, Report by Japan, WT/TPR/G/175. WTO Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
282 
 
WTO (2007c). Trade Policy Review Report: Japan, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/175. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2007d). Trade Policy Review Report: Indonesia, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/184. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2007e). Trade Policy Review: Indonesia, Report by Indonesia, WT/TPR/G/184. Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2007f). Trade Policy Review Report: Indonesia, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/184. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2007g). Trade Policy Review Report: Thailand, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/191. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2007h). Trade Policy Review: Thailand, Report by Thailand, WT/TPR/G/191. Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2007i). Trade Policy Review Report: Thailand, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/191. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2008a). Trade Policy Review: Singapore, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/202.  
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2008b). Trade Policy Review: Singapore, Report by Singapore, WT/TPR/G/202. Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2008c). Trade Policy Review: Republic of Korea, Report by the Secretariat, 
WT/TPR/S/204. Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2008d). Trade Policy Review: Republic of Korea, Report by Republic of Korea, 
WT/TPR/G/204. Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2009a). Trade Policy Review: Malaysia, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/225. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2009b). Trade Policy Review: Malaysia, Report by Malaysia, WT/TPR/G/225. Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2009c). Trade Policy Review Report: Malaysia, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/225.  
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
283 
 
WTO (2010a). Trade Policy Review: China, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/230. Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2010b). Trade Policy Review: China, Report by China, WT/TPR/G/230. Geneva: World 
Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2010c). Trade Policy Review Report: China, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/230. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2011a). World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From 
Coexistence to Coherence. Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2011b). Trade Policy Review: Japan, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/243. Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2011c). Trade Policy Review: Japan, Report by Japan, WT/TPR/G/243. Geneva: World 
Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2011d). Trade Policy Review: Cambodia, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/253. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2011e). Trade Policy Review: Thailand, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/255. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2011f). Trade Policy Review: Thailand, Report by Thailand, WT/TPR/G/255. Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2011g). Trade Policy Review Report: Thailand, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/255. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO and IDE-JETRO (2011h). Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia: From trade 
in goods to trade in tasks. Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
WTO (2012a). Trade Policy Review: Philippines, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/261. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2012b). Trade Policy Review: Philippines, Report by The Philippines, WT/TPR/G/261. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2012c). Trade Policy Review Report: The Philippines, Minutes of the Meeting, 
WT/TPR/M/261. Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
284 
 
WTO (2012d). Trade Policy Review: China, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/264. Geneva: 
World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2012e). Trade Policy Review: China, Report by China, WT/TPR/G/264. Geneva: World 
Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2012f). Trade Policy Review Report: China, Minutes of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/264. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2012g). Trade Policy Review Report: Republic of Korea, Report by the Secretariat, 
WT/TPR/S/268. Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2013a). Trade Policy Review Report: Japan, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/276. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2013b). Trade Policy Review Report: Indonesia, Report by the Secretariat, 
WT/TPR/S/278/Rev.1. Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
WTO (2015). Trade Policy Review Report: Japan, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/310. 
Geneva: World Trade Organisation. 
Yi, S. (2012). Reaching the World through Private Sector Initiative: Service Exports from The 
Philippines. In Goswami, A. G., Mattoo, A., and Saez, S. (Ed.), Exporting Services –A developing 
Country Perspective, (pp.121-159). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications.  
Yoshimatsu, H. (1999). The state, MNCs, and the car industry in ASEAN. Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 29 (4), 495-515. 
Yoshimatsu, H. (2008). The Political Economy of Regionalism in East Asia –Integrative 
Explanation for Dynamics and Challenges. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Yoshimatsu, H. (2010). Domestic Political Institutions, Diplomatic Style and Trade Agreements: 
A Comparative Study of China and Japan. New Political Economy, 15 (3), 395-419. 
Yun, C. (2003) ‘International production networks and the role of the state: lessons from the East 
Asian development experience’. European Journal of Development Research 15 (1), 170–193.  
Yusuf, S., Altaf, M.A. and Nabeshima, K. (Ed.) (2004) Global Production Networking and 
Technological Change in East Asia. Washington, D.C.: World Bank; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
285 
 
Zahrnt, V. (2008). Domestic Constituents and the Formulation of WTO Negotiating Positions: 
What Delegates Say. World Trade Review, 7 (2), 393-421. 
  
286 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Anonymous List of Interviewees 
Occupation Date of interview 
Senior Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry, Japan 
(Former Head of international trade negotiation, METI, Japan) 
26 December, 2011 
24 April, 2015 
Counsellor, WTO secretariat 8 April, 2013 
21 July, 2015 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the international 
organisations, Geneva 
9 April, 2013 
Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 9 April, 2013 
23 April, 2015 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea in 
Geneva 
9 April, 2013 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the WTO 9 April, 2013 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the WTO 9 April, 2013 
Counsellor, WTO secretariat 10 April, 2013 
Counsellor, WTO secretariat 10 April, 2013 
Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Republic of The 
Philippines to the WTO, Geneva 
10 April, 2013 
20 July, 2015 
Counsellor, WTO secretariat 10 April, 2013 
Counsellor, WTO secretariat 11 April, 2013 
Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Geneva 
11 April, 2013 
22 July, 2015 
Trade Policy Analyst, WTO secretariat 11 April, 2013 
22 July, 2015 
Counsellor, WTO secretariat 11 April, 2013 
First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Geneva 
12 April, 2013 
22 July, 2015 
Third secretary, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic 
of China to the WTO 
12 April, 2013 
Counsellor, WTO secretariat 12 April, 2013 
22 July, 2015 
Professor, Keio University, Japan 7 November, 2014 
Senior Manager, Keidanren secretariat 8 November, 2014 
27 April, 2015 
Director, Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 20 April, 2015 
Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 21 April, 2015 
Director, Japan External Trade Organisation 20 April, 2015 
Deputy Director, International Economy Division, Japan 
External Trade Organisation 
20 April, 2015 
Director General, Japan External Trade Organisation (previous 
services trade negotiator, METI, Japan) 
20 April, 2015 
Senior Research Officer, Research Department- Public Policy, 
Mizuho Research Institute Ltd. 
21 April, 2015 
Director, METI, Japan 21 April, 2015 
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Director, International Legal Counsel Office, METI, Japan 21 April, 2015 
Member of the Public Policy Committee, Japan Information 
Technology, Services Industry Association, Japan 
Member of Japan Services Network 
22 April, 2015 
Special Advisor, Liaison Officer for Japan and East Asia, The 
Geneva Association 
22 April, 2015 
General Manager, The General Insurance Association of Japan 22 April, 2015 
Former head of services trade negotiations, METI, Japan 23 April, 2015 
Professor, Chiba University 28 April, 2015 
Deputy Director, Office of International Affairs, Financial 
Services Agency, Japan 
30 April, 2015 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of 
Viet Nam, Geneva 
20 July, 2015 
Senior Counsel, GE Japan (previously services trade 
negotiator, METI, Japan) 
28 April, 2015 
Deputy Director-General, Financial Services Agency, Japan 30 April, 2015 
Director, Financial Services Agency 30 April, 2015 
Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the 
WTO 
20 July, 2015 
Director, WTO secretariat 
 
21 July, 2015 
Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Geneva 
22 July, 2015 
Counsellor, WTO secretariat 22 July, 2015 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the WTO 23 July, 2015 
Director, WTO secretariat 23 July, 2015 
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Thailand to the WTO 23 July, 2015 
 
Director, Wold Trade Institute 24 July, 2015 
Trade Consultant, The Philippines (Previously, trade policy 
officer, ASEAN secretariat) 
2 October, 2015 
Senior Director, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
Malaysia 
20 October, 2015 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire to Government for the field study in Geneva, 
2013 
 
Questionnaire to Government 
 
*The questionnaire is used only for the academic research purposes. I will not 
disclose the answers given to the questions below for other purposes. 
 
Section A. Services trade policy-making in general 
 
1. Government 
Q A.1.1: Which ministry/department leads (or represents) government for services trade 
negotiations? Is the lead ministry same for the multilateral negotiations for the WTO and 
plurilateral negotiations? 
Q. A.1.2: What are the relations between Ministry of foreign affairs and Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (or Ministry of Commerce) in terms of leading services trade negotiations? 
Q A.1.3: Which ministries and regulatory agencies are involved in services trade policy 
formulation other than the lead ministry mentioned above? Please list all relevant 
ministries and agencies. 
 
Q A.1.4: Does the provincial authority participate in the services trade policy-making? Or 
does it show any interests in any specific sectors?  
 
Q. A.1.5: In general, which ministries are in favour of promoting services trade 
liberalisation? 
 
Q. A.1.6: In general, which ministries are defensive in services trade liberalisation? 
 
Q. A.1.7: How does the lead ministry reconcile different positions among the ministries 
and regulatory agencies involved to adopt a country’s position? 
 
 
2. Private sector (business sector) 
Q. A.2.1: Does the private sector involve in services trade policy-making in your country? 
If YES, please go to Q.A. 2.2-Q.A.2.5 
If NO, please go to Q.A.2.6 
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Q. A.2.2: If Yes (Q2.1), what kind of organisations and firms are major actors? Please list up 
the name of the organisations in each category. 
(i) Business Federations 
(ii) Sector associations (sector associations and professional associations) 
(iii) Services coalitions (e.g. Coalition of Services Industries (CSI) of the US and 
European Services Network (ESN) of the EU) 
(iv) Individual firms 
 
Q. A.2.3: To what extent can business lobbying group participate in trade policy 
formulation (access to the policy making process)? 
 
Q. A.2.4: Does the lead ministry have any formal institutionalised consultation system with 
the private sector? 
 If YES, what kind of formal consultation system is institutionalised? 
 Does the lead ministry also informally consult with some private organisations or 
firms which do not participate in the formal consultation? 
 
 If NO, does the lead ministry informally consult with the private sector? 
  
Q. A.2.5: Do the ministries and/or regulatory authorities which participate in services trade 
policy-making process also directly contact with the private sector to make its own 
positions? 
 
Q. A.2.6: If No (Q A.2.1), why does the private sector take participate in services trade 
policy-making in your country? (e.g. there is no culture to involve the private sector, there 
is no interests shown from the private sector, government does not want the private 
sector to be involved, and a lack of capacities of the private sector) 
 
Q. A.2.7: In general, which services sector show interests in liberalising services trade of 
trade partners? 
 
Q. A.2.8: In general, which services sector show interests in liberalising domestic services 
markets? 
 
Q.A. 2.9: In general, which services sector are offensive against services liberalisation? 
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Section B.  Your observations on services trade and its policy-making process 
of your country 
Q.B.1.1: What do you observe your government’s interests in services trade liberalisation 
(in comparison with goods trade), especially through PTAs? 
Q. B.1.2: How do you observe your country’s services sector? Are there any competitive 
sectors? Are there any sectors which show growing competitiveness? 
Q. B.1.3: Do you think that there are any services sectors which require government 
protection in your country?  
Q. B.1.4: What do you observe your country’s on-going reforms in the services sector (e.g. 
privatisation of state owned enterprises, imperfect competition)? 
Q. B. 1.5: Do you think that there are any differences between services trade-policy-
making for the WTO negotiations and one for the PTA negotiations? (e.g. Home ministries 
show more interests in PTA negotiations as their negotiation targets against the PTA 
partners becomes clear) 
Q. B.1.6: Do you think that trade policy-making process in services is more complicated vis-
a-vis one in goods trade? (e.g. involvement of many ministries, regulatory issues and 
complex services agreement) 
Q. B. 1.7: Do you think that the private sector in your country is well aware of the 
importance of services liberalisation? 
Q. B.1.8: Do you think that the private sector in your country has capacities to lobby for 
services trade negotiations in terms of human resources and financing? 
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Section C. Services trade negotiations of PTAs in East Asia 
This section specifically asks about the past services trade negotiations of your countries’ 
PTAs within East Asia: 
Please answer the following questions for each case. 
  
1. Government 
Q. C.1.1: Which ministries and regulatory agencies are involved in services trade policy 
formulation other than the lead ministry mentioned above? Please list all relevant 
ministries and agencies. 
 
Q. C.1.2: Did which ministries show offensive interests? 
 
Q.C.1.3: Did which ministries show defensive interests? 
 
Q. C.1.4: Did the Provincial government participate in the policy making process? Or does 
it show any interests in any specific sectors? 
 
Q.C.1.5: If YES (in Q.C. 1.4), what kind of provincial institutions participate? What kind of 
interests did they present? How were they involved in the negotiations? 
 
Q. A.1.5: How did the lead ministry reconcile different positions among the ministries and 
regulatory agencies involved to adopt a country’s position? 
 
 
2. The private sector (business sector) 
Q. C.2.1: Did the private sector involve in the negotiation? 
       If YES, please go to Q. C2.2-Q.C.2.5 
If NO, please go to Q.C.2.6 
 
Q. C.2.2: If Yes (Q.C.2.1), what kind of organisations and firms were major actors? Please 
list up the name of the organisations in each category. 
(i) Business Federations 
(ii) Sector associations (sector associations and professional associations) 
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(iii) Services coalitions (e.g. Coalition of Services Industries (CSI) of the US and 
European Services Network (ESN) of the EU) 
(iv) Individual firms 
 
Q. C.2.3: To what extent could business lobbying group participate in trade policy 
formulation (access to the policy making process)? 
 
Q. C.2.4: Did the lead ministry have any formal institutionalised consultation system with 
the private sector? 
 If YES, under what kind of formal consultation system? 
 Did the lead ministry also informally consult with some private sector which did not 
participate in the formal consultation 
  If NO, does the lead ministry informally consult with the private sector? 
  
Q. C.2.5: Did the ministries and/or regulatory authorities which participate in services 
trade policy-making process also directly contact with the private sector to make its own 
positions? 
 
Q. C.2.6: If No (Q C.2.1), why does the private sector take participate in services trade 
policy-making in your country? (e.g. there is no culture to involve the private sector, there 
are no interests shown from the private sector, government does not want the private 
sector to be involved, and a lack of capacities of the private sector) 
 
Q. C.2.7: Which services sector showed interests in liberalising services trade of trade 
partners? 
 
Q. C.2.8: Which services sector showed interests in liberalising domestic services markets? 
 
Q.C.2.9: Which services sectors were offensive against services liberalisation? 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire to the Japanese Government353 
 
Questionnaire to the Japanese Government (METI) 
 
*The questionnaire is used entirely for the research project about the trade policy-
making in East Asia at the London School of Economics. Your name will not be 
disclosed unless you provide special permissions to do so. 
 
Section A.  General observations on services trade and its policy-making 
process  
Q.A.1: How do you observe your government’s interests in services trade liberalisation in 
comparison with those in goods trade? 
Q.A.2: How do you observe the Japanese private sector’s interests in services trade 
liberalisation in comparison with those in goods trade? 
Q.A.3: Do you think that trade policy-making process in services trade is more complicated 
vis-a-vis one in goods trade? (e.g. involvement of many ministries, regulatory autonomy and 
complexities of the services agreements) 
Q.A.4: How do you evaluate your country’s services sector (e.g. domestic services structure, 
international competitiveness, their business in the Asian FTA partners)? 
Q.A.5: Do you observe that the Japanese companies are becoming more active in expanding 
their markets in East Asia? Do you observe that services trade and investment among East 
Asian countries would increase in the future? 
 
  
                                                          
353 Questionnaires were prepared for each ministries. Annex 3 is the one prepared for the METI, Japan 
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Please answer the questions below based on your experience through the FTA 
negotiations for services of which you were in charge. 
 
Section B. Services trade policy-making for the FTAs in East Asia and the 
Japanese government institution 
 
3. Government 
Q.B.1.1: Did which ministry officially lead (or represent) the Japanese government for the 
FTA services trade negotiations? Only MOFA? Or both MOFA and METI? 
Q B.1.2: Which ministries and regulatory agencies were involved in services trade policy 
making other than the METI and the MOFA? Please list all relevant ministries and agencies. 
Q.B.1.3: What was the METI’s role during the services negotiations? How do you evaluate 
the role of the METI? 
Q.B.1.4: How do you observe the relations between the METI and the MOFA through a 
whole process of policy-making (e.g. making the general negotiation positions of Japan and 
making the requests and offers and take a final decision)? 
Q.B.1.5: Prior to the internal government policy coordination, did the METI internally 
make the initial negotiation positions? If so, please explain about (i) the initial negotiation 
objectives, (ii) tactics and (iii) the level of agreement. 
Q.B.1.6: Among the incentives to create the FTAs listed below (a-g), please tick the degree 
of importance you think relevant. Please add any incentives if any.  
a. Eliminate negative effects caused by the existing FTAs 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
b. Strengthen preferential treatments (minimum GATS-plus) vis-a vis external regions 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
c. Extension of MFN treatment from the existing FTAs which a partner country 
concluded with the third parties 
 1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
 
d. Fulfil the requirements of the GATS Art.V in order to be compatible with the WTO 
system 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
e. Achieve the requests from the Japanese export oriented services suppliers 
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1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
f. Achieve the requests from the import competing, defensive services suppliers to 
protect the domestic market 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
g. Achieve the requests from the Japanese manufactures to improve the business 
environment in East Asia 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
h. Other incentives if any: 
 
Q. B.1.7: Which ministries were in favour of opening the market of the FTA partner(s)? 
 
Q.B.1.8: Which ministries are defensive in liberalising the Japanese services markets in 
terms of the sectors and Modes? 
 
Q.B.1.9: To adopt the country’s positions, did you observe that there were any difficulties 
in reconciling different positions among the ministries and regulatory agencies involved? If 
so, how did the lead ministry (MOFA?) reconcile them?  
Q.B.1.10: How do you evaluate the MOFA’s negotiating power inside the government as 
lead ministry of services trade negotiations? 
Q.B.1.11: How do you self-evaluate the METI’s negotiating power inside the government? 
Q.B.1.12: Do you think that the ministries or regulatory authorities with regulatory 
autonomy exercised political power during the policy-making process? 
 
The Private sector (business sector) 
Q.B.2.1: Do you think that the Japanese private sector has been active in lobbying for the 
FTA services trade negotiations?  
Q.B.2.2: Did the Japanese government establish institutionalised consultation systems 
with the private sector for the FTA negotiations? If so, please explain the system. 
 
Q.B.2.3: In addition to the system mentioned above, did the METI independently use other 
formal consultation system specifically for the private sector? 
Q.B.2.4: Other than the formal consultation system, did the METI frequently take contact 
with the business lobbying groups (or firms)? 
 
Q.B.2.5: What kind of organisations and firms were closely taking contact with the METI? 
Please list up the name of the organisations in each category. 
(v) Business Federations 
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(vi) Sector associations (sector associations and professional associations) 
(vii) Professional associations 
(viii) Individual firms 
 
 
Q.B.2.6: To what extent did the METI grasp the fact that the other ministries and/or 
regulatory authorities which participate in services trade policy-making process have direct 
contact with a specific private sector or firms to get technical information and make its 
own positions? 
 
Q.B.2.7 Do you think that the private sector which informally lobbied their regulatory 
agencies also shared the information with the METI?  
 
Q. B.2.8: Which services sectors (or firms) showed interests in liberalising services markets 
of the FTA partner(s)? 
 
Q.B.2.9: Were there any services sectors (or firms) which showed interests in liberalising 
the Japanese services markets? 
 
Q.B.2.10: Which services sectors (or firms) were defensive against services liberalisation of 
the Japanese services markets? 
 
Q.B.2.11: Among the Japanese private sector mentioned above, inputs from which 
organisations (or firms) were powerful? 
 
Q.B.2.12: Among the export oriented services suppliers and the import-competing services 
suppliers which one was influential in terms of services trade policy-making for the FTA? 
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Section C. Evaluation of the agreement and commitments 
Q.C.1: Do you evaluate that the Japanese government could satisfactory achieve the 
substantially GATS-plus services trade agreements? If yes, which part of the agreements? If 
not, what were the reasons? 
Q.C.2: Do you think that the review process provided in the agreement is effective enough to 
improve the level of liberalisation? 
Q.C.3: Do you think that the private sector is in favour of other international institutional 
arrangements (e.g. BIT) other than FTAs?  
Q.C.4: Would you please explain why the Japan-ASEAN FTA could not include the services 
agreements? What is the current status of the negotiations? 
 
ご協力、どうもありがとうございました 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire to the Japanese private sector 
 
Questionnaire to the Private Sector 
 
*The questionnaire is used entirely for a research purpose. Your name will not be 
disclosed unless you provide special permissions to do so. 
 
Section A.  General observations on services trade and its policy-making 
process 
Q.A.1: How do you observe your organisation (association, or company)’s interests in 
services trade liberalisation in comparison with those in goods trade? And why do you think 
so? 
Q.A.2: How do you evaluate your country’s services sector (e.g. domestic services structure, 
international competitiveness, their business in the Asian FTA partners)? 
Q.A.3: Do you observe that the Japanese services suppliers are becoming more active in 
expanding their markets in East Asia? Do you observe that services trade and investment 
among East Asian countries would increase in the future? 
 
Please answer the questions below based on your experience through the FTA 
negotiations for services trade of which you were in charge. 
 
Section B. Services trade policy-making for the seven bilateral FTAs* in East 
Asia and its policy institution 
*Seven bilateral FTAs in East Asia include: Japan-Singapore FTA, Japan-Malaysian FTA, 
Japan-Thailand FTA, Japan-Brunei FTA, Japan-Indonesian FTA, Japan-The Philippines 
FTA, and Japan-Viet Nam FTA  
4. The Private sector (business sector) 
Q. B. 2.1: Do you think that the Japanese private sector has been actively lobbying for the 
FTA services trade negotiations?  
Q.B.2.2: Did the Japanese government establish institutionalised consultation systems 
with the private sector for the FTA negotiations? If so, please explain the system. 
 
Q.B.2.3: In addition to the system mentioned above, did the MOFA independently use 
other formal consultation system specifically for the private sector? 
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Q.B.2.4: Other than the formal consultation system, did the business lobbying groups (or 
firms) frequently take contact with the MOFA through the policy making process (e.g. pre-
consultation of the negotiations, up-dating the on-going negotiations status)? 
 
Q.B.2.5: What kind of organisations and firms were major actors? Please list up the name 
of the organisations in each category. 
(ix) Business Federations 
(x) Sector associations (sector associations and professional associations) 
(xi) Professional associations 
(xii) Individual firms 
 
Q .B.2.6: Did the MOFA also make use of informal consultations with some private sector 
(e.g. business Federations, sector associations, professional associations and individual 
firms)? 
Q.B.2.7: To what extent did the MOFA grasp the fact that the other ministries and/or 
regulatory authorities which participate in services trade policy-making process have direct 
contact with a specific private sector or firms to get technical information and make its 
own positions? 
 
Q.B.2.8: Do you think that the private sector which informally lobbied their regulatory 
agencies also shared the information with the MOFA?  
 
Q. B.2.9: Which services sectors (or firms) showed interests in liberalising services markets 
of the FTA partner(s)? 
 
Q. B.2.10: Were there any services sectors (or firms) which showed interests in liberalising 
the Japanese services markets? 
 
Q.B.2.11: Which services sectors were defensive against services liberalisation? 
 
 
5. Government 
Q.B.1.1: Did which ministry officially lead (or represent) the Japanese government for the 
FTA services trade negotiations? Only MOFA? Or both MOFA and METI? 
Q B.1.2: Were which ministries and regulatory agencies involved in services trade policy 
making other than the MOFA and the METI? Please list all relevant ministries and agencies. 
Q.B.1.3: What was the METI’s role during the services negotiations? How do you evaluate 
the role of METI? 
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Q.B.1.4: How do you observe the relations between the MOFA and the METI through a 
whole process of policy-making (e.g. making the general negotiation positions of Japan and 
making the requests and offers and take a final decision)? 
Q.B.1.5: Prior to the internal government policy coordination, did the MOFA internally 
make the initial negotiation positions? If so, please explain about (i) the initial negotiation 
objectives, (ii) tactics and (iii) the level of agreement. 
Q.B.1.6: Among the incentives to create the FTA mentioned below, do you think which one 
was the most important for the MOFA? Please tick one from five options categorised by a 
degree if insentives. Please add any incentives if any other than the below.  
a. Eliminate negative effects caused by existing FTAs 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
b. Strengthen preferential treatments (minimum GATS-plus) vis-a vis external regions 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
c. Fulfil the requirements of the GATS Art.V in order to be compatible with the WTO 
system 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
 
d. Achieve the requests from the Japanese export oriented services suppliers 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
e. Achieve the requests from the import competing, defensive services suppliers to 
protect the domestic market 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
 
Q. B.1.7: Which ministries were in favour of opening the market of the FTA partner(s)? 
 
Q.B.1.8: Which ministries are defensive in liberalising the Japanese services markets in 
terms of the sectors and Modes? 
 
Q.B.1.9: To adopt the country’s positions, did you have any difficulties in reconciling 
different positions among the ministries and regulatory agencies involved? If so, how did 
the MOFA reconcile them?  
Q.B.1.10: How do you self-evaluate the MOFA’s negotiating power inside the government 
as lead ministry of services trade negotiations? 
Q.B.1.11. Do you think that the ministries or regulatory authorities with regulatory 
autonomy exercised political power during the policy-making process? 
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Section C. Evaluation of the agreement and its commitments 
Q.C.1: What are the highlights of the agreement? 
Q.C.2: As for the Japan’s commitments, which sectors are more liberalised than the GATS 
commitments? 
Q.C.3: As for the partner country’s commitments, which sectors are more liberalised than 
the GATS commitments? 
Q.C.4: Do you evaluate that the MOFA could achieve the substantially GATS-plus services 
trade agreements? If yes, which part of the agreements? If not, which part of the 
agreements and what were the reasons? 
Q.C.5: Would you please explain why Japan-ASEAN FTA could not include the services 
agreements? What is the current status of the negotiations? 
Q.C.6: Do you think that the review process provided in the agreements is effective enough 
to improve the commitments? 
Q.C.7: What is the current status of implementation issue and/or further negotiations issues of 
the agreement? 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
ご協力、どうもありがとうございました。 
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire to the ASEAN governments 
 
Questionnaire to the government officials of the ASEAN countries 
 
*This questionnaire is used entirely for a research project about the Political 
Economy of services trade integration in the East Asia –A case study of the Japan-
ASEAN FTAs at the London School of Economics (see the research outline in detail). 
To elucidate the experiences of the ASEAN countries, your supports in answering 
the questionnaire is necessary. Your name will not be disclosed unless you provide a 
special permission to do so. 
 
Below is a short description of the objective of the questionnaire. 
 
This research defines that services trade integration as the process of interactions 
between markets and policies (FTAs). Services trade integration in East Asia lags 
far behind from goods integration both in terms of markets and policies. Taking 
the ASEAN-Japan relations as an example, at the time when the ASEAN-Japan 
bilateral FTAs were concluded during the 2000s, neither market integration nor 
policy integration took place.  
The main objective of this questionnaire is to identify the policy side reasons. The 
question: why did the ASEAN-Japan services trade chapters in the bilateral 
FTAs between the ASEAN countries and Japan in the 2000s result in the 
shallow agreements (very limited GATS-plus)? is at the core of our research 
interests. By finding the key factors, we can further develop arguments to their 
implications to on-going services trade integration which are taking place in the 
2010s.  
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Section A.  General observations on services trade and its policy-making 
institution  
Q.A.1: How do you observe your government’s interests in services trade liberalisation in 
comparison with those in goods trade? Do you think that your government’s interests in 
services trade has been changing in the 2010s in comparison with the ones in the 2000s, 
around the time when your government made the bilateral FTA with Japan (as well as 
ASEAN plus Japan FTA)? 
Q.A.2: How do you observe your country’s private sector’s interests in services trade 
liberalisation in comparison with those in goods trade? Do you think that the private sector’s 
interests in services trade have been changing in the 2010s in comparison with the ones in 
the 2000s, around the time when your government made the bilateral FTA with Japan (as 
well as ASEAN plus Japan FTA)? 
Q.A.3: Do you think that trade policy-making process for services trade is more complicated 
vis-a-vis the one for goods trade? If so, what are the reasons (e.g. involvement of many 
ministries, regulatory autonomy and complexities of the services agreements)? 
Q.A.4: How do you evaluate your country’s industrial policy for services industry? Do you 
observe that industrial policy for services was different in the 2000s in comparison with the 
one in the 2010s? 
Q.A.5:  Do you think that your country (e.g. government, the private sector and society in 
general) prioritise more on the manufacturing sector rather than the services sector? 
Q.A.6: How do you evaluate your country’s services sector? Are there any significant 
development from the 2000s (e.g. domestic services structure, competitiveness and their 
business in Asia)? 
Q.A.7: How do you evaluate the progress of internal services integration of the ASEAN in 
comparison with the 2000s? 
Q.A.8: Do you think that your country takes into account the degree of internal services 
integration of ASEAN when it negotiates an FTA with non-ASEAN country? 
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Section B. Services trade policy-making for the FTA with Japan 
* If you were involved in the FTA negotiations with Japan, please provide answers based 
on your specific experience of negotiations with Japan. If you were not involved in the 
FTA with Japan, please provide general answers.  
 
 
6. Government 
Q.B.1.1: Which ministry officially lead (or represent) your government for the FTA services 
trade negotiations (hereafter “lead ministry”)?  
Q B.1.2: Which ministries and regulatory agencies were involved in services trade policy 
making other than the above “lead ministry”? Please list all relevant ministries and 
agencies. 
Q.B.1.3: How do you observe political power of the “lead ministry”?  
Q.B.1.4: Prior to the internal government policy coordination, does the “lead ministry” 
internally make the initial negotiating positions? If so, please explain about the initial 
objectives and negotiating position of the “lead ministry” at the time of the FTA with 
Japan? 
Q.B.1.6: Among the incentives to create the FTAs listed below (a-g), please tick the degree 
of importance you think relevant. Please add any incentives if any.  
a. Eliminate negative effects caused by the existing FTAs 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
b. Strengthen preferential treatments (minimum GATS-plus) vis-a vis external regions 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
c. Extension of MFN treatments from the existing FTAs which a partner country 
concluded with the third parties 
 1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
d. Fulfil the requirements of the GATS Art.V in order to be compatible with the WTO 
system 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
e. Achieve the requests from the domestic services suppliers which export services 
1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
f. Achieve the requests from the import competing, defensive services suppliers to 
protect the domestic market 
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1. Very weak,  2. Weak, 3. Not so weak but not so strong, 4. Strong, 5 Very strong 
h. Other incentives if any: 
 
Q. B.1.7: Which ministries were in favour of opening the market of Japan at the time of the 
FTA with Japan? 
 
Q.B.1.8: Which ministries were defensive in liberalising the domestic services markets 
both in terms of the sectors and Modes? 
 
Q.B.1.9: To adopt the country’s positions, did you have any difficulties in reconciling 
different positions among the ministries and regulatory agencies involved? If so, how did 
the “lead ministry” reconcile them?  
Q.B.1.10: How do you evaluate the lead ministry’s negotiating power inside the 
government at the time of the FTA negotiations with Japan? 
Q.B.1.11. Do you think that the ministries or regulatory authorities with regulatory 
autonomy exercised political power during the policy-making process? 
 
 
7. The Private sector (business sector) 
Q. B.2.1: How was your country’s private sector involved in lobbying for the services trade 
negotiations of the FTA with Japan? (if you were not involved in the FTA with Japan, how is 
your country’s private sector involved in lobbying for the services trade negotiations for 
the FTAs?) 
Q.B.2.2: Is your country’s private sector becoming more active in lobbying in the 2010s in 
comparison with the 2000s? If so, do you think what are the reasons? 
Q.B.2.3: Did your government establish institutionalised consultation system with the 
private sector for the FTA negotiations with Japan? If so, please explain the system (if you 
were not involved in the FTA with Japan, please provide general explanations). 
 
Q.B.2.4: In addition to the system mentioned above, did the “lead ministry” and/or 
domestic regulatory ministries/agencies use other formal consultation systems specifically 
with the private sector? 
 
Q.B.2.5: Did the current consultation system drastically change from the ones in the 
2000s? 
 
Q.B.2.6: Other than the formal consultation systems, did the business lobbying groups (or 
individual companies) frequently take contact with the “lead ministry” during the policy 
making process (e.g. pre-consultation of the negotiations, up-dating the on-going 
negotiations status)? 
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Q.B.2.7: What kind of organisations and firms were major actors at the time of the FTA 
with Japan? Please list the name of the relevant organisations in each category (if you 
were not involved in the FTA with Japan, please provide general explanations). 
 
(xiii) Business federations 
(xiv) Sector associations 
(xv) Professional associations 
(xvi) Individual companies 
 
Q .B.2.8: Among the business lobbying groups (or individual companies) listed above, 
which actors were the most active (if you were not involved in the FTA with Japan, please 
provide general explanations)? 
 
Q .B.2.9: Did the “lead ministry” also make use of informal consultations with some private 
sector (e.g. business federations, sector associations, professional associations and 
individual firms) at the time of FTA with Japan (if you were not involved in the FTA with 
Japan, please provide general explanations)? 
 
Q.B.2.10: To what extent did the “lead ministry” grasp the fact that the other ministries 
and/or regulatory authorities which participate in services trade policy-making had direct 
contact with a specific sectoral/professional organisation or a firm to obtain technical 
information and make its own positions (if you were not involved in the FTA with Japan, 
please provide general explanations)? 
 
Q.B.2.11: Do you think that the private sector which informally lobbied their domestic 
regulatory ministries/agencies also shared the information with the “lead ministry” (if you 
were not involved in the FTA with Japan, please provide general explanations)? 
 
Q. B.2.12: Which services sectors (or individual companies) showed interests in liberalising 
services markets of Japan (if you were not involved in the FTA with Japan, please provide 
general explanations)? 
 
Q. B.2.13: Were there any services sectors (or firms) which showed interests in liberalising 
the domestic services markets in the 2000s? What is the current situation in the 2010? 
 
Q.B.2.14: Which services sectors or firms were defensive against liberalising the domestic 
services markets in the 2000s? What is the current situation in the 2010? 
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Section C. Evaluation of the agreement and its commitments 
 
Q.C.1: Do you think that your government (or ministry) is satisfied with the result of the 
services trade chapter of the ASEAN-Japan bilateral FTA? If not, why? 
Q.C.2: What are the highlights of the agreement (e.g. standstill, MFN, transparency, and 
cooperation) for your country? 
Q.C.3: As for your countries’ commitments, what are the highlights? 
Q.C.4: As for the Japan’s commitments, what are the highlights? 
Q.C.5: Would you please explain why the ASEAN plus Japan FTA could not include the 
services agreements? What is the current status of the negotiations? 
Q.C.6: Do you think that ASEAN services trade integration affected your country’s 
negotiating positions and the level of commitments at the time of negotiations? 
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Section D: Others 
 
If you were involved in the FTA negotiations with Japan, would you provide your 
observations on: why did the ASEAN-Japan services trade chapters in the bilateral 
FTAs between the ASEAN countries and Japan in the 2000s result in the shallow 
agreements (very limited GATS-plus)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you were not involved in the FTA negotiations with Japan and have a difficulty in taking 
contact with them to answer this questionnaire, would you please provide the persons’ name 
and email address so that I can take contact? 
 
Name Email address 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. 
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Appendix 6.1: Questionnaire to International Trade Policy Experts for the 
Field Study in April 2013 in Geneva 
 
Questionnaire to the TPR Division, WTO secretariat 
 
Minako MORITA-JAEGER 
London School of Economics 
 
Below is a summary of my empirical analysis of services trade integration in East Asia as a base of discussion. 
Services trade integration in East Asia is underdeveloped both in terms of market and policy. 
 
Economic features of services markets and trade in East Asia: First, most of the East Asian 
countries (except Singapore and The Philippines) are services importing countries instead of exporting 
countries. Second, the East Asian countries are not competitive in global services trade. In global 
services trade, the US and the EU are dominant players both in terms of imports and exports. Some East 
Asian countries such as China, Japan and Singapore are ranked within the top ten in world services 
trade exports; however, the volume of exports is very limited, which is only one third of that of the US. 
Third, services market integration is underdeveloped in East Asia. A certain level of intra-services trade 
takes place among China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore; however, their major trade partners are 
the US and the EU. Fourth, the economic features of services market indicate a lack of global 
competitiveness as well as underdeveloped services market integration in the region. In East Asia, 
whereas Singapore can be characterized as a country of liberal and competitive services market, the 
other countries are not. For example, the competitiveness of services sector in Japan and South Korea 
still lags behind the manufacturing sector. Some ASEAN countries such as The Philippines and 
Malaysia are gaining competitiveness in some services sectors, however, some uncompetitive sectors 
are remaining in place. Strong government intervention and imperfect competition are also observed in 
other ASEAN countries (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand) and China. As for LDCs (Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar), which are undergoing democratic and decentralisation process, the services sector is still 
small and underdeveloped at the domestic level. In short, the observations could demonstrate a lack of 
competitiveness in global services markets and underdeveloped services trade integration in the region.  
The policy feature of services trade integration in East Asia:  First we found that the restrictiveness 
of the actual policies is much higher than the world average in most of East Asian developing countries 
except Cambodia. Notably, The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Viet Nam and China are the 
countries which retain high restrictiveness. Even Japan and South Korea retain higher restrictiveness 
than the OECD average. The results imply that unilateral services trade policies in East Asia are not 
providing sufficiently good conditions for services suppliers to do business in the region. Second, in 
spite of an upsurge of bilateral PTAs in East Asia since the 2000s, the margins of preferential treatment 
are limited in most of PTAs in comparison with the GATS commitments. This means that the level of 
liberalisation is much less than the actual liberalisation under unilateral liberalisation. Third, a lack of 
consistency within the existing agreements in the region may become a deadlock towards creation of a 
consolidated PTA in the region. In conclusion, the policy analysis identified that institutional integration 
of services trade in East Asia is too weak to motivate services suppliers to promote services trade in the 
region. 
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*The questionnaire is used only for the academic research purposes. I will not disclose the answers 
given to the questions below for other purposes. 
 
1. Observation on the services sector 
Q.1-1: How do you observe the structural policies of the services sector (e.g. regulatory policy and reform; 
competition policy; state-owned enterprises and privatisation policy, inward investment policy)? 
Q.1-2: How do you observe competitiveness (e.g. growing sectors and weak sectors) of the services sector? 
Q.1-3: What are the major problems of the services sector in the country (vis-à-vis the manufacturing sector)? 
 
2. Observation on services trade policy 
Q.2-1: How do you observe services trade (including investment) policy of the country? Do you think that the 
government has been trying to promote liberalisation of the market to vitalise the economy? 
Q.2-2: What are the reasons for the low level of GATS commitments (The Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Viet 
Nam and Indonesia)? 
Q.2-3: What are the reasons for the low level services commitments of the PTAs in East Asia? 
Q.2-4: Which ministries were offensive for services trade liberalisation? 
Q.2-5: Which ministries were defensive for services trade liberalisation? 
 
3. Observation on the trade policy making process 
Q.3-1: What are strong characteristics of the trade policy formulation process of the country in general? 
Q.3-2:  Do you observe any involvement of provincial government in the trade policy making process 
(especially services trade policy)? 
Q.3-3: As for the institutional framework of services trade policy-making, do you observe that internal 
consultations inside government tend to be more complicated than that of goods trade? 
 
4. Participation of the private sector (business sector) in the trade policy making process 
Q4-1: Do you observe that trade policy-making process of the country is opened to the non-state actors? Is 
there any formal consultation mechanism for that? 
Q.4-2: To what extent can business lobbying group participate in trade policy formulation (access to the policy 
making process)? 
 
Q.4-3: Which services sectors are offensive and which are defensive in general? 
Q.4-4: Which business organisations are major players of services trade negotiations? 
 Are there any business confederations? 
 Are there any sectoral associations? 
 Are there any professional associations? 
 Is there any services coalition? 
 
Q.4-5: How do the business interests groups try to influence policy? 
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Appendix 6.2: Questionnaire to international trade policy experts for the 
field study in July 2015 in Geneva 
 
Questionnaire 
 
[General] 
How do you evaluate the legal and regulatory environment trend of the ASEAN countries since the 
2000s? 
How would you characterise the ideology of ASEAN towards economy and trade (e.g. protectionism 
or liberalism)? Do you think that the ideology remains the same as it used to be in the 2000s? 
How would you observe interests of the private sector in ASEAN on services trade? Do you think that 
the interests have been growing from the 2000s? 
 
 [Market] 
Q. What are strong characteristics of the ASEAN economy in the 2010s in comparison with the one in 
the 2000s? 
Q. Do you observe trends of the services sector of the ASEAN countries in terms of domestic 
economy and trade since the 2000s?  
 
[Economic policy and trade policy] 
Q. Do you observe that economic development policy play more important role in trade policy 
making in the ASEAN countries? 
Q. How do you generally observe the service sector policy of the ASEAN countries? Are there any 
differences between the 2000s and the 2010s? 
Q. Do you observe that the ASEAN countries were not ready for using FTAs as a mean of promoting 
services liberalisation and deregulation in the 2000s?  
Q. Do you think that the ASEAN government may make use of currently negotiated FTAs (e.g. TPP, 
RCEP, and ASEAN-EU) for further services liberalisation and regulatory reforms?  If not, what are the 
strong reasons (e.g. nurture the domestic SMEs, protect state-owned enterprises or recently 
privatised companies, strong resistance of the private sector, and horizontally fragmented 
government institution for services)? 
 
[Institution] 
How do you evaluate the government institution of the ASEAN countries in terms of efficiency; 
transparency; administrative discretion; and legal and regulatory structure? Which country is the 
most efficient and transparent and which one is not?  
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Appendix 7: Services trade related data 
Table 1: Percentage of imports in total trade in services, East Asia and US, 2000-2010 
 
YEAR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
ECONOMY 
                    Brunei 
Darussalam -65.24 -54.25 -51.3 -57.79 -49.41 -44.5 -38.65 -38.24 -38.16 -36.21 - 
          China -15.54 -15.11 -14.6 -15.5 -13.45 -11.21 -8.761 -6.076 -7.432 -18.5 -11.44 
          Indonesia _ _ _ -69.58 -42.25 -41.37 -46.15 -48.67 -46.02 -42.54 -35.73 
          Japan -40.76 -40.42 -39 -30.27 -25.99 -17.85 -13.44 -14.12 -12.21 -13.75 -10.23 
          South 
Korea -6.304 -8.977 -17.5 -14.24 -11.85 -16.65 -19.09 -14.15 -5.957 -8.276 -11.93 
          Malaysia -16.76 -13.22 -9.54 -22.55 -11.2 -10.84 -8.328 2.769 0.1698 4.7231 0.825 
          Philippines -35.64 -42.69 -36.9 -36.68 -30.53 -22.85 2.1722 29.92 13.556 23.753 17.226 
          Singapore -5.168 -10.87 -8.17 -5.644 -2.919 0.7992 1.7697 14 13.581 17.913 16.426 
          Thailand -10.3 -10.86 -7.95 -13.05 -17.49 -25.4 -24.82 -21 -27.84 -20.7 -25.75 
          Viet Nam -16.91 -16.91 -20.3 -19.21 -18.4 -6.619 -0.16 -11.13 -11.94 -29.57 -24.81 
  
 
         United 
States 32.281 27.64 24.99 20.26 19.041 22.11 23.059 32.24 33.451 34.851 35.402 
Note:  Data of Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos are not available. 
Source: UNCTADSTAT 
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Table 2: Leading exporters and importers in world trade in commercial services, 2010 
(Billion dollars and percentage) 
Rank   Exporters Value Share 
Annual 
percentage 
change   Rank   Importers Value Share 
Annual 
percentage 
change 
             1   Extra-EU (27) exports  685 24.4 5   1   Extra-EU (27) imports  590 21.9 4 
2   United States  518 18.5 9   2   United States  358 13.3 7 
3   China  170 6.1 32   3   China  192 7.1 22 
4   Japan  139 4.9 10   4   Japan  156 5.8 6 
5   India  123 4.4 33   5   India  116 4.3 45 
6   Singapore  112 4.0 20   6   Singapore  96 3.6 21 
7   Hong Kong, China  105 3.8 23   7   Korea, Republic of  93 3.4 17 
8   Korea, Republic of  82 2.9 13   8   Canada  90 3.3 15 
9   Switzerland  78 2.8 8   9   Russian Federation  70 2.6 19 
10   Canada  67 2.4 15   10   Brazil  60 2.2 36 
11   Australia  47 1.7 17   11   Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  51 1.9 8 
12   Russian Federation  44 1.6 7   12   Hong Kong, China  51 1.9 16 
13   Taipei, Chinese  40 1.4 28   13   Australia  50 1.9 24 
14   Norway  40 1.4 5   14   Thailand  46 1.7 21 
15   Thailand  34 1.2 14   15   Norway  42 1.6 15 
16   Turkey  33 1.2 2   16   United Arab Emirates  41 1.5 11 
17   Malaysia  33 1.2 14   17   Switzerland  38 1.4 -3 
18   Brazil  30 1.1 15   18   Taipei, Chinese  37 1.4 28 
19   Macao, China  28 1.0 52   19   Malaysia  32 1.2 17 
20   Israel  25 0.9 12   20   Indonesia  26 1.0 14 
21   Egypt  25 0.8 11   21   Mexico  22 0.8 4 
22   Ukraine  16 0.6 24   22   Nigeria  20 0.7 22 
23   Indonesia  16 0.6 29   23   Iran, Islamic Rep. of  19 0.7 12 
24   Mexico  15 0.5 0   24   Turkey  18 0.7 18 
25   Lebanon  15 0.5 -10   25   South Africa  18 0.7 25 
26   South Africa  14 0.5 17   26   Israel  18 0.7 5 
27   Philippines  13 0.5 20   27   Angola  16 0.6 -10 
28   Argentina  15 0.5 18   28   Argentina  13 0.5 15 
29   Morocco  12 0.4 2   29   Egypt  13 0.5 2 
30   Croatia  11 0.4 -4   30   Lebanon  13 0.5 -7 
31   United Arab Emirates  11 0.4 16   31   Ukraine  12 0.4 6 
32   Chile  11 0.4 25   32   Kuwait  12 0.4 3 
33   Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  10 0.4 10   33   Chile  12 0.4 17 
34   Cuba  a  9 0.3     ...   34   Algeria  11 0.4 2 
35   New Zealand  10 0.3 11   35   Kazakhstan  11 0.4 13 
36   Iran, Islamic Rep. of  8 0.3 1   36   Philippines  11 0.4 28 
37   Viet Nam  7 0.3 30   37   Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela  10 0.4 9 
38   Kuwait  7 0.2 -34   38   Viet Nam  10 0.4 21 
39   Panama  6 0.2 10   39   New Zealand  9 0.3 15 
40   Syrian Arab Republic  a  5 0.2     ...   40   Colombia  8 0.3 13 
    Total of above  2670 95.0 -       Total of above  2510 93.1 - 
  
World (excl. intra-EU (27))  2810 100.0 12 
   
World (excl. intra-EU (27))  2695 100.0 12 
             
a  Secretariat estimate. 
Note:  Figures for a number of countries and territories have been estimated by the Secretariat. Annual percentage changes and rankings are affected by continuity breaks in the series for a large number of economies, and by 
limitations in cross-country comparability. See the Metadata. For annual data 2000-2010, see Appendix Tables A8 and A9. 
                          
             Source: WTO World Trade Developments in 2011 
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Table 3: Japan services exports to the world 2010  
 Service label 
Exported Value in 2010 
Service label Exported Value in 
2010 
Total services 
141282912 
Sea transport - 
Supporting, auxiliary 
and other sea 
transport services 
2580000 
Sea transport - Freight 27540000 Business travel 2160000 
Royalties and license fees 
26682646 
Air transport - 
Passenger 2120000 
Merchanting and other trade-
related services 23750000 
Worker's 
Remittances 1510000 
Miscellaneous business, 
professionnal and technical 
services 
15750000 
Insurance services 
1273640 
Personal travel 
11070000 
Computer and 
information services 1046937 
Construction services 
10637971 
Communications 
services 733653 
Supporting, auxiliary and other 
air transport services 3820000 
Compensation of 
employees 170000 
Financial services 
3606748 
Audio-visual and 
related services 90000 
Operational leasing services 
3050000 
Other 
personal,cultural and 
recreational services 60000 
Air transport - Freight 
2870000 
Sea transport - 
Passenger 20000 
Government services, n.i.e. 
2580317 
Other transport - 
Freight 10000 
                                                                                                     Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) statistics 
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Table 4: South Korea services exports to the world 2010 
Service label 
Exported Value 
in 2010 
Service label 
Exported Value 
in 2010 
Total services 82719400 News agency services 8300 
Construction services 
11842400 
Other information provision services 
77100 
Financial services 2846700 Franchises and similar rights 821900 
Government services, n.i.e. 1149800 Other royalties and license fees 2323900 
Telecommunication services 
513500 
Merchanting 
2561100 
Audio-visual and related services 
190000 
Other trade related services 
2101400 
Computer services 149200 Operational leasing services 901000 
Sea transport - Passenger 11100 Legal services 587100 
Sea transport - Freight 
27816600 
Accounting, auditing, book-keeping and tax 
consulting services 93600 
Sea transport - Supporting, auxiliary 
and other sea transport services 2446500 
Business and management consultancy, 
public relations services 312000 
Air transport - Passenger 
4028700 
Advertising, market research and public 
opinion polling 267200 
Air transport - Freight 
3464100 
Research and development services 
344700 
Supporting, auxiliary and other air 
transport services 276600 
Architectural, engineering and other 
technical consultancy 403400 
Business travel 4085800 Waste treatment and depolution 31400 
Health-related expenditure 
68000 
Other agricultural mining, and on-site 
processing 17700 
Personal travel - Education related 
expenditure 37100 
Other miscellaneous business, professionnal 
and technical services 3305000 
Other personal travel 
5573700 
Services between affiliated enterprises, n.i.e. 
2984400 
Postal and courier services 228800 Education services 59300 
Life insurance and pension funding 
200 
Health services 
9800 
Freight insurance 91600 Other 375800 
Other direct insurance 102200 Compensation of employees 598700 
Reinsurance 165500 Worker's Remittances 6399600 
Auxiliary services 31600 Unit : US Dollar thousand  
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organisation, 
International Monetary Fund statistics 
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Table 5: Singapore services exports to the world 2010 
Service label Exported 
Value in 
2010 
Total services 
112308000 
Transportation 
32737800 
Travel 
14180600 
Financial services 
12182100 
Insurance services 
2837230 
Royalties and license fees 
1866600 
Computer and information 
services 1790300 
Communications services 
1347220 
Construction services 
1048740 
Embassies and consulates 
247344 
Personal, cultural and recreational 
services 218630 
 Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, International Monetary Fund 
statistics. 
Table 6: China services exports to the world 2010 
Service label Exported 
Value in 
2010 
Service label Exported 
Value in 
2010 
Total services 171203280 Air transport - Passenger 4262680 
Travel 45814000 Air transport - Freight 5014130 
Construction services 
14494686 
Supporting, auxiliary and 
other air transport services 
613403 
Computer and information 
services 
9256345 
Other transport - Passenger 
47815 
Insurance services 1726906 Other transport - Freight 363821 
Communications services 1220068 Other transport - Other 981034 
Financial services 
1331123 
Merchanting and other 
trade-related services 
35586768 
Royalties and license fees 
830484 
Business and management 
consultancy, public relations 
services 22769600 
Government services, n.i.e. 
954630 
Advertising, market 
research and public opinion 
polling 
2885246 
Audio-visual and related 
services 
122915 
Research and development 
services 
  
Sea transport - Passenger 
29615 
Compensation of employees 
13636000 
Sea transport - Freight 19000860 Worker's Remittances 19803800 
Sea transport - Supporting, 
auxiliary and other sea 
transport services 3897152 
 
 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source : ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organisation, 
International Monetary Fund statistics. 
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Table 7: Philippines services exports to the world 2010 
Service label Exported 
Value in 2010 
Service label Exported Value in 
2010 
Total services 13243000 Other personal travel 2737000 
Computer services 2151000 Construction in the compiling economy 121000 
Telecommunication services 305000 Freight insurance 38000 
Financial services 38000 Reinsurance 39000 
Audio-visual and related services 27000 Franchises and similar rights 4000 
Sea transport - Supporting, auxiliary and other 
sea transport services 
94000 Merchanting 22000 
Air transport - Passenger 598000 Operational leasing services 7000 
Air transport - Freight 507000 Business and management consultancy, public 
relations services 
6315000 
Supporting, auxiliary and other air transport 
services 
152000 Advertising, market research and public opinion 
polling 
12000 
Other business travel 11000 Research and development services 16000 
Health-related expenditure 14000 Compensation of employees 5127000 
Personal travel - Education related expenditure 21000 Worker's Remittances 16238000 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organisation, 
International Monetary Fund statistics. 
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Table 8: Thailand services exports to the world 2010 
Service label 
Exported Value in 2010 
Total services 
34298400 
Other personal travel 
17971900 
Other business services 
6582300 
Transportation 
5915750 
Worker's Remittances 
2302120 
Business travel 
1742000 
Compensation of employees 
1278230 
Construction services 
471650 
Communications services 
470970 
Government services, n.i.e. 
240770 
Health-related expenditure 
233100 
Financial services 
187660 
Personal travel - Education related 
expenditure 
180140 
Royalties and license fees 
153130 
Personal, cultural and recreational services 
121200 
Insurance services 27910 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund statistics 
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Table 9: Malaysia services exports to the world 2010 
Service label 
Exported Value in 2009 
Service label 
Exported Value in 2009 
Total services 28769000 Telecommunication services 560050 
Compensation of employees 
1130870 
Construction in the compiling economy 
908850 
Sea transport - Passenger 3230 Freight insurance 4200 
Sea transport - Freight 1589570 Other direct insurance 374890 
Sea transport - Supporting, auxiliary and other sea 
transport services 
694100 
Financial services 
89860 
Air transport - Passenger 1430080 Computer services 1453770 
Air transport - Freight 453330 Other royalties and license fees 265730 
Supporting, auxiliary and other air transport services 
161540 
Merchanting 
722000 
Other transport - Other 76250 Operational leasing services 96620 
Other business travel 
15582200 
Other miscellaneous business, professionnal 
and technical services 
3399610 
Health-related expenditure 6540 Other 645750 
Personal travel - Education related expenditure 208750  Embassies and consulates 42130 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source : ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organisation, 
International Monetary Fund statistics. 
 
Table 10: Indonesia services exports to the world 2010 
Service label 
Exported Value in 2010 
Total services 16765800 
Worker's Remittances 6734940 
Personal travel 4716290 
Other business services 4309420 
Transportation 2665430 
Business travel 2241610 
Government services, n.i.e. 555090 
Construction services 520050 
Financial services 332200 
Compensation of employees 181110 
Computer and information services 114120 
Personal, cultural and recreational 
services 
104220 
Royalties and license fees 59560 
Insurance services 22170 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund statistics 
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Figure 1: Cambodia services exports to the world 2010 
 
 
Table 11: Cambodia services exports to the world 2010 
Service label 
Exported Value in 
2010 
Service label 
Exported 
Value in 2010 
Total services 1743930 Other business travel 98890 
Financial services 3550 Other personal travel 1161140 
Royalties and license fees 
340 
Postal and courier services 
56060 
Sea transport - Passenger 
  
Telecommunication services 
40000 
Sea transport - Freight 
520 
Construction in the 
compiling economy 
10460 
 Sea transport - Supporting, 
auxiliary and other sea 
transport services 
21470 
 Freight insurance 
1030 
Air transport - Passenger 152210 Computer services 320 
 Air transport - Freight 
4170 
 Other trade related services 
71920 
Supporting, auxiliary and other 
air transport services 
30170 
 Other personal,cultural and 
recreational services 
1000 
Other transport - Passenger 30 Embassies and consulates 73180 
Other transport - Freight 
540 
Compensation of employees 
4500 
 Other transport - Other 16940 Worker's Remittances 150990 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source : ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division, World Trade Organisation, 
International Monetary Fund statistics. 
Air transport -
Passenger
8%
Supporting, auxiliary 
and other air 
transport services
2%
Other business travel
5%
Other personal travel
61%
Postal and courier 
services
3%
Telecommunication 
services
2%
Other trade 
related services
4%
Embassies and 
consulates
4%
Worker's Remittances
8%
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Figure 2: Brunei services exports to the world 2009 
 
 
 
Table 12: Brunei services exports to the world 2009 
 
Service label 
Exported Value in 
2009 
Total services 914911 
Transportation 451742 
Travel 254373 
Other business services 174020 
Communications services 21693 
Insurance services 13083 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
 
Source: ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on WTO statistics 
 
  
Transportation
49%
Travel
28%
Other 
business 
services
19%
Communication
s services
2%
Insurance 
services
2%
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Figure 3: Laos services exports to the world 2010 
 
 
 
Table 13: Laos services exports to the world 2010 
 
Service label 
Exported 
Value in 2010 
Total services 510990 
 Other personal travel 381670 
 Other transport - Other 44420 
Other supporting and auxiliary transport 
services 44420 
Compensation of employees 35090 
Telecommunication services 27260 
Embassies and consulates 22200 
 Construction in the compiling economy 13080 
Other direct insurance 10950 
Worker's Remittances 6690 
Postal and courier services 4760 
 Air transport - Passenger 3400 
Air transport - Freight 3260 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source : ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund statistics. 
Other personal 
travel
64%
Other transport -
Other
7%
Other supporting 
and auxiliary 
transport services
7%
Compensation of 
employees
6%
Telecommunication 
services
5%
Embassies and 
consulates
4%
Construction in the 
compiling economy
2%
Other direct 
insurance
2%
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Figure 4: Myanmar services exports to the world 2010 
 
 
Table 14: Myanmar services exports to the world 2010 
Service label Exported Value in 2010 
Total services 366620 
Transportation 149730 
Compensation of 
employees 
116010 
Travel 72630 
 Miscellaneous business, 
professionnal and 
technical services 
59990 
 Merchanting 52140 
Government services, 
n.i.e. 
32130 
Communications services 
  
Royalties and license fees 
  
 Other personal,cultural 
and recreational services 
  
Worker's Remittances   
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
Source : ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on International Monetary Fund statistics. 
 
  
Transportation
31%
Compensation 
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24%
Travel
15%
Miscellaneous 
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services
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Figure 5: Viet Nam services exports to the world 2004 
 
 
 
Table 15: Viet Nam services exports to the world 2004 
 
Service label 
Exported Value in 
2004 
Total services 3972400 
Travel 1950000 
Air transport 476900 
Sea transport 283500 
Financial services 183000 
Communications services 120000 
Government services, n.i.e. 31000 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
 
Source : ITC trade database, ITC calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division 
  
Travel
64%
Air transport
16%
Sea transport
9%
Financial 
services
6%
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services
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Table16: Major exporters and importers in financial services, 2008 
 
Rank   Exporters Value 
Share in 
15 
economies 
Annual 
percentage 
change   Rank   Importers Value 
Share in 
15 
economies 
Annual 
percentage 
change 
 
1   European Union (27) 163708 57.5 2   1   European Union (27) 69535 60.0 2 
           Extra-EU (27) exports 72813 25.6 0              Extra-EU (27) imports 27330 23.6 1 
2   United States 60190 21.1 -2   2   United States 19143 16.5 -3 
3   Switzerland 19249 6.8 0   3   Japan 3982 3.4 10 
4   Hong Kong, China 11818 4.2 -5   4   Canada 3888 3.4 -4 
5   Singapore 6579 2.3 0   5   India 3552 3.1 10 
6   Japan 5454 1.9 -12   6   Hong Kong, China 3137 2.7 12 
7   India 4059 1.4 20   7   Russian Federation 2080 1.8 41 
8   Korea, Republic of 3785 1.3 -5   8   Switzerland 2042 1.8 14 
9   Canada 3076 1.1 -4   9   Singapore 1885 1.6 7 
10   Russian Federation 1320 0.5 12   10   Saudi Arabia 1508 1.3    ... 
11   Norway 1274 0.4 25   11   Ukraine 1465 1.3 65 
12   Brazil 1238 0.4 14   12   Brazil 1145 1.0 42 
13   Taipei, Chinese 1146 0.4 -12   13   Turkey 978 0.8 57 
14   Australia 901 0.3 5   14   Norway 956 0.8 -15 
15   Turkey 841 0.3 113   15   Korea, Republic of 691 0.6 -1 
    Above 15 284635 100.0    -   
 
  Above 15 115985 100.0    - 
                          
Note:  Based on information available to the Secretariat. For more information on asymmetries, see the Metadata. 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 
 
Table 17: Major exporters and importers in telecommunications services, 2008 
Rank   Exporters Value 
Share in 
15 
economies 
Annual 
percentage 
change   Rank   Importers Value 
Share in 
15 
economies 
Annual 
percentage 
change 
 
1   European Union (27) 37964 61.1 8   1   European Union (27) 35074 69.8 3 
           Extra-EU (27) exports 12619 20.3 16              Extra-EU (27) imports 12489 24.8 13 
2   United States 9163 14.7 14   2   United States 7193 14.3 2 
3   Kuwait 6071 9.8 30   3   Russian Federation 1846 3.7 45 
4   Canada  a 1467 2.4    ...   4   Canada  a 1041 2.1    ... 
5   Russian Federation 1401 2.3 18   5   Malaysia 817 1.6 -4 
6   India 1211 1.9 3   6   Korea, Republic of 782 1.6 15 
7   Turkey 725 1.2 43   7   Australia 728 1.4 27 
8   Morocco 632 1.0 57   8   India 502 1.0 16 
9   Malaysia 602 1.0 -2   9   Hong Kong, China 417 0.8 22 
10   Hong Kong, China 555 0.9 0   10   Norway 401 0.8 27 
11   Korea, Republic of 550 0.9 14   11   Argentina 366 0.7 18 
12   Norway 511 0.8 10   12   Brazil 296 0.6 221 
13   Brazil 452 0.7 75   13   Turkey 289 0.6 -2 
14   Kenya 435 0.7 33   14   Israel 283 0.6 -19 
15   Philippines 404 0.7 -22   15   Lebanon 249 0.5 18 
    Above 15 62145 100.0    -   
 
  Above 15 50280 100.0    - 
             
a  Secretariat estimate. 
Note:  Based on information available to the Secretariat.  As certain major traders in communications services do no report the item telecommunications services separately, they may not appear in the list.  Transactions on 
telecommunications services are often reported on a net rather than a gross basis.  See the Metadata.   
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 
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Table 18: The level of commitments offered in FTAs in East Asia 
 
Korea-GATS 48.81 Philippines-GATS 16.41 Viet Nam-GATS 34.18 
Korea-Singapore 58.42 Philippines-Japan 27.68 Viet Nam-Japan 34.18 
Korea-ASEAN 49.70 ASEAN-(P)-Korea 21.47 ASEAN(V)-Korea 34.18 
Japan-GATS 52.89 ASEAN-(P)-China 18.75 ASEAN(V)-China 34.18 
Japan-The Philippines 62.59 ASEAN 7th package (P) 34.95 ASEAN 7th package (V) 38.27 
Japan-Malaysia 62.84 Malaysia-GATS 27.47 Indonesia-GATS 17.26 
Japan-Thailand 62.33 Malaysia-Japan 29.08 ASEAN(I)-Korea 23.43 
Japan-Brunei 62.84 ASEAN(M)-Korea 33.89 ASEAN(I)-China 17.52 
Japan-Viet Nam 54.51 ASEAN(M)-China 28.66 ASEAN 7th package (I) 41.58 
Japan-Singapore 58.50 ASEAN 7th package (M) 43.39 
  China-GATS 39.29 Thailand-GATS 19.39 
  China-Singapore 40.14 Thailand-Japan 20.37 
  China-ASEAN 39.97 ASEAN(T)-Korea 19.69 
  Singapore-GATS 37.59 ASEAN(T)-China 20.32 
  Singapore-Korea 70.98 ASEAN 7th package (T) 37.86 
  Singapore-China 44.07 Brunei-GATS 7.99 
  Singapore-Japan 59.62 Brunei-Japan 11.73 
  ASEAN(S)-Korea 40.31 ASEAN(B)-Korea 9.52 
  ASEAN(S)-China 42.37 ASEAN(B)-China 9.18 
  ASEAN 7th package (S) 42.03 ASEAN 7th package (B) 30.78 
   
Source: The index is from the dataset of the commitments in regional trade agreements” of the WTO (available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/dataset_e/dataset_e.htm). 
Note: The index is brought onto a 0-100 scale: 100 (full-commitments in all sub-sectors and relevant modes). 
GATS stands for the GATS commitments. K stands for Korea, J:Japan, C:China, S:Singapore, P: Philippine, 
M:Malaysia, T: Thailand, B: Brunei, V: Viet Nam, I: Indonesia. Japan-Indonesia EPA is not included here 
because the index is not available from the dataset. 
 
